The Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries
At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government.
In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the
American Continents, by the free and independent condi-tions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers�
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It needed scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was than anticipated. Of the events in that quarter of the globe with which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellowmen on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essen-tially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the ami-cable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.
In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declare our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, providing no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States.
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power; submitting to injuries from none.
But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossibly, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference.
If we look to comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.
Most people ( when referring to the Monroe Doctrine ) only include two small segments from the above. The first segment, is the noncoloniza-tion clause, "the American Continents, by the free and independent condi-tions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers�". The second segment, is the separation of the two hemispheres clause, "The political system of the allied powers is essen-tially different in this respect from that of America� We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the ami-cable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The authorship of the Monroe Doctrine is the subject of some debate between historians. Some believe it was solely the work of President Monroe, while others attribute it to his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, and others believe it was based on basic Jeffersonian ideals.
The work of James Monroe. According to lawyer, former WV governor, and historian, William A. MacCorkle, Monroe himself came up with the ideas for the doctrine. MacCorkle looks at Monroe's correspondence with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, to show that all of the principles of the doctrine were already on the President's mind. Personally I find this argument somewhat weak after reading those letters. However I think it should be noticed that the President did mention Russia, France, Spain, and Britain in his writings, which further leads me to believe that the doctrine was not singling out one specific country.
The work of John Quincy Adams. According to historian Worthington C. Ford, Adams was behind the ideas and the bold language of the Monroe Doctrine. This theory is based on three main points. The first is that Adam, as Secretary of State, drafted Monroe's speech, and as official documents show, Monroe hardly edited the speech in regards to the part known as the Monroe Doctrine. Second, was the instructions to Richard Rush (US envoy to London), on 29 November 1823. The letter said "�That we could not see with indifference any attempt (by one or more powers of Europe to dispose of the Freedom or Independence of those States, without their consent, or against their will.)" Third, was a cabinet meeting of 21 November in which Adams outlines his intended reply to a message received from Baron Tuyll. The message Adam gave Tuyll was, "My purpose would be in a moderate and conciliatory manor, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications; to assert those upon which our own Government is founded, and, while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force, and all interference with the political affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will." The work of Thomas Jefferson. T. R. Schellenberg assistant archivist of the United States believes that the main idea is separation from Europe, which has long time been attributed to Jefferson. For more on this read: Jeffersonian Origins of the Monroe Doctrine by T.R. Schellenberg.
What was the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine? There are three main schools of thought that deal with what country was the Monroe Doctrine directed at. The first is that of Dexter Perkins, the authority on the Monroe Doctrine, and author of Hands Off A History of the Monroe Doctrine, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826, The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867, The Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907, and an essay he wrote for Foreign Affairs titled "Bringing the Monroe Doctrine Up to Date". Perkins believes that it developed as a consequence of European events in the autumn of 1823. This is a two fold statement, he refers to both the advance of Russians down the west coast of North America into territory claimed by the United States, and the threat by the Continental powers to reconquer the Spanish colonies in the New World. I don't know why Perkins would think it was directed at Spain when Monroe specifically said in his address, "In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declare our neutrality�". Yet, another reason it was not directed at Spain was that Monroe also said, in the same address, "If we look to comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them".The second is that of Edward H. Tatum Jr. Tatum agrees that the events at the end of 1823 brought the Doctrine into being, however he believes it embodies ideas and attitudes common in the US before 1823 and that these were chiefly anti-British rather than anti-Continental powers. In Tatum's argument he sights several articles that appeared in 1822 and early 1823. One source the Review asked it's readers, "Would not the Spanish colonies, as part of the same empire, then demand their parental attention? And might not the United States be next considered as deserving their kind guardianship?" Another, the National Intelligencier, stated "The day may come sooner than we have thought on, when these ('our fortified coast and our gallant navy') may not only be our defense, but a barrier to preserve the remaining liberties of the world."
The third is that of Arthur P. Whitaker. Whitaker believes it was directed against France because Monroe said so. This argument he backs up with two important facts. Number one, he believes only France had the power and capability to invade the former Spanish colonies. Number two, In October of 1824 Monroe said the doctrine was directed toward France. For more information on this read: The United States and the Independence of Latin America by A. P. Whitaker. There are, of coarse, those who believe that it was simply a generalization of American sentiment and that while all of the above may constitute a threat to national security it was not directed at any one country. This theory is in part because at that time America could not back such a warning by military mite. I agree with this theory.
The first corollary is the Clay Corollary, also known as the "No Transfer Corollary". Secretary of State Henry Clay's remarks in 1825, "neither Cuba nor Puerto Rico could be transferred to any other powers by Spain". The preceding is what is commonly known as the Corollary. This was "at the time when Texas and Cuba constituted the two great ambitions of expansionists in the United States. However, their feelings on the rest of Latin America was different. That is why I believe the Clay Corollary is two-sided; and the following need be noted as part of it. On 28 January 1825 the Brazilian Charge d'affairs to Washington (Jose Silvestre Rebello) wrote Adam's in regards to the Monroe Doctrine.
Considering that in such an event the United States would be bound to put into practice the policy laid down in the said Message, giving proofs of the gen-eros-ity and justice which animates her, which could not be done without sacrifice of life and treasure; and it not being in accordance with reason, justice and right that the government of Brazil should accept such sacrifices gratuitously: that government is ready to enter into a Convention with the Government of the United States, the object of which will be the preservation of the independence of Brazil in the case of any Power aiding Portugal in its vain and chimerical projects for the recolonization of Brazil.
The same reason which moves the Government of Brazil to hope that the Government of the United States will propose the conditions for the said Convention permits it also to hope that the Government of the United States will also offer conditions for entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Government of Brazil.
However, Adam's became president and Clay responded on 13 April 1825.
But such a treaty would be inconsistent with the policy which the United States have heretofore prescribed to themselves. That policy is, that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former Colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties. From that policy they did not deviate during the whole of the long contest between Spain and the several Independent Governments which have been erected on her former American Territories.
This message was disappointing, to say the least, to the Government of Brazil. Later on Argentina appealed to the US for help in its war with Brazil. By this point it becomes abundantly clear that clarification of the Monroe Doctrine is needed, so Secretary Clay responds as follows.
The declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obliga-tion, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand. When the case shall arrive, if it should ever occur, of such an European interference as the message supposes, and it becomes consequently necessary to decide whether this country will or will not engage in war, Congress alone, you well know, is competent, by our Constitution, to decide that question.
Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united and the war had been carried on by their joint arms that would not bear the remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe's mes-sage deprecates.
On 7 March 1825 Joel R. Poinsett was appointed (by Clay) as the first US Minister to Mexico. Clay instructed him to inform the Mexican Government of the "advantages em-bodied in the principles announced by President Monroe". Here is another example of politicians being vague. Poinsett, in turn gets carried away and tells the Mexican Secre-tary of State that the US had "openly declared their determination not to permit any other nation to interpose with armed hand between Spain and the Americas". Needless-to-say, this starts the first check (as in checks and balances) on the Monroe Doctrine. This check is seen in the form of a resolution passed by the House asking the President to explain on what authority the Minister to Mexico had made such generous statements and to "inform the House whether the United States have, in any manner, made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign power with the independence or form of government of those nations; and, if so when, in what manner, and to what effect". On 29 March 1826 Clay prepared a report, (which President Adams quickly forwarded to the House) a por-tion follows.
The United States have contracted no engagement, nor made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, or to either of them that the United States would not permit the in-terference of any foreign power with the independence or form of government of those nations, nor have any instructions been issued authorizing any such en-gagement or pledge.
All apprehensions of the danger to which Mr. Monroe alludes, of an inter-ference by the allied powers of Europe to introduce their political systems into this hemisphere, have ceased. If, indeed, any attempt by force had been made by allied Europe to subvert the liberties of the southern nations on this continent, and to erect upon the ruins of their free institutions monarchical systems, the people of the United States would have stood pledged, in the opinion of their Executive, not to any foreign State, but to themselves and to their posterity, by their dearest interests and highest duties, to resist to the utmost such attempt; and it is to a pledge of that character that Mr. Poinsett alone refers.
With that said, one would think that the Monroe Doctrine was dead, and some did. When President Victoria of Mexico read that he told his General Assembly that the Monroe Doctrine "is disclaimed by the present Government of The United States". The above statement is just one more reason why (as I stated earlier) I feel it was just a gener-alization of both Monroe's sentiment and that of public opinion (and in being so, not directed at any one country).
The next corollary is from President James K. Polk. In 1845, he said "no future European colony or dominion�be planted or established on any part of the North American continent". He also said, "We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union (of Texas and the United States ) because it might disturb the 'balance of power', which they ( European countries ) may desire to maintain upon this continent." The first quote is the common oversimplified version of the Polk Corollary; however, the later is much more important. It is so, for two main reasons. The first is that it is specific to Texas; which leaves less room for misinterpretation. The second, is that it illustrates, once again, that the only use of the Monroe Doctrine was to justify the foreign policy of following statesmen. I think most people would agree that Monroe did not have the annexation of Texas in mind when he addressed Congress with what is now the Monroe Doctrine.
Another corollary, which I will only mention, is the second of the Grant Corollaries. In 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant stated "I believe�that our institutions were broad enough to extend over the entire continent as rapidly as other peoples might desire to bring themselves under our protection�In view of the facts which had been laid be-fore me, and with an earnest desire to maintain the 'Monroe Doctrine', I believe that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not take measures". This refers to the Dominican Republic.
Now I will discuss the Olney Corollary. Secretary of State Richard Olney's message to London, 20 July 1895, "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and it's fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." This is also known as the 'twenty-inch gun'. This document was 12,000 words and had to do with the Venezuelan boundary dispute (the line separating Venezuela and British Guiana). Olney also said "�any permanent political union between a European and an American state (was) unnatural and inexpedient". "The states of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any one of them by a European power is, of course, to com-pletely reverse the situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations with us." Finally, Olney demanded arbitration, warned of US interven-tion, and requested the British answer before the president's annual message to congress in December. Lord Salisbury's (of England) reply did not reach Washington until after the president's speech and he denied the application of the Monroe Doctrine thereby as-suming that the US had no real interest in the dispute.
So, what led up to this corollary? Well, in 1870 Venezuela appealed to the US arguing that the British violated the Monroe Doctrine. Also, the American depression of the 1890's was caused by overproduction, which both President Grover Cleveland and Olney thought could be cured by expanding foreign trade. It is very important to note that who controlled the Orinoco River was very important because it was the gateway to trade with northern South America.
Last of all we have the most famous of the corollaries, the Roosevelt Corollary, is actually two separate corollaries. The first was announced on 6 December 1904, by President Theodore Roosevelt; this is also known as the 'Big Stick' .
Any country whose people conduct themselves well, can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political manners, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to exercise of an international power.
The second is known as the "Invasion for Protection" Corollary.
It is far better that this country should put through such an arrangement (enforcing fulfillment of the financial obligations contracted by Latin American states) rather than to allow any foreign country to undertake it.
In conclusion, the Monroe Doctrine originally meant, "America not for Europe," but the Corollaries made it say, "America for the U.S.A.". The Corollaries also resulted in six US protectorates: Cuba, (1898-1903 / 1906-1909 / 1912) Puerto Rico, Panama, Dominican Republic, (1916-1924) Nicaragua, (1912-1933) and Haiti (1915-1934). (The preceding dates in parentheses indicate US Marine occupation.) The Monroe Doctrine is not a viable source to simplify American Foreign Policy of the era. In fact it is the source of much confusion and disagreement. This why I would strongly suggest to all historians and political scientists to speak with great care and forethought when referring to the Monroe Doctrine. It is obvious that one can be greatly mislead by merely mention it, in a textbook to simplify American involvement in Latin America. When our actions have never been equivalent for individual Latin American states.
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