One might still be tempted to assert that our arguments have supported the position of Moral Relativism. After all, one might argue, if we claim that the meanings we sincerely give the words we use - meanings that are to be mirrored by those an honest set of moral axioms would give them - are to acknowledged through the actions of one who insincerely dissents, then aren't the prevailing mores validated by the fact that they are so often acted upon? Can the same not be said of popular preferences? Even if we were to agree that the acceptance of benevolence as a priority was a universal moral imperative (a demand that morality places on us all), would we still not be left with the fact that what is good fortune or bad is still culturally relative, and thus the imperative, is one to embrace relativism, rather than to reject it?

The answer is no. First of all, this argument misses the point of the preceding argument. The point was not that the false dissenter's beliefs were mistaken, because they weren't expressed through his actions, but that they weren't truly held at all, and so there was no controversy to resolve. Secondly, it commits the logical fallacy of equating a statement with its converse. That is, equating

"If A is true, then B is true"

with "If A is false, then B is false",

where A and B are statements in their own right. (A counterexample to this false logical principle, can be found if we take A to be the statement "It is raining", and B to be the statement "water is falling through the air". "If A is true then B is true" is certainly true - if it is raining, then water is surely falling through the air, but "If A is false, then B is false" is not valid - perhaps it is snowing, instead of raining, in which case water is still falling through the air, albeit frozen water).

In our particular case, we would take the statement A to be "his actions do not express his claimed beliefs", and B to be "we can discount their validity". Our previous argument, was that we should assert that if we hold A to be true, we should hold B to be true as well. Here, however, the converse to our accepted statement, is trying to slip past us, while our guard is down, disguised as the original statement.

Secondly, that which is asserted, as we have said, is not always that which is felt. In the next article we link to below, we will examine an example of this, which will lead in the direction of an absolute conception of what is and is not good fortune, in one case - a culturally invariant beginning point for moral argumentation. Thirdly, that which we imagine we feel, is not always a reflection of our most basic desires. This, we will discuss in a little bit.

But, our example ...

From this observation, that we admit our valuing of certain goods through our actions, even when we don't through our words, we find that there is a way of determining what is good fortune, and what is bad, that can't be dismissed as being a matter of arbitrary convention. It is not always, or maybe even very often, an entirely friendly process, as it involves a confrontation with one of the least charming of human traits, namely hypocrisy. Here, we see this approach being put into effect, in response to someone who is peddling a thoroughly unwholesome philosophy - one that would tend to promote self-destructive, and callous behavior. Sad to say, it is a philosophy that has gained new popularity, among Christians and Pagans alike. If what you read seems offensive, real life often is.

So, do you want to explore this topic, or go on to other things ?