updated
(April 9: Senior administration officials brief on background) (2,950)
Senior administration officials briefed reporters April 9 on President
Bush's meetings with President Robert Kocharian of Armenia and
President Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan at the White House earlier in
the day, and said last week's peace talks in Key West, Florida between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh had been "very
successful."
The briefers said Bush met with Kocharian and Aliyev separately,
accompanied by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin
Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Ambassador
Carey Cavanaugh, one of the three co-chairs of the Key West talks.
"Both meetings were extremely warm in tone. Both meetings consisted
of, from the American side, President Bush expressing his support for
the efforts that both countries have made for peace, appreciation for
the progress, understanding that there remains a good deal of work to
be done," a briefer said.
There are plans for Aliyev and Kocharian to meet again in Switzerland
in June, a briefer said. "Switzerland has already said it will help
facilitate with this process, because of the substantial movement
forward that was achieved last week in Florida."
The talks in Switzerland will involve the same format as the Key West
talks -- jointly chaired by the three co-chairs of the Minsk group,
the United States, France and Russia. The Minsk group consists of 11
member nations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), as well as Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are working to
find a solution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The three co-chairs' role is "facilitative," said a briefer: "It's to
help both leaders as they try to craft a compromise that can lead to a
durable settlement."
In summarizing the April 3-6 Florida talks, a briefer said: "Both
presidents have come into these discussions with an understanding that
the only way to find a durable peace is through serious compromise.
That has been the hallmark of their efforts. It is, I think, the most
difficult task that faces them, both at the bargaining table and in
returning to their publics to gain broad support for this. But they
understand this is the only way to craft for their countries the kind
of futures they believe that their people deserve."
The briefer said the exact nature of the Florida talks is
confidential.
"We have said repeatedly that any solution that would bring about a
durable settlement has to be a solution that is acceptable to the
general populace in the region," he added.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
The Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, April 10, 2001
Armenia, Azerbaijan Report Progress in Talks
Diplomacy: Bush urges leaders to keep working toward settling 13-year-old
ethnic conflict in Caucasus.
By NORMAN KEMPSTER, Times Staff Writer
���� WASHINGTON--The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan told President Bush
on Monday that they have made substantial progress in talks aimed at
ending 13 years of ethnic conflict over the disputed enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, senior U.S. officials said.
���� "We were surprised at how far they came," one official said in
reference to negotiations last week in Key West, Fla., between Armenian
President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijani President Heydar A. Aliyev.
���� The official said Bush encouraged Kocharyan and Aliyev during
separate meetings in the Oval Office to "keep at the process." The rivals
agreed to resume their talks in Geneva in June.
���� Two administration officials briefed reporters at the White House on
condition that they not be identified because of the diplomatic
sensitivity of the talks.
���� The optimistic assessment by the U.S. mediators was echoed by
spokesmen for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
���� U.S. officials said Kocharyan and Aliyev agreed to keep confidential
the details of their talks, which are aimed at settling a conflict that
began in 1988 when both countries were Soviet republics.
���� After six years of fighting, the combatants declared a
cease-fire. However, the truce is an uneasy one, with several hundred
casualties a year from land mines and sniper fire.
���� Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave in Azerbaijan with a predominantly
Armenian population. In 1988, Armenian separatists declared
independence. Backed by the Armenian government, the separatists gained
control of the mountainous territory and an adjacent belt of land between
it and Armenia proper.
���� Although the Key West talks marked the 16th time that Kocharyan and
Aliyev have met, there was a substantial change in format in last week's
negotiations. Previously, the two presidents held brief sessions, usually
lasting only a few hours. The Key West talks ran from Tuesday morning to
late Friday.
���� U.S. officials said a similarly long meeting was expected in Geneva.
���� In Key West, Kocharyan, Aliyev and their delegations spent most of
their time in separate meetings with U.S., Russian and French mediators
instead of in direct negotiations. U.S. officials said both sides agreed
that the "proximity talks" resulted in more progress than previous
sessions.
���� "Both presidents came into these discussions with an understanding
that the only way they can achieve peace is through serious compromise," a
U.S. official said.
���� The Armenia-Azerbaijan talks marked the Bush administration's deepest
venture into direct mediation of an intractable international
dispute. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell kicked off the talks last
Tuesday.
Copyright 2001 Los Angeles Times
Bush meets with Azeri, Armenian leaders
in support of peace
By Steve Holland
REUTERS
WASHINGTON - President Bush urged the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia
yesterday to keep up momentum toward peacefully resolving the conflict in
the mountainous enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Bush held separate meetings at the White House with Armenian President
Robert Kocharyan and Azeri President Haydar Aliyev.
Last week, Kocharyan and Aliyev held peace talks in Florida that ended on
an upbeat note, with both sides reporting progress.
The two former Soviet republics have been split for 13 years over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region, dominated by ethnic Armenians who tried to secede
from Azerbaijan in 1988.
About 35,000 people have died in the conflict, which also drove about
800,000 Azeris from their homes before a truce in 1994. Despite the truce,
about 200 people are killed each year by land mines and snipers.
The United States is eager to see an end to the conflict, and hopes that
greater stability will help Azerbaijan become a major oil supplier for
Western markets.
"The President encouraged both leaders to keep at the process, to work to
overcome the differences," a senior Bush administration official said.
"And all the parties to the discussion agreed that peace will bring
considerable benefits to the region, to the peoples of both countries and
to the entire South Caucasus region and beyond," the official said.
Bush invited the two leaders to the White House for meetings as a sign of
respect for the work they did last week in Key West, Fla.
At that time, talks were held under the auspices of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the aid of U.S., French and
Russian mediators.
After yesterday's meeting, Aliyev told reporters that "we are hopeful the
United States of America and other cochairs will intensify their efforts
in order to achieve peaceful resolution to this conflict."
Kocharyan left without talking to reporters.
Two senior U.S. officials who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity
declined to provide details of the remaining differences between the two
sides or to say how close the two sides are to an agreement.
Items on the table during the Key West talks included:
The presence of Armenian forces in the disputed region.
Trade blockades that have crippled the local economy.
The resettlement of refugees left homeless by the war.
The degree of autonomy the Nagorno-Karabakh region should have.
The Philadelphia Inquirer
Tuesday, April 10, 2001
Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.
KARABAKH ARMY SCHEDULES MILITARY MANEUVERS.
Lieutenant General Seyran Ohanian, who is defense minister of the unrecognized
Nagorno- Karabakh Republic, announced on 8 April that the enclave's armed forces
will begin three days of military maneuvers on 10 April, RFE/RL's
Stepanakert correspondent reported. Ohanian denied any connection
between the exercises and last week's Key West talks on resolving the
Karabakh conflict. The Armenian armed forces chief of staff, Lieutenant
General Mikael Harutiunian, will attend the maneuvers as an observer.
Meeting on 9 April in Stepanakert with Karabakh President Arkadii
Ghukasian, Harutiunian positively assessed the combat readiness of the
Karabakh army. LF
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 70, Part I, 10 April 2001
Azeri national hero says about 7,000 volunteers
ready to take up arms
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Apr 9, 2001
Text of report by Azerbaijani news agency Bilik Dunyasi
Baku, 9 April: The deputy chairman of the Unity Party, [National Hero] Tofiq
Cafarli, said that the Union of Azerbaijanist Forces had put forward an
initiative to organize volunteer battalions ready at any time to reinforce
the ranks of the Azerbaijani army to liberate the occupied lands.
As he noted: "Some 6,700 volunteers have already been mustered and several
fighting battalions can be formed out of them. After carrying out the
necessary measures for battle training and management of the subunits, these
people will be able to come into service. We also intend to form elite
battalions, if it is possible to use that expression, which will be made up
of professional soldiers. To fling inexperienced 18-20-year-olds into battle
at the beginning of war means sending them to destruction which can be
described as genocide. Professional soldiers should fight. We shall request
the Defence Ministry and the Military Commissariat to register the entire
personnel of the volunteers after we have completed our work."
Tofiq Cafarli has called upon officers in reserve to reinforce and command
the subunits of the volunteer battalions.
However, this initiative of the Union of Azerbaijanist Forces was met
sceptically by the Defence Ministry. The head of the Defence Ministry press
service, Col Ramiz Malikov, believes that this initiative of the union is
provocative and has nothing to do with the course conducted by the
president. "The army, commanded by the supreme commander, does not need
extra battalions," he said.
Source: Bilik Dunyasi, Baku, in Russian 0900 gmt 09 Apr 01
Both Sides Suffer as War-Torn Caucasus
Enclave Lies in Limbo
Conflict: Leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan meet with Bush today as major
powers try to end stalemate.
By JOHN DANISZEWSKI, LA Times Staff Writer
Monday, April 9, 2001
��� SHUSHA, Azerbaijan -- On almost any day, artist Hovik Gasparian can be
found here seated on a stool, bent over an easel, putting oil on canvas to
show the ruins of the city he loves.
��� Deftly he paints the blown-apart buildings, the piles of rubble, the
broken beams and the crushed fountains of this historic settlement high on a
mountain in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. From his studio in
the town's half-ravaged art gallery, he looks out at the remains of the
school he attended as a boy three decades ago.
��� Those memories, too, go into his art.
��� "I just try to portray what my heart and soul feel," the painter
explained to a visitor walking the ghostly streets. "They are in pain, and I
want to convey that on canvas."
��� Seven years after a cease-fire between Armenians and Azerbaijanis ended
a six-year war fought over this region of glorious mountains and stunning
valleys, the enduring suffering on both sides is palpable.
��� Ethnic Armenians, having fought and died to assert their claim to the
land, now scrape by in the small, heavily defended, self-proclaimed state of
Nagorno-Karabakh--struggling economically, cut off from the world and
unrecognized as sovereign except by Armenia itself.
��� On the other side, at least 570,000 Azeris were ejected from their
homes, with many living in bleak limbo in Azerbaijan. For them and for
Azerbaijan, the humiliation of defeat remains an open wound that continues
to fester and roil the country's political life.
��� Trying to break the stalemate, the United States, France and Russia last
week brought together the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the
latest in a series of peace talks, this time in Key West, Fla. The two
leaders will meet separately with President Bush at the White House today.
��� The aim of the diplomacy is a final settlement that would be a victory
for both sides, allowing refugees to return home, borders to be reopened,
and trade and commerce to resume in a part of the world considered
increasingly important since the discovery of huge oil reserves nearby.
���� In Shusha, those talks seem far away. The picturesque town used to be
mainly Azeri and numbered about 16,000 residents. Now a mere 2,000 to 3,000
people live here, virtually all Armenian. Some, like the artist Gasparian,
were born here and know its small cobbled lanes. Others are Armenian
refugees, transplanted from Azerbaijan in the mutual "ethnic cleansing" that
characterized the first phase of the war.
���� The war was fought over the Armenian majority's demand in
Nagorno-Karabakh to be allowed to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia.
Demonstrations and ethnic killings gave way to pitched battles, in which an
estimated 30,000 people died. Shusha (Shushi in Armenian) was a major
battleground.
���� From Shusha, Azerbaijani soldiers shelled Stepanakert (known as
Xankandi in Azerbaijani), the enclave's main city, six miles to the
northwest in a bowl-like valley. Armenian forces grimly scaled the heights
of this town in 1992, forcing the Azerbaijanis to flee. Tall minarets with
tiled designs still stand, and drinking fountains are adorned with Islamic
symbols, though the mosques of the Azeris are ruined or derelict.
���� The largest Armenian church--imposing, white-stone Christ the
Savior--was used as an ammunition storehouse by the Azerbaijanis, and now
has been renovated, with shiny new chandeliers and freshly painted frescoes
paid for by Armenian Americans.
���� While rueful about the past, Gasparian is skeptical that a solution can
be found that satisfies both sides after their bitter fight.
���� Most of the talk so far has focused on Nagorno-Karabakh being formally
returned to Azerbaijan, but with a high degree of autonomy guaranteed.
Gasparian scoffs at that idea, saying it is exactly the situation that
existed before the war.
���� "I lost cousins, nephews, my sister's husband," said the 40-year-old
artist. "Material losses? I lost my house and everything in it. Everyone in
Karabakh has lost something or someone."
���� But the situation of no-war, no-peace is equally intolerable, taking a
psychic as well as an economic toll on the Armenians living here.
���� "I expect war to break out again. You can almost smell the powder in
the air," fretted Mais Gevorkian, 27, who was a machine-gunner in the last
war. In his bare apartment, he takes out a treasured envelope and pulls out
already fading black-and-white photos of himself crouched on the ground,
posing with his weapon and his squad. Now he is unemployed, living in a
former Azeri apartment and depending on odd jobs and vegetables from his
garden to feed his three children and wife, pregnant with No. 4. People are
appreciative of the fighters, he said, but there is no military pension; he
is on his own.
���� It's not the peace he imagined when he was fighting. "I thought we
would be able to live without pressure, and I thought life would be easier,"
he said.
���� Because both sides so obviously need a settlement and do not wish to
return to war, international mediators think there is a chance for a deal,
in the current discussions or in a later round of negotiating tentatively
planned for Moscow.
���� American, Russian and French diplomatic aims often collide. But on the
topic of Nagorno-Karabakh, the three share an increasing desire to end the
state of tension and the blockade that knots up what once was, and could be
again, one of history's great crossroads.
���� The United States seeks greater stability in the area because it is
orchestrating a major new oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and
Iran. Helping Armenia also is a high priority of the politically active
Armenian community in the United States. Plus, the U.S. aim to expand the zo
ne of democracy and free markets eastward is more likely to succeed in the
Caucasus if there is peace.
���� France has its own interests: to intensify the area's nascent
affiliation with Europe and to open new trade corridors for European goods
across Asia, reviving the old Silk Road of the Middle Ages. And Russia wants
to engage in commerce and maintain ties with both former Soviet republics.
Christian Armenia in particular is its traditional friend, a natural
counterbalance to Islamic and Turkish influences in the area. And peace
between the Caucasian countries would help Russia secure a north-south trade
route to Iran and the Persian Gulf.
���� The entry to Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia is over a winding mountain
road that during the last seven years has been rebuilt to U.S. standards,
with wide shoulders, guardrails and reflective markers. It was financed by
Armenian Americans in the Los Angeles area. (A region, people here are quick
to tell you, that holds the world's second-largest concentration of
Armenians after the Armenian capital, Yerevan; it is home to about 800,000
people of Armenian descent.)
���� There are no customs or passport formalities at the legal international
border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Instead, a road sign in the Armenian
alphabet welcomes visitors to Nagorno-Karabakh. (Non-Armenians, however, are
later obliged to stop and show visas for the self-styled republic.
���� Lachin, on the road to Stepanakert, shows no sign that it was once a
major Azerbaijani town dominating the belt of Azerbaijani territory that
separated Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh. The belt was occupied by
Nagorno-Karabakh forces, and as a result the enclave now shares a de facto
border with Armenia.
���� In Stepanakert last week, soldiers at the city's main garrison showed
off their tanks and martial-arts skills for a visiting reporter.
���� A recently retired lieutenant colonel said that economic problems do
not matter, not when weighed against the pride people feel in having won
their victory.
���� "Our people are different from everyone else, even different from
Armenians in Armenia. Our people will fight and suffer and even starve to be
independent," said the officer, Mikhail Gabreilian, 56. "If it comes to war
again, the people will rise in unison."
���� But a somewhat different impression came from a man in Shusha.
���� Vilen Stepanian, a 69-year-old stone carver, was spotted sitting
patiently tap-tap-tapping with his chisel at a piece of marble that will be
used in a monument being built to commemorate Armenian police officers who
died fighting against Azerbaijan.
���� Though he is happy for the commission, Stepanian sees no contradiction
in admitting that if there should be peace, he would return as quickly as he
could to live out his days in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan on the Caspian
Sea. That is where he spent his adult life before the war.
���� "Life always was good there," he said nostalgically, recalling his old
Azeri boss, who had begged him not to go. "And here, life is so hard that we
do not even have sugar to put in our tea."
Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.
ARMENIAN, AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENTS END KEY WEST TALKS.
The talks in Key West between Robert Kocharian, Heidar Aliev, and
the U.S., French, and Russian OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs on
resolving the Karabakh conflict ended as anticipated on 6
April. Kocharian's spokesman, Vahe Gabrielian, told AP on 7
April that the talks resulted in "a further narrowing of
differences," but Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian
said that "there are still disagreements on numerous
questions," according to ITAR-TASS. Also on 7 April, U.S.
representative Carey Cavanaugh told journalists that the
meetings constituted "a bold and significant step forward,"
while his French counterpart Jean-Jacques Gaillard said "we
are now much closer to peace" than before the talks began on
3 April, RFE/RL's Armenian Service reported. In a joint
statement released on 7 April, the three co-chairmen said
that they "are preparing a new comprehensive proposal that
addresses the problems and needs identified by the presidents
that require a solution to reach peace." They did not divulge
details of the new proposal, which will be presented to the
two presidents in Geneva in June. Turan quoted Cavanaugh as
saying that both Aliev and Kocharian rejected the possibility
of a military solution, and that steps have been taken to
involve Iran, which is not an OSCE member, in discussions on
resolving the conflict. LF
RFE/RL
Armenian, Azeri presidents made "more progress"
than they expected
Agence France Presse
BY: Christophe de Roquefeuil
DATELINE: KEY WEST, Florida, April 6
Armenia and Azerbaijan made more progress than expected at talks that
wrapped up here Friday, seeking to end 13 years of bitter conflict over
the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, a US negotiator said.
And a "new comprehensive proposal" to resolve the conflict will now be
elaborated by Washington, Moscow and Paris ahead of another meeting
between the two sides scheduled for June in Geneva.
"We achieved here more progress than expected," US ambassador Carey
Cavanaugh told reporters, at the end of four days of talks Friday.
"We are much closer to peace than we were before the conference," said his
French counterpart, Jean-Jacques Gaillarde.
The White House had announced earlier in the day that US President George
W. Bush is to meet in Washington with Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev
and Armenian President Robert Kotcharian, in separate meetings Monday.
Although it declined to state the purpose of the get-togethers, the news
appeared to herald positive news.
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Russia Viacheslav Trobnikov, the third
diplomat in the troika mediating on behalf of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), called the negotiations "very
satisfactory work."
>From an outset of talks Tuesday when the two presidents had both made acid
remarks, the tone improved gradually. On Thursday, Armenian Foreign
Minister Vardan Oskanian expressed optimism over progress made on the
third day of peace talks with Azerbaijani leaders in Key West, Florida.
Karabakh is a tiny strip of mountainous land in southwestern Azerbaijan.
In Soviet times it possessed an 80 percent Armenian majority. In 1988, its
local assembly voted to be administered by Yerevan and not Baku.
Fighting broke out among villagers and turned into full-scale war with the
breakup of the Soviet Union. More than 30,000 were killed from both sides,
with around one million people driven from their homes during the course
of the dispute.
A ceasefire was signed in 1994 but peace talks have dragged on ever
since. At the heart of the deadlock remains the status of Karabakh. Baku
is offering "the highest level of autonomy," but the Armenians are holding
out for recognition of their Nagorno-Karabakh republic.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell opened the talks in Key West Tuesday,
calling on leaders of both countries to find a "mutually acceptable
settlement" of their dispute.
cr/jlp-bur/ksb
April 7, 2001, Saturday
Copyright 2001 Agence France Presse
Armenia, Azerbaijan leaders to meet with Bush
after step toward peace
April 6, 2001, Friday, BC cycle
By STEVE GUTTERMAN, Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: KEY WEST, Fla.
The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet with President Bush on
Monday after "very fruitful" negotiations on a settlement of their
conflict over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, a U.S. official said.
"This has been a bold and significant step forward," Ambassador Carey
Cavanaugh, the chief U.S. negotiator at four days of peace talks, said
Friday. The talks were mediated by diplomats from the United States,
Russia and France.
The diplomats are preparing a proposal for a final settlement of the
13-year-old dispute, which has dragged on since a 1994 cease-fire ended
fighting that killed more than 30,000 people and drove a million from
their homes.
On Monday, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliev and Armenian President
Robert Kocharian are scheduled to meet separately with Bush, who will show
his support for their efforts and "talk about opportunities to advance
peace," Cavanaugh said.
No deal will be signed in Washington, and the diplomats did not reveal any
details of the discussions or of plans for the peace proposal. They will
probably meet again with Aliev and Kocharian in Geneva in June, Cavanaugh
said.
Russia, France and the United States are the leaders of a subgroup of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that has been seeking
to end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for nine years.
"We are much closer to peace than we were before this conference," said
the top French negotiator, Ambassador Jean-Jacques Gaillarde. However, he
added, "There is still a lot of work to do before we have a peace
agreement."
Secretary of State Colin Powell opened the talks Tuesday, calling for
"mutual compromise" to settle a dispute that has hobbled economic
development in Armenia and Azerbaijan and sown chaos in the volatile
region squeezed between Russia, Turkey and Iran, where the United States
wants to see stability.
The fighting started in 1988 after the mostly ethnic Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh moved to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. Despite
the cease-fire, about 200 people die every year in violence related to the
conflict, and many thousands live in dormitories, mud huts and other
temporary housing.
The cease-fire left Nagorno-Karabakh and some surrounding territory -
about one-fifth of the territory of Azerbaijan - firmly in the hands of
the ethnic Armenians, who have declared its independence.
Among the key issues in the peace process are the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh, which is not recognized as a sovereign state, as well as
the future of the surrounding territories and the return of the displaced
people. Any potential settlement deal is likely to draw fierce criticism
from opposition groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan that do not want to
compromise.
Most of the negotiations in Key West were "proximity talks" in which
negotiators from the three countries have met separately with each
president. The two have met together more than 15 times in the last two
years.
Kocharian's spokesman, Vahe Gabrielian, said the Key West talks brought "a
further narrowing of differences" between the positions of the bitter
neighbors.
"Of course, it's not the end of the road," he said.
Copyright The Associated Press
Frozen in Time
6 April 2001
Azeris fear the cease-fire over Nagorno-Karabakh will end before a
solution is reached, and they criticize the West for taking sides instead
of working toward peace.
by Seymur Selimov
BAKU, Azerbaijan--As Azeri President Heydar Aliev sits down this week with
his Armenian counterpart Robert Kocharian--surrounded by the lush palms of
Key West, Florida--to discuss a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
their populations back home hold out little hope that the discussions will
lead anywhere.
That is particularly true in Baku [for the view from Armenia, click
here]. Recent leaks of earlier draft peace plans proposed by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have hardened
the popular mood against concessions and increased skepticism that the
talks, like all proceeding talks, will bring an end to the impasse. Few
believe an end to the conflict--frozen in time since a May 1994 cease-fire
agreement stopped the war that claimed more than 20,000 lives--is anywhere
in sight. Azeri officials continue to insist on the preservation of
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but offer a high level of autonomy for
Nagorno-Karabakh. But that solution remains unacceptable to Armenia, which
opposes any subordination of the enclave to Azerbaijan.
To start with, most Azeris don't see the situation as a conflict, but as
military aggression by Armenia that left a large chunk of their
territory--with massive loss of human life--in the hands of an occupier.
Armenia, they believe, wanted all along to annex Nagorno-Karabakh, where
ethnic Armenians voted for succession in a December 1991 referendum; they
reject Armenian assertions that the Azeri authorities had been unable to
protect ethnic Armenians. They express disappointment that the
international community did not respect the 1992 [1993] resolutions of the
UN Security Council, entitled "On immediate release of occupied Azerbaijan
grounds," but instead entrusted the "Minsk Group" of the OSCE with
resolving the dispute. To Baku's dismay, the Minsk Group--co-chaired by
France, Russia, and the United States--has refused to recognize Armenia as
an aggressor. Likewise, the Minsk group proposals, leaked to the press in
January, caused a storm of protest , with the latest plan from November
1998 suggesting that Karabakh form a common state with Azerbaijan that
would give it de facto independence.
Making matters worse, most Azeris have serious misgivings about the three
countries that co-chair the Minsk group. They view France as a traditional
ally of Armenia that has rendered considerable financial help and support
in the international arena to Yerevan. On 8 November, for example, the
French Senate approved a bill recognizing the genocide of Armenians
committed by Ottoman Turks in 1915. Azerbaijan has sided with Turkey in
claiming that the number of Armenians killed was far less than the 1.5
million figure estimated by most historians. According to political
scientist Rasim Musabekov, "The Azeri community agrees with the Turks that
the claims of the genocide are exaggerated and have the well-thought-out
aim of pressuring not only Turkey, but at the same time [pressuring]
Azerbaijan over the Karabakh problem."
IN THE ARMS OF RUSSIA
Inconsistencies also abound in relations with the Russian chair of the
Minsk group. Already at the beginning of the conflict, most Azeris
believe, the Russian military aided the Armenians, leading to their
victory. Azeris view the continued presence of Russian military bases in
Armenia as a guarantee of military help should the conflict be
renewed. And the discovery that billions of dollars in Russian arms had
been funneled into Armenia between 1994-1999 also makes Azeris wonder
about Russia's impartiality.
Azerbaijan is hoping that Russian President Vladimir Putin will take a
different stance on the conflict. "Putin looks at the relations between
the two countries more realistically," said Vafa Guluzade, former Azeri
state adviser on foreign policy.
But anticipation that Russia will play a more constructive role is still
just that--and there are no real signs that Putin is ready to change
course. Russia has done everything possible to convince Azerbaijan that
peace in Karabakh will come from the maternal arms of Moscow--and all
Azerbaijan has to do is return to Russia for protection. Azeri observers
interpreted the Russian president's comments following Armenian President
Robert Kocharian's visit to Moscow last year--during which Putin agreed
that Moscow held the key to settling the Karabakh conflict and was willing
to play that role--as meaning that the Kremlin would not pressure Yerevan
to come to a compromise until Azerbaijan did as well. That meant,
observers thought, Baku would first have to accept that only Russia could
guarantee the peace process. Many believe it is that attitude that has
contributed to what they see as the Armenians' rigid position.
The policy path pursued by the United States is also a serious problem as
far as Azerbaijan is concerned. Baku considers the U.S. position to be a
double standard: Washington recognizes the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan, but at the same time sympathizes with calls to recognize the
Armenia genocide. And the U.S. Congress continues to block aid to
Azerbaijan, accusing Baku of engaging in a blockade of Armenia.
Azeri officials argue that Armenia shares boundaries not only with
Azerbaijan, but also with Georgia, Turkey, and Iran, so there can be no
real blockade. Though there is no official inter-governmental cooperation
between Ankara and Yerevan, the two capitals' commercial structures
actively conduct trade. And together with the prohibition of financial aid
to Azerbaijan, the United States allocates millions of dollars to Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh annually. As such, many Azeris feel that financial
help, at the expense of assistance for other countries, prolongs what they
see as Armenia's unpunished imperialist policy.
ONCE AND FOR ALL
All those misgivings have created a feeling of doubt that the Minsk group
will be able to solve the dispute objectively. "The war paused, but for
how long?" asks Said Ragimov, a teacher. "You can see that no positive
results have yet been achieved ... and let's look at who is benefiting
from the conflict's [stalemate]. The Azeri side has lost 20 percent of its
territory ... The world community is against any aggression, [but] when we
were accepted into the UN, that 20 percent was included in our
territory." Ragimov also questioned the focus of European countries on
recognizing the Armenian genocide, while ignoring the current
conflict: "Why don't those countries see modern aggression instead of
dealing with what has taken place in the past?"
Even though Baku views each of the Minsk group countries with some
suspicion, refusal to work with the group would likely have negative
consequences. In particular, Armenia could present Azerbaijan's refusal to
cooperate as its reluctance to find a solution to the problem and work
toward peace. Moreover, working with the Minsk group serves to keep the
conflict on the world's agenda--if Azerbaijan refuses to cooperate with
the group, it could lose that advantage. As a compromise, Baku would like
to see additional co-chairman added to the Minsk group, preferably an
ally, such as Turkey.
For now, the majority of people in Azerbaijan are not optimistic about
finding a peaceable solution to the cold war. "On the whole, the
cease-fire is fine, but only if the war is eventually ended permanently
and properly," says Esmira Mamedova, a nurse at the central military
hospital in Baku, who saw enough fallout from the previous violence. "The
conflict is basically frozen, but what if it suddenly is thawed and war
will resume again?" she asks.
"This war has taken many of my relatives' lives, ... both my children have
perished, my grandparents' tomb has been destroyed, and my house has been
destroyed. Nevertheless, I do not want a prolongation of war," says an
elderly refugee from Khodgali [Khojaly], a district of Azerbaijan that was
overrun by Armenian troops in February 1992. "I do not want further
bloodshed. I have experienced a lot due to that war, and I am personally
for an armistice, but a true one--not just a cosmetic one. Now the
conflict is being preserved and will be transmitted to the next
generation. It is necessary to resolve this problem once and for all, and
to make sure we don't burden our children with it."
Copyright� 2001 Transitions Online. All rights reserved.
Deadlock Over Karabakh
6 April 2001
Armenian president confident and firm heading into Key West Karabakh
meeting.
by Haroutiun Khachatrian
Armenian President Robert Kocharian, undaunted by Azerbaijani threats to
resume armed conflict and bolstered by unified domestic public opinion,
maintained a firm stance in advance of the round of Nargorno-Karabakh
peace talks, held in Key West, Florida, starting on 3 April. Expectations
in Armenia are low that the existing deadlock in negotiations on Karabakhs
future status can be broken.
Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev will be joined by
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Key West in the search for a
negotiated solution. Kocharian has stated that direct bilateral talks are
unlikely to produce a settlement. The divergent views of the Armenian and
Azeri leaders are such that international mediators, specifically the OSCE
Minsk Group, should take the lead in the search for a compromise
acceptable to all parties, the Armenian president said during a meeting
with university students on 21 March.
At that same student meeting, Kocharian stressed that Armenias negotiating
stance remains unchanged and said that Yerevan would oppose any
arrangement that leaves Karabakh under Azerbaijans jurisdiction. He said
flatly that Azerbaijans proposal to grant broad self-governing powers to
Karabakh was unacceptable, adding that Armenia would insist on securing a
direct territorial link to Karabakh, as well as international security
guarantees for the enclave.
In maintaining a firm line, Kocharian enjoys near-universal support from
the Armenian political establishment. In the days leading up to the Key
West meeting, the president met with leaders of most major political
parties--including the Yerkrapah Union of War Veterans and Dashnaktsutiun,
or Armenian Revolutionary Party--to reaffirm the unified position of
Armenia on the Karabakh issue.
Kocharian and other government officials have been largely dismissive of
Azeri threats to resume military operations if negotiations fail to
achieve a breakthrough soon. In a speech to the nation on 21 March, Aliyev
warned that a resumption of the war could not be excluded.
In addition, Azeri officials have publicly speculated that a military
alliance with Turkey would enhance Bakus ability to wage and win a renewed
war with Armenia.
In his meeting with students, Kocharian cautioned Azerbaijan, saying the
Armenian military was prepared for any contingency, having strengthened
its defensive positions along the border since the 1994 Karabakh
cease-fire. "The one who starts a war, will be the one who is
defeated," Kocharian said. Dashnaktsutiun leaders portrayed the Azeri
statements on the resumption of hostilities to be an indicator of weakness
in negotiations, while at the same time voicing concern about the
possibility of Turkey becoming a factor in the Karabakh peace process.
Meanwhile, some Armenian political observers are expressing doubts about
whether the OSCE Minsk Group is capable of mediating a compromise at the
present time, citing the growing tension in U.S.-Russian relations. A few
Armenian officials are also concerned that Russia has yet to decide
whether a Karabakh settlement is in Moscows best interests. Resolution of
the Karabakh conflict would remove a major obstacle to development of the
Caspian Basins oil and gas reserves. It could also possibly enhance the
prospects for construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which is viewed as
the chief rival to Russian oil and gas export routes via Novorossisk.
According to Ashot Manucharian, the leader of the Socialist Union of
Armenia, if Russia decides that a Karabakh settlement does not serve its
interests, Moscow may be tempted to destabilize the region, with
unpredictable consequences.
--------------
Haroutiun Khachatrian is a Yerevan-based writer specializing in economic
and political affairs.
Copyright� 2001 Transitions Online. All rights reserved.
US brokers peace talks on disputed Armenian enclave
Public feeling may be too strong to bridge the divide over Nagorno-Karabakh,
reports David Stern
Financial Times; Apr 4, 2001
The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan began talks in the US yesterday in
what is being hailed as an historic opportunity to resolve a 13-year-old
territorial dispute that has claimed at least 25,000 lives.
Robert Kocharyan, President of Armenia, and Azerbaijan's President Haydar
Aliyev met in Key West, Florida, for US-brokered talks to try to settle
their claims on the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The talks were due to be opened by Colin Powell, US secretary of state, and
follow two meetings between the leaders earlier this year mediated by
France's President Jacques Chirac.
Nagorno-Karabakh broke away from Azerbaijan in the dying years of the Soviet
Union and tried to unite with Armenia proper. The Karabakh Armenians, with
support from Yerevan, drove the Azeris from the territory before a ceasefire
was signed in 1994. Today the peace negotiations remain deadlocked over the
issue that began it: Karabakh's political status.
Azerbaijan wants the mainly ethnic Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh back in its
control, though it is offering it broad autonomy; Armenia wants independence
for the region. The talks are due to last between four and six days.
Some observers doubt the divide can be bridged, not least because of the
political sensitivity of the issue at home. Even Mr Aliyev, who dominates
Azeri politics, found himself recently taken aback by the strength of
feeling in the country.
When in February he called a surprise session of parliament to discuss the
matter it was thought he might be preparing the country for disappointment.
What he got was a blast of hardline resistance.
"This is clear capitulation," said Lala Shovket, an opposition leader. The
talk on the street suddenly turned to guns and of possible resumption of
hostilities. Karabakh, it seemed, was the one issue that was bigger even
than Mr Aliyev.
Subsequent talks with Mr Kocharian at the end of February were described as
fruitless. The Azeri president began to say that if nothing was offered,
Baku would be justified in forcefully taking back what was internationally
recognised as Azerbaijani territory. "We're ready for you," replied Mr
Kocharian.
Most observers still see the belligerence as posturing ahead of the Florida
talks.
"Everyone's talking of war, but no one is stockpiling sugar yet," said one
western diplomat in Baku.
Both sides stand to lose more than they would gain by the resumption of
hostilities. War could push both countries' already teetering economies over
the edge. Conversely, some western officials say that Dollars 1bn could be
pledged to rehabilitate the war-ravaged areas and repatriate refugees if a
peace deal was signed.
Karabakh has implications beyond the region as well. Washington has
increased its interest in the Caucasus since western oil companies became
involved in the nearby Caspian Sea. Russia, the one-time colonial power,
continues to view the area as part of its sphere of influence. And to the
south and west, Iran and Turkey are looking for political and economic
footholds.
Details on the talks are vague, however. The Minsk Group, the body set up by
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe to supervise the
talks, has imposed a media blackout. Nevertheless officials familiar with
the thrust of the negotiations say the two sides are close to agreement.
"The sense is that the propects now for peace are the best ever," said one
western diplomat.
Though officials from both sides have played down prospects for a
settlement, hopes have been raised by the fact that all three Minsk Group
co-chairs - Russia, France and the US - are present.
The possibility of peace has also been bolstered by Moscow's seeming change
in attitude toward the south Caucasus. Carey Cavanaugh, the US
representative to the Minsk Group, says that all three co-chairs are working
together effectively. Observers interpret this as meaning that Moscow has
ceased being a spoiler in the talks.
Why the Kremlin would undergo such a turnround is unclear, but many see a
more coercive and less confrontational policy toward the ex-Soviet republics
by President Vladimir Putin.
The stakes are high, however. Opposition to previous peace feelers spelled
the downfall of former Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrossian and might
have played a part in the assassination of the country's prime minister and
parliament speaker two years ago. In Azerbaijan, witnessed by the firestorm
unleashed by Mr Aliyev's peace debate, the risks are just as great.
Copyright: The Financial Times Limited
The Los Angeles Times
Wednesday, April 4, 2001
Powell Joins Nagorno-Karabakh Talks
Diplomacy: Florida meeting is an attempt to jump-start stalled peace
process for Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders.
By NORMAN KEMPSTER, Times Staff Writer
KEY WEST, Fla.--In the Bush administration's first venture into direct
mediation of an international dispute, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
conferred Tuesday with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan about the
stalemated conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
���� "These Key West talks highlight U.S. engagement in the international
effort to bring peace" to the troubled region, Powell told reporters.
���� In keeping with President Bush's determination that Washington should
not impose a settlement on unwilling parties, Powell said the United
States was "prepared to support any agreement acceptable to the two
presidents."
���� That drew a sharp rejoinder from Azerbaijani President Heydar
A. Aliyev, who called for far more direct intervention. He said it is not
enough for the international community to say that "whatever the
presidents agree upon will be acceptable."
���� Aliyev complained about "indecisiveness on the part of the
international community" in the face of seven years of deadlocked
negotiations after a war that killed 15,000 people and left a million
homeless.
���� Later, Powell said he was not surprised by Aliyev's remarks, adding
that the mediators do intend to be more active than they have been over
the last several years. But he did not reveal specifics.
���� The talks in former President Harry S. Truman's vacation White House
were the 16th round of face-to-face discussions between Aliyev and
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan.
���� Powell headed to Washington Tuesday evening but said he could return
if his presence was needed.
���� Judging by their public statements before the talks retreated behind
closed doors, Kocharyan and Aliyev have a long way to go before they make
peace. Aliyev spoke for almost half an hour, recalling all of Azerbaijan's
grievances in a conflict that began in 1988 when both countries were still
Soviet republics.
���� In a tart, but brief, response, Kocharyan said: "I have not made
these many miles of trip to Florida to try these propaganda campaigns. I
have come here to work constructively to seek a settlement."
���� Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominately Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan,
declared independence in 1988, touching off a long and bitter war. A 1994
truce left the region under control of ethnic Armenians supported by the
Armenian government. The separatists also hold a ring of Azerbaijani
territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and a corridor connecting the
enclave with Armenia proper.
���� Kocharyan is the former prime minister of Nagorno-Karabakh. He was
elected president of Armenia in 1998, pledging to keep the enclave in
Armenian hands.
���� Since the 1994 truce, the conflict has claimed a few hundred lives a
year as a result of sniper fire and land mines.
���� Powell stressed the economic dimension of the conflict, urging
Armenia and Azerbaijan to put aside their differences and "allow these two
countries to progress more quickly into the promise of the 21st century
world economy."
���� After kicking off the conference, Powell turned the U.S. delegation
over to Carey Cavanaugh, a diplomat who has been working on the issue for
years. In an unusual procedure adopted by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the chairmanship of the mediation group rotates
between the United States, Russia and France.
���� In Stepanakert, the largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh, the leader of
the small, self-proclaimed state said he hoped the talks would lead to a
settlement allowing the enclave to be unified with Armenia or be
recognized as independent.
���� "All other options mean that we move not toward peace but toward
war," said Nagorno-Karabakh President Arkady Gukasyan.
���� Gukasyan, interviewed by The Times on Tuesday night at his residence
in Stepanakert, said there were several factors conducive to a peaceful
settlement now. He said he sensed that the Azerbaijani side "more than
ever is inclined to take a realistic view of everything."
���� While expressing confidence in Kocharyan, Gukasyan said the republic
is not a direct party to the talks and therefore might reject whatever the
participants decide.
* * *
���� Times staff writer John Daniszewski in Stepanakert contributed to
this report.
Copyright 2001 Los Angeles Times
Azerbaijan says US recognizes Armenia as aggressor
(Baku) 525 gazet
in Azerbaijani
3 Apr 01
�� Excerpt from� K. Hasanli report by Azerbaijani newspaper 525 qazet
entitled "USA has accused Armenia of aggression"
�� [Subhead] The US State Department admits that the Armenian armed
forces took part in the occupation of Azerbaijani lands in 1992-94
�� On the eve of the Key West meeting between the Azerbaijani and
Armenian presidents on a Karabakh settlement, the US State Department
disseminated a report on the forthcoming meeting and the history of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
�� [Passage omitted: known details of statement]
�� It is interesting that for the second time now since the beginning of
this year the USA is confirming Armenia's involvement in the occupation
of Azerbaijani lands. The US State Department accused the Armenian army
of occupying Azerbaijani territory, along with the Karabakh separatists,
in an annual report on the state of human rights in world countries
disseminated a few months ago. The same accusation has been voiced on the
eve of the meeting between [Azerbaijani President] Heydar Aliyev and
[Armenian President] Robert Kocharyan. We should recall that during the
parliamentary debates on 23-24 February [on Karabakh conflict], Aliyev
complained that the West had still not recognized Armenia as the
aggressor. He said that there was no official document describing
Armenia's aggressive policy. Following this, Armenia has indirectly been
called the aggressor in two US State Department official documents. Can
we describe this as a radical change in Washington's approach to the
Karabakh conflict?
�� The former [Azerbaijani] state foreign policy adviser, Vafa Quluzada,
told a 525 Qazet correspondent that he believes the accusation against
Armenia in this US State Department document is worthy of note. He said
that up to now many Muslim countries, particularly the Organization of
Islamic Conference, had recognized Armenia as the aggressor, but no
Western countries had condemned Yerevan over this issue. "I do not recall
there being any phrase of this nature in any US documents when I occupied
an official position," Quluzada said. He believes that the USA is
indirectly recognizing Armenia as the aggressor. "Armenia has openly been
condemned for its aggressive policy in an official US State Department
document. This demonstrates a radical change in the USA's position on the
conflict. It can also be claimed that Armenia will now face tough
pressure from the West," Quluzada said.
Armenian manoeuvres aimed at intimidating Azeri leadership - Azeri agency
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Apr 4, 2001
Text of report by Azerbaijani news agency Sarq
4 April, Sarq correspondent F. Huseynzada: Armenian forces stationed on the
heights in Krasnoselskiy District in Armenia to the south of Sariyal
Mountain fired on Azerbaijani positions deployed near Qazilxanyal Mountain
and near the Baskand mountain pass in Gadabay District in Azerbaijan on 3
April between 1320 and 1340 [0820-0840 gmt].
Apart from this, the Armenian Armed Forces fired on Azerbaijani positions
from 2248 till 2300 [1748-1800 gmt] 8km to the northeast of the occupied
village of Talis in Goranboy District in Azerbaijan. This time they targeted
Azerbaijani positions in the village of Borsunlu. Fire was opened from
assault rifles and machine guns. It was neutralized by response actions. The
press service of the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry says that Azerbaijani
forces did not suffer any losses.
The latest events show that certain circles in Armenia seem to have become
worried about the prospects of the negotiations between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani presidents that started yesterday [3 April] in the USA and are
trying to openly demonstrate force. The aforementioned incidents are not the
only ones over the past days. The Russian media reported that Armenian
forces had started large-scale military exercises near the border with the
Naxcivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan on the same day that the
negotiations started in the USA. It is quite possible that with such actions
Armenia is trying to intimidate the Azerbaijani leadership and force it to
make concessions in the Karabakh settlement.
Source: Sarq news agency, Baku, in Russian 1200 gmt 04 Apr 01
Azerbaijan: Experts expect nothing good from Key West
(Baku) Zerkalo
in Russian
31 Mar 01
�� Text of K. Ali report by Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo entitled "Key
West: nothing good"
�� [Subhead] A virtual dialogue between four prominent political analysts
about the forthcoming talks between Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan
�� Two days remain before the presidents' meeting in the US town of Key
West. Our press has published more forecasts and analyses on the subject
than was desireable. Many of these forecasts have been nothing but an
embarrassment.
�� In order to avoid such embarrassment, one should rely on the opinion
of independent professional political analysts who used to occupy
executive positions in the country's administration.
�� We should note from the very start that our experts - Vafa Quluzada,
Tofiq Zulfuqarov, Rasim Musabayov and Eldar Namazov -� do not foresee
anything good happening in Key West. Only the eternally optimistic Vafa
Quluzada is glad that the USA is giving greater attention to the problem.
"We have been knocking on all the doors in Washington and up to now, have
been met only with politeness," he said. Zulfuqarov considers that the
level of the US meeting is undoubtedly lower than the level of other
meetings of this sort -� the invitation to come to Key West was sent not
by the president but by Secretary of State Colin Powell.
�� [Subhead] Much depends on relations between the [OSCE Minsk Group]
cochairmen
�� Quluzada is stressing the time the Florida meeting is being held -
when Russian-US relations have become aggravated. The new US
administration is exerting pressure on Russia and the latter is in turn
trying to resist this; we shall therefore probably get nothing at this
point and we shall have to be content with increased US interest in our
problem.
�� Zulfuqarov is also concerned about relations between the OSCE Minsk
Group cochairmen. Relations between the USA and Russia are not at their
best at the moment, and in such cases, talks get stuck in a rut, or
merely go through the motions. On the other hand, the mediators are
concerned about the heightened tension in the region, particularly in
Azerbaijan. The superpowers are competing in the region but at the same
time they are cooperating in order to stop the situation reaching crisis
point. Everyone understands that it is impossible to establish a firm
position in the South Caucasus without having influence in Azerbaijan.
�� The former foreign minister believes that if Azerbaijan itself
heightens tension, this will break the scheme established by the
superpowers and for this reason the USA now needs a fresh initiative to
neutralize the threat to its interests.
�� Eldar Namazov also pointed to the difficult internal situation in the
OSCE Minsk Group. Two cochairmen, France and the USA, are clearly bent on
finding a quick solution to the Karabakh conflict. Their economic
interests are primarily behind this aspiration. Large-scale investments
are expected in the development of new deposits in our region in the near
future as well as the laying of pipelines. Namazov believes that these
countries want these investments to be made in peaceful and stable
conditions in order to reduce risks.
�� [Subhead] What is going to happen in Florida?
�� NKR [Nagornyy Karabakh Republic] chief separatist [president] Arkadiy
Gukasyan has said that no document on the Karabakh settlement would be
signed in Key West.
�� Quluzada (I hope he is not offended by such a proximity of views) also
does not see the possibility of any progress being made in Key West.
"Kocharyan will get orders from Moscow to stand firm and not give in. We
want to resolve the problem peacefully, but the Armenian proposal to
liberate seven districts in exchange for Nagornyy Karabakh's independence
does not suit us. All the districts seized with Russia's help, including
Nagornyy Karabakh, are our legitimate territory."
�� Continuing this idea, Zulfuqarov says that the status of Nagornyy
Karabakh cannot be resolved quickly and that no one should have false
expectations from Key West. Without resolving the status issue, there can
be no quick and peaceful resolution of the problem. The Armenians believe
the same, he added. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan confessed
two years ago that eight to nine years of talks were needed to draw up
the status.
�� Answering my question, Musabayov forecast two options for the
development of the situation. The first one is that the parties will not
agree to anything in Key West. The second is that the parties will sign a
certain document which meets Armenia's interests more than it does
Azerbaijan's.
�� [Subhead] What are these "frames"?
�� In the run-up to the Key West meeting there have been many rumours
about some framework agreement the Americans have prepared for the two
presidents. In Quluzada's opinion, the signing of such a document would
be great progress. Everything, however, depends on Russia's stand.
According to the information available to Quluzada, [Russian President]
Vladimir Putin was extremely unhappy that he failed to reach an agreement
with Aliyev during his Baku visit. We did not agree to the status that
Russia proposed for the Qabala radar station and refused to agree to the
deployment of Russian troops in Azerbaijan. We did this as Russia offered
nothing in exchange. It did not even offer its positive role in the
Karabakh conflict settlement. Everybody remembers what Putin said about
the Karabakh problem on the eve of his visit to Baku� - "Russia does not
intervene."
�� However, Russia's stance is quite explicable. If the Karabakh conflict
is resolved, not only Azerbaijan but also Armenia will get out of its
influence. Therefore, Russia will not give the region to the USA without
getting anything in exchange. Thus, there will be no frames suitable for
us.
�� Zulfuqarov admits the possibility of a new initiative from the
cochairmen because presidents are not invited just for the sake of it. He
recalled the words about the country's territorial integrity that Aliyev
said in his Novruz speech, but had not mentioned the country's
sovereignty. This means that he tolerates an autonomy for Armenians.
�� The president criticizes the stage-by-stage resolution of the problem.
This means that only the package proposal can be submitted in Key West.
This in turn means long talks with unlimited scope for dragging them out
in order to� prevent a war. The Armenians are deliberately insisting on
dragging the talks out within some frames because they want to
consolidate juridically what they have seized and wait for a moment more
convenient for them.
�� In Musabayov's opinion, a hypothetical framework agreement will have
not a real impact on
�� the process of achieving peace. If frames suiting Armenia and not
acceptable to us are accepted in Florida, then the final refining and
signing of the project could be held in Moscow.
�� [Subhead] What are we moving towards?
�� Quluzada forecast long ago that after the Key West meeting there would
be one in Moscow. But if there is no progress at the Florida talks -
progress is possible only if there is an agreement between Moscow and
Washington -� one should not hope for a meeting in Moscow.
�� The ex-aide considers that Armenia will not be able to take a tough
stand in Key West because, unlike Azerbaijan, it does not have any
relations with the USA. We have developed relations with America, oil
contracts, and the working groups for the Baku-Ceyhan project, while
Armenia is like a remote province of Russia, which has no economic links
but only formal contacts with the USA. As a CIS country, they receive US
aid under the Freedom Support Act, but nobody can say what Armenian-US
business relations are.
�� "We cannot have an impact Armenia's stance by peaceful means, while
the military option is fraught with the danger of major destruction
throughout the entire region - that's why there has been stalemate
between us and the Armenians up to now. We have no choice but to resume a
war or to wait until the USA or Russia exert pressure on Armenia. If the
USA repeals Section 907 [banning US government aid to Azerbaijan] and
imposes sanctions against Armenia, as the invader, after the latter again
reveals itself in Key West, the settlement process will make gigantic
strides. The Armenians will understand that they will no longer be able
to enjoy the support of two superpowers through their lobby.
�� To avoid a war, Quluzada said, Armenia should make a correct
assessment of the situation. There are no people in Azerbaijan who wish
to accept the current state of being the occupied side. Threatening us
with the occupation of seven more districts, Armenia is trying to force
us to capitulate, but Azerbaijan will not do this. Thus, Armenia has no
choice but to act constructively and get a part of what it wishes to
have.
KALBAJAR OCCUPATION TURNS 8
It has been 8 years since Armenians captured the borderline Kalbajar
province stretching for 105 kilometers along the border.
The province was set up in 1930. Its population prior to the occupation
was 45,000 people. The province included 122 villages, 28,000 hectares of
forests. Its highest mountain top was Jamish (3,724 meters above sea). The
area of the province, which was frequently referred to as Azerbaijans
Urals, was 1,936 km.*
[AssA-Irada] News Digest, April 2-3, 2001
Bitterness runs deep in Nagorno-Karabakh
as leaders talk peace, residents threaten war
����������������� BY DAVID FILIPOV
����������������� Boston Globe
LACHIN, Azerbaijan -- The land is good in Lachin,
so good that the eye can almost ignore the roofless,
gutted skeletons of houses that sprawl among the
white-blossomed apricot trees in the steep valley
overlooked by Sergo Zalebekian's carefully
manicured yard.
Zalebekian is one of about 2,000 Christian
Armenians who have settled among the war-wrecked
ruins of houses that once belonged to Muslim
Azerbaijanis in Lachin, which guards the western
entrance to the disputed enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Zalebekian lost his home and
many of his friends as the Armenian fighters he
commanded won control of Nagorno-Karabakh from
Azerbaijan in a 1991-94 war that left over 30,000
people dead.
The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan are
meeting in Key West, Fla. -- with the United States,
Russia and Europe mediating their talks -- in search
of a peaceful end to the longest-running conflict in
the former Soviet Union. They will have to consider
the thousands of people like Zalebekian, who would
rather fight again than leave his new home in Lachin.
The land is very bad on the windswept plain just a
two-hour drive to the east -- if anyone dared drive
across a tensely guarded, heavily fortified front line
-- where Rashid Dunuamaliyev and his family have
been living for nine years in a
mud-and-thatch-covered hole in the hard ground.
The Dunuamaliyevs once had a house in Lachin, but
like some 800,000 Azerbaijanis from
Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding area, they
were forced to flee. From the hardpan prairie in
central Azerbaijan where they and 1,700 other
refugees have settled, they can see the mountains of
their homeland.
Armenians are living in the ruins, Azerbaijanis in the
ground, and neither side is ready to relinquish its
claim to the land that they once shared. The situation
in and around Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that it will
take much more than diplomatic accords to end the
virulent hatred between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
A draft accord would have Armenia give up the
territories its troops have occupied around
Nagorno-Karabakh, withdraw the troops, and agree
to return the enclave to Azerbaijan's control, albeit
with broad autonomy. Azerbaijan and its ally,
Turkey, would lift their longstanding blockades
against Armenia. The displaced Azerbaijanis could
start to go home.
But the accord cannot put back together what has
been lost during the 13-year dispute: the way
Armenians and Azerbaijanis once shared the land
both nations claim as their spiritual homeland. Both
sides have accused the other of numerous war crimes
after the ethnic Armenians who dominated
Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1988.
Neither side seems ready to put aside differences
now.
``I saw genocide with my own eyes,'' Zalebekian
said. ``It's hard to have your homeland, your garden
taken away. This is our land now. This is Armenian
land.''
From his dugout near the central Azerbaijan town of
Aghjabedi, Dunuamaliyev smiled grimly when he
was told that Armenians are rebuilding their lives
among the ruins of his homeland. Here in the
Azerbaijan plains, there is no life. There is no work.
The nearest water is two miles away. Snakes and
frogs regularly plague the underground residents.
``How long can this go on?'' Dunuamaliyev said,
gesturing at his gloomy, subterranean home. ``If the
Armenians do not agree to give our land back, there
will be war.''
Some of the Armenians have populated deserted
towns abandoned by fleeing Azerbaijanis, such as
Lachin. But most of the Azerbaijani refugees had no
place to go. Now, they are scattered across
Azerbaijan, in tent camps, train wagons, temporary
housing and mud dugouts, waiting to go home.
Although foreign interest in the country's Caspian
Sea oil reserves has boosted Azerbaijan's economy,
little has been spent on the refugees.
But although the defeated Azerbaijan has tasted the
first fruit of foreign wealth, Armenia's victory has
left it isolated. Azerbaijan and Turkey have blocked
off trade routes and energy pipelines, and Armenia's
political instability and proximity to a war zone have
scared off investors.
Armenia's president, Robert Kocharian, a hero of
Nagorno-Karabakh's separatist drive until his
election in 1998, has shown signs that he is ready to
compromise with Azerbaijan over the status of the
enclave. One Western diplomat in Yerevan said the
meeting in Key West, the 16th between the Armenian
and Azerbaijani presidents, is ``the closest we've
seen in terms of getting some sort of agreement.''
Published Thursday, April 5, 2001, in the
����������������� San Jose Mercury News
Fact Sheet: History of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
(Issued by State Department March 30) (510)
Following is the text of a fact sheet released in conjunction with
peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh between Presidents Heidar Aliyev of
Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia that are scheduled to begin
April 3 in Key West, Florida. The talks, which are sponsored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be
opened by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.
(begin text)
U.S. Department of State
March 30, 2001
Fact Sheet
HISTORY OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
In the late l8th century, several khanates, including Karabakh,
emerged in the south Caucasus to challenge the waning influence of the
Ottoman Empire. After the Russian Empire eventually took control over
the region in 1813, Azerbaijani Turks began to emigrate from Karabakh
while the Armenian population of mountainous (nagorno) Karabakh grew.
With the 1917 Russian Revolution, Azerbaijan and Armenia each declared
independence and sought control over Karabakh during the Russian Civil
War. In 1923, after the Bolshevik takeover of the Caucasus,
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) was made an autonomous region within the
Azerbaijani Soviet Republic. Soviet control temporarily quieted ethnic
tensions.
By the 1980s, N-K's population was about 75% ethnic Armenian, with
most Azerbaijanis living in the district and city of Susha. During the
glasnost of the late 1980s, there was a push for a change in N-K's
status. In 1988, Armenian demonstrations against Azerbaijani rule
broke out in both N-K and Armenia, and the N-K Supreme Soviet voted to
secede from Azerbaijan. In 1990, after violent episodes in N-K, Baku,
and Sumgait, Moscow declared a state of emergency in N-K, sent troops
to the region and forcibly occupied Baku. In April 1991, Azerbaijani
militia and Soviet forces targeted Armenian paramilitaries operating
in N-K; Moscow also deployed troops to Yerevan. However, in September
1991 Moscow declared it would no longer support Azerbaijani military
action in N-K. Armenian militants then stepped up the violence. In
October 1991, a referendum in N-K approved independence.
The violence increased dramatically after the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. Over 30,000 people were killed in the fighting from 1992 to
1994. In May 1992, Armenian and Karabakhi forces seized Susha (the
historical, Azerbaijani-populated capital of the region) and Lachin
(thereby linking N-K to Armenia). By October 1993 Armenian and
Karabakhi forces eventually succeeded in occupying almost all of N-K,
Lachin and large areas in southwestern Azerbaijan. As Armenian and
Karabakhi forces advanced, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani
refugees fled to other parts of Azerbaijan. In 1993 the UN Security
Council adopted resolutions calling for the cessation of hostilities,
unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts, and
the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping force in the region. The UN
also called for immediate withdrawal of all ethnic Armenian forces
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Fighting continued,
however, until May 1994 when Russia brokered a cease-fire.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.
Fact Sheet: Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process
(Issued by State Department March 30) (420)
Following is the text of a fact sheet released in conjunction with
peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh between Presidents Heidar Aliyev of
Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia that are scheduled to begin
April 3 in Key West, Florida. The talks, which are sponsored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be
opened by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.
(begin text)
U.S. Department of State
March 30, 2001
Fact Sheet
NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS
Russia brokered a general cease-fire in May 1994 and this continues to
hold. There are frequent violations, however, and cross-border sniping
and land-mine incidents claim hundreds of lives each year. All sides
insist on their continued commitment to a settlement reached through
negotiations.
U.S., Russian and French officials, under OSCE auspices and
representing a group of interested OSCE member states (the "Minsk
Group") as Co-Chairs, have been working in close and effective
cooperation to bring the parties to the negotiating table. Co-Chair
shuttle diplomacy in 1997-98, with input from the parties, generated
three proposals which remain on the table. Each party, however, at one
time or other, rejected at least one of the proposals, thereby
preventing negotiations from restarting within the OSCE framework.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs declined to submit further proposals,
prompting Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev and Armenian President
Robert Kocharian to initiate a direct dialogue in April 1999. The two
presidents have met over a dozen times since then in pursuit of a
settlement. Details of their talks remain confidential. At the same
time, the Co-Chairs have worked separately with the presidents to
facilitate their dialogue and to expand the range of
confidence-building measures and other steps to reinforce the
cease-fire. The Co-Chairs have welcomed the direct dialogue as
complementary to the multilateral diplomatic track. Nevertheless, they
also recognize that Nagorno-Karabakh authorities must be included in
the process and the views of the population there taken into account.
The two presidents met most recently in Paris on January 26 and March
4-5 and, with personal diplomatic efforts by President Chirac, made
some progress. The April 3-7 Key West talks will introduce a new
format by having the presidents meet separately with the three
Co-Chair mediators in a proximity format over the course of several
days.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.
US State Department issues statement on Karabakh talks - Azeri report
Text of report by Azerbaijani news agency Turan on 3 April
Washington, 2 April: The US State Department has released a statement on the
Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents' meeting in Key West on the settlement
of the Karabakh conflict and on the history of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict.
The statement forwarded to Turan news agency said that the OSCE Minsk Group
had put forward three proposals for resolving the conflict in 1997-98. The
parties to the conflict rejected all three proposals. The [Minsk Group]
cochairmen declined to submit new proposals and suggested that the
presidents start a direct dialogue in April 1999. The presidents have held
12 meetings since then, the contents of which are kept secret. At the same
time the cochairmen carried out separate work with both presidents with the
aim of supporting the dialogue, preparing confidence-building measures and
maintaining the cease-fire. The cochairmen consider it important to have the
Nagornyy Karabakh leadership involved in the talks and to take into account
the opinion of the population of the region. Certain progress was obtained
during the presidents' meeting in Paris on 4-5 March.
The statement further says that the Key West talks on 3-4 April will be held
in a new format. Both presidents will have separate meetings with the
cochairmen over several days.
A historical note which was attached to the statement says that after the
Karabakh khanate came under Russia's control in 1813, the Azerbaijani Turks
"began to emigrate" from the region while the Armenian population "grew".
The statement says that the Azerbaijani population was concentrated in the
town of Susa [Shusha]. The Armenian armed forces and the Karabakh Armenians occupied
the town in May 1992. At the same time Lacin District connecting [Nagornyy]
Karabakh with Armenia was occupied as well. Armenian forces occupied a large
chunk of territory in southwestern Azerbaijan in 1992-94. "Hundreds of
thousands of Azerbaijani refugees fled to other parts of the republic from
the advancing Armenian and Karabakh forces."
In its 1993 Resolution, the UN Security Council called for the cessation of
hostilities, access for international humanitarian relief and deployment of
peacekeeping forces in the region. The UN demanded at the same time "the
immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territory of
Azerbaijan".
STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN H.E. HEYDAR ALIYEV
KEY WEST, Florida
APRIL 3, 2001
Unofficial translation
Dear US Secretary of State Powell,
Dear OSCE Secretary General Kubish,
Dear Minsk Conference Co-chairs,
Dear Participants,
Dear Media Representatives,
Ladies & Gentlemen,
First of all, allow me to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Secretary of
State, for your invitation to visit the United States of America. I express my
gratitude to the US Administration, the Key-West authorities and all the
organizers of the meeting for hospitality and excellent working conditions.
Special character of this meeting is defined by the fact that for the first time
the OSCE Minsk Group has gathered in such a format, when OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs along with the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and other
participants plan to discuss peaceful resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Regretfully, such a meeting format has never been used in the past. Maybe, it is
one of the reasons, why we have failed to reach a success until now. I hope that
the current meeting will play a positive role in the resolution of the conflict,
which has been going on for more than 12 years.
The history of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh military conflict is
quite well known to international community. It would not be an exaggeration to
say that this is one of the conflicts in the world, which is not being resolved
for a long time.
Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly speak about and
share my thoughts with you on main obstacles to settlement of the conflict.
It is known that this conflict stemmed from the territorial claims towards
Azerbaijan by Armenia, which tried to seize and annex Nagorno-Karabakh, an
indigenous part of Azerbaijan. It happened in 1988, when Armenia and Azerbaijan
still were sister republics within the Soviet Union. However, as a result of
unjust position of the Soviet leadership towards Azerbaijan, and possibly
because of their unwillingness to prevent the conflict, it has grown and
escalated into a war.
I would like to emphasize that back in 1921 the Government of Azerbaijan granted
the status of autonomous region to the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,
and the region enjoyed all the rights of autonomy. Thus, there were no objective
reasons whatsoever for the eruption of this conflict. At the moment when the
conflict started 185,000 people were living in Nagorno-Karabakh. 74 percent of
them were Armenians and 25.2 percent Azerbaijanis.
Armenia, striving to realize its territorial claims against neighboring country
of Azerbaijan, has provoked separatist and terrorist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
to an armed confrontation. Later Armenia itself started a military aggression
against Azerbaijan.
Nagorno-Karabakh has fallen fully under military control of separatists and the
Armenian armed forces, which carried out an ethnic cleansing by forcibly
expelling the whole Azerbaijani population of 50,000. This process was marked by
murders and violence. And the genocide was carried out against the Azerbaijani
population in the town of Khojaly.
After occupying Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian armed forces escalated their military
operations beyond borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and additionally
occupied, outside of it, seven large administrative regions of Azerbaijan.
Thus, 20 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan had been occupied by the year
1993, and at present continue to remain under the occupation of the Armenian
armed forces. Everything on that territory is destroyed, looted, razed to earth.
More than 900 large and small settlements, about 600 schools, 250 healthcare
institutions, all museums, historical and cultural monuments have been
destroyed.
During the conflict 30,000 Azerbaijani citizens perished, over 200,000 were
wounded and maimed, thousands were taken prisoners, became hostages and are
missing. About a million Azerbaijanis, one out of every eight citizens of the
country, have been forced out from their land and have been living in tents
under unbearable hardships for already nine years. A new generation has grown up
in tents.
It is hard to find any other parallel situation in the world, when one state has
occupied other state�s territories, carried ethnic cleansing there in a massive
scale, and the world community silently observes this tragedy. Azerbaijan�s
justified demands to curb the aggressor are not given support.
Nine years ago, on March 24, 1992, the Council of Ministers of the CSCE at its
special meeting in Helsinki decided to hold the Minsk Conference aimed at
reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Thus, an international body was established to deal with the
resolution of the conflict. This decision, which defined the mandate of the
Minsk Conference and framework for negotiations process, was extremely
important.
In 1993 the UN Security Council has several times debated the issue of the
Armenian armed occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Four resolutions have been
adopted - number 822 dated April 30, number 853 dated July 29, number 874 dated
October 14, and number 884 dated November 11.
In these resolutions the UN Security Council resolutely demanded immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan, as well as creating conditions for the return of
refugees and internally displaced people to their homes and native lands. The
United Nations absolutely supported sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, and reaffirmed the Nagorno-Karabakh region as a part of
Azerbaijan. The Security Council also supported mediating role of the CSCE Minsk
Group.
However, all these resolutions have not been implemented and the UN Security
Council has not bothered itself to follow up on enforcing its own decisions.
In December of 1994, during the CSCE Budapest Summit, a decision was made to
intensify the activities of the CSCE on Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. The CSCE heads of states defined the step-by-step nature of settlement
and instructed the CSCE Minsk Conference co-chairs to work out an agreement on
cessation of the armed conflict. The agreement was to envisage elimination of
main consequences of the conflict for all sides and to become the basis for
convening the Minsk Conference. A decision was also made to deploy
multi-national peacekeeping forces of the CSCE to the conflict zone.
At the OSCE Lisbon Summit, in December 1996, a basic formula for settlement of
the conflict was defined. All the OSCE member-states, with the exception of the
Republic of Armenia, supported three main principles of the settlement, which
ensure the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, granting the
highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan to the Nagorno-Karabakh, with
security guarantees for its whole population.
Thus, the international community has defined legal basis for settlement,
establishing framework for negotiations and identified tasks of mediators.
Since the OSCE Lisbon Summit Russia, US, and France, the three largest nations
in the world, are the Minsk Group co-chairs. We placed high expectations on
them, counted on their efforts to achieve resolution of the conflict, restore
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and return refugees to their homes. But,
unfortunately, until now it didn�t happen. Armenia does not carry out all
decisions made by the United Nations and the OSCE.
The Minsk Group co-chairs have put forward three proposals on settlement of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The first proposal, submitted in
June of 1997, consisted of the package solution of the conflict, the second, as
of October 1997, was based on step-by-step solution. In November of 1998 the
co-chairs made a new, the third proposal, on �common state.�
Azerbaijan accepted the first and the second proposals of the co-chairs as basis
for negotiations, despite the fact that some of their articles contradicted
norms and principles of the international law, encroached on the principle of
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. But even under these circumstances Armenia
refused to accept those proposals and held clearly unconstructive position.
We did not accept the proposal of co-chairs on �common state.� The term �common
state,� which has no international law basis, implies that the Nagorno-Karabakh
is an independent state and territorial entity, and grants it, equally with
Azerbaijan, the status of the subject of the �common state.� This proposal fully
contradicts norms and principles of the international law, deprives Azerbaijan
from a part of its territory and actually legitimizes Armenian aggression
against Azerbaijan.
We consider that co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, guided by the principles of
international law, had to exert more effective influence over the negotiation
process, promote settlement of the conflict, restoration of Azerbaijan�s
territorial integrity and return of refugees to their homes as soon as possible.
The Nagorno-Karabakh, an inalienable part of Azerbaijan, can be granted high
degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan.
Unfortunately, the co-chairs have been mainly busy with mediating, without
exerting necessary influence over the process of negotiations in compliance with
the norms of international law. Our hopes for co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group,
represented by Russia, US and France, have not brought the expected results yet.
Since April of 1999, at the initiative of the US Administration face to face
meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan started, first one
taking place in Washington. Since then we have had numerous meetings with
President Kocharian in Geneva, Moscow, Istanbul, Paris, Minsk, Davos, Yalta, and
also at the border between our countries.
During our dialogue with the President of Armenia we were mainly engaged in
search for mutually acceptable compromises for peaceful resolution of the
conflict and establishing a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I
would like to emphasize that by the end of 1999 we were close to achieving
compromise. But soon afterwards Armenia has renounced on the agreement reached.
During the difficult negotiations the Armenian side has always taken a tough and
unconstructive position. We can not come to an agreement because the position of
the Armenian side at these talks is based on the presumption that, having
occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory, it has an advantage. Armenia by
all means strives to seize part of the territory of Azerbaijan, annex it, or
gain the status of independence for the Nagorno-Karabakh.
Regretfully, the meetings between two Presidents have led the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairs to hold waiting and passive position, reducing their activities to the
principle �Whatever the Presidents agree upon, will be acceptable for the OSCE.�
We, on the other side, consider that the meetings of the Presidents do not
substitute for the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs� activities. Vice versa, they are
mutually complementing and should ensure that negotiation process progresses
into final resolution of the conflict.
In compliance with norms and principles of the international law and the UN
Charter, the territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers of every
independent state, member of the United Nations, should be respected by all,
especially by the OSCE, which has undertaken responsibility for resolution of
this conflict. OSCE and its Minsk Group must strongly adhere to this principle
and by all means promote its strict observance.
However, the current situation in the peace process creates a dangerous
precedent in international relations.
Instead of respecting norms and principles of international law and
strengthening them rigorously, indecisiveness on the part of international
community is witnessed. Fundamental norms and principles of the international
law such as territorial integrity, inviolability of borders are being
questioned, thus damaging the basis for the decades old international practice
and international law, just to please 100,000 Armenians who live in the
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Obviously, peace, stability, and security
achieved as a result of acceptance of military aggression, can be neither
strong, nor lasting.
Having described the history of the current situation in the Armenia-Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, I declare that Azerbaijan remains to be committed to
peace and upholding the cease-fire, which was established in May of 1994. We
will continue to make further efforts aimed at achieving comprehensive and
peaceful resolution of the conflict.
At the same time, I think all what I have just told you gives you an opportunity
to realize the difficult situation we have found ourselves in. Therefore, I
appeal to Russia, US and France, co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to intensify
their activities in order to put an end to this military conflict and establish
lasting peace.
There is no need to prove that Azerbaijan, with 20 percent of its territory
under occupation, hundreds of thousands of citizens living in tents, is most
interested in ending the conflict and achieving peace. It is absolutely clear
that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan will have enormous impact on stability
and security in the whole South Caucasus.
We have arrived at this meeting with great expectations and we count on active
efforts by Russia, US and France, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, and
also on the constructive position of the Republic of Armenia.
Thank you for your attention.
Fact Sheet: History of the Minsk Conference
(Issued by State Department March 30) (400)
Following is the text of a fact sheet released in conjunction with
peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh between Presidents Heidar Aliyev of
Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia that are scheduled to begin
April 3 in Key West, Florida. The talks, which are sponsored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), will be
opened by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.
(begin text)
U.S. Department of State
March 30, 2001
Fact Sheet
HISTORY OF THE MINSK CONFERENCE
The Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on March 24, 1992 requested the
Chairman-in-Office (CiO) to convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh
under the auspices of the CSCE to provide an ongoing forum for
negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. The conference was to have
taken place in Minsk, but never occurred. The so-called Minsk Group
comprising a dozen OSCE states has spearheaded the effort to find a
political solution to the conflict. The Minsk Group today includes
Norway, Austria, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Turkey,
France, the Russian Federation, the United States, as well as Armenia
and Azerbaijan.
The December 1994 Budapest Summit established a co-chairmanship for
the process. The CiO issued on March 23, 1995 the mandate for the
Co-chairmen of the Minsk Process. In early 1997 the Co-Chairmanship
was revised to its current composition: the United States, Russian
Federation, and France. The current Co-Chair representatives are
Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh of the United States, Ambassador Nikolai
Gribkov of the Russian Federation, and Ambassador Jean-Jacques
Gaillarde of France.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs are responsible for efforts to advance peace
and stability in this region. They frequently visit the region,
meeting with the Parties to the conflict (in Baku, Yerevan, and
Stepanakert) to promote a peaceful solution and confidence-building
measures. They report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE) Chairman-in-Office, currently Romanian
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana. The Minsk Process is aided by other
complementary OSCE bodies, such as the High-Level Planning Group
(HLPG), which is made up of military experts seconded by OSCE
participating States, and the Personal Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office, who resides in the region.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State.
AZERBAIJAN GENOCIDE DAY MARKED.
Azerbaijan on 31 March marked the Day
of Azerbaijan Genocide on the 83rd anniversary of the
massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by predominantly Armenian
Bolshevik forces in Baku, the Turan news agency reported.
Flags were flown at half-mast, and the Azerbaijani parliament
appealed on the United Nations and governments around the
world to recognize what the deputies described as the
continuing genocide against the Azerbaijani people by
Armenian forces now occupying portions of Azerbaijan. PG
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 5, No. 64, Part I, 2 April 2001
(for more news on Genocide look Archive42)
War over a word: U.S. should stay out of
Armenian-Turkish dispute
http://www.sacbee.com/voices/news/voices02_20010402.html
(Published April 2, 2001)
Since 1984 there have been sporadic attempts in
Congress to declare the mass killing of Armenians
by troops of the Ottoman Empire during World War
I as genocide. Successive U.S. administrations
have opposed the move on the grounds it would
harm U.S. relations with Turkey, successor to the
Ottoman Empire.
Last fall, under heavy pressure from Ankara,
President Clinton persuaded House Speaker
Dennis Hastert not to allow a vote on the resolution,
which was expected to pass. Now the matter is
again before the House, and President Bush also
opposes the resolution, a reversal of a campaign
promise to "properly recognize the tragic suffering
of the Armenian people."
This bitter, generations-old dispute turns largely on
a single word -- genocide -- meaning a deliberate
attempt to wipe out a people, in this case some 2
million ethnic Armenians who lived in eastern
Anatolia, then and now part of Turkey. In 1915,
Russia, which fought against Turkey in World War
I, invaded the region; the Turkish government,
fearing that ethnic Armenians, who sided with
Russia, would launch attacks against Turks (as
many did), decided to deport all Armenians. In the
following months, Turkish forces and irregulars
massacred whole communities and visited horrors
upon the Armenian population that led to the deaths
of uncounted thousands. Armenians and their
supporters claim the toll was 1.5 million; Turkish
officials have acknowledged as many as 600,000
Armenian deaths, but insist that there was no
genocidal plan and that even more Turks died in
chaotic conditions growing out of war, dislocation
and bitter winter conditions.
In recent years, the weight of scholarly opinion has
shifted toward the Armenian side; many academics
who formerly rejected the genocide claim have
either changed their minds or, some say, have
been cowed into silence by what has come to be
the prevailing view.
Remembering this past is important, not just
because it validates the communal memories of
suffering of Armenians and their American
descendants, but also because it reminds all of
what horrors ethnic strife can unleash. But
government decisions to involve themselves in acts
of symbolic remembrance must also pass a test of
national interest. In this case, Congress would do
well not to take sides in a dispute in which this
country has nothing to gain and perhaps much to
lose.
Apart from harming relations with Turkey, a U.S. ally
and a key player at the confluence of Europe and
the Middle East, U.S. criticism, coming in the wake
of similar actions by several European parliaments,
could further convince Turks that America, like
Europe, is resisting Turkey's inclusion in Western
institutions out of cultural and religious bias.
To brand today's Turkey with the early 20th century
crimes of a long-defunct Turkish regime would only
add to the Turks' sense of alienation from the West
and perhaps set back recent modest gains in
relations between Turkey and independent Armenia
after a decade of economic and diplomatic
estrangement.
A better U.S course would be to apply pressure on
Turkish leaders to grant fuller access for scholars
to Ottoman archives, thus helping to bring to light
more facts about the horrendous events of 1915,
and to prod Ankara into improving its human rights
record, especially with respect to the country's
large Kurdish minority. The cause of history's truth
is better advanced by expanding knowledge of the
past than by hanging political pronouncements on
the wall.
Let historians decide on so-called genocide
Nationalists who use history have different goals. They use events from
the past as weapons in their nations' battles. They have a purpose -- to
triumph for their cause, and they will use anything to succeed in this
goal
Like other men and women, historians have political goals and ideologies,
but a true historian acknowledges his error when the facts do not support
his belief. The nationalist apologist never does so
The Armenian issue has long been plagued with nationalist studies. This
has led to an inconsistent history that ignores the time-tested principles
of historical research. Yet when the histories of Turks and Armenians are
approached with the normal tools a logical and consistent account results
Justine McCharty
Ankara - Turkish Daily News
Throughout the recent debate on the Armenian genocide question, one
statement has characterized those who object to politicians' attempts to
write history, "Let the Historians decide." Few of us have specified who
we are referring to in that statement. It is now time to do so.
There is a vast difference between history written to defend one-sided
nationalist convictions and real accounts of history. History intends to
find that the truth is illusive. Historians know they have prejudices that
can affect their judgement. They know they never have all the facts. Yet
they always try to find the truth, whatever that may be.
Nationalists who use history have a different set of goals. They use
events from the past as weapons in their own nation's battles. They have a
purpose -- the triumph of their cause -- and they will use anything to
succeed in this goal. While a historian tries to collect all the relevant
facts and put them together as a coherent picture, the nationalist selects
those pieces of history that fit his purpose' ignoring the others.
Like other men and women, historians have political goals and ideologies,
but a true historian acknowledges his errors when the facts do not support
his belief. The nationalist apologist never does so. If the facts do not
fit his theories the nationalist ignores those facts and looks for other
ways to make his case. True historians can make intellectual
mistakes. Nationalist apologists commit intellectual crimes.
The Armenian issue has long been plagued with nationalist studies. This
has led to an inconsistent history that ignores the time-tested principles
of historical research. Yet when the histories of Turks and Armenians are
approached with the normal tools of history a logical and consistent
account results. "Let the historians decide" is a call for historical
study like any other historical study, one that looks at all the facts,
studies all the opinions, applies historical principles and comes to
logical conclusions.
Historians first ask the most basic question. "Was there an Armenia?" Was
there a region within the Ottoman Empire where Armenians were a compact
majority that might rightfully demand their own state?
To find the answer, historians look to government statistics for
population figures, especially to archival statistics, because governments
seldom deliberately lie to themselves. They want to know their populations
so they can understand them, watch them, conscript them, and, most
importantly to a government, tax them. The Ottomans were no different than
any other government in this situation. Like other governments they made
mistakes, particularly in under-counting women and children. However, this
can be corrected using statistical methods. What results is the most
accurate possible picture of the number of Ottoman Armenians. By the
beginning of World War I Armenians made up only 17 percent of the area
they claimed as " Ottoman Armenia," the so called "Six Vilayets." Judging
by population figures, there was no Ottoman Armenia. In fact if all the
Armenians in the world had come to Eastern Anatolia, they still would not
have been a majority there.
Two inferences can be drawn from the relatively small number of Armenians
in the Ottoman East: The first is that by themselves, the Armenians of
Anatolia would have been no great threat to the Ottoman Empire. Armenian
rebels might have disputed civil order but there were too few of them to
endanger Ottoman authority. Armenian rebels needed help from outside
forces, help that could only be provided by Russia. The second inference
is that Armenian nationalists could have created a state that was truly
theirs only if they first evicted the Muslims who lived there.
To understand the history of the development of Muslim-Armenian antagonism
one must apply historical principles. In applying those principles one can
see that the history of Armenians was a history like other histories. Some
of that history was naturally unique because of its environment but much
of it was strikingly similar to what was seen in other places and times.
1. Most ethnic conflicts develop over a long period. Germans and Poles,
Finns and Russians, Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, Irish
and English, Europeans and Native Americans in North America -- all of
these ethnic conflicts unfolded over generations, often over centuries.
2. Until very modern times most mass mortality of ethnic groups was the
result of warfare in which there were at least two warring sides.
3. When conflict erupted between nationalist revolutionaries and states it
was the revolutionaries who began confrontations. Internal peace was in
the interest of settled states. Looked at charitably, states often wished
for tranquility for the benefits it gave their citizens. With less charity
it can be seen that peace made it easier to collect taxes and use armies
to fight foreign enemies, not internal foes. World history demonstrates
this too well for examples from other regions to be needed here. In the
Ottoman Empire, the examples of the rebellions in Greece, Serbia and
Bulgaria demonstrate the truth of this.
On these principles, the histories of Turks and Armenians are no different
from other histories. Historical principles applied.
The conflict between Turks and Armenians did indeed develop over a long
time. The primary impetus for what was to become the Armenian-Muslim
conflict lay in Russian imperial expansion. At the time of Ivan the
Terrible, circa the sixteenth century, Russians began a policy of
expelling Muslims from lands they had conquered. Over the next three
hundred years, Muslims, many of them Turks, were killed or driven out of
what today is Ukraine, Crimea and the Caucasus. From the 1770s to the
1850s Russian attacks and Russian laws forced more than 400,000 Crimean
Tatars to flee their land. In the Caucasus region, 1.2 million Circassians
and Abazians were either expelled or killed by Russians. Of that number,
one third died as victims of the mass murder of Muslims that has been
mostly ignored. The Tatars, Circassians and Abazians came to the Ottoman
Empire. Their presence taught Ottoman Muslims what they could expect from
a Russian conquest.
Members of the Armenian minority in the Caucasus began to rebel against
Muslim rule and to ally themselves with Russian invaders in the
1790s: Armenian armed units joined the Russians, Armenian spies delivered
plans to the Russians. In these wars, Muslims were massacred and forced
into exile. Armenians in turn migrated into areas previously held by
Muslims, such as Karabakh. This was the beginning of the division of the
peoples of the southern Caucasus and eastern Anatolia into two conflicting
sides -- the Russian Empire and Armenians on one side, the Muslim Ottoman
Empire on the other. Most Armenians and Muslims undoubtedly wanted nothing
to do with this conflict, but the events were to force them to take sides.
The 1827 to 1829 wars between Russians, Persians and Ottomans saw the
beginning of a great population exchange in the East that was to last
until 1920. When the Russians conquered the Erivan Khanete, today the
Armenian Republic, the majority of its population was
Muslim. Approximately two thirds, 60,000 of these Muslims were forced out
of Erivan by Russians. The Russians went on to invade Anatolia, where
large numbers of Armenians took up the Russian cause. At the war's end,
when the Russians left eastern Anatolia 50 to 90,000 Armenians joined
them. They took the place of the exiled Muslims in Erivan and else where,
joined by 40,000 Armenians from Iran.
The great population exchange had begun, and mutual distrust between
Anatolia's Muslims and the Armenians was the result. The Russians were to
invade Anatolia twice more in the nineteenth century, during the Crimean
War and the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War. In both wars significant numbers of
Armenians joined the Russians acting as spies and even occupation
police. In Erzurum, for example, British consular officials reported that
the Armenian police chief appointed by the Russians and his Armenian force
"molested, illtreated, and insulted the Mohammadan population," and that
6,000 Muslim families had been forced to flee the city. When the Russians
left part of their conquest at least 25,000 Armenians joined them, fearing
the vengeance of the Muslims. The largest migration though was the forced
flight of 70,000 Muslims, mainly Turks, from the lands conquered by the
Russians and the exodus of Laz in 1882.
By 1900, approximately 1,400,000 Turkish and Caucasian Muslims had been
forced out by Russians. One third of those had died, either murdered or
victims of starvation and disease. Between 125,000 and 150,000 Armenians
emigrated from Ottoman Anatolia to Erivan and other parts of the Russian
southern Caucasus.
This was the toll of Russian imperialism. Not only had one-and-a-half
million people been exiled or killed, but ethnic peace had been
destroyed. The Muslims had been taught that their neighbors, the
Armenians, with whom they had lived for more than 700 years, might once
again become their enemies when the Russians next advanced. The Russians
had created the two sides that history teaches were to be expected in
conflict and mass murder.
The actions of Armenian rebels exacerbated the growing division and mutual
fear between Muslims and Armenians of the Ottoman East.
The main Armenian revolutionary organizations were founded in the 1880s
and 1890s in the Russian Empire. They were socialist and nationalist in
ideology. Terrorism was their weapon of choice. Revolutionaries openly
stated that their plan was the same as that which had worked well against
the Ottoman Empire in Bulgaria. In Bulgaria rebels had first massacred
innocent Muslim villagers. The Ottoman government, occupied with a war
against Serbs in Bosnia, depended on the local Turks to defeat the rebels,
which they did, but with great losses of life. European newspapers
reported Bulgarians deaths, but never Muslim deaths. Europeans did not
consider that the deaths were a result of the rebellion, nor the Turk's
intention. The Russians invaded ostensibly to save the Christians. The
result was the death of 260,000 Turks, 17 percent of the Muslim population
of Bulgaria, and the expulsion of a further 34 percent of Turks. The
Armenian rebels expected to follow the same plan.
The Armenian rebellion began with the organization of guerilla bands made
up of Armenians from both the Russian and Ottoman lands. Arms were
smuggled in. Guerillas assassinated Ottoman officials, attacked Muslim
villages, and used bombs, the nineteenth century's terrorist's standard
weapon. By 1894 the rebels were ready for open revolution. Revolts broke
out in Samsun, Zeytun, Van and elsewhere in 1894 and 1895. As in Bulgaria
they began with the murder of innocent civilians. The leader of the Zeytun
rebellion said his forces had killed 20,000 Muslims. As in Bulgaria the
Muslims retaliated. In Van for example 400 Muslims and 1,700 Armenians
died. Further rebellions followed. In Adana in 1909 the Armenian revolt
turned out very badly for both the rebels and the innocent when the
government lost control and 17,000 to 20,000 died, mostly
Armenians. Throughout the revolts and especially in 1894 and 1897 the
Armenians deliberately attacked Kurdish tribesmen, knowing that it was
from them that great vengeance was not that likely to be expected. Pitched
battles between Kurds and Armenians resulted.
But it all went wrong for the Armenian rebels. They had followed the
Bulgarian plan, killing Muslims and initiating revenge attacks on
Armenians. Their own people had suffered most. Yet the Russians and
Europeans they depended upon did not intervene. European politics and
internal problems stayed the Russian hand.
What were the Armenian rebels trying to create? When Serbs and Bulgarians
rebelled against the Ottoman Empire they claimed lands where the
majorities were Serbs or Bulgarians. They expelled Turks and other Muslims
from their lands, but these Muslims had not been a majority. This was not
true for the Armenians. The lands they covered were overwhelmingly Muslim
in population. The only way they could create an Armenia was to expel the
Muslims.
Knowing this history is essential to understanding what was to come during
World War I. There had been a long historical period in which two
conflicting sides developed.
Russian imperialists and Armenian revolutionaries had begun a struggle
that was in no way wanted by the Ottomans. Yet the Ottomans were forced to
oppose the plans of both Russians and Armenians, if only to defend the
majority of their subjects. History taught the Ottomans that if the
Armenians triumphed not only would territory be lost, but mass expulsions
and deaths would be the fate of the Muslim majority. This was the one
absolutely necessary goal of the Armenian rebellion.
The preview to what was to come in the Great War came in the Russian
Revolution of 1905. Harried all over the Empire, the Russians encouraged
ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan, fomenting an inter-communal war. Azeri
Turks and Armenians battled each other when they should have attacked the
Empire that ruled over both. Both Turks and Armenians learned the bitter
lesson that the other was the enemy, even though most of them wanted
nothing of war and bloodshed. The sides were drawn.
In late 1914, intercommunal conflict began in the Ottoman East with the
Armenian rebellion. Anatolian Armenians went to the Russian South Caucasus
for training, approximately 8,000 in Kagizman, 6,000 in Igdir and others
elsewhere. They returned to join local rebels and revolts erupted all over
the East. The Ottoman Government estimated 30,000 rebels in Sivas Vilayeti
alone, probably an exaggeration but indicative of the scope of the
rebellion. Military objectives were the first to be attacked. Telegraph
lines were cut. Roads through strategic mountain passes were seized. The
rebels attacked Ottoman officials, particularly recruiting officers,
throughout the East. Outlying Muslim villages were assaulted and the first
massacring of Muslims began. The rebels attempted to take cities such as
Zeytun, Mus, Sebin Karahisar and Urfa. Ottoman armed forces which were
needed at the front were instead forced to defend the interior.
The most successful rebel action was in the city of Van. In March 1915
they seized the city from a weak Ottoman garrison and proceeded to kill
all the Muslims who could not escape. Some 3,000 Kurdish villagers from
the surrounding region were herded together into the great natural bowl of
Zeve, outside the city of Van, and slaughtered. Kurdish tribes in turn
took their revenge on any Armenian villagers they found.
Popular opinion today knows of only one set of deportations, more properly called forced migrations, in Anatolia, the deportation of the Armenians. There were in fact many forced migrations. For the Armenians, the worst forced migrations came when they accompanied their own armies in retreat. Starvation and disease killed great numbers of both, far more than fell to enemies' bullets
It is true that the Ottomans had obvious reason to fear Armenians, and that forced migration was an age-old tool in Middle Eastern and Balkan conflicts. It is also true that while its troops were fighting the Russians and Armenians, the Ottoman Government could not and did not properly protect the Armenian migrants. Nevertheless, more than 200,000 of the deported Armenians reached Greater Syria and survived.
Those who see the evil of genocide in the forced migrations of Armenians ignore the survival of so many of those who were deported. They also ignore the fact that the Armenians who were most under Ottoman control, those in Western cities such as Izmir, Istanbul, and Edirne, were neither deported nor molested, presumably because they were not a threat.
If genocide is to be considered, however, then the murders of Turks and Kurds in 1915 and 1916 must be included in the calculation of blame. The Armenian molestations and massacres in Cilicia, deplored even by their French and British allies, must be judged. And the exile or death of two-thirds of the Turks of Erivan Province, the Armenian Republic, during the war must be remembered.
Part II
Justine MacCharty
Historical principles were once again at work. Rebels had begun the action and the result was the creation of two warring sides. After the Armenian deeds in Van and elsewhere, Muslims could only have expected that Armenians were enemies who could kill them. Armenians could only have feared Muslim revenge. Most of these people had no wish for war, but they had been driven to it. It was to be a merciless conflict.
For the next five years, total war raged in the Ottoman East. When the Russians attacked and occupied the East, more than a million Muslims fled as refugees, itself an indication that they expected to die if they remained. They were attacked on the roads by Armenian bands as they fled. When the Russians retreated it was the turn of the Armenians to flee. The Russians attacked and retreated, then attacked again, then finally retreated for good. With each advance came the flight of hundreds of thousands.
Two wars were fought in Eastern Anatolia, a war between the armies of Russia and the Ottomans and a war between local Muslims and Armenians. In the war between the armies, civilians and enemy soldiers were sometimes treated with humanity, sometimes not. Little quarter was given in the war between the Armenians and the Muslims, however. That war was fought with all the ferocity of men who fought to defend their families.
Popular opinion today knows of only one set of deportations, more properly called forced migrations, in Anatolia, the deportation of the Armenians. There were in fact many forced migrations. For the Armenians, the worst forced migrations came when they accompanied their own armies in retreat. Starvation and disease killed great numbers of both, far more than fell to enemies' bullets. This is as should be expected from historical principles; starvation and disease are always the worst killers. It is also a historical principle that refugees suffer most of all.
One of-the many forced migration was the organized expulsion of Armenians from much of Anatolia by the Ottoman government. In light of the history and the events of this war, it is true that the Ottomans had obvious reason to fear the Armenians, and that forced migration was an age-old tool in Middle Eastern and Balkan conflicts. It is also true that while its troops were fighting the Russians and Armenians, the Ottoman Government could not and did not properly protect the Armenian migrants. Nevertheless, more than 200,000 of the deported Armenians reached Greater Syria and survived. (Some estimate that as many as two-thirds of the deportees survived.)
Those who see the evil of genocide in the forced migrations of Armenians ignore the survival of so many of those who were deported. They also ignore the fact that the Armenians who were most under Ottoman control, those in Western cities such as Izmir, Istanbul, and Edirne, were neither deported nor molested, presumably because they were not a threat.
No claim of genocide can rationally stand in the light of these facts. If genocide is to be considered, however, then the murders of Turks and Kurds in 1915 and 1916 must be included in the calculation of blame. The Armenian murder of the innocent civilians of Erzincan, Bayburt, Tercan, Erzurum, and all the villages on the route of the Armenian retreat in 1918 must be taken into account. The Armenian molestations and massacres in Cilicia, deplored even by their French and British allies, must be judged. And the exile or death of two-thirds of the Turks of Erivan Province, the Armenian Republic, during the war must be remembered.
That is the history of the Conflict between the Turks and the Armenians. Only when that history is known can the assertions of those who accuse the Turks be understood.
In examining the claims of Armenian nationalists, first to be considered should be outright lies.
The most well-known of many fabrications on the Armenian Question are the famous "Talat Pasa Telegrams," in which the Ottoman interior minister and other officials supposedly telegraphed instructions to murder the Armenians. These conclusively have been proven to be forgeries by Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca. However, one can only wonder why they would ever have been taken seriously. A whole people cannot be convicted of genocide on the basis of penciled scribblings on a telegraph pad.
These were not the only examples of words put in Talat Pasa's mouth. During World War I, the British Propaganda Office and American missionaries published a number of scurrilous works in which Ottoman officials were falsely quoted as ordering hideous deeds.
One of the best examples of invented Ottoman admissions of guilt may be that concocted by the American ambassador Morgenthau. Morgenthau asked his readers to believe that Talat Pasa offhandedly told the ambassador of his plans to eradicate the Armenians. Applying common sense and some knowledge of diplomatic practice helps to evaluate these supposed indiscretions. Can anyone believe that the Ottoman interior minister would actually have done such a thing? He knew that America invariably supported the Armenians, and had always done so. If he felt the need to unburden his soul, who would be the last person to whom he would talk? The American ambassador. Yet to whom does he tell all? The American Ambassador! Talat Pasa was a practical politician. Like all politicians, he undoubtedly violated rules and made errors. But no one has ever alleged that Talat Pasa was an idiot. Perhaps Ambassador Morgenthau knew that the U.S. State Department would never believe his story, because he never reported it at the time to his masters, only writing it later in a popular book.
The use of quotes from Americans is selective. One American ambassador, Morgenthau, is quoted by the Armenian apologists, but another American ambassador, Bristol, is ignored. Why? Because Bristol gave a balanced account and accused Armenians as well as Muslims of crimes.
The most often seen fabrication may be the famous "Hitler Quote." Hitler supposedly stated, "Who after all is today speaking of the destruction of the Armenians?" to justify his Holocaust. The quote now appears every year in school books, speeches in the American Congress and the French Parliament and most writings in which the Turks are attacked. Professor Heath Lowry has cast serious doubt on the authenticity of the quote. It is likely that Hitler never said it. But there is a more serious question: How can Adolf Hitler be taken as a serious source on Armenian history? Were his other historical pronouncements so reliable that his opinions can be trusted? Politically, "Hitler" is a magic word that conjures up an all too true image of undisputed evil. He is quoted on the Armenian Question for polemic and political purpose, to tie the Turks to Hitler's evil. In the modern world nothing defames so well as associating your enemies with Hitler. This is all absurdity, but it is potent absurdity that convinces those who know nothing of the facts. It is also a deliberate distortion of history.
Population has also been a popular field for fabrication. Armenian nationalists had a particular difficulty -- they were only a small part of the population of the land they planned to carve from the Ottoman Empire. The answer was false statistics. Figures appeared that claimed that Armenians were the largest group in Eastern Anatolia. These population statistics were supposedly the work of the Armenian Patriarch, but they were actually the work of an Armenian who assumed a French name, Marcel Leart, published them in Paris and pretended they were the Patriarch's work. Naturally, he greatly exaggerated the number of Armenians and diminished the number of Turks. Once again, the amazing thing is that these were ever taken seriously. Yet they were used after World War I to justify granting Eastern Anatolia to the Armenians and are still routinely quoted today.
The Armenian apologists quote American missionaries as if missionaries would never lie, omitting the numerous proofs that missionaries did indeed lie and avoided mentioning anything that would show Armenians to be less than innocent. The missionaries in Van, for example, reported the deaths of Armenians, but not the fact that those same Armenians had killed all the Muslims they caught in that city.
The main falsification of history by the Armenian apologists lies not in what they say, but in what they do not say. They do not admit that much of the evidence they rely on is tainted because it was produced by the British Propaganda Office in World War I. For example, the Bryce Report, "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire," has recently been reproduced by an Armenian organization, with a long introduction that praises its supposed veracity. Nowhere does the reprint state that the report was produced and paid for by British Propaganda as a way to attack its wartime enemies, the Ottomans. Nor does the reprint state that the other Bryce Report, this one on alleged German atrocities, has long been known by historians to be a collection of lies. Nor does the reprint consider that the sources in the report, such as the Dashnak Party, had a tradition of not telling the truth.
The basic historical omission is never citing, never even looking at evidence that might contradict one's theories. Nationalist apologists refer to English propaganda, missionary reports, statements by Armenian revolutionaries, and the like. They seldom refer to Ottoman documents, hundreds of which have been published in recent years, except perhaps to claim that nothing written by the Ottomans can be trusted although they trust completely the writings of Armenian partisans. These documents indicate that the Ottomans planned no genocide and were at least officially solicitous of the Armenians' welfare. The fact that these contradict the Armenian sources is all the more reason that they should be consulted. Good history can only be written then both sides of historical arguments are considered.
Worst of all is the most basic omission -- the Armenian apologists do not mention the Muslim dead. Any civil war will appear to be a genocide if only the dead of one side are counted. Their writings would be far more accurate, and would tell a very different story, if they included facts such as the deaths of nearly two-thirds of the Muslims of Van Vilayeti, deaths caused by the Russians and Armenians. Histories that strive for accuracy must include all the facts, and the deaths of millions of Muslims is surely a fact that deserves mention.
Those of us who have studied this question for years have seen many approaches come and go. The old assertions, based on the Talat Pasa telegrams and missionary reports, were obviously insufficient, and new ones have appeared.
For a while, Pan-Turanism was advanced as the cause for Turkish actions. It was said that the Turks wished to be rid of the Armenians because the Armenian population blocked the transportation routes to Central Asia. This foundered on the rocks of geography and population. The Anatolian Armenian population was not concentrated on those routes. The Armenian Republic's Armenians, those in Erivan Province, were on some of those routes. However, when at the end of the war the Ottomans had the chance to occupy Erivan they did not do so, but went immediately on to Baku to protect Azeri Turks from attacks by enough to believe that their chief concern was advancing to Uzbekistan.
Much was made of post-war-courts martial that accused members of the Committee of Union and Progress Government of crimes against the Armenians. The accusations did not state that the courts were convened by the unelected quisling government of Ferid Pasa who created the courts to curry favor with the allies. The courts returned verdicts of guilty for all sorts of improbable offenses, of which killing Armenians was only one. The courts chose anything, true of false, that would cast aspersion on Ferid's enemies. The accused could not represent themselves. Can the verdicts of such courts be trusted? Conveniently overlooked were the investigations of the British, who held Istanbul and were in charge of the Ottoman Archives, but who were forced to admit that they could find no evidence of massacres.
10 April 2001, Copyright� Turkish Daily News
News referred from Habarlar-L