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Islam & The Niqab

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One's Religious Views Should Be Identified as Part of an Established Religious Institution/Sect,

But they Do Not Have to Be Shared Identically by Anyone Else To Be Honored by the Court

Numerous states throughout the United States provide religious exceptions from a photo requirement on a driver's license. These states have accommodated an individual's First Amendment rights and have not found that the state's interest is so compelling as to require an individual to choose between violating a fundamental religious tenet or surrendering their driver's license.

Each state has different law on how the exemption is to be acknowledged and implemented. Florida could make it as restrictive as they wanted within reason. For instance, in some states you just fill out a form noting your religious objection; in other states you must go before the Governor for his or her acknowledgement of your beliefs; yet, in some states (such as Vermont) the photo is not required at all (the applicant must go to another building to request and pay for an optional photo). Of course, most everyone chooses to get the photo because they find it beneficial for their daily transactions outside of driving and they have no religious objections to it.

Although the state of Florida is in no way compelled to adopt laws of other states, that is not the point in raising the issue. The point is that there are already driver's with valid non-photo licenses driving in Florida, pulled over by law enforcement, issued tickets, etc., and these people present no problem or threat to the system. It goes to the arguement of compelling state interest, showing that the system is already equipped to deal with exceptions.

Following is just a sample of relevant case law that supports a niqab (face veil) driver's license photo and rejects the state's right to trample on religious exercise, because alternative methods of identification are sufficient.

Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff.'d sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), 10 5 S. Ct. 3492 (1985).

Quaring, a Christian Nebraska driver's license applicant believed that the Second Commandment expressly forbids the making of "any graven image or likeness" of anything in creation. Exodus 20:4; Deuteronomy 5:8. Quaring's refusal to allow herself to be photographed was a response to a literal interpretation of the Second Commandment and that it was her personal interpretation. The court noted that Quaring's beliefs were religious in nature, though unusual in the twentieth century.

The Court noted that although the position and current practice is in the minority, that Quaring was still entitled to protection. in fact, the Quaring court stated as follows:

"[T]he guaranty of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function an dcompetence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow [adherent] more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. 

The Quaring court also rejected Nebraska's argument that the quick and accurate identification of motorists is compelling enough to prohibit exemptions to the photograph requirement.

Mr. Dennis, a member of The Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA, believed that the Second Commandment prohibited him from having a photograph taken.

The court found that the state's interest was not so compelling as to prohibit selective exemptions to the photograph requirement.

The court noted people seeking an exemption from the photograph requirement on religious grounds were few enough in number that the Colorado officials could not demonstrate that allowing a religious exemption would present an administrative or overwhelming problem.

The Court stated:

"I conclude that the path of judicious prudence coincides my inclination that the higher values of the First Amendment should prevail over the state's concerns about bureaucratic inconvenience."

A group of Christians from the Pentecostal House of Prayer in Indiana believed that the Second Commandment prohibits them from owning or posing for a photograph, painting, and/or sculpture. The court deferred to this fundamental precept and held that the Indiana statute's photograph requirement was unconstitutional if it required one to choose between surrendering their driving privileges and violating an important tenet of their religion. Although the court agreed that there was a strong, if not compelling interest, the court stated "the idea that the photograph requirement is necessary to that interest is patently absurd."

The Court further stated:

"The Bureau's argument that the photograph requirement gives it a means of speedy, positive identification, thus aiding the Bureau in the performance of its duty to insure safe roads in Indiana, is more compelling. Normally, we would not question the State's need for administrative efficiency in an area as broad and complex as is involved in the licensing of all Indiana drivers. However, we feel that there are other alternatives available to the Bureau which would satisfy this purpose without impinging on the rights of these appellees. For example, statistics which are traditionally included on a driver's license such as license number, height, weight, eye and hair color, have long proven adequate to enable the Bureau to fill its important duties.

Furthermore, we feel that it is much to a driver's advantage to have a photo-license as it is to the state. Having a photo-license goes a long way to easing the problems which arise when cashing checks and transacting other non-cash business. Since a photo-license is arguably an advantage to license-holders, it follows that the exemption sought by appellees will to some degree, work a disadvantage upon them. Thus it is not likely that a ruling in appellees' favor will result in wide spread abuse.

In sum, we agree with the trial court's finding that the state's interest in the photograph requirement, such as it is, is not so compelling that it may be allowed to infringe upon appellees' fundamental right to freely exercise their religious beliefs."

These cases and many others make it clear that the court cannot consider evidence that a person's beliefs are "wrong" because not shared by others, even those of the same faith.

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