Atoms
and Monads:
Democritus and Leibniz
*All is taken from “Panpsychism in the West” by
David Skrbina, Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2005.
In the first book of De anima Aristotle
takes pains to note that
most everyone before him, through and including Plato, did not clearly
distinguish between soul and mind (nous). For example, we find the
following
passage on Democritus:
“Soul and mind are, he says, one and the
same thing.” (405a10)
Finally, consider the atomist theory of
Leucippus and Democritus. On
their view, all things in the world consist of imperceptibly small,
indivisible
atoms (atomos) that move through otherwise empty
space and interact via
mechanical means to create the large-scale objects of matter. Democritus claimed that not all atoms are
alike, but that there are many different sizes and shapes, and that
these
differences account for the different physical properties.
It is sometimes believed that there is no place
for mind or soul in the
atomist universe. And in fact these philosophers did take the first
steps away
from a “hylozoist” interpretation. Cleve (1969: 421) has noted this:
For the very first time, we have here the
notion of “matter without consciousness.”
Democritus (or Leucippus) forms the notion of atomoi apatheis,
of
“unfeeling atoms,” being the first to drop [in part] the idea of
panzoism.
However, these philosophers did not eliminate
soul
from the cosmos. Even though most kinds of atoms were completely
without
feeling, one certain type of atom—namely, that of spherical shape—was
unique in
that it possessed psyche and sensitiveness. Aristotle
explains that “those [atoms] which are spherical [Democritus] calls
fire and
soul” (De anima 404a2). The
implied connection between soul
and fire was evidently quite common in ancient Greece; both were seen
as the
most rarefied of substances, and often soul was considered to be made
from the
element fire. The Democritean psyche was thus atomistic and material,
like all
things.10
The crucial question is this: Which objects, in
addition to humans,
contain the spherical soul atoms? Aristotle continues:
Spherical atoms are identified with soul
because atoms of that shape are most adapted to permeate everywhere,
and to set
all the other [atoms] moving by being themselves in movement. (404a5)
If soul atoms are everywhere (and not just
“everywhere
in the human/animal body”), the apparent conclusion is that all things
have
souls (argument by Continuity). Consistent with earlier theories of
soul, there
are clear implications here that soul-atoms are omnipresent and are the
ultimate cause of motion. Perhaps they are not always everywhere,
and
perhaps they are not the only source of
motion—this we cannot tell.
Consequently, it is difficult to clearly determine the extent of
panpsychism in
atomism. But the concept of a soul-atom had a great
deal of
influence, both on ancient atomists (including Epicurus and Lucretius)
and on
panpsychist philosophers, even through the late 1800s. William Clifford
(ca.
1870) and others put forth panpsychist theories of “mind-stuff” that
recall the
ideas of Democritus.
It bears repeating that, apart from Heraclitus,
the so-called hylozoist
tradition of the pre-Socratics is misnamed. Nothing in the above
citations
indicates specifically that anyone viewed all things as alive (except
through
the indirect association of life with psyche). ‘Hylopsychism’ would be
more
appropriate, or even ‘hylotheism’. (‘Pantheism’ is not really correct,
since
that term implies that a singular god is identical with all things; the
intent was
clearly that multiple gods exist, and that they dwell in things as an
inherent
aspect of being.) ‘Hylozoism’ carries a negative connotation in modern
literature and is frequently used as a vague disparagement of aspects
of Greek
philosophy. The term is incorrect and misleading, and it is one more
indication
of the low regard given to panpsychist philosophy. Surprisingly, the
one
ancient philosopher most deserving of the label ‘hylozoist’ is Plato.
********************************************
Leibnitz
The panpsychism of Leibniz (1646–1716) was
rooted in his conception of the monad. Yet even
before his development of this
concept he found reasons to see all
things as animate. Some of his earliest philosophical
writings date from
the mid 1680s, when he was about 40 years old. In Primary Truths he asserted, with emphasis, that “every
particle of the universe contains a world of an infinity of creatures” (1686a/1989: 34). The same year, in a
letter to Arnauld, Leibniz defined ‘soul’ as “substantial form” and
attributed
it to all things with a “thoroughly indivisible” unity: “I assign substantial forms to all
corporeal
substances that are more than mechanically united.”
(1686b/1989: 80)
The extent of such objects is presumed to be widespread but is left
unspecified.
Leibniz seems to have had at least two
reasons for thinking this way. The first was Leeuwenhoek’s recent (ca.
1660)
invention of the microscope and his discovery of “animalcules” in
apparently
clear drops of water. This was dramatic empirical evidence that
hitherto unseen
forms of life resided in unsuspected places. A plethora of life implied
a
plethora of souls. Leibniz admitted as much in a 1687 letter to
Arnauld: “. . .
experience
favors
this multitude of animated things. We find that there is a prodigious
quantity
of animals in a drop of water.” (1989: 88)
Second, Leibniz found theological reasons
for this belief. An ensouled universe was
more nearly perfect than one in which only mankind possessed soul, and
thus was
more in line with the perfection of God. It is, Leibniz
wrote, “in
conformity with
the greatness and beauty of the works of God for him to produce as many
[true] substances
as there can be in this universe” (1687/1989: 87).
It is
“a perfection of nature to have many
[souls]” (ibid.).
Detailed reference to the notion of the
monad did not come until 1698, and the full development of the monad
theory not
until the works Principles of Nature and Grace (1714a) and Monadology (1714b). However, even Leibniz’s writings
leading up to the concept of the monad indicated that he associated the
soul or
substantial form with a point-like entity. As early as 1671, at age 25,
he
wrote that “the soul, strictly speaking, is only at a point in space”
(in
Hoeffding 1908: 335). In 1695, he wrote of “true unities” underlying reality:
. . . in order to find these real
unities, I was forced to have recourse
to a real and animated point, so to speak, or to an atom of
substance which must include something of form or activity to make a
complete
being. (1695: 139)
Here again we see the association of
animation with a point-like entity. Leibniz continues:
I found that [the
atoms’] nature consists in force,
and that
from this there follows something analogous to sensation [i.e.
perception] and
appetite, so that we must conceive of them on the model of the notion
we have
of souls.
Like Bruno’s, Leibniz’s monad was a
point-like, atom-like entity that constituted all extant things. The
monad was
the true substance, and all other things were simply collections or
aggregates
of these monad substances: “These monads
are
the true atoms of nature, and, in brief, the elements of things.”
(1714b, section 3) Monads have the rather paradoxical quality of being
at once
absolutely simple and “without parts” and yet being absolutely unique
from one
another. In fact every monad is a kind of focal point for its own
perspective
on the universe, and is internally as complex and ordered as the entire
cosmos:
. . . there must be a plurality of properties
and relations in the
simple substance [i.e. monad], even though it has no parts.
(1714b,
section 13)
. . . each monad is a living mirror . . .
which represents the
universe from its own point of view, and is as ordered as the universe
itself.
(1714a, section 3)
These simple yet complex monads have other
interesting characteristics. First, they are “windowless”—they have no
direct
interaction with the outside world or with each other. They are exempt
from
physical causality. Second,
monads have two
primary capabilities: perception and appetite.
Perceptions are just
the states that monads pass through as they continually reflect their
ever-changing perspective on the universe. The appetite, or desire, is
that
which “brings about the change or passage from one perception to
another”
(ibid., section 15). The animistic flavor of these two terms is clearly
linked
to the idea that every monad is a soul.
Monads thus served as the theoretical basis
for Leibniz’s panpsychism. In 1698 he wrote:
I
believe that . . . it is consistent neither with the order nor with the
beauty
or the reason of things that there should be something vital or immanently active
only in a
small part of matter, when it would imply
greater perfection if it
were in all. And even if . . . intelligent souls . . . cannot be
everywhere,
this is no objection to the view that there should everywhere be souls,
or at least things
analogous to souls. (1698/1956: 820; section 12)
In Monadology (section 66) he reiterated: “. . . we see
that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of
entelechies, of souls in the least part of matter.” Panpsychism was a
consistent and fundamental aspect of his metaphysics.
Leibniz faced three perplexing and related
questions: How can point-like entities adhere to form apparently solid
objects?
How can a theory of monads account for the high-level soul/mind that is
found
in humans? And why do certain collections of monads (e.g. humans)
possess
high-level unified minds whereas others (e.g., rocks) do not?
The solutions to these problems center on
two concepts: that of the aggregate and that of the dominant monad. Throughout his
philosophical career, Leibniz emphasized the distinction between mere
collections or aggregates of monads and those collections with a
substantial
sense of wholeness and unity. Aggregates included objects or systems
that were
loosely organized, like a “heap of stones,” an “army,” a “herd,” or a
“flock.”
They furthermore included objects that were apparently solid and
whole—rocks,
tables, houses, shoes, and so on. In his theory of aggregates Leibniz
followed Democritus25:
aggregates only seem to be whole and unified. Their unity is only in
our
minds, not in reality. This is clear in the case of flocks and
herds, less so in the case of
a solid rock.
Yet Leibniz saw them as on a continuum and
as distinct from other objects—humans, other animals, plants—that were
truly
integrated beings. Integrated objects possess a “substantial
unity,” something that “requires
a thoroughly indivisible and naturally
indestructible being” (1686b/1989: 79).
The substantial unity of true individuals
was realized physically by the dominant monad. Of
the countless monads making up the body of a person, one monad
somehow came to dominate the others and to draw them together into
cohesiveness.26
This dominant monad, or “primary
entelechy,”
was the soul of the person. The
human body, in itself, was
considered a mere aggregate; but together with the dominant monad or
soul it
made up a “living being”:
[The dominant monad] makes up the center of a
composite substance (an animal, for example) and is the principle of
its unity,
is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads, which
constitute the body belonging to this central
monad. (1714a, section 3)
Again, this was the case for humans,
animals, plants, and the microscopic animalcules in the droplets of
water. Such
things were in fact doubly ensouled: they consisted of animate
sub-monads, and
they possessed a single unifying soul in the dominant monad. Aggregates
were
not animate in themselves, but were still composed of the same
soul-like
monads. Therefore, even aggregates were
animate in a restricted sense. This was identical to Bruno’s view, but
Bruno
offered no theory as why it should be the case. Leibniz at
least proposed
the outline of a theory, even though he left many things
unanswered—including
how and why one monad comes to dominate and why this only happens in
certain
collections of monads.
These open questions point to an
incompleteness in Leibniz’s theory. He was never clear, for example, on
whether
large-scale objects or systems, such as the Earth, were to be
considered
“substantial unities.” Only once, in an early letter to Arnauld, did he
address
this directly: “. . . if
I am asked in
particular what I say about the sun, the earthly globe, the moon,
trees, and other
similar bodies. . . . I cannot be absolutely certain whether they are
animated,
or even whether they are substances. . . .”
(1686b/1989: 80) Leibniz
soon accepted trees and other plants as animated beings, but
the general status of large-scale systems remained open throughout his
life.