Justice:
What's The Right
Thing To Do? Episode 08: QUESTIONS
Immanuel Kant vs
Rawls on the “Original
(Social) Contract”
1.
In the last
episode we discussed that the “Original
(Social) Contract,” for Kant, IS
NOT HYPOTHETICAL (a “contract that
never happened” – as Sendal
claims), but an !!!IDEA OF
REASON!!!
Explain
this,
and discuss how Rawls’ conditions for a theory of justice are different
from Kant’s…
(i.e., that the
“Original (Social) Contract,” for Rawls, IS hypothetical, etc…)
2.
“Imagine a contract among
parties
who were equal in power and knowledge, who were identically situated,
that
is the idea behind
Rawls’
claim that the way to
think
about justice is from the standpoint of a hypothetical contract, behind
a veil
of ignorance, that creates a condition of equality by ruling out (or
enabling
us to forget for the moment) the differences in power and knowledge
that could
even in principle, lead to unfair results. This is why for
Kant and
for Rawls a hypothetical contract among equals is the only way to think
about
principles of justice. What will those
principles
be?”
3.
Explain
the First Principle; and why does Rawls reject Utilitarianism?
4.
Explain the
Second Principle, and what would be the test for it? Would income
inequalities
be tolerated under this principle? How does Rawls deal with this?
5.
What’s
wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?
Relate
this to the problems with a Meritocratic
System?
6.
Why
doesn’t even the formal
equality of opportunity – the Libertarian
conception – extend its
incite far enough?
7.
Rawls
thinks that the principle of eliminating morally arbitrary influences
in the
distribution of income and wealth requires going beyond the
meritocratic
system. Now,
how do you go
beyond?
8.
Some
questions to ponder:
a.
In an egalitarian
system, would
the more talented people still want to work hard, if they know that
they will
have to give away a part of what they’ve made? Would not the best
system to exercise
their talents be a meritocracy?
b.
Does it bother you that in a meritocratic
system, even
with fair equality of opportunity, people get ahead, get rewards, that
they
don’t deserve… simply because they happen to be naturally gifted?
c.
Would
not
correcting for this arbitrariness be detrimental – because it would
reduce incentives?
d.
We all have some sort of “undeserved glory” of
some
sort, so should you be satisfied with the process of your life –
because you
have not created any of this? From a societal standpoint, should we not
have
some kind of a gut reaction to the “minority” (well-endowed, wealthy)
being
oppressed by the majority? Why even put in the effort?
e.
Effort? Rawls
says that even the effort that some people expend: conscientious
driving, he work
ethic,… even effort
depends on fortunate family
circumstances – for which you, we, can claim no credit. … Psychologists
say
that work ethic striving is related to the order of one’s birth. If the
case
for the meritocratic conception is that effort should be rewarded,
doesn’t
Rawls have a point that even effort, striving, work ethic, is largely
shaped –
even by birth order? Is it your doing that you were first in the birth
order?
[NO…] So,
why should income and wealth and opportunities in
life be based on factors
arbitrary from a moral point
of view? That’s a challenge that he puts to
market societies, but
also to those of us at places like “this,” i.e., COLEGIO
BRAINS
question
to think about for next time…
9.
Discuss the three different theories of
distributive
justice mentioned: strengths and weaknesses…
10.
Discuss three objections to
Rawls’ Egalitarian theory… the
Difference Principle in detail…
11.
In argument 3b
Sandel discusses the
Libertarian objection to Rawls’ Egalitarian theory via the
idea of self-ownership
developed by Nozick;
ultimately, the argument reacts to the idea of COERCION : that
is, if you tax people to create public schools –
against their will – you coerce
them – it’s a form of THEFT. And the reason is, according to the Libertarians, we have to think of
ourselves as owning
our talents and endowments, because, otherwise, we’re back to
just using
people, and coercing people – that’s the Libertarian reply.
a.
How does
Rawls answer this objection?
b.
How would
Rousseau and Kant answer this objection?
See the
excerpts from
i.
Rousseau’s “Social Contract” Excerpt_from_Rousseau_Social _Contract.html ; and
ii.
Kant’s essay on “Theory and
Practice” Excerpt_from_Kant_Theory_and_practice.html (discuss Kant’s
idea of coercion being necessary with a Civil Constitution)…
12.
What is
the difference between moral desserts and entitlements?
13.
Rawls says distributive
justice is not a matter of moral dessert, though it is a matter of
entitlements
to legitimate expectations. Here’s
where he explains it: “A just scheme
answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate
expectations
as founded upon social institutions. But what
they are entitled to is not proportional to or
dependent upon their intrinsic worth.”The
principles of justice that
regulate the basic structure do not mention moral dessert, and there is
no
tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it. Why
does Rawls make this distinction? What morally is at stake?