

Tiananmen Square

Paper 2: Strategic Briefing. (RIBA Work Stage B)

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Tiananmen Square: Paper 2: Strategic Briefing

“And all this in a moment of time: for thought is quick.”

Thomas Hobbes.

“Leviathan,” (Part 1, Chapter 3: “Of the Consequence or Trayne of Imaginations.”)

1651

Preface

This paper is written as a second part to my first paper on the subject of Tiananmen Square. It might be read as a consequence to the various ‘trains’ of imagination that were expressed in it.

Acknowledgements

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Introduction

In my first paper on the Architectural opportunities for Tiananmen Square, I suggested that there could be an opportunity to build government offices on the site. However, after considering the options for the site I suggested that to place any buildings directly on the square may not be the best option from an Architectural point of view. In short, the integrity of the square as a unity set within the morphology of the city as it is broadly arranged could well be lost. This would indeed be regrettable, particularly if the square could be opened up for the people as suggested in my earlier paper.

I then referred the reader to the potential of other site areas that exist in the vicinity of the square which might be usefully employed as possible areas for future development. Indeed, due to their central location they too might be used for government offices. In this paper, I now wish to turn to the question of how this opportunity might be exploited. However, before turning to the detail of this proposal it may be useful to assess just what a government is, and how this interpretation might apply to the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). I shall cover these topics in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. Based on this analysis and in Chapter 3, I shall briefly cover what an outline scope of works for the project might include.

In Chapters 4 to 6, I shall then return to the task of site analysis, from both a theoretical standpoint and a practical standpoint. In Chapter 7 to 9 I shall address the elements of the design that may be important at each individual site location identified. In Chapter 10 I will then return to the theoretical aspects of designing for the total site and suggest any further solutions or direction required. In Chapters 11 and 12, I will suggest some ideas for implementing a possible programme for the works, and deal with the question of building costs and funding. Lastly, in Chapter 13, I shall cover the topic of further work to done.

1. Government Structures

Before one can design offices for a government client, the Architect ought to posit the question "What is a Government?" For without knowing what a government is in general terms, one cannot design for it.

Firstly, a government is an institution, a corporate body not dissimilar to any large privately run corporation. Table 1 shows how governments have in fact quite similar structures or hierarchies of command and control, ownership structures and employment structures.

Secondly, governments may be structured in a similar fashion to a private holding company. In short, its various departments and ministries can be considered as separate 'corporations' under the ownership of a single institution.

Nor do governments differ particularly from private corporations in their general aims or objectives. These are: its immediate survival in the World by the creation of 'wealth,' secondly, its self-perpetuation or regeneration over a longer period of time, and thirdly, its ability to expand either by reproduction, replication, innovation, merger (either friendly or hostile) or takeover.

Governments and private corporations will also engage in broadly similar behaviour patterns. For example, they both expend energy developing new opportunities that may lead to the goals outlined above. They will also engage in activities which will help to reduce risks or resolve any potential threat to its continued existence.

If Governments are similar to private corporations in structure, goal orientation and behaviour, how do they differ? The most important difference between the two entities is (ordinarily) the means by which Governments can seek to achieve its goals. In short, Governments can use force. Indeed, private corporations are generally limited in this regard by Governments. Because private corporations cannot usually engage in the use of force, such corporations are generally happy to assist governments in this area either financially (through taxation) or with the transfer of knowledge, equipment or even personnel.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that in order to provide private corporations with protection, governments seek to control and defend a given three dimensional space, which covers land, sea and air. Private corporations can then operate, unmolested, within that given area.

Table 1: Typical Government Structures		
	A: Structure of a Private Business Corporation	B: Typical Government Structure
1	Chairman of the Board of Governors	Head of State
2	The Board of Governors	Executive Council
3	Chairman of the Board of Directors	"A Prime Minister" (3)
4	The Board of Directors	"Cabinet" (3)
5	Share-holder Representatives (1)	Upper House of Parliament (4)
6	Share-holder Representatives (2)	Lower House of Parliament (5)
7	Share-holders (with voting rights) ("Ordinary" share-holders)	The Voting Electorate (for items 5 & 6)
8	Share-holders (with no voting rights)	Non-voters: eg. people below age of 18 years of age, Criminals, Mad People, Animals and Foreign Residents
9	Company Employees	Civil Servants (including The Armed Forces)

Note (1): These share-holder representatives might either include retired share-holding directors and / or governors, or share-holders of individual corporations within the corporate holding company structure.

Note (2): These share-holder representatives (of the main holding company) might be managers of brokerages, banks, mutual funds, pension funds and life assurance corporations, as well as share-holding directors and / or governors. These might be analogous to political parties in a government structure.

Note (3): Office exists in countries with Heads of State, who are Constitutional Monarchs or Constitutional Presidents, and with some Executive Presidencies (eg: France). USA for example does not officially have these offices. (In the UK they effectively form item 2, the "Executive Council," which is called HMG, as servants or ministers of "The Crown," under the leadership of the Head of State, HM The King or HM The Queen. They are usually members of the elected Lower House of Parliament, and the leaders of a political faction which also has the most elected members in the Lower House. (See also Table 8.))

Note (4): These representatives could be appointed by the Head of State (Eg: The UK, Canada and the PRC, I believe), or they could represent individual provinces or states within the nation state, either through direct elections by residents (Eg: The USA), or as delegates elected from and by the provincial or state governments.

Note (5): These representatives often represent individual voters or residents through small geographical constituency areas, where representatives are personally known to the voters in each area (Eg: The USA, Canada and the UK), or as delegates elected from and by the provincial or state governments (Eg: The PRC).

2. The People's Republic of China (PRC)

Is the government of The People's Republic of China (PRC) similar to the general arrangement of private business corporations, and therefore, other government structures? Table 2 demonstrates that it is.

Table 2: PRC Government Structure (1)		
	A: Structure of a Private Business Corporation (From Table 1)	B: PRC Government Structure
1	Chairman of the Board of Governors	Chairman of the SCMCPRC (2)
2	The Board of Governors	SCMCPRC
3	Chairman of the Board of Directors	Premier of the State Council
4	The Board of Directors	The State Council (3)
5	Share-holder Representatives	The CPPCC (6)
6	Share-holder Representatives	The NPC (4)
7	Share-holders (with voting rights) ("Ordinary" share-holders)	The Voting Electorate (for item 6) (5)
8	Share-holders (with no voting rights)	Non-voters: eg. people below age of 18 years of age (?), Criminals, Mad People, Animals and Foreign Residents
9	Company Employees	Civil Servants (including The Armed Forces)

Note (1): Information from <http://en.wikipedia.org> and <http://bbc.co.uk>

Note (2): The Chairman of the SCMCPRC is head of the armed forces of the PRC and acts as a typical Head of State rather than the President of the PRC, who has no military command.

Note (3): No members of "The State Council" are members of the SCMCPRC to my knowledge.

Note (4): The NPC elects the Chairman of the SCMCPRC, the SCMCPRC, the President of the PRC, the Premier of the State Council, the State Council, and the Supreme People's Court.

Note (5): The voting electorate vote for district level "congresses." District Congress members vote for delegates from the District Congress to the Provincial Congress. Provincial Congress members vote for delegates from their Provincial Congress to the NPC. The armed forces also elect delegates to the NPC.

Note (6): Members of the CPPCC are, I believe, appointed by The Head of State, much like the members of the UK House of Lords. (However, members might also be elected by a similar system to the NPC process.)

There are however, certain features about the PRC system of government which are worth mentioning. The first of these concerns the theory and practice of “State Sovereignty,” the second concerns the arrangement of the parliament, and third is the possibility of future changes in the order of government in general.

(a) State Sovereignty

Like other nation states, the definition of “sovereignty” in the PRC is defined by an *a priori*. In this case “sovereignty” resides with the people of the country, rather than a “Crown” or “The State.” The people of the country are referred to as “The People.”

Like other states this “sovereignty” is also personified in a practical sense by the person of “The Head of State.” (In the case of a monarchy it is the person of the monarch. (The word “sovereignty” is derived from the Latin word for a King, which is “Rex.”) In a republic it is either a constitutional president, who is often appointed by an elected Lower House, or it is an executive president directly elected to that position by the people of the country.) Outwardly, in the PRC this appears to be a “constitutional president.” He or she is appointed by what might be called the Lower House of Parliament, which is called the National People’s Congress (NPC).

Unlike other nation states, whether monarchies or republics, the President of the PRC however does not control the armed forces. This task appears to be held by another office (The Chairman of the State Central Military Commission of The People’s Republic of China (SCMCPRC)). Therefore, **effective** sovereign power is held, not by the President of the PRC, but by this other office, higher up the chain of command.

There is a second point of apparent difference with the PRC structure of “sovereignty” compared to other nation states. In the PRC the **effective** appointment to the positions of “President of the PRC” and the Chairman of the SCMCPRC appears to be made through the structure of a single political party, and no other, prior to any official election by an organ of state. This party is called “The Communist Party of China” (CPC). In short, the (state) sovereignty of the people of the PRC seems to be exclusively and consistently mediated by the CPC.

Table 3 shows a possible hierarchy of the selection process which lies behind the effective sovereignty of the nation. As one can see this selection process has an extraordinary number of layers compared to any other common method of selection used elsewhere. (The table also shows how the organs of the dominant political party, the CPC, inter-twine with the state structure of “sovereign” power, and affect the selection process of its key participants, prior to any official election by the lower house, the NPC.)

Table 3: PRC Sovereignty and CPC Structure (1)			
	Title of Office	Structure	Order of Promotion (7)
1	Chairman of the State Central Military Commission of the PRC (SCMCPRC) (2)	State	4
2	The State Central Military Commission of the PRC (SCMCPRC) (2)	State	
3	The Standing Committee of the Politburo (5-9 people) (3)	CPC	
4	The Politburo (19-25 people) (4)	CPC	
5	Chairman of the Central Military Commission (5)	CPC	3
6	The Central Military Commission (5)	CPC	
7	The President of the PRC (2)	State	2
8	The General Secretary of the Central Committee	CPC	1
9	The Central Committee / Standing Committee of the National Committee (300 people)	CPC	
10	The National Congress / National Committee (2,000 people) (6)	CPC	
11	The Party Membership (66 million people)	CPC	
12	The People (1.2 billion people)	State	

Note (1): Information from <http://en.wikipedia.org> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Note (2): Officially elected to the position by NPC.

Note (3): Meets weekly. (Elected by the Politburo?)

Note (4): Meets monthly. (Elected by the Central Committee?)

Note (5): Officially elected to position by the Politburo of the CPC.

Note (6): Meets once every 5 years. Delegates are from the regional offices of the CPC. (Officially elects the Central Committee and the General Secretary?)

Note (7): Order of promotion to position of effective "Head of State" with command of the armed forces.

Note (8): Red represents the state, blue represents the CPC

(b) The State Parliament

The second feature of the basic corporate structure of the government of the PRC concerns the arrangement of (legislative) powers within its parliament. Like other nations, the parliament has two houses: a 'lower' house, which is called "The National People's Congress" (NPC), and an 'upper' house, which is called "The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" (CPPCC).

There are a number of points worth noting:

Firstly, like other parliaments of nation states with a constitutional president or constitutional monarch, the lower house elects an operational executive government to run the various ministries and departments of the civil service. In the PRC this is called "The State Council" (a cabinet), and headed by a "Premier" (a prime minister). It also officially elects "The President of the PRC" and "The State Central Military Commission of the PRC," which commands the PRC armed forces. In addition it elects the membership of a supreme court. This is called "The People's Supreme Court."

Secondly, the full membership of each house only sits for a few weeks in each year. Therefore, each house elects a "standing committee" to carry out the main tasks of the two bodies over the year.

Thirdly, the CPC always appears to control about 70% of the membership in each house. This enables the CPC to control the election of the operational executive government, (ie: the State Council), the President, the State Central Military Commission of the PRC and the Supreme Court, and determine the course of government policy without any effective political opposition from outside the CPC. This has been the situation since 1949.

This dominance of the two houses by the CPC does not mean that no effective political discussion ever takes place on either government policy or the selection of key government officials. What it does mean, however, is that effective discussion mainly takes place within the structure of the CPC long before it even reaches the two houses of parliament. In fact, it is interesting to note, for example, as Jean Chesneaux narrates in his history, "China, The People's Republic 1949-1976," that CPC policy, and therefore ultimately government policy, seems to have swung (like a pendulum) from left to right with as much regularity as any other central government in any Western European state.

In addition, with each shift in power, key CPC members have risen and fallen from **government** office accordingly. (Deng Xiao-ping is the most well-known. Rising and falling from government office with three swings in power towards the right wing of the party during the course of his life.) These swings in policy from left to right were evidently reflected in the views of CPC members in each house, particularly the NPC, as the election of each new set of government officials was ultimately carried out by delegates in the NPC, or lower house. (For a brief discussion on the two strains of thought within the CPC, the reader can refer to Appendix 1: CPC Political Discourse. This located at the end of this paper.)

Fourthly, it is interesting to note how the members of the NPC are chosen. In each case it seems that members are elected to the position from the regions of the country (22 provincial governments, 4 Municipalities, 5 Autonomous Regions, and 2 SAR's), and also from the armed forces.

Provincial people's congresses elect members from their own provisional congress as delegates to the NPC. In turn, district level people's congresses elect members from their own district congresses to the provisional congress. Finally, members of district level congresses are elected directly by the people living in each district.

According to Wikipedia, it is interesting to note that the CPC seems to exercise some considerable influence in the election process. (See: <http://en.wikipedia.org>) A member of a district congress, for example, may apparently need some form of "approval" by the CPC prior to standing for election (by the membership of a district congress) as a delegate to a provincial congress.

In this way it appears that the CPC is able to gain a consistent majority of delegates at the level of the provincial and national people's congresses.

In addition, the CPC "approval" process means that even delegates who are not members of the CPC are 'guaranteed' to follow the CPC line, in spite of any membership that they might have with other political parties.

From a philosophical point of view, the need for this "approval" process by the CPC may stem from its apparent unstated view about the nature of state sovereignty in the PRC. In short, that the CPC believes most fundamentally in the concept that the state and the CPC, itself are in effect **indivisible**.

This means that any attempt that might be made by another political party in the PRC to form an alternative executive government, either at a provincial level or even at the national level (by controlling the majority of seats in the NPC), is ultimately regarded as a threat to the unity of **state sovereignty** not only by the CPC itself, but also by the national executive government (ie: The State Council.), the President of the PRC, and the ultimately the State Central Military Commission of the PRC, which are all administered by members of CPC.

To conclude, it would seem then that (unlike other political systems) the ruling political party in the PRC is not quite ready to accept either the idea of an active and vocal “loyal opposition” (that is loyal to the State, rather than the CPC), or even the idea of a publicly identifiable “shadow executive government,” or “government-in-waiting,” which might be ready to take on the responsibilities of leading the country, as a future executive government in charge of the State Council.

Nor does the CPC seem ready to accept the idea of a non-CPC member as either “President of the PRC,” or “Chairman of the State Central Military Commission of the PRC” (ie: The effective “Head of State”).

Perhaps, this political arrangement may change in the future. However, for this to happen, the CPC would need to allow more non-CPC delegates into the various houses of congress. And this might be a long way off.

(c) Other Realities to Consider: The Question of Change.

It is possible that the great fear faced by the CPC, and therefore, the executive government of the country, is not simply a political challenge at the ballot box, but is something rather more serious. This is the possibility of the breaking-up of the current union of provinces that form the PRC sovereign area.

If a province were to come under the control of an executive government lead by a non-CPC party, the fear is the province might decide to secede from the union. This possibility is clearly made easier by the current system of electing delegates from one congress to the next. With each step up the chain of political leadership, this leadership losses more and more contact with its base support, the people. Thus the most remote is the most vulnerable, and this is the central government. If the central government losses the support of the people, then the balance of power might swing towards the provincial government to such a degree that secession from the union is made a possibility.

Perhaps, the way around this problem is to allow the people to directly elect representatives to the NPC, the CPPCC and the provincial congresses from appropriately sized geographical constituencies (as the USA does and Canada does in part, for example). This would be similar to the system of electing delegates to the district level congresses.

This method of selection might bind the people more directly to their government at the national level making it more difficult for any independently minded provincial governments to succeed from the union. This is because delegates to the NPC and the CPPCC would then have a direct connection and responsibility to the people through their own geographical election constituencies, without being officially separated from them by the two tiers of provincial and district level government.

This approach would also mean that all the areas of a province would have a national representative that is directly connected to the people in a human way through an individual human being, acting as their representative for their particular constituency area, whom they can see and meet with near their homes and places of work.

Currently, only the political organization of the CPC is able to make this kind of “national-local people connection” through party offices located in every civil election district or military establishment and the national committee or congress of the CPC. (See Table 3) (The Army, the PLA, is perhaps, the only state organization capable of making a “national-local people connection.”)

Provincial level congresses might also benefit from having direct elections of delegates. Again, provincial delegates would have the benefit of direct contact with the people in their own individual geographical election constituencies, without being officially separated by the district level of government.

Of course, this change in the system of representative government may not ever occur in the PRC, but it does demonstrate that any building required for government offices ought to allow for the possibility of some change in the future, and this would require the incorporation of some ‘flexibility’ in the building design.

3. Outline Scope of Works: Introduction

Having outlined the general arrangement of typical government structures in the PRC, and their general articulation by the CPC, I should now like to turn to the question of what kind of government offices might be built in the vicinity of Tiananmen Square based largely on the above analysis.

Some key points should be noted:

- (a) Although state sovereignty, state government, parliament and the CPC are unified by the singular power and influence of the CPC in practice, these elements of leadership can still be defined as distinct institutions, which could be articulated in built form.
- (b) The CPC is still a political party (along with other parties in the PRC) and not an official government bureau. Therefore, it ought not to form a part of any official state government office building complex.
- (c) A government office building complex might include the following key offices of the state or central government: The offices of the State Central Military Commission of the PRC, the President of the PRC, the executive government or State Council, and key government ministries. These might be the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury, and others if space allows.
- (d) A separate built structure might be designed for a state parliamentary complex, which would include both the lower house (NPC) and the upper house (CPPCC).

The general structure of government in the PRC, then, would suggest that two office complexes could be built, the first for the offices of the state or the central government, which is called "The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China" (CPGPRC), and the second for the PRC state parliament.

The first of these projects would simply be office buildings of a certain size and arrangement. Their general scope of work would not be exceptional in any way.

The second project for a parliament presents certain difficulties not least because of the different seating and areas required. Clearly the two week annual meeting of the full houses will need far more seating than the smaller "standing committees," which meet throughout the year. Table 4 shows just how disparate the two populations are in each case.

Additional facilities for the two complexes might also be included in each complex as required. These could be underground vehicle parking, loading and unloading areas, refuse points, vehicle drop-off and pick-up points, building service areas, fireman's access, libraries, computer rooms, data storage, committee rooms, press briefing rooms, media centres, offices for staff and delegates, visitor centres and public viewing areas, security access facilities, disabled persons access facilities, police and security offices, fire control, lifts, escalators, washrooms, dining facilities, shops, cafes, and restaurants.

Table 4: PRC Parliament: Population

	House	Name	Full Meeting	Standing Committee
	A	B	C	D
1	Lower House	NPC	3000 (1)	150 (2)
2	Upper House	CPPCC	2196 (1)	290 (2)

Note (1): Meets once a year in spring

Note (2): Meets regularly throughout the year

Note (3): Information from <http://en.wikipedia.org> and <http://bbc.co.uk>

4. The Site: Three Areas and Three Representations

A brief visual study of the site shows that there are three broad areas for possible development using land which is currently owned by the state or city government. Site A is Tiananmen Square itself. Site B is the area currently occupied by the History Museum, which lies to the north-east of the square. Site C is the area occupied by “The Great Hall of the People,” which lies to the north-west of the square. (See images 1, 2 and 3.)

This arrangement of three areas could tie in with a theoretical position for the basic design. The three site areas could represent in a material or built form the basic three ‘constituencies’ of the country. These constituencies are the people, the people’s representatives and the people’s government.

Site A could be a public square or park. This would ‘represent’ (and literally contain) the people. The parliament could be located at Site B. This would represent and contain the people’s representatives. Site C could represent and contain the principal offices of the people’s central government.

(See “Table 5: PRC Terminology,” for some of the different terms of reference commonly used to describe these representations. See also Appendix 3 for a number of interpretative diagrams which briefly describe the existing and proposed key design relationships between the three site areas.)



Image 1: Tiananmen Square: View from the South. Site A is the Square itself, Site B is on the east side where the History Museum is located (on the right of the picture), and Site C is on the west side where “The Great Hall of the People” is located (on the left of the picture).




Image 2: Site Plan: Site areas A, B and C.




Image 3: Site Plan: Existing Site Area: 1: Qianmen Gate. 2: Mausoleum. 3: "The Monument to the People's Heroes." 4: The National Flag. 5: The History Museum and "The Museum of the Revolution." 6: "The Great Hall of the People."

Table 5: PRC Terminology		
	A: Typical Terminology	B: PRC Terminology
1	Central Government	The Central People's Government of the PRC (CPGPRC)
2	Head of State (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces)	Chairman of the SCMCPRC
3	Executive Council	SCMCPRC
4	Prime Minister	Premier of the State Council
5	"Cabinet"	The State Council
6	Upper House of Parliament	CPPCC
7	Lower House of Parliament	NPC
8	President	Official Head of State of the PRC
9	A CPC Party Official	A Cadre
10	The Electorate / The Voters.	"The Masses" / "The Base" / "The People."
11	Supporters of non-CPC political parties and NGOs in the PRC	Sometimes considered as "Counter-Revolutionaries" by the CPC (2)
12	Street Demonstrations against the CPC (1)	Can be considered as "Counter-Revolution" and "Turmoil" by the CPC (3)

Note (1): It is understood that street demonstrations in Tiananmen Square are currently prohibited, much like they are around "The Palace of Westminster," the UK parliament. (In the UK this applies to the area within a radius of 1 kilometre from the parliament building).

Note (2): "Counter-Revolutionaries" usually get a term of imprisonment, or the death penalty.

Note (3): If the State Council declares that demonstrations are "Counter-Revolutionary" or "Turmoil," it might declare "Martial Law" in the areas affected. This then allows the SCMCPRC to use military force in order to disperse demonstrations. eg: Martial Law was declared on 20th May 1989 to allow the PLA to disperse the anti-CPC street demonstrations in and around Tiananmen Square.

5. Three Demolition Phases and Three Construction Phases

The reason for the material arrangement suggested in Chapter 4 is not only based on a formal representation. There are also some important practical considerations connected with the current use of Site C.

Currently Site C contains "The Great Hall of The People." As noted in my first paper on Tiananmen Square (Paper 1: Appraisal), this hall is used by the two houses of parliament. Therefore, this structure cannot be demolished without first providing new accommodation for the parliament elsewhere.

Given the above situation a programme for site clearance and construction might follow the order in Table 6. (Sites A and B could in fact be cleared and constructed concurrently if speed is required.)

It is worth noting that the principal offices of the people’s central government, which might be relocated to Site C, are currently located elsewhere in the city of Peking. (Indeed, it is also interesting note that the offices of the very top positions of the government are to be found in the very secluded and comfortable environment of Zhongnanhai, a former palace complex of the Qing and the Ming Emperors. This is located to the north-west of the square, west of the “Forbidden City.”)

Table 6: Proposed Order of Demolition and Construction by Site Area			
A: Order	B: Site Designation	C: Building to be Demolished	D: New Construction
1	A	Mausoleum (Obelisk to be relocated)	Tiananmen Square: New landscape design
2	B	The History Museum	The Parliament of the PRC
3	C	“The Great Hall of the People”	Central Government Offices (CPGPRC)

6. The Site Plan: The Problem of Design Unity

A building project for Sites A, B and C raises the important question of design unity between the three sites. Just how important is the question of unity to the theoretical basis of the project proposed in Chapter 4? And what are the basic design tools by which design unity might be achieved materially in this particular case?

In Chapter 4 I noted that the three sites could represent the three constituencies that describe the constitution of the PRC. These are the people, the people’s representatives and the people’s (central) government. Clearly the relationship between the three constituencies is an important one in the life of the nation. For example a unity of purpose between the three constituencies is important simply from a practical point of view.

Although each constituency has a distinct character which could be ‘described’ by a distinct formal arrangement of materials, it would seem that a visual or Architectural ‘expression’ of unity would also be important in any design proposed for the three sites seen as a whole.

This unity of Architectural design might be said to 'represent' or even encourage a desirable state of unity of purpose between the three constituencies.

The basic design tools that might help to generate this overall material unity of the project could be either subtle or blunt. I shall now deal with each accordingly.

The subtlety of Architectural unity will rest simply on matters of point and line. From these basic tools, space in both area and volume can be given form and description. This form and description can be felt or seen by mankind and act upon his emotion.

In short, to achieve unity, points, lines, areas and volumes must be given order. This order might be articulated by measurement, division, repetition, addition and subtraction. Order might be given by proportion, rhythm, hierarchy, symmetry, colour or tone. It will be affected by its interaction with the world of nature, which is the world of Mankind: light and darkness, the Sun and the Moon, by nature's forces, by gravity, electro-magnetism and by nuclear forces. It might be affected by compression and tension, by the wind and the water, and by the living things, and also by the deployment of earthly materials.

Design unity could also be achieved using the blunt tools of Architecture. These might be the revival of a past style of Architecture or the application of a dogmatic theory.

The choice of a past style might be dictated by the singular taste or whim of a person of influence or great wealth, or it could be proscribed by the 'fashion' of the day.

To achieve 'design unity,' one simply applies the past style of Architecture across the site in accordance with 'the rules' laid down by 'The Masters' in their treatises or pattern books, or by following past examples.

Resurrecting a past style of Architecture is often accompanied with the support of a dogmatic theory. The most famous of these is John Ruskin's idea that the Gothic style is best used in government buildings because the style projects Christian virtues, where as buildings designed in the classical style are immoral, because the Empire of Rome was a state based on slavery. (One wonders what he might have thought of the choice of decoration used on the exterior of "The Great Hall of the People" at Tiananmen Square, which appears to be Ancient Egyptian.)

A more recent dogma is the mechanistic theory that form ought to follow function. This has led to an Architectural style that is so bland, that it alienates all who come in to contact with it. Unfortunately, this has often led to a complete rejection of all modern design and the idea that Architecture is and can be an innovating Art form like any other.

Indeed, the rejection of modern design has led to the revival of past styles of Architecture in the belief that any modern work will lead to disappointment, or perhaps disenchantment. The state architecture currently found at Tiananmen Square is simply a typical example of this kind of problem.

Another example in the PRC is the current policy of locating the top echelon of government in a palace of the former Qing and Ming Emperors at Zhongnanhai. To Architects this represents a complete repudiation of both modern thinking and modern design in any form by the key officials of the country. (To tourists and visitors it might represent disappointment. No doubt many visitors to the capital city of the PRC would like to see this aspect of China's ancient heritage too sometime.)

Finally, it is interesting to note the apparent emergence of a new dogma, called "sustainable design." This is a view that all Architecture should follow design principles that are considered "sustainable" in relation to a mantra being developed by an "environmental movement" of some considerable influence.

Whilst this new movement is essentially non-aesthetic in nature, there is, it seems to me, a real threat that the values of this new movement will dictate the aesthetic values of Architecture in the near future. In short, it will seek to influence town planners and government officials to dictate a return to some form of traditional or vernacular architecture on the basis that only this style can be considered as truly "sustainable."

Another peculiar aspect of this movement has been its apparent wedding to the computer industry as it seeks to expand its market place. This has quite simply led to the most bizarre forms of legislation yet concocted by some European governments, bent by the dual pressure of the new movement and the computer industry, without any regard to the general practice of either true vernacular building or civil architecture in reality.

7. The Design for Site A

The design opportunities of Site A, the square itself, were largely covered in my first paper on the topic, and the reader is advised to refer to that document for further information. However, this analysis was largely done without the proposal that new government offices might be constructed on Sites B and C, as I have proposed in this second paper. This aspect, therefore, needs some investigation.

The key point is that Site A will be a physical link between the two sites, Site B and C. How, one should ask, ought this link to be articulated in design terms?

To some extent this will depend on the form of the buildings that might be constructed on Sites B and C. Therefore, I shall consider their design first of all. Having done that task, I shall then return to the design of the square in its role as a link space between the two sites. (See Chapter 10)

8. The Design for Site B

As noted in Chapter 4, I have suggested that Site B is used as the site for a new parliament building for the nation. This national parliament is composed of a lower house called the National People's Congress (NPC) and an upper house, which is called the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

The focal element of the building will of course be the debating chambers of the two houses.

These will need to be designed to accept seating for the full house and "the standing committees" of each house. Seating for the first of these requirements could be temporary. Or it could be combined with seating for the visiting public which could be used ordinarily by the visiting public during the more regular sittings of the two standing committees.

Alternatively, the numerical composition of the two houses, both the full secession and the standing committees, might be changed to encompass a less disparate composition between the two. Perhaps one of the main reasons why such large differences occur between the population of the full secession and the standing committees is that in 1949, when the constitution of the PRC was first developed, travel between the provinces and the capital was both difficult and onerous (and even dangerous). With considerable improvements in air travel in recent years, a change in the composition of the two houses might now be a reasonable expectation. For example, the membership of each standing committee might be safely increased to approximately 600 persons each.

With the increase in a regular representation, the size of the full secession might even be reduced or eliminated entirely. For clearly, with greater regular scrutiny of both legislation and central government policy by the two houses, the greater risk of choosing a much smaller group of individuals, as is currently the case, would be much reduced. And therefore, the need for such a large delegation at the full secession of each house for the purposes of electing the standing committees would be rendered unnecessary. In addition, scrutiny of national legislation and central government policy by provincial governments in the provinces could also be improved by computer technology and communications media. (ie: new NPC / CPPCC legislation could be published on the Internet.)

This increase in the size of the two standing committees suggested here could also tie in with the new approach to electing both provincial and national congresses suggested in Chapter 2, Section (c), of this paper.

The second important element of any new facility would be the incorporation of new committee rooms for the various parliamentary scrutiny committees and sub-committees.

Aside from the design of the two chambers and committee rooms, the new complex might include special facilities for the members of each house. These could include offices for each standing committee member, common rooms for visiting delegates and VIP's, and a shared resource library for books, legislation, house-records and data acquisition. A small hotel might also be included for any visiting delegates and VIP's of the two houses, when required to attend scrutiny committees. This might incorporate catering and bar facilities which could serve the full membership. Staff car parking could also be included.

Facilities for interface with visiting VIP's, the general public and the public press might also be included in the project. These might be viewing galleries over the main debating chamber and large committee rooms, a public visitor centre explaining the mode and means of parliamentary activity, a press room and media communications centre and visitor's car parking. A security access area would also be needed to control the flow of the public in and out of the building.

Lastly, the complex would need to have motorized vehicle facilities, building services and facility management systems in place. These might include underground car parking, fire service access and control points, refuse collection points, loading and unloading, back-up power generation, environmental control systems and basic building services, escape stairs, lifts and escalators.

At this point it is worth remembering a few important planning constraints that might apply to all three sites. Firstly, it has been suggested in the past, by none other than Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), a former premier, that any building structures in the general area of the Forbidden City should be no higher than Tiananmen Gate. This is about 35 metres high. Secondly, in these days of possible terrorist activity, it is also advised that important buildings of this nature ought to be set back from any public road, and any area used for parking road vehicles, by at least 25 metres or more. Any building placed directly adjacent to a public road would require additional blast protection. Crash proof bollards would also be needed around the site perimeter to prevent any vehicle from entering the site from any direction. (The square itself might also need this kind of protection, simply to prevent any traffic accidents.)

9. The Design for Site C

Having completed the parliamentary facility at Site B, the existing buildings on Site C could then be demolished, and a new central government complex built on the site.

As noted in Chapter 3, a new central government complex could include the principal offices and ministries of state. These might be divided up into separate buildings. Thus, the offices of the State Central Military Commission of the PRC and the President of the PRC could be housed in one building, the offices of the State Council of the PRC in another. The offices of the principal ministries, eg: for national defence, foreign affairs and the treasury might each be located in their own separate buildings.

The size and extent of these structures would be dependent on the size of the various departments. Unfortunately this information is not currently available to the author. However, based on the observation of other countries these departments can be quite extensive, and perhaps there may not be sufficient room on the site to house all the staff of each of the departments suggested. On the other hand, the site is considerable, and it may be that additional departments could be housed in this location.

Given this lack of information and the reality of change occurring to government organizations in general, flexibility of building use would clearly be a desirable goal. With this aim in mind, some form of ideal building typology might be developed. This could then be repeated around the site in an orderly manner.

This method of repetition, however, should not necessarily mean that the each building will lack individually. Nor should the opposite occur that the aesthetic of each building is so disparate that the complex loses all appearance of cohesion.

Any design for Site C would also need to incorporate similar facilities to those of Site B. These could include special facilities for the staff and visiting VIP's, facilities for interface with the general public and the public press, basic building services, staff and visitor car parking, loading and unloading, refuse collection and building management systems.

10. Design Unity Reconsidered

Having outlined the general requirements of Sites B and C, in this chapter I now wish to consider how these requirements might be made into an Architectural unity that links the two sites together, and includes an appropriate design for Site A.

As noted in my first paper on Tiananmen Square, the square itself exhibits a strong axial alignment from south to north. On either side of this alignment, the open space of the square and its built structures are arranged symmetrically. The centre line of the square coincides with key landmark buildings of historical significance. These are the Tiananmen Gate at the northern end of the square, and the Qinmen Gate at the southern end. (This last gate is made up of two gates, the Zhongyang Gate, and to the south of this, the Arrow Gate.) Any building design for Sites B and C will be greatly influenced by this symmetry. However, it does not necessarily mean that any new buildings must exhibit the exactly the same frontage to the square, although this might be desirable.

One of interesting things about the current buildings on each site is that they do not have the same face. However, they are both symmetrical in themselves, and as a result they appear to be similar when first seen. However, the mind's eye recognizes that a difference does in fact exist, while conscious recognition is temporary fooled. The event leaves a profoundly disturbing first impression upon the mind, which is only relieved until one makes a conscious study of the two buildings. Presumably, those visitors to the square who fail to look more closely will always remain somewhat disturbed in the mind, without knowing quite the reason why.

Perhaps one the reasons why one is so disturbed by the current Architecture of the square is that the mind's eye more consciously recognizes its strong north-south axial symmetry. Therefore, the conscious mind expects a harmony to exist between the two buildings, where in fact none is truly present.

The current arrangement demonstrates the dangers of a strategy of apparent similarity. Either it would be better to have two buildings of a similar aesthetic order or even two buildings with completely distinct aesthetic identities. At least there would be no initial confusion.

The current arrangement of the buildings on Sites B and C also demonstrates that a significant visual impact can be achieved both on the square and in relation to each other. If the main strategy of the designer is to make a strong visual connection between the two sites then the design problem illustrated by the existing structures will need to be resolved in any new project for the site in some way or other.

An approach to the 'problem' of unity is simply to make the presence of design unity felt or remembered rather than one which is seen in any direct manner. The distance of over 600 metres, which lies between Sites B and C, is sufficiently large enough to make any simultaneous observation of the two sites quite difficult.

This difficulty presents the designer with an opportunity to move away from the current position of achieving a monumental expression, which is clearly the aim of the present structures in the square, to a rather more comfortable or moderate scale of Architecture, even to a point of relative domesticity.

The square itself could then be 'freed' to take on any of the schemes proposed in my first paper, whether grand or moderate, open or closed, green and verdant or hard and dry.

Of course, with more vegetation in the square the greater the loss of a direct visual connection there will be between the two sites. Memory will therefore play a greater role in the formation of a designed 'connection' between the two sites as well as the square itself. It is in this area that a strategy of using similar building typologies and aesthetic treatment would become important. This of course will be felt more acutely by people moving between the three site areas, such as government officials and civil servants. However, over time, the recognition of a similar aesthetic system will establish a 'connection' in the minds-eye of the general public, perhaps in a more gradual way.

The use of a common building typology (ie: the basic arrangement of form) will also assist building users, visitors and facility managers in recognizing the commonalities in building function and orientation, making the buildings easier to use when people are first introduced to them. (Fire-fighters will also find this design approach useful too, I think.)

This last design strategy, which calls for a common building typology particularly between Sites B and C, raises further questions regarding not just the overall visual aesthetic, but also the nature of their basic functional arrangement in the master plan.

The multiplicity of functions suggested in the general scope of the work in Chapters 3, 7, 8 and 9 would point to some kind of collegiate or university campus arrangement. This design approach would of course establish the necessary formal departmental distinctions. However, it would also help to stimulate greater communication between the departments, which is fundamental to achieving the 'cross-fertilization' of ideas and action that is so important to the successful operation of any central government or parliamentary institution.

There are of course design precedents for this kind of 'campus' arrangement. The most well known is "The village" of Whitehall and the UK Parliament, which has developed 'organically' over a long period of time. There are also examples in other areas of government service, which have developed from a more conscious awareness of the importance of design unity and master planning. The most well known in this category is the CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia. The very 'corporate' nature of this organization also points to its successful application in the area of private business. The campus of the Microsoft Corporation in Washington State is a good example. This design approach then leads right back to my initial analysis of the true realities of government structure in Chapter 1, and my conclusions regarding the true nature of the structure of government in the PRC noted in Chapter 2.

The idea of using a campus approach to master planning the building arrangements on Sites B and C also sits well with my call for a scheme with a more 'domestic' scale of Architecture, rather than the more 'monumental' approach of the current buildings on the site, which of course is the more typical approach for this genre of building; the approach of hubris. (eg: "The Capitol" in Washington D.C. "The Hill" in Ottawa, "The Reichstag" in Berlin etc...)

11. Remarks on Programme

The project could of course start at any time.

From an economic point of view, it would be best to start construction of a project of this type in the down-cycle of the PRC economy. It would benefit from the reduced prices for materials and labour. It would also help to reduce the hardship of the urban workforce in the Peking area, as employment from the private sector construction industry dries up. The next major downturn might soon occur after the Olympic Games being held in Peking in August 2008.

From a political point of view, part of the work could be begun immediately. This is because, the liberal democracies may be thinking of boycotting the 2008 Olympic Games. Why would the liberal democracies boycott the games?

The liberal democracies may wish to boycott the Games because the PRC is not considered to be fully democratic under its current system of representational executive government. A boycott would enable the democracies to demonstrate their opinion (from a shared point of principle) of the CPC's continuing monopoly on political power and executive government in the PRC.

The republican democracies might also wish to boycott the games because of the CPC's continuing monopoly over the process of selecting the "Head of State," that is both the presidency and the chairmanship of the State Central Military Commission of the PRC, again from a point of shared principle.

There might, of course, be other reasons (see note 1 below), but the above reasons might well be the essential ones for most democratic countries.

Note 1: Other reasons for a potential global political boycott of the 2008 Peking Olympic Games might be one of the following additional reasons to those already noted above, which are, in no particular order, as follows: (Notwithstanding the possible right of sportsmen and women to boycott the political boycott and attend the Games, with the required inducements no doubt. One does wonder, however, if Sebastian Coe for example, would have won his medals in 1980 under normal conditions, and no doubt so does he.)

- (a) The existence of PRC state judicial trails without independent juries, legally and physically protected and independent defence and prosecution witnesses, independent judges and independent defence and prosecution lawyers.
- (b) The unfettered access by the public and the free press as witnesses to the dispassionate process of prosecution by either the state or other offended parties at PRC state judicial trails.
- (c) The possibility of inadequate legal aid for defendants and (inadequate) access to independent legal protection before, during and after a trail in the PRC.
- (d) The possibility of prolonged imprisonment without trial or without access to (reasonable) bail by the state courts of the PRC.
- (e) The possibility of inadequate access to a disinterested translation by independent interpreters in a state made up of numerous minority linguistic groups, foreign visitors and businesses.
- (f) The use of the death penalty in the law of the PRC.
- (g) The apparent charging of relatives of the defendant for the munitions ordinance used in state executions carried out by law.
- (h) The apparent exercise of state executions before large public audiences (usually in sports stadiums) required to attend by law as witnesses. (One wonders whether or not the IOC has managed to obtain any satisfactory assurances that the marvelous new Olympic Stadiums will not be used as future places of public execution after the event or, whether or not they have even asked for such assurances to be made by the CPGPRC.)
- (i) The possibility of inadequate legal protection for private property from forced acquisition by the state or state officials, or the provision of adequate compensation in the event of legal acquisition.

(The list is continued to the next page)

On the other hand, the democracies have allowed their citizens to attend the Olympic Games in the past when held in countries with similar political monopoly powers over arrangements for electing executive governments. Examples of this are the 1936 winter and summer Games held in Germany, and the 1980 winter and summer Games held in Russia. So there is no way of quite knowing which direction the politicians of the democracies will jump. (What is clear is the essential political nature of this particular sporting event, and one does wonder, from time to time, why it is even held at all, but there we are.)

Note 1: (continued from previous page.)

- (j) The possible illegal imprisonment of political activists, who express sustained vocal and active non-violent opposition to the continuing CPC majority (by possibly unfair means) in the NPC and CPPCC.
- (k) The possibility of poor living conditions and standards of imprisonment without adequate and free access by independent local or international prison inspectors, and access by visitors.
- (l) The apparent suppression of the local and international free press and public media.
- (m) The apparent suppression of internet sites which express a contrary view to the CPC.
- (n) The flooding of the Upper Yangtze River contrary to the wishes of local inhabitants (over 1 million people), and their enforced removal from the flooded area without, apparently, adequate compensation for private property or loss of livelihood (from 1999 to 2006).
- (o) The imperialist PRC military occupation and annexation of the free state of Tibet by armed force in 1950 contrary to the wishes of the people and their rightful sovereign leader, and without a proper plebiscite being conducted by a disinterested third party. Eg: The United Nations Organization. And ditto for East Turkistan (Xinjiang Province).
- (p) The apparent PRC military occupation and annexation of the free states of Hong Kong, "Free China" (China, New Territories) and Macao by armed force in 1997 and 1999 and without a proper plebiscite being conducted by a disinterested third party. Eg: The United Nations Organization (UNO). (And contrary to the ethical norms and *modus operandi* of the "decolonization" process usually conducted by the UNO.)
- (q) The dispersal of student and proletarian demonstrations in Tiananmen Square on 3 June 1989, and other places, by an apparently poorly organized, poorly lead, ill disciplined and an unprofessional military operation conducted by the PLA on behalf of the SCMCPRC, which apparently lead to large numbers of deaths and injuries which might have been avoided had it been conducted in a more organized fashion, perhaps by a professional and properly trained civil police force, if it had to be conducted at all.
- (r) The apparent ongoing unofficial support for the PDRK for its continuing official "State of War" with the United Nations Organization, the ROK and allied countries, such as the ROC (since 1950). (The failure of the CPGPRC to promote "The one country, two systems" approach on the Korean peninsular at the UN General Assembly, (with perhaps regular written and verbalized official government policy position statements delivered to the General Assembly), might also suggest a lack of sincerity in its dealings with the ROK, the people of Korea, Hong Kong, China (New Territories), Macao and Taiwan, UNO and the UN itself. This apparent lack of sincerity also appears to be reinforced by the failure of the PRC to support the "one country, two systems" approach at the UN as a possible peaceful solution to the unification of Cyprus, The Holy Land, Kashmir, Ceylon, The Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ireland and perhaps, even a "one country, three systems" approach for a peaceful unification for Iraq. (Perhaps some countries could simply change their names, eg: The ROK could change its name to "Korea." That way the war between the PDRK and the ROK would cease to exist, because there would be no ROK for the PDRK to be officially at war with. It is also interesting to note that the UK is strangely silent on the promotion of "The one country, two systems" approach. On the other hand, the idea of course was not a British one.)

(The list is continued to the next page)

Another reason why the games might 'need' to be boycotted is to slow down the PRC economy, which has tended towards the upper-end of the economic cycle in recent years. Ironically, this ramping-up of the economy might be due to the significant investment made by both global and local financiers into the PRC economy, which has partly resulted from the central governments own investment into the Games itself.

The democracies may however look favourably upon any kind of project that it sees as promoting an end to the CPC monopoly on the process of electing the executive government and the state leadership. However, a few new buildings on Sites B and C, without any real constitutional change might simply be interpreted as mere "window dressing."

Nevertheless, the Games could benefit directly in a material sense from any work begun and completed before the Games on Site A. With the removal of the existing structures from the square, marathon runners would be able to run through it from end to end without any impediments, after entering or leaving the square via the Zhongyang Gate, which might be a spectacle worth seeing.

In addition, the runner with the Olympic flame at the start of the opening ceremony could also run through the gate and the square from end to end in a straight line, before running on to the main stadium; straight lines being more aesthetically pleasing to the human eye.

Note 1: (continued from previous page.)

- (s) The maintenance of an official "State of War" with the ROC (since 1949), and the regular statements made by the PRC government expressing its 'right' to seize the island by force of arms, which continues to upset the stability and peace of the people of Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. (It also contrary to oft stated call by the CPGPRC for "stability." Clearly the CPGPRC contains as many hypocrites as any other government around the globe.)
- (t) The recent testing of missiles across the Taiwan Strait and into Outer Space to the disruption of international shipping, fisheries, aircraft and satellite operations.
- (u) The conduct of repeated military exercises and the build up of nuclear missile forces near Taiwan as a provocation to reinstate hostilities against the ROC, to the detriment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years.
- (v) The testing of nuclear weapons (at Lop Nor) in recent years in contravention of global standards and general agreements on the testing of nuclear weapons.
- (w) The probability of the continuing sale of nuclear technology and material to nation states which do not have adequate safeguards and protection against the proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge to non-nuclear states and to non-governmental organizations. (Eg: Pakistan and possibly, Iran and the DPRK.)
- (x) The apparent unauthorized occupation and annexation by force of certain islands in the Spratly Archipelago in recent years, which has caused disruption to international shipping and fisheries, and which may be contrary to the established claims of Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines.
- (y) The poor living conditions of Pandas at Peking Zoo (as last seen by the author in 1997), and perhaps other Zoo animals in other places in the PRC.
- (z) The apparent feeding of live poultry in zoos to Lions to entertain the visitors.

12. Building Costs and Funding

As first noted in the previous chapter, the project could be financed by the central government perhaps in the next “downturn” of the “economic cycle.” This would help reduce initial construction costs of the project, and possibly alleviate some of the unemployment problem in the city that will occur with the “downturn.”

There are of course alternative propositions to central government finance for the project. These might be one of the following:

- (a) A Private Public Partnership (PPP)
- (b) A Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
- (c) A Build Operate Transfer (BOT) Proposal

(a) A Private Public Partnership (PPP)

This is simply an arrangement in which a consortium of private financiers, construction experts, building contractors and central government corporations share the construction costs, the running costs and the ownership of the building once it is completed. Central Government would guarantee that it would rent the building at a fixed rate per annum, which would cover any interest payments made on the initial capital investment by the consortium as a group. It would also allow for an agreed profit-margin of a certain moderate percentage. A typical example of this kind of operation is the financing of the London Underground improvement works currently underway. (However, the ownership of the stations, tunnels and tracks remain with the Government Corporation. The trains and carriages are owned by the consortium. Payments made on the initial capital investment are made by the profit margin charged on the travel charges made to the customers.)

(b) A Private Finance Initiative (PFI)

This arrangement is much the same as option (a). However, the consortium does not include a government agent as an initial financier. Therefore, the construction of the project would be fully funded by private finance and the building itself owned entirely by the consortium as a private owner. However, the government would still guarantee to rent the building over a certain period of time, such as 30 years at an agreed rent, once the building is completed by the consortium and occupied by the government as a client-user. Facilities management by the consortium would also be included in the cost of the project over its rental lifespan. An example of this type of arrangement is the current building programme for new government hospitals and schools in the United Kingdom.

(c) A Build Operate Transfer (BOT) Proposal

This is similar to option (b) in that the construction and running costs and facilities management would be fully financed by a private construction consortium. The government would also agree to rent the building at an agreed rate for a period of say 30 years. However, at the end of the period, the ownership of the building would then be transferred to the central government. Examples of this type of arrangement have mainly occurred in infrastructure projects such as toll roads, road bridges and tunnels, like those in the Hong Kong Area. (Here, however, it is the road user that pays the toll (as the client-user) rather than the central government, who will ultimately own the infrastructure after the 30 year period.)

The impediment to any of these options is the possibility of “nationalization” occurring at some point before the termination of the 30 year period. Given the Trotskyite notion that all property is theft, some private financiers may feel that a Communist Government, or whatever colour, cannot be trusted when it comes to matters of property ownership and property rights.

(d) Conclusion

The fear of pre-emptive nationalization by the central government without the possibility of adequate compensation could mean that any proposed construction on Sites A, B and C may mean that the project will need to be fully financed by the central government. This is because any group of private sector investors may be unwilling to take the necessary risk of any possible future nationalization.

The main risk to central government is cost control. The cost of construction for buildings of this type has been very difficult to predict in recent years. For example, the new parliamentary buildings in Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom have cost twice as much as originally estimated by quantity surveyors. (I believe that the possibility of political corruption has not yet been ruled out as a possible cause for these cost over-runs.) However, there is no reason to suggest that any new government buildings in this case should be anywhere near the cost of those in the UK. This is due to the far lower cost of basic construction labour and materials in the PRC.

13. Further Work to be Done

Like any project of this kind, a construction consortium of interested parties will need to be developed at an early stage and given a face. Concurrently, interest in the project will need to be ascertained from the Central People’s Government of the PRC (CPGPRC) as the ultimate end-user.

If the consortium is to be foreign based, this may need to be conducted through intermediaries, such as the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or through the more established agencies of foreign central government embassies in Peking.

Once tentative approval for the project is ascertained from the CPGPRC, and certain assurances and insurances are obtained, as well as certain guarantees on the modalities for payment are established, work might then begin on serious design proposals by the construction consortium. These could be obtained by Architects and Structural Engineers within the consortium itself. Alternatively, designs might be obtained through publicly advertised requests for (schematic) design proposals in the Architectural Press, or through the more discrete method of inviting design tenders from pre-selected firms of Architects and Engineers.

Once initial schemes have been received and a design team chosen and contracted, either by the construction consortium, or the CPGPRC, liaison with the CPGPRC would need to be established more directly in order to pin-down a more definitive scope of work for the project. With this new detailed scope of work, new designs could be developed for early cost estimation by quantity surveyors.

Once the cost estimates are received, recommendations by the design team and / or the construction consortium can then be made to the CPGPRC.

Following approval by the CPGPRC for a particular schematic design, detailed design might then proceed with the necessary supporting funds made available to either the construction consortium and / or its design team. With further design approvals made by the CPGPRC, or its sponsored client team for the detailed design, work could then proceed to the production of tender documentation, if the building contract is to follow traditional lines. In the case of a PPP or PFI type project, construction documents could be developed immediately.

With the construction documents completed and a building contractor signed on, demolition and construction work on the site could then begin in accordance with the phasing suggested in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

In this paper I expanded upon my initial design investigation into the development opportunities for Tiananmen Square (Paper 1: Appraisals). In that paper I concluded that placing any major buildings directly on the Tiananmen Square might not be the best design option. Instead the square itself could be utilized as a park or parade ground of some kind. However, I also noted that initial paper there might be opportunities for new buildings in the vicinity of the square which could be utilized for new government offices.

Before turning to the problem of the identification of these new site areas for potential development, I decided to introduce the topic of what a government is and how this is interpreted in the People's Republic of China (PRC). I covered these topics in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively. Based on this analysis and in Chapter 3, I briefly covered what an outline scope of works for the project might include.

In Chapters 4 to 6, I then returned to the task of site identification and site analysis from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. In Chapters 7 to 9, I addressed the elements of the design that may be important at each individual site location identified. In Chapter 10 I returned to the theoretical aspects of designing for the total site, and suggested some further solutions or design direction that might be required. In Chapters 11 and 12, I suggested some ideas for implementing a possible programme for the works, and dealt with the question of building costs and funding.

Lastly, in Chapter 13, I suggested what further work might be done to progress the project, in the event that some interest in it could be ascertained from both the Central Government of the PRC (CPGPRC) and any potential building consortiums who might be interested in constructing the work, either in part or in full.

It is tempting to speculate on just how likely this project is. Critics will doubtless say that there will be such opposition from central government officials to the demolition of the main structures on Sites A, B and C that the chances of any new design being constructed on these sites will be zero. I can only reply to this criticism with the following observations:

- (a) The existing buildings on Sites B and C are now 48 years old. Typically post-war buildings of the modern era are in fact only designed to last 50 years. After this period they will usually require a substantial and costly refurbishment. A cost-benefit analysis on the two buildings will need to be carried out over the next two years to see whether or not the expense of any major refurbishment is justified in each case compared to the cost of constructing new buildings to meet the needs of the CPGPRC over the next fifty years.

To get an idea of the potential cost difference it is interesting to compare the unit costs of two recent building works in Canada: The renovation of the Library of Parliament in Ottawa, CDN\$34,943 per square meter, and the expansion of the Winnipeg Central Library at CDN\$1,010 per square meter, 2.89% of the cost. (Chodikoff, P.57, Enns, P.46)

Part of the reason for the cost difference between the two libraries is perhaps the major structural under-pinning required at the Library of Parliament to give it greater earthquake protection. Similar earthquake protection work could be required for both the Great Hall of the People and the History Museum. Although, both buildings did withstand the great earthquake of Tangshan, which is a mere 100 miles to the east of Peking, in July 1976, significant, and perhaps hidden structural damage may still have occurred. The cost of such rectification work could well be incalculable. (The original budget for the Ottawa Library of Parliament was set at CDN\$72 million, whilst the final cost was CDN\$136 million. This is nearly twice the original estimate. (Chodikoff, P.57) It is worth remembering that the human cost of the Tangshan earthquake was around 240,000 lives. (Buckley, M. P.695) The Great Hall of the People holds up to 10,000 lives.

- (b) The brief Architectural analysis of the two buildings to be demolished found in Appendix 2 may convince some Architectural critics that the intrinsic value of the buildings to be demolished, in terms of their architectural aesthetics and historical significance, might be considered as somewhat limited, particularly when one considers their relative value compared to the other historical and utilitarian values of the proposal supported in this paper.

- (c) Table 7 shows that the CPC, as the executive government of the PRC since 1949, has not been afraid to demolish countless numbers of building structures on this site area in the past. Indeed, it might be argued that some of these structures had in fact a far greater heritage value than those which replaced them and are now required to be demolished for the general proposals set out in this paper. (The most important of these buildings which were demolished by the current government, are the old city walls. These were built in the 15th Century. But countless other dwellings, some no doubt of significant heritage value, have also been lost by the expansion of the square itself and the building of the current structures on each site area.) (See image 4: This shows a plan of the city walls built during imperial times.)
- (d) The proposed demolition or removal of the existing monumental structures in Tiananmen Square (Site A) in this paper, and my first paper on the subject, actually offers a chance to reintroduce the historic alignment of the city, and with it, a chance to experience the living history of the northern capital. (See image 4.)

	Date of Demolition	Demolished Structures	Age of Original Structures	New (Current) Structures
	A	B	C	D
1	1950 - 2	Outer City Walls	15 th Century	Ring Roads
2	1958?	Outer Gate to the Forbidden City	15 th Century	The Obelisk
3	1958	Private Dwellings?	?	“The Great Hall of the People” (4)
4	1958?	Private Dwellings?	?	The History Museum
5	1960 - 4	Inner City Walls (2)	15 th Century	Ring Roads
6	1976	Public Park (3)	?	The Mausoleum (4)

Note (1): All information from Buckley, pp. 595 – 606 unless otherwise noted.

Note (2): Chesneaux, p. 231.

Note (3): Terrill, see Illustration 8

Note (4): Built in 10 months (See Buckley, Michael *et al.* pp 595 – 606.)




Image 4: Peking City Walls and North-South Axis. (Ming dynasty (pre:1644)?) Tiananmen Square lies to the south of the Forbidden City, between its outer walls and the city wall, both walls are now gone. (image from Behling, P.83) The (red) axis line, which is added by the author, shows that the inner palace building arrangement, within the existing inner palace wall, is slightly to the right of the main axis line. The palace buildings were destroyed by the Qing in 1644 and new ones built. The last Ming emperor, Chongzhen, hung himself, after slaying his family, in the garden which lies just to the north of the inner-palace wall (Jingshan Park / Coal Hill). (Buckley, P.619)

END

Appendix 1: CPC Political Discourse

Jean Chesneaux's analysis of the political history of the People's Republic of China in his book, "China, The People's Republic 1949 – 1976," seems to indicate that CPC executive government policy has behaved in much the same way as any European government throughout the period. That is the government has made consistent swings in policy from "left" to "right," and back again.

Broadly speaking, one might put this down to the realities of the "economic cycle," which of course seems to affect all nation states throughout the world, regardless of their political system.

This appendix deals with the following subjects on CPC political discourse and the question of how building Architecture might respond to it:

- (a) The two "Lines" of political discourse in the CPC.
- (b) "The Revolutionary Line." (Maoism)
- (c) "The Revisionist Line." (Marxist-Leninism)
- (d) "The Economic Cycle."
- (e) The future of political discourse in the PRC.
- (f) The response by Architecture to change in the parliamentary system.
- (g) A note on CPC and PRC ambiguities.
- (h) The response by Architecture to change in state relationships.
- (i) The relationship of the CPC to the army (PLA).
- (j) The response by Architecture to change in the army (PLA).
- (k) Conclusion.

(a) "Two Lines"

Chesneaux suggests that the economic reality of the "economic cycle" is expressed within the CPC by a political discourse of two "Lines." These, he calls "The Revolutionary Line" and "The Revisionist Line," and correspond to "the left" of the party and to "the right." In geographical terms, these political differences tend to correspond with the socio-economic and cultural differences that occur between the populations of the rural areas of the PRC, and those of the urban areas respectively.

Interestingly enough, this appears to be diametrically opposite to the political discourse of “the left” and “the right” in many European countries, for example. In Europe, urban areas tend to have “left-wing” parties in control, whereas rural areas have “right-wing” parties in control. This might be explained by the natural conservatism (ie: ‘right-wing’) of people living within the constraints of the natural world, whilst urban populations, living in a more artificial or man-made environment are in less daily contact with the constraints of nature. This may tend to give urban people a sense of freedom, which allows them to develop more dynamic political systems and socio-economic arrangements, which challenge any natural conservatism.

In the PRC, the “right” of the CPC might be described, ironically, as “Marxist-Leninist,” a term that would certainly be regarded as “left-wing” in any European country. The “left” of the CPC might be described as “Maoist.”

(b) “The Revolutionary Line” (Maoism)

“Maoism” or “The Revolutionary Line” is essentially a rural based ideology. It developed primarily out of the challenge of a poor rural people to a stagnant and unresponsive aristocratic system of executive government and land-ownership. The essentially Maoist Revolution of 1949 might be compared to the French Revolution of 1789, made one hundred and sixty years earlier.

However, there also appears to be an element of ‘Maoist’ ideology that seems to go beyond simply establishing the initial revolutionary success against the aristocracy. In short, that a rural based revolution can also be induced artificially, and that from time to time it can be re-induced, in order to maintain political power over the longer term. In addition, it also seems that such methods can be exported to other rural based societies, much like the Napoleonic model.

However, rural people tend to be the same everywhere. They are still essentially conservative in their thinking because of the dominance of nature over their lives. And hence, the rural people of the PRC might be considered as “right-wing” as anywhere else.

It could be argued that this “Line” expresses such “right-wing” tendencies from time to time that they verge on becoming an extreme form of “National Socialism.” This may partly explain the tacit support that the PRC gave to the *Khmer Rouge* in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 in its extreme campaign to literally eliminate the urban population and artificially induce a rural based form of revolution. (The tacit support that the Government of the USA gave the *Khmer Rouge* over the same period is simply inexplicable by the usual standards of “Western” morality and political philosophy.)

One also wonders if the tacit PRC support for the current policies of the government of Zimbabwe is also indicative of the continuing strength and activity of a political faction in the CPC that still believes in these more extreme forms of 'Maoist' revolutionary ideology.

This support for the government of Zimbabwe may also indicate other "right-wing" tendencies. In short, that such 'revolutionary' activity is simply a disguise to cover more imperialistic or strategic aims. Firstly, this is done by apparently assisting in the perpetuation of the initial revolutionary government. In short, it might advise it to follow the 'Maoist' principles of artificially re-inducing rural 'revolutionary' activity, and artificially depopulating urban areas from time to time. Secondly, the PRC appears to be able to develop favourable long term strategic resource arrangements with these governments. This is due precisely to the very climate of confusion and economic weakness that such activities seem to bring about.

It still remains to be seen just what kind of economic relationships the PRC is now developing with the governments of The Sudan and Nepal. It also remains to be seen whether or not these relationships were fostered by some form of tangible 'pre-revolutionary' support at the rural level of society, simply to exploit the national assets or capital markets in the future. For it would appear that, if this is the case, "The Revolutionary Line" has now thoroughly mutated into a new model of 'revolution,' which might be called "revolutionary imperialism" or "revolutionary capitalism." (It also remains to be seen whether or not "The Revolutionary Line" will try to usurp "the one country, two systems" concept, as developed for Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, as an illegitimate means of incorporating a free and independent Nepal into the PRC itself. This might stem from another form of ideological mutation, leading to an imperialistic form of "the one country, two systems" concept: "the one country, two systems, and revolutionary imperialism" concept.)

The natural conservatism of rural people may also tend towards a more inward-looking approach to life than that held by urban people. This conservative tendency may partly explain the general isolation of the PRC before "the opening-up" policy of 1978, which was initiated by "The Revisionist Line."

In contrast to this rural conservatism, the urban support of "The Revisionist Line" might be considered as more internationalist in outlook. This would explain the sense that the relationship of the PRC with Russia and Vietnam is now more productive, it would also explain its support for new socio-economic relations with "The West."

(c) “The Revisionist Line” (Marxist-Leninism)

“Marxist-Leninism,” or “The Revisionist Line,” is essentially an urban based ideology. It develops out of the challenge of a poor urban people to a mercantile system of property ownership that is also essentially unchanging and unresponsive to the needs of the poor. This imbalance of wealth in the older European societies has generally been corrected by the participation of urban based political parties in executive government arising from greater political democracy, particularly with the true enfranchisement of the poor and working classes, or “Proletariat,” both men and women.

The European merchants of course continue to remain “right-wing.” They also continue to remain powerful through their own skills of wealth creation. However, they will always remain a minority population in urban areas. Thus, with free and fair elections to government, political parties of the “left-wing” have been able to control much of the government in urban areas, as well the national government from time to time. This has generally enabled a redistribution of wealth through government taxation and expenditure and local and national legislation, in a more humane manner to the benefit of all.

In the PRC, the CPC “Revisionist Line” as a “Marxist-Leninist” line has tended to favour the development and population growth of the urban areas. The idea behind it is to lead the people towards the creation of a “Communist” society as espoused by the doctrine of Karl Marx, which according to Marx can only begin from an urban based civil society. (The plagues and diseases of nature, which originate from human poverty, do not recognize “class boundaries,” or indeed “class struggles.”)

In Europe this population growth in the urban areas occurred through the emigration of people from the rural areas as ‘mercantilism’ created capital based farming practices, which left much of the rural population unemployed, but created an agricultural surplus that could be ‘exported’ to the expanding city population, which was created by the rural unemployed. (This population would then find employment with the city merchants making agricultural machinery, amongst other things, or immigrate to new lands which still used a labour based agricultural system.) In short, the reality of urban growth was driven by new mechanical knowledge, introduced by new ways of thinking about the world as it really is.

In the PRC, this process of rural to urban migration is also occurring as rural areas have begun to use more machinery and technology in agriculture, creating both agricultural surplus and rural unemployment. In the cities of the PRC, merchants have also been active in finding work for the people who have emigrated from the rural areas.

(d) “The Economic Cycle”

The process of the economic development of rural areas, of rural to urban migration and the creation of new employment in the cities of the PRC is still ‘regulated’ by the “economic cycle.”

The “economic cycle” appears to have had some affect on the political line chosen by the CPC leadership at any one time.

In period before “the opening-up” of the PRC to global economic markets in 1978, the regulation of the “economic cycle” seems to have been largely an internal event based on the two “Lines.” When “The Revisionist Line” was to the fore, urban economic growth and migration to the cities was promoted. When “The Revolutionary Line” was to the fore, rural economic growth and migration from the cities to the rural areas was encouraged.

After “the opening-up” in 1978, the PRC economy has begun to be influenced by the global “economic cycle.” This has meant that the CPC has effectively less control over the timing of the cycle within the PRC sovereign area.

When the economy enters a down-cycle, a change from one “Line” to another still seems to occur within the CPC executive government. However, now it seems that it does not matter which “Line” is to the fore at the time of the “downturn,” as long as the “Line” changes and is seen to change by both the people and the economy in general. Perhaps one might even say it hardly matters if there is an entirely new “Line” of any description - as long as it originates from the CPC it is a “good Line” to have at the time.

The first of these major down-cycles, after “the opening-up,” seems to have occurred in 1989. In the past, a “downturn” in the “economic cycle” might have been countered by a political campaign to encourage “The Revolutionary Line,” in short, to send any surplus urban labour back to the countryside. In 1989, this strategy was not used by the CPC until after the urban population made their situation felt “on the street,” in quite a demonstrable manner. This would indicate that the party did not fully anticipate the timing of the down-cycle and prepare for it accordingly. Or, they were simply out of touch with the dynamics of a down-cycle which they did not and could initiate themselves.

(e) The Future of Political Discourse in the PRC

Since 1989, the CPC seems to have anticipated major changes in the “economic cycle,” and developed more peaceful strategies and tactics to cope with the future “downturns” of the globally orientated “economic cycle.”

These new strategies may yet allow the party to continue as a singular unit in charge of the wheels of executive government through each down-cycle. (In the democracies, political parties are normally ‘required’ to give way to a new executive government by the verdict of the ballot box, unless they are extremely lucky.)

However, if these new strategies do not work, future “downturns” may force the CPC to consider splitting into two parties, with each party claiming to know “all the answers” (which occurs in the democracies). This in turn could lead to the formation of new alliances with the existing political parties, which make up the remaining 30% of the NPC and the CPPCC. This might lead to the formation of a ‘new’ executive government under one or other of the two new parties. (Under such an event, the issue of whether the Chairman of the SCMCPRC or the President of the PRC are either of one party or the other hardly matters, as long as they remain ‘above it all’ in a non-partisan way, appoint the appropriate team to lead the executive government (the party with the most votes in the NPC), and stick to their required term of office before retiring with a reasonable state pension.)

With two ‘new’ principle parties (each moderated by the existing smaller parties), the people of the PRC would then have the opportunity of changing the executive government (by elections) from one party to the other at each “downturn” in the “economic cycle,” as they tend to do in the democracies as a ‘punishment’ for economic ‘failure.’ (The process might be considered as a ‘cathartic’ to their change in relative wealth as the economy slows down in the “downturn” of the “economic cycle.”)

If two parties were developed from the singularity of the CPC, they might follow one or other of the two traditional “Lines” or develop entirely new “Lines” or political philosophies, perhaps based originally on one or other of the traditional “Lines.” In addition, one might be rural based and the other largely urban based, or a mixture of the two.

(f) The Response by Architecture to Change in the Parliamentary System

The Architectural design of any parliamentary complex will of course need to 'respond' architecturally to the (new) realities of cyclical change occurring to the economy of the country and its affect on the political system of parliamentary representation, as noted above in sections (a) to (e).

If the CPC were to "split" more openly into two 'parties' based largely on the two "Lines," the design of a new parliament could assist in establishing a more appropriate Architectural setting for the representation of this development towards a "two-party system" for the two houses of the PRC parliament.

Alternatively, such an Architectural setting might be designed prior to any demonstrable split occurring, with the view to developing "a two-party system" more gradually over time. In short, the Architectural setting might shape or encourage the process of a change towards a "two-party system," rather than the other way round. Architecture would be in the "Vanguard" of political change (for a while at least). This, of course, might not go down too well with the current membership of "the standing committee of the Politburo of the CPC," who all appear to be engineering graduates (of the Moscow University. This might also suggest that the "Marxist-Leninist" Line is currently to the fore, rather than the "Maoist" Line).

(g) A Note on CPC and PRC Ambiguities

It does seem odd to me that the name of "The Communistic Party of China" (CPC) is not called "The Communist Party of the People's Republic of China," given that "China" does not yet officially exist in much of the area it would seem to govern. (The term, "China," or "Zhongguo," is strictly speaking a geographical term not a political or constitutional one, under current conditions.)

Perhaps, the CPC executive government ought to change the official name of the country, which is currently "The People's Republic of China," to "China." This would then remove the inherent ambiguity in the current name of the party, which some people might find a little confusing. This suggested change in the name of the country might also begin to 'solve' the current ambiguous 'problem' of "the two Chinas," which is of course is a 'problem' that can only be resolved by the establishment of just one "China." Keen observers of the political systems in the Hong Kong and Macao Areas will doubtless note that the SAR governments occasionally refer to themselves, respectively as, "Hong Kong, China," and "Macao, China." This could mean that there are in fact two "Chinas" (at the political or constitutional level) and no-one has yet fully realized it.

Of course, the suggested renaming of the PRC to “China” might lead to the existence of a new ‘problem.’ This is the problem of the existence of “three Chinas” all of which would need to be officially recognized by both the CPC and the PRC executive government and state leadership.

This “three China policy” could, however, lead to the existence of significant problems of understanding and agreement in cross-strait relations with the island of Taiwan.

These ‘problems’ could occur because the government of the island only supports a “one China” policy and not a “three China” policy, or even possibly, the current “two China” policy of the Hong Kong and Macao Areas.

Given this kind of confusion on the “one China” issue, the government on the island of Taiwan could be well advised to remove itself entirely from its current position of advising the PRC executive government and state leadership with the technical resolution of the problem of establishing one “China / Zhongguo”

In addition, the government in Taiwan might also exercise the following actions, firstly it might dissolve the state of “The Republic of China” (ROC), and secondly it might declare an independent government or state as an interim measure.

The above actions might then allow the matter of establishing one “China / Zhongguo” to be more easily resolved by the CPC, the PRC executive government and the PRC state leadership with more precision and clarity.

This approach could also benefit the current executive government of the PRC as it might reduce the impact of any unnecessary interference from the more locally focused political establishment in Taiwan, which may find the ‘problem’ of the creation of one “China” simply too large a problem to effectively advise on with any well rounded knowledge and expertise.

In addition, the dissolution of the ROC would bring about the termination of the official current “state of war” that exists between the ROC and the PRC, as the ROC would no longer exist. Changing the name of the PRC to “China” might also assist in the resolution of this outstanding political problem. This is because the PRC would no longer exist. Therefore, without the existence of either the ROC or PRC there could be no official “state of war” between them.

This resolution on its own of course would not entirely ‘solve’ the “one China” problem. This is because there would now be “three Chinas,” as noted earlier. These would be “Hong Kong, China,” “Macao, China,” and “China.”

However, this 'problem' could be automatically 'solved' with the change in name of the PRC to "China" as any current agreements between the PRC and the two former sovereign powers of Hong Kong and Macao, that is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Portugal, on matters of PRC sovereignty regarding "the two small Chinas" might no longer take effect, because the PRC would no longer exist.

However, any agreements made previously with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Portugal, with the remaining one "China" could of course take effect in their stead.

In short, Macao might officially need to return to Portuguese sovereignty, and the Island of Hong Kong and the peninsular of Kowloon up to Boundary Street might officially need to return to UK sovereignty. (The area called "The New Territories" would of course still need to return to the one remaining "China" due to the termination of the lease first made in 1898, unless of course a new lease, or administrative arrangement could be negotiated with HMG (UK).)

(h) The Response by Architecture to Change in State Relationships

The Architectural design of new government offices to such potential changes in the state relationships of the country outlined in section (g) above might also need to be anticipated in any design proposal.

Perhaps the best way to anticipate any architectural response to changes in state relationships is to simply design an office complex that is basically flexible in its use. In short, to design a building that is capable of performing the tasks of central government under any system of constitutional organization.

To achieve the requirement of flexibility, a new government complex would not only need to function in a flexible way at the utilitarian level, but would also need to have an aesthetic design that is essentially 'non-partisan' (in either matters of political party or state relationships).

This raises the question, "how can Architectural design be non-partisan?"

Perhaps the answer to this question is to design simply for the practical requirements of human beings as human beings. In short, to design a complex at the scale of human beings, (rather than something 'monumental' and 'grand,') that is comfortable and commodious, and with an aesthetic that pleases the needs of the human eye, the human mind and the human body. For, whatever our political beliefs and ideologies, we are still limited by our natural human condition.

(i) The Relationship of the CPC to the Army (PLA)

As in most sovereign states, the integrity of the civil state depends upon the establishment of order provided by its military forces. Without military integrity there would be no civil integrity established either within the state structure of government or its geographical boundaries. To achieve this goal, the military must have credibility in relation to other state military organizations, and the willing support of its people, both financially and materially. To achieve this goal it must have order, and a robust moral integrity.

In the PRC, it would appear that these goals are currently orchestrated by the CPC. It is the CPC, through its offices in the Army, that instills order and military discipline by providing the basis of its moral integrity as an important participant in the drive towards the goal of an ideal civil society, which the CPC sees ultimately as a Communist State.

As a result of this relationship between the Army and the CPC, the Army has often found itself used as tool in the party's socio-economic policy and its various political campaigns since 1949. It has also been used as tool for restraining and controlling the pace of these campaigns, particularly in their final stages. In this sense the Army has been understood by PRC society as a "people's army." In short, it does not just provide a system for national defence, it also promotes and supports the CPC in its social and ideological work within civil society.

In recent years this relationship to the party seems to be changing. The Army itself has been reluctant to get involved in party work and promotional campaigns. This is because it has been called, perhaps once too often, to correct the excesses of such campaigning. This has led to a greater focus on the non-partisan activities of national defence, internal disaster response and civil government work, such as constructing dual-use infrastructure projects (Military roads, railways, airports, heliports, ship docks, nuclear power stations, nuclear reprocessing plants, high tech telecommunications factories, research development institutes, space satellite production and long range rocketry).

More recently, this non-partisan work has led to a greater involvement in international work as more countries around the world are now willing to accept the Army's participation, particularly, when made within The United Nations (UN) structure.

In short, the Army has begun to change in to a more "professional" organization with regard to its work and outlook, rather than simply being a "revolutionary" tool for CPC political policy.

Nevertheless, the CPC remains an active element throughout the organization of the Army from its base structures to the very top echelon. For example, it appears that the Central Military Commission is still initially determined and vetted by the CPC in its “standing committee of the Politburo,” before it is elevated to its position as “The State Central Military Commission of The People’s Republic of China” (SCMCPRC) by an election at the NPC. (See Table 3)

This arrangement between the CPC and the Army may, of course, change at some point in the future. For example CPC cadres appointed to military units might be replaced by professional state official liaison officers appointed by the executive government (CPGPRC) from the civil service of the federal government. Serving military officers and men might be barred from serving in political parties or party offices. They might also be barred from serving in particular positions of state, such as the President of the PRC, the Chairperson of SCMCPRC, the State Council of the PRC, the heads of central government ministries, the NPC, the CPPCC and on provincial and district congresses.

No doubt foreign states will also be interested in seeing the de-politicization of the Army. It would certainly help to remove any lingering doubt that it is currently engaged in political work of a subversive or insurgency nature in foreign countries such as those noted in Section (b). Of course, the only sure way of eliminating this kind of suspicion is for the serving personnel of the PLA to participate in UN only sanctioned operations when serving the nation abroad.

(j) The Response by Architecture to Change in the Army (PLA)

In section (i) I noted the past relationship of the CPC to the PLA, and the more recent changes in the Army’s current development as it appears to move from a politicized past to a more professional future. How would this development affect the design of any civil architecture for a new central government office complex at Tiananmen Square, a substantial part of which might include offices for the Ministry of National Defence?

Given these apparent changes, the architectural response could be much the same as for any civil government department. That is, any new offices should be flexible in its design and express a ‘non-partisan’ aesthetic.

As noted, the key recent changes to the Army are its greater “professionalism,” its use in disaster relief, its participation in “dual-use” infrastructure work, and its growing participation in UN operations. All of these activities are expanding areas of work for the Army. Therefore any new design will need to be capable of allowing for a future increase in the office floor area required for use by the Army.

The final design might be built in construction phases as required to meet this expanding demand, or it might be built in one phase and any surplus office space might be temporarily used by other government departments, or even sub-let to private companies.

The design might include some special facilities, such as “a national disaster response control centre” and “UN operations liaison office and operations headquarters,” along with the more usual departments found in such a facility (administration, pay, logistics, policy, intelligence, foreign military liaison and offices for the joint-chiefs of the general staff etc...).

(k) Conclusion

In this appendix I have given a brief summary of the past, present and possible future development of political discourse in the CPC, and how this might affect any Architectural design for new government offices in the vicinity of Tiananmen Square.

I have also noted how future changes in parliamentary representation, foreign and state affairs and defence affairs might develop, and how, from an Architectural point of view, these particular changes could affect the design. From this analysis, I concluded that any design for new government buildings ought to be both non-partisan in style and allow for flexibility of use.

From the historical view point, it is interesting to note that the current development of the government structure in the PRC seems to have certain similarities with that of the British Commonwealth of 1649 to 1660 (See Table 8).

It is certainly interesting to speculate whether the apparent changes in the ethos of the Army noted in section (i) will lead to some form of “Restoration,” if not in fact, but at least in style. In short, that the running of the Army becomes a de-politicized organization, separated from the ideological influence of one political party or another, but wedded instead to a non-partisan concept of service to the state of the PRC as a whole. However, this of course is a matter for the current and the future politicians of the PRC to determine.

In the meantime any new building offices required by the PRC central government ought to allow for current needs and state structures, as well as any new developments that might occur in the future in whatever form they might appear.

Table 8: A Comparison of the PRC Government Structure with the British Commonwealth of 1649 - 1660			
	The PRC (1949 - Present)	The British Commonwealth (1649 -1660) (4)	The British Crown (1660 - Present)
	A	B	C
1 (1)	"The People"	"The Commonwealth"	"The Crown"
2	Chairman of the SCMCPRC	Lord General (1642-53) Lord Protector (1653-59)	HM The King / HM The Queen
3	SCMCPRC (2)	The Council of Officers	His / Her Majesty's Government (HMG)
4	CMC of the CPC	<i>No equivalent</i>	<i>No equivalent</i>
5	The President of the PRC	<i>No equivalent</i>	<i>No equivalent</i>
6	The Premier of the State Council	?	"A Prime Minister" (Actually part of HMG)
7	The State Council	The Council of State	"A Cabinet" (also HMG)
8	The Standing Committees of the NPC & CPPCC	"The Rump Parliament" (1648-53 & 1658-60) (5) "The Nominated Parliament" (1653)	<i>No equivalent</i>
9	NPC & CPPCC	"The Long Parliament" (1640-60) (6)	"The Crown" in Parliament (6)
10	"The State" (3) (CPC?)	"The Commonwealth" (The Puritan Church?)	The Church of England, The Presbyterian Church of Scotland, The Church in Wales, The Church in Ireland?
11	Political Parties	<i>No equivalent</i>	Political Parties (c.1700)

Note (1): Title for designating the "sovereignty" of the country.

Note (2): The Central Government of the PRC, which is called "The Central People's Government of the PRC" (CPGPRC), is effectively the SCMCPRC (item 3 in column A).

Note (3): In the PRC the state structure is officially entirely secular. However, it is often understood by CPC officials and spokesmen that the CPC is "The State." This seems to 'allow' the CPC to give itself a superior position in the framework of constitutional government well above other political parties. It also seems to allow the CPC to use the authority of the state, its resources, its civil service and its armed forces, to maintain its superior position above the other political parties, and any prominent 'independent' leaders. In the UK there is officially a "United Kingdom" of Church and State in "The Crown." (ie: It is both secular and religious at the same time.) This might be considered as similar in form to the idea of an indivisible unity of "The State" and the CPC. One might consider the basic dogma of the CPC as a kind of religion or religious doctrine, which is manifested in a kind of religious Order or 'brotherhood,' which is the CPC itself. The British Commonwealth was effectively a secular state, but had Puritan Church leanings.

Note (4): Information from Kenyon. pp 158-194

Note (5): Consisted of about 150-200 Members of Parliament, which is similar to the membership of the standing committees of the NPC & CPPCC. ("The Nominated Parliament" had 140.)

Note (6): "The Crown" in Parliament has an Upper House, "The House of Lords," and a Lower House, "The House of Commons." The Commonwealth Parliament had officially only a Lower House from 1649 to 1653. (All ministers in HMG are usually members of the Lower House.)

Appendix 2: A Note on the Existing Architecture of Sites A, B and C

The existing structures on Site A are “The Monument to the People’s Heroes,” which was constructed in 1958, and the Mausoleum of Mao Tse-tung, founder of the PRC, which was built in a 10 month period from 1976 to 1977. The Structures on Sites B and C are the History Museum and “The Great Hall of the People,” respectively. The latter was built in 1958 also within a 10 month period. (Buckley, pp 595 - 606.)

The Architectural style of these structures is unusual but not exceptional. There are differences in style between them. However, these are not immediately noticeable to the human eye. All are monumental in appearance. They are all designed in an eclectic or hybrid style of European ‘Neo-classical’ Architecture. All three buildings have colonnades of one kind or another.

“The Great Hall of the People” appears to have Ancient Egyptian decorative motifs. The other two buildings have no significant applied decoration. However, the Mausoleum has four Soviet style sculptural groups decorating the staircases to the north and south of the building. They appear to be excellent examples of “Socialist Realist” figurative work.

As well as figurative bas-reliefs, “The Monument to the People’s Heroes” has some applied traditional Chinese imperial style decoration. It is in fact the only work that has any Chinese feel to it. The other buildings appeal to the monumental Soviet Neo-classicism of the period, which was imported by Russian technicians and Russian trained engineers. Although in the case of the Mausoleum the style is so minimal that one is immediately reminded of the Architecture of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany.

However, the designs of the two buildings on Sites B and C do have some unusual Chinese references, in spite of their Soviet style European appearance. In short, both buildings are clearly based on the palace floor plans of the “Forbidden City” with one major difference. This is their rotation by 90 degrees. This allows their main entrances to point to Tiananmen Square. In fact, this arrangement of main entrances is not entirely favoured by traditional Chinese geomancy. It is interesting to note, however, that the main vehicle drop-off and pick-up point for VIP’s for “The Great Hall of the People” appears to be on the south side of the building, which is favoured by Chinese geomancy.

It also interesting to note how relatively unsuccessful these plans are in meeting the requirements of their new functions. For example, “The Great Hall of the People” has clearly had to ‘expand’ into the traditional ‘eastern’ courtyard area to the north of the main central building.

Along the central axis of “The Great Hall of the People” the three main buildings, which are distinct in the original palace Architecture, have been glued together into one amorphous mass. This effectively separates it functionally from the ‘exterior’ courtyard spaces. In the original Architecture these sheltered spaces are largely open to the exterior. This allowed a multi-layered visual link across the spaces of the palace, whether sheltered or open, which was full of special meaning and delight. The new buildings are all enclosed and at a scale so vast that the original beauty and meaning cannot be replicated. Indeed, all the human intimacy of the original Architecture is simply lost.

Why these buildings have attempted to use traditional palace floor plans and mesh them with European style functions and exterior treatment is really beyond rational explanation. The result is not beauty or joy. It does seem to indicate, however, that the Architects of the period were caught between two worlds: A world of a lost past and a hesitant future.

These designs might also indicate that the profession of Architecture in the PRC had literally lost its understanding of the past. And yet nor did it fully understand the design discipline of the new imported ‘future.’ (If they had perhaps, the designers might have also based their Architecture on true Classical style floor plans instead of the ancient Architectural floor plans of Imperial China.)

Perhaps, the essential ‘problem’ is that this imported ‘future’ also looked back, but to a different past and a different history, which was not their own.

In the current period, the global profession of Architecture has largely moved on from the imitation of past styles, and now looks towards the development of truly new forms and arrangements. Perhaps the Architects of the PRC will also develop their own unique designs without the need to borrow from either their own past or someone else’s.

Of course, this does not mean a total rejection of the past *per se*; one can always learn something new from it. However, perhaps one should also remember to respect the strength of the more popular and enduring systems of social belief in one’s design work, particularly in the PRC. For if the designer does not take heed of them, others will, and in so doing will make changes to the design which might not be so desirable from either a functional or an aesthetic point of view. (Naturally, in this instance, I refer to the esoteric arts of traditional Chinese geomancy and Feng Shui.)

Appendix 3: Interpretative Diagrams for the Site Area

This appendix includes the following subheadings:

- (a) A diagram for the existing site area.
- (b) Interpretative diagrams for the existing site design.
- (c) Interpretative diagrams for the new design proposal.
- (d) Interpretative diagrams for Foucault's analysis of knowledge.
- (e) Interpretative diagram for the recommended design approach.

(a) A Diagram for the Existing Site Area.




Diagram 1: The Physical Site Area. (This diagram indicates its physical connections.)

(b) Interpretative Diagrams for the Existing Site Design.




Diagram 2: The Relationship of Design Elements in the Existing Design. (The people are represented primarily by the open area in the northern half of the square.)




Diagram 3: The Function of Design Elements in the Existing Design. (Life is represented by the open space in the northern half of the square.)




Diagram 4: The Ontological Representation of the Design Elements in the Existing Design. (The ontological experience of a person, or a living human being, is primarily represented by the open space in the northern half of the square.)




Diagram 5: The Ontological Representation of the Design Elements in the Existing Design: based on the major building elements. (The mausoleum of Mao Tse-tung represents the mortality of life.)

(c) Interpretative Diagrams for the New Design Proposals.




Diagram 6: The Design Proposal for the New Design Elements.




Diagram 7: The Function of the New Design Elements in the Design Proposal. ("Politics" is the creation of Law and its ultimate interpretation, which is made possible through the study and application of Linguistics and philology, amongst other things; eg: Ethics.)




Diagram 8: An Ontological Representation of the New Design Elements in the Design Proposal. (The Square is a representation of the people. "A Person" is representative of a living (human) being.)

(d) Interpretative Diagrams for Foucault's Analysis of Knowledge.




Diagram 9: An Ideal Representation of the "Classical" System of Human Knowledge: superimposed on the Design Proposal. (Foucault, M.) (This system is not modulated by time, but is immutable and unchanging. It is rite in the lifeless form of the taxonomy of dead creatures: The function of taxidermy in the study of Natural History serves it well by the way of example.)




Diagram 10: An Ideal Representation of "The Modern" System of Human Knowledge: superimposed on the Design Proposal. (Foucault, M.) (This system is modulated by time. It is constantly under review and liable to change. Nothing is fixed. Human knowledge and experience is a living thing. The study of the Biology of nature is the study of the change in the Living Things, not the Dead, which is purview of Chemistry and Physics.)

(e) Interpretative Diagram for the Recommended Design Approach.




Diagram 11: A representation of the key functions and design 'representation' for each site: These are identified in order to suggest the design aim or objective and strategic approach for each site area.

The Glossary

BOT	Build Operate Transfer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMC	Central Military Commission (of the CPC)
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPG	Central People's Government
CPGPRC	Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
HK	Hong Kong
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HMG (UK)	Her Majesty's Government (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
IOC	International Olympic Committee
NPC	National People's Congress
PDRK	The People's Democratic Republic of Korea
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PLA	The People's Liberation Army
PFI	Private Finance Initiative
PRC	The People's Republic of China
ROC	The Republic of China
ROK	The Republic of Korea
SAR	Special Administrative Region
SCMCPRC	State Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNO	United Nations Organization
VIP	Very Important Person

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