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Haz
Points to Disgruntled Generals
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Laksamana.Net
July
10, 2002 01:07 PM, By the Editor |
Haz
Points to Disgruntled Generals
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Laksamana.Net -
Vice President Hamzah Haz has pointed a finger of
blame at disgruntled generals who, he implied, have
been destabilizing the restive province of Aceh by
penetrating the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Amid the controversy concerning the government’s
plan to impose martial law in response to the
continuing violence in Aceh, Haz has questioned who is
the mastermind behind GAM.
“Is it true that the terrorist group belongs to GAM,
or is it GAM with another added factor? We still do
not know. Or, are there external parties who want
Indonesia to be unstable?” said Hamzah Haz as quoted
by Kompas (7/7/02).
Haz was opening what is likely to become a new debate
on generals and mid- ranking officers who have served
and established deep roots in Aceh from the days of
the Suharto era.
Seen from the military track records of high-ranking
officers, there are two former generals who served in
Aceh and went on to become ministers. They are Lt.
Gen. Syarwan Hamid, Minister for Home Affairs under
President B.J. Habibie, and incumbent Minister of
Communications Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar.
Syarwan Hamid has a black record in Aceh, where he
served as Military Resort Commander in Lhokseumawe,
Korem o11 Lilawangsa, between 1991-1992.
Gumelar’s connection with Aceh is less direct. In
1994 was assigned as Chief of Staff of the North
Sumatra-based Bukit Barisan Military Command
overseeing Aceh, under commander Arie Kumaat. Kumaat
went on to head the State Intelligence Agency (BAKIN)
under President Abdurrahman Wahid.
Since the end of authoritarian rule under Suharto, the
crisis in Aceh has not necessarily been driven by GAM
alone, but as a reflection of the proxy war among the
generals. Under Suharto, military and intelligence
operatives were given a carte blanc to put down
the armed rebellion instigated by GAM.
Internal military tension had already surfaced,
especially when then Armed Forces Commander General
Benny Moerdani came into conflict with Suharto
following the military’s rejection of then State
Secretary Sudharmono as vice president in 1988.
The bad relations between Suharto and Moerdani saw the
latter work to bring his faction to prominence, taking
over strategic positions at the center as well as at
regional military command level.
The event that triggered the liquidation of
Moerdani’s faction was the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre
in Dili, East Timor, which implicated Maj. Gen.
Sintong Panjaitan and Col. Waraouw, two Moerdani protégés.
Then came the turn of Feisal Tanjung, assigned by
Suharto as head of the Military Honorary Council
investigating who was responsible for the Dili
massacre.
The appointment signalled a power shift at central and
regional military commands. Tanjung was appointed by
Suharto as Army Chief of Staff in 1993.
The power shift was also reflected in Aceh. Then Col.
Syarwan Hamid, close to Tanjung, was in charge in the
troublespot of Lhokseumawe.
In 1990, a year before Syarwan took over the resort
command, Suharto’s son in law and another Moerdani
rival, Prabowo Subianto, was assigned to Aceh as
Kostrad (Strategic Reserve Command) unit commander.
This coincided with increasing tension, military
oppression and a rise in the level of armed
insurrection, allegedly provoked by dissatisfied
regional military officers from behind the scenes.
The central military command in Jakarta launched an
anti-narcotics campaign, the Nila Operation, in 1990,
resulting in cleaning up at least 47 Aceh-based
military officers who had got involved in the
marijuana trade.
The story became interesting when authorities
investigated one officer involved, Sgt. Robert
Suryadarma from Battalion 111 based in East Aceh, one
of the major troublespots.
Suryadarma was found to be a follower of Rizal Gading,
a rival faction of GAM supreme leader Hasan Tiro.
Rizal Gading in turn, is alleged to have had close
ties to Benny Moerdani (see Geoffrey Robinson, Rawan
is as Rawan Does, The Origins of Disorder in New Order
Aceh, Indonesia Magazine).
The crackdown in Aceh ran parallel to events at the
center, where Suharto began to strengthen the Feisal
Tanjung military faction in an effort to balance
Moerdani’s power.
From this arose speculation that Moerdani had been
supporting certain disgruntled elements in the
military linked to GAM in order to undermine the
credibility and authority of its rival faction in
handling the crisis in Aceh.
In response to the increasing armed strength of GAM
supported by some military personnel, the military
became more oppressive.
It was during Syarwan Hamid’s tenure as Lhokseumawe-based
commander that militarism hit a new peak in Aceh,
involving not only military personnel but ordinary
civilians.
As local commander, Syarwan introduced a strategy of
civil-military cooperation - a euphemism for
compelling civilians to participate in intelligence
and security operations against real or alleged
government opponents. Syarwan thus militarized the
civilian population.
“The youth are the front line. They know best who
the GPK (Security Disrupting Movement) are. We will
then settle the matter,” said Syarwan (Kompas,
July 11, 1991).
In its effort to isolate the armed insurgency by GAM,
the military established the Military Operation Area
(DOM) in three troublespots, Pidie, East Aceh and
North Aceh.
In these three areas, GAM was believed to have gained
the sympathy of a fairly wide cross-section of the
civilian non-combatant population.
The military became trapped in a process of
state-sponsored terrorism, utilizing tools including
rape, kidnapping, mass killing and torture to combat
the civilian pro-GAM population.
The DOM was finally lifted during the Habibie
presidency, but the military and GAM remained trapped
in unending armed conflict.
Analysts say that during the military domination of
Aceh under Suharto, military personnel in charge in
Aceh mostly had backgrounds in intelligence and
included veterans of special anti-terror units.
“As they were mostly experts in counter terrorism,
it was no great problem for them to act as
terrorists,” explains one.
Viewed in this light, Hamzah Haz seems to have good
reason to question whether it is GAM and GAM alone
which has been perpetrating terrorist acts.
As if to suggest a similarity between Aceh and the
attack earlier this year on Soya village in Ambon, Haz
has given the impression that the military is
continuing to work behind the scenes to destabilize
the regions.
“As at Soya in Ambon, up to date we still do not
know who is behind the ruthless mass killings. This is
just one example,” he said. |
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