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July 1, 2002 Issue
Not a Ticking Time Bomb
The fundamental threat to Indonesia's future does not come from radical Islam but
from the government's inability to uphold law and order
By Harold Crouch NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL
July 1 issue — Indonesia has always been critical to the stability of Southeast Asia
not because of anything the country has done, but because of what everyone fears it
might do—fall apart. Since September 11, that worry has only grown. Now Indonesia
represents more than a sprawling archipelago that straddles vital sea lanes. It is the
world's largest Muslim nation, a potential breeding ground for fundamentalists and a
chaotic hinterland into which Islamic terrorists could well burrow. In other words, now
countries far beyond the region are afraid—some would say terrified—of th! e prospect
of Indonesia's falling apart.
ARE THESE FEARS justified? There is no question that Indonesia faces enormous
challenges, and that its performance since the fall of Suharto in 1998 has not inspired
much confidence. But some of the nightmare scenarios are grossly exaggerated. So
far there are no grounds for believing that Indonesia is close to disintegration along the
lines of the Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia, while the prospect of Islamic
radicals' seizing power is quite remote.
Communal violence has been common during recent years. But what is often
forgotten is that the regions most affected by conflict—Aceh, Papua, Maluku, West
and Central Kalimantan and Poso on the island of Sulawesi—contain little more than 5
percent of Indonesia's population. This is not to say that the suffering brought about
by such violence is not serious. Still, the unrest should be seen in perspective. About
95 percent of Indonesia's population live in areas that have not been disrupted by
widespread violence.
Armed separatist movements are active in only two of Indonesia's 32 provinces—Aceh
and Papua—and in neither are they close to winning. As long as the roots of
separatist demands are not addressed, these struggles will continue; the brutal
methods often adopted by the military only exacerbate local disaffection. But there
are no signs that armed separatism is about to emerge in any of the other 30
provinces.
Although Islam is the religion of 87 percent of Indonesians, radical Islamic groups
have never been close to political power. In the 1999 election, parties committed to
explicitly Islamic goals won only 14 percent of the vote. Most Muslims gave their
votes to the two main secular parties, President Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar, the
former ruling party under Suharto.
Violence perpetrated by radical Islamic groups receives much publicity but is not in
fact widespread. The worst violence involving Muslims has taken place in regions like
Ambon and Poso, where evenly balanced Christian and Muslim communities have
been at war with each other. Such violence has not been a Muslim monopoly. In
these regions it is not only churches but also mosques that have been destroyed.
The fundamental threat to Indonesia's future, in fact, does not come from separatism
or from radical Islam but from the government's inability to uphold law and maintain
order. Public confidence in the so-called justice system to provide justice is minimal.
The courts are notorious for corruption among poorly paid judges and prosecutors; the
police are famous for protection rackets and the involvement of police officers
themselves in crime. The military, which receives only 30 percent of its requirements
from the government budget, is left to fill the gap through its own commercial
operations and what can only be described as extortion.
Military and police impunity for human-rights offenses is deeply entrenched. The
current trials of those accused of human-rights crimes in East Timor might result in
the conviction of a few junior officers and militia members, but no one believes that
they will ensnare senior officers. Military officers have been ! investigated over the
murder of the Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay six months ago, but the case
has not been resolved. In major cities, it is common for vigilantes to kill petty
criminals, but the killings are almost never investigated.
Yes, Indonesia's stability is quite fragile and vulnerable to an unpredictable external
shock—like the financial crisis of 1997. But it would require an implosion—itself quite
unlikely—of the central government in Jakarta for the process of disintegration even to
begin.
The more pressing challenge facing Indonesia is how to ensure respect for law and
how to maintain order. The problem is that Indonesia's courts, police and military are
poor instruments for achieving this goal—and the government seems to have little
enthusiasm for reforming them. In the absence of institutions capable of guaranteeing
public security, Indonesia's economy will continue to stagnate and social and political
tensions will be aggravated. The world should perhaps worry less about whether
Indonesia will fall apart and start pushing Jakarta to get its act together.
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CROUCH was head of the International Crisis Group in Jakarta and is now with the
Australian National University in Canberra.
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