Release Date May 4 2002

The Fifth Parliamentary Conference Wellington May 4-5 2002

Muldoon and the Advisory Group - Recollections December 1975/August 1976

By Len Bayliss

Whilst giving a talk to the Blenheim Rotary Club, soon after the 1975 election, I was given a message to call Hugh Templeton - he asked me to visit him when I returned to Wellington the following day. When I went to see him he asked me if I was willing to act in an advisory capacity to the new Prime Minister (Muldoon). Whilst this was a complete surprise, I had no hesitation in immediately answering in the affirmative - the country faced serious economic problems - which I had repeatedly publicised. I told Hugh I was not a member or a supporter of the national party or any other party. Also, I had to get the approval of Bruce Smith, General Manager of the Bank of New Zealand. I was then the Bank’s Chief Economist and had been employed in that role since August 1966.

I obtained Bruce Smith`s preliminary approval and shortly afterwards had an informal and relaxed interview with Muldoon. He sketched out his concept of an advisory Group within a Prime Minister’s Department - which was quite a bit different from that mentioned by Hugh Templeton. He added that Bernie Galvin would be the Departmental Head. I thought the concept of an advisory group, within a Prime Minister’s Department was excellent. The only other part of the interview I recall was that, with some trepidation, I stated that I wanted freedom to express my own analysis and recommendations - but that Muldoon, naturally, had full freedom to accept or reject them. He smiled and said that was okay by him. On returning to the BNZ I reported to Bruce Smith and he gave his final approval.

Prof. Gustafsen`s book states that I was the only member of the advisory group nominated by Muldoon. This was a major surprise to me since I had had virtually no personal contact with Muldoon. Shortly before the 1975 election, Muldoon had written to me asking for my comments on a monetary policy paper, written by Frank Holmes, which advocated major liberalisation moves. I strongly supported Frank and added a few additional thoughts of my own.

First Day

As soon as I had received Bruce Smith`s approval, I phoned Bernie and asked when should I start. He replied ASAP and as a result I turned up at Parliament buildings the next day and was directed to the third floor where the Prime Minister’s Office was located. Security was non existent - so much so that I felt that Parliament’s apparent zero security was unwise in the light of international terrorist attacks at that time. I wandered through the third floor offices and opened one door - which was the ante room leading into the PM`s office. Inside were Bernie, Henry Lang ( Secretary to the Treasury) and I think Grey Nelson the PM`s Assistant Secretary. As I entered Bernie, sitting on a table, was roundly castigating Henry "Why did you give the old bugger three options when you must have known that he would pick the toughest" - this referred to the Treasury economic policy paper containing policy recommendations to overcome a serious economic deterioration - a not unusual post election situation. Henry, for once, was at a loss for words! This minor spat was interesting since according to the subsequent economic folk lore, still being repeated, to the effect that Muldoon should have been much tougher when first elected. After a bit of a chat and gossip, Bernie told me to select my office and read through the Treasury and Reserve Bank post election economic papers. which are always written before the electoral result is known. I had contributed to a number of them in the past. Bernie told me my bailiwick would be monetary, fiscal and housing policy and to go and find myself an office. I had a good look round the immediate offices, picked the best one, and settled down to working in the Prime Ministers Department Advisory Group .

The Prime Minister’s Department

The Prime Minister’s Department offices were adjacent to the Prime Minister’s suite. Prior to the Muldoon Government, these offices contained the External Affairs Dept - . the latter were pretty unhappy at loosing their place in the sun since they believed, with some justification, that their influence depended on close proximity to the Prime Minister (a truism for most Governments) and also in the case of a private sector Chief Executive. I enjoyed the short time External Affairs remained since we met at morning tea and it was always interesting to discuss international affairs with them .

My memory is of very cordial relations with the other members of the PM`s Dept - who at first viewed the Advisory group newcomers with a combination of fascination and good humoured tolerance. Every time I met Philip O`Shea, a delightful and very erudite fellow, with a good sense of humour, I tried to convince him that I should have both the Order of Merit and a Knighthood. Philip promised to do his best but gently inferred that I was being rather greedy. The only person I had minor difficulties with was Patrick Millen, head of the Cabinet Secretariat, who had a somewhat exaggerated view of his importance. When Muldoon and Galvin were overseas I was the head of the Advisory Group. Patrick informed me in this situation that he was the acting head of the Prime ministers Dept. I did not argue and when push came to shove I ignored him - little point in making a fuss as long as you get your own way! Bernie concurred with my approach.

Initially if we worked late we could dine at Bellamy’s with other parliamentary staff and the press gallery. The food was good, there was considerable quantities of booze and large amounts of gossip/innuendo etc etc... all very interesting and enjoyable. The Advisory group members were initially viewed with a fair amount of cynicism by the regulars but things settled down as we ceased to be a novelty.

The Advisory Group

The other members of the Advisory group were fairly quickly appointed - some sooner than others because of their ability to speedily switch employment. Bernie made the choices and only consulted me on one appointment.

- Jack McFaull, from the Dairy Board, was the Agriculture Adviser. Jack had previously had a career with the Reserve Bank and the Wool Board and was highly experienced and respected. We had spent ten years together in the Reserve Bank and had kept in touch. I knew him best in the Group and had a very high opinion of him both as a person and as a very practical and constructive economist.

- John Wood was then a very highly regarded Foreign Affairs official - a judgement subsequently proved correct . An excellent operator with a good sense of humour and easy to get on with. Currently Ambassador in Washington.

- Tony Sullivan, from AHI, was the manufacturing/business adviser and did a superb job in pushing manufacturing exports and maintaining liaison with business.

- John Beckett, ex Rhodes scholar, was from NZ Railways and was mainly involved in transport and energy matters - very important and difficult portfolios.

- John Roberts, from Trade and Industry, was concerned with trade matters (he died in the Mt Erebus crash).

In addition there was Rob Hole covering social policy and Neil Sterling a young Treasury economist.

The Group had very close and friendly relations with the PM`s press section - comprising Gerry Symmans, Peter Acland and Michelle Boag (now President of the National Party). Keith Hancock, an excellent companion with a wicked sense of humour, was the PM`s speech writer- that is for the ones the PM did not personally dictate.

The morale of the Group during my time was excellent - as were the personal relations between group members. It was a very happy team. Politically the centre lefties were in a majority but all gave total loyalty to the Prime Minister - even if some disagreed with some his policies...... principally sporting contacts with South Africa.

Group members had a great deal of independence and were expected to show much initiative in carrying out their tasks. There was a compete absence of bureaucratic structures and thinking. We each had an important job to do and got on with it Bernie ran a very loose rein but a very effective one. We had to use our own judgement and discretion.

Every Friday afternoon the group met in Muldoon’s office and reported events in their field - including business and departmental reactions. These meetings were of interest as group members learnt a great deal about trends over a wide area, economic, social, foreign policy etc. At times the meetings were quite hilarious. For Muldoon they were a very valuable source of expert information thus enabling him to have an excellent grasp of events. Later, usually some time after 5pm, some of the members met for drinks and for a very relaxed and convivial social in time Bernie’s office - I usually participated for a short time.

I had no problems working with Bernie Galvin - whom I had known for many years. We had a very similar economic philosophy and I can recall no significant policy disagreement when we worked together in the Advisory Group - or any other time for that matter. I had first met Bernie, introduced by Molly Lucas, when I was on loan to Treasury from the Reserve Bank in 1961 and had had frequent contact with him since then - as well as with other Treasury economists and investigating officers. These contacts were increased greatly when I was economist to the Monetary and Economic Council (1961/66) and when I was a member of the Targets Advisory Group (1969) with the National Development conference. Economists in those days were a very friendly co-operative bunch - even if their views on economic policy differed greatly. The post-1984 professional animosity and personal vituperation were unheard of.

Many people believed that I spent much time closeted with Muldoon formulating economic policy. This was not even remotely correct. Bernie and I were the economic team. I would draft papers for Muldoon and in most cases Bernie would initial them and pass them on to the PM - who nearly always returned them initialled by the following morning. If Bernie disagreed, we would have a chat and make any necessary alterations. Bernie had excellent judgement and knew when to press ahead and when to lie low. All my reports, certainly those of substance for Muldoon, for other departments, or for other outside bodies were approved by Bernie. As far as I was concerned, we had an excellent working relationship. I think other group members may have spent more time with the PM - but broadly speaking they would not initiate policy without first discussing it with Bernie.

In my opinion, Bernie was an outstanding head of the PM`s Dept. Its success was largely due to him - as were the excellent personal relations within the group.

Much of my work was as a committee member - mainly in the Officials committee on Economic Policy, with Treasury providing the chairman and secretary - a strong tactical position. I did not enjoy committee work and was not very good at it - at least that was my opinion. By contrast, Henry Lang and Bernie Galvin were both superb committee men - which was probably a not unimportant reason for both of them becoming Secretary to the Treasury.

Bernie`s finest effort was when we went to a meeting where he had not had time to read the papers and where Treasury was proposing a policy which we strongly opposed. I briefed Bernie as we walked to the meeting and he said, let me do the talking. At the meeting, with a positively angelic cum statesmanlike demeanour, he proceeded to completely destroy the Treasury case largely on peripheral arguments which he convincingly argued were very important.- Treasury were shattered. I think Bernie conceded the proposal should be raised in six months time - a good face saver for Treasury but which everyone knew was the end of the matter. It was much the best example of committeeship I have ever witnessed. Henry Lang was also very expert. I recall him putting the fear of God into the Cabinet Economic sub committee unless they adopted his recommendation - which in fact had considerable merit

Muldoon had an extraordinary ability to absorb and make decisions on the massive amount of paperwork which is inseparable from the office of Prime Minister. I have worked for and with some very able chief executives and business leaders but none were in the same class as Muldoon. He appeared to me to be uncomfortable with social chit chat. There was an office Christmas party in 1976 at which the Advisory group met in Muldoon’s sitting room. It was a very convivial affair, except for Muldoon who was generally ignored and sat looking a bit glum. He seemed quite out it, was watching TV covering a very bad storm. I felt a bit sorry for him and went over and started talking shop. He immediately perked up as soon matters of substance were raised .

There were two other qualities which I particularly admired in Muldoon - apart from his outstanding chief executive ability. He was not a nit picker and he disliked sycophants. I have written many speeches for senior people - most of whom considered (quite incorrectly) that their views carried considerable weight. Draft would succeed draft but in Muldoon’s case there was usually only one draft and few if any alterations. A case in point being his first Mansion House speech in London after he became PM. I put much effort into this speech, which was clearly of major importance. I think he approved the first draft without any alterations. I then sent it to Treasury who wanted one sentence changed, I wrote a note to this effect to Muldoon who retuned it the next day with "NO" and that was that!

Muldoon had a remarkably tough constitution, great physical stamina and was able to stand extraordinary stress. I was amazed quite often by his ability to spend long hours in the House, chair committees, carry out interviews and keep up to date with a massive amount of paperwork. Only at the end of 1976, just before the holiday recess, did I see him look tired.

Muldoon was a formidable person to cross but if persons stood their ground and had a strong case they at least earned respect if not agreement - or even a kind word. Many would not agree with this opinion but I consider that in many instances the recipient of Muldoon`s reprimand deserved it because their remarks were irrelevant, superficial, impractical or time wasting. Muldoon did his homework and expected others to do the same. I have been present at Cabinet economic committee meetings when he was very brusque with Ministers who made ill considered or ill judged remarks. On the other hand, his attitude to officials was, in Bernie’s words, always "wholly proper". That is not to infer that he was kindly or generous. He expected high quality work and loyalty and was very critical when his standards were not achieved. Obviously he was not always right, he was always under great pressure and some were harshly treated - but never in my presence .

When the PM and Bernie were overseas, usually with John Wood, I was in charge of the Advisory Group. Bernie never left me any instructions - only a chaotic desk and an equally chaotic safe! My first job was always to sort out the papers into their appropriate piles so that I had a grasp of my immediate responsibilities. As the Group was working well, I cannot recall having any problems - there was no need for me to get involved unless a group member wanted my opinion and dropped in for a chat

I would report directly to Brian Tallboys, Deputy Prime Minister, whom I held in high regard both as a person and as the Deputy Prime Minister. I recall Brian giving a short impromptu speech opening the "Loaves and Fishes", a Church of England eatery situated close to Parliament. Afterwards I thought how lucky New Zealand was to have a man of such consummate integrity and decency as Deputy Prime Minister. He was very able, had a good intellect and had the rare ability to seek and understand both sides of an argument. This latter quality can often prove a severe handicap to successful politicians or executives who never doubt they know best.

There were a number of occasions when I gave him some excellent (!) advice which he almost certainly ignored. The first occasion was when I reported to him early one morning and found him thumbing through several voluminous files of Foreign Affairs cables which had arrived overnight and/or the previous day. Most were full of bureaucratic trivia. I suggested that it was ridiculous that the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Affairs Minister should have to waste so much of his valuable time on irrelevant trivia and told him he should firmly instruct Frank Corner, the Dept Head, that henceforth only the important cables should be submitted. It is, of course, a well known ploy in both the public service and in business to swamp the Minister or the Board with voluminous reports in order to keep them from asking questions or interfering with Management. In 1961, my co-worker in Treasury told me as he sent off Treasury report number 6000 + (?) to the Minister of Finance "this will keep the old bugger (Harry Lake) busy and not give him time to ask damn fool questions".

Another time, some six or seven months (?) after the 1975 election, I was talking to Brian and he was strongly criticising the failure of Treasury and the Dept of Agriculture to produce a strategy paper for Agriculture - a matter which I also felt strongly about. I suggested that Brian should summon the heads of Treasury and Agriculture and give them a strong rocket for the dilatoriness. I went on to suggest that after doing this he should leak his action to the press gallery. This would not only have the desired result in policy terms but would also demonstrate to both to the general public and to the Public Service that he was not prepared to tolerate poor performance from even the most senior of the Public Service mandarins.

A third occasion was when Jack McFaull came to me around 4.45 pm one Friday evening over some dairy industry problem concerning the Rangitiki Dairy Company which had unexpectedly emerged and which required Brian`s signature by 5 pm if a disaster was not to occur. We went to Brian`s office and said he just had to sign this particular document right away - there was no time for background explanation. Quite rightly, he was furious at being put in this position which primarily reflected, from memory, bad staff work on the part of the participating parties. This is but one, not very good example of the intense pressure Ministers continuously worked under. Ministers required a very strong mental and physical constitution to survive the constant pressure.

There were two other aspects of my being an acting permanent head which are worth recalling. Both Bernie and John Wood were always receiving high security documents and went into top secret consultations - a matter of some amusement to the rest of the group.... although we always kept straight faces. One time when Bernie and John were overseas the lady who delivered these documents came to my office, when Jack was present, and asked what she should do with the highly secret sealed document which she obviously wanted to get rid of. I said l would take it since I was the acting departmental head. When she had gone I said to Jack what shall we do with this stuff - maybe we should open it and see if we should send it on to Bernie. Jack agreed, so we opened it and there was some information which had been published in the ‘Economist’ a couple of weeks earlier. I tore the papers up and put them in the wastepaper basket. Neither Jack nor I were surprised at its contents since we both had plenty of experience with bureaucratic behaviour.

The other occasion was much more onerous. When Bernie was away I would receive on Friday afternoon all the cabinet papers for the following Monday`s Cabinet meeting. These papers mainly comprised memos from Government departments and were, with the exception of those from Treasury, often turgid, voluminous and badly written - and a major chore for Ministers over the weekend. They were also a major chore for me since I felt, as Bernie’s surrogate, that I should read them carefully for major errors or omissions. There was no one else to take final responsibility. I only found one significant error- and this was easily corrected on Monday morning. But I was relieved when Bernie returned.

Other Ministers

I had quite a number of meetings with Eric Holland, Minister of Housing, a pretty decent sort of chap but far from being a political heavyweight like his Prime Minister father. I was supposed to assist him but I think I did a pretty poor job. The housing market had massively expanded during the 1973/74 boom following high inward migration - a situation which was reversed in 1976/77. Not a good time to be Minister of Housing - he was under intense pressure from the industry, particularly the major home builders, to prevent a major drop in housing construction.

I saw quite a bit of George Gair - who I had originally underrated but soon learned to greatly respect and like. George was an extremely able and thoughtful Minister, very good to work with and an excellent politician in the best sense of the word. I also had good, but limited relations, with Hugh Templeton.

It was not uncommon for Ministers to seek the support of Advisory Group members to positively influence Muldoon. Adam Schneider once invited me to his office and in a rather roundabout and friendly way asked me to help convince Muldoon of the merit of one of his pet policies. I declined equally graciously and we parted on good terms.

All group members had quite a lot to do with other Ministers, although I was less involved since Muldoon was Minister of Finance. Many persons and some officials seemed to think I was some sort of "eminence grise" constantly plotting with Muldoon, but I spent very little time with him. All my reports, certainly those of substance, had to be approved by Bernie. As far as I was concerned we had an excellent working relationship. I think other group members spent more time in contact with the PM but broadly speaking they would not initiate policy without first discussing with Berne.

As far as I was concerned, I would only push policies which I had some knowledge of and supported. One time.... I think it was Berne suggested that Jack McFaull and I go round and have a chat with the Head of the Agriculture Dept to see if we could help sort out the Meat industry - a perpetual problem industry of major national importance. I was well aware of many of the traps - personality conflicts, labour, marketing and supply problems, etc of the industry while Jack was much better informed. We went to the Dept of Agriculture and had our chat - during the course of which it became clear that Ag had no positive contribution to make. In fact, they had no contribution at all. Jack and I decided we would not get involved in the meat industry quagmire for which we had no solution (nor had the bureaucracy) - nor had we the time or ability at that time to make a really worthwhile contribution. After I left the PM`s Department, Jack became very successfully involved in meat industry matters.

I cannot recall all the activities I was involved - all my papers are in the Massey University Archives for those who are interested. My main job was to keep track of the economy and this meant scrutinising all the key statistics, reports etc and phoning or meeting with officials and business managers. I have always found that dealing direct, and maintaining confidentially, paid dividends. I then had to report verbally or in a memo to Bernie - the latter usually being passed on to the PM. For most of my time the balance of payments, which had recorded a huge deficit in 1975, and monetary conditions following the major policy changes in early 1976, were my main focus - together with unemployment. In addition, I would receive a fair amount of confidential information which it was hoped would be passed on to the PM - and usually was.

In all honesty, I have to say that I was well fitted for my tasks since I had been doing much the same work over the previous 25 years in the Reserve Bank, Treasury, Monetary and Economic Council and the Bank of New Zealand. Also, I had an excellent range of contacts amongst officials, business, unions and farm organisations. I had always made a point of not being desk bound since I first started work as an economist in 1951 and enjoyed meeting and learning from ‘hands on’ people covering a wide range of activities.

More specifically, I recall in mid 1976 having to write a number of memos, which I considered a huge waste of time, opposing the Reserve Bank view that NZ was heading for another massive boom similar to that which had occurred in 1973. In fact, real GDP hardly changed over 1976/80! Another instance was combating a joint Treasury/Reserve Bank proposal to make the trustee banks the main providers of housing finance and exclude the trading banks - a really absurd proposition. Another task was to write the government’s public statement which was to be made after a highly likely major oil discovery in the southern ocean - the obvious need was to calm down the huge rise in optimism and expectations which would result from such a discovery.

I also put considerable effort into trying to prevent a too drastic decline in housing - mainly with the objective of limiting a major drop in activity and employment. I was castigated by the Reserve Bank and Treasury as being soft, but with nil GDP growth over 1976/80, major increases in unemployment and large scale outward migration, I do not think my objective was completely lacking in judgement. On the other hand, there was little point in building houses which were really not required.

Another activity was to get involved in a wages policy ....where I first met Max Bradford. This was a complicated business in which, to put it mildly, I lacked expertise. I did attend a meeting with the FOL led by Tom Skinner, at which Tom said very angrily to Cliff Terry, who was leading the Government’s team, "If you say once more that wages are a major cause of inflation, when in fact inflation is caused by excessive money supply growth, I will walk out of this meeting". Cliff, a good friend, was pretty non nonplussed and the meeting struggled!. At that time it was believed that wages policy was largely determined by a Sunday morning whisky drinking session between Muldoon and Skinner.

Politics

One contribution which I am rather ashamed of was when George Chapman, President of the National Party, phoned me and asked if it was correct for him to state in a speech that "there was light at the end of the tunnel". I had some acquaintance with George as he was a director of the Bank of New Zealand and we had had a number of chats on banking and economic matters. I was very busy when George rang, in fact we were always extremely committed, and I would have wished to get rid of him ASAP. This was not easy as George is a determined chap and he wanted an answer. In the end, after a fairly lengthy conversation, I rather reluctantly agreed that there was light at the end of the tunnel. As events turned out this was a somewhat optimistic assessment. In retrospect, I should not have given such a premature judgement without thoroughly examining all the relevant facts. Second, I was a public servant and should not engage in political activities and it was particularly important that the Advisory Group not be seen to be so engaged. Talking to George was a borderline case since it was part of my job to discuss economic trends with a variety of people and organisations and George’s question was not dissimilar to those asked by many others. In fact, I was repeatedly asked for an economic assessment and my replies had to contain no political inferences.

I had quite a lot of contact with the press and I always endeavoured to be helpful in answering their questions. Many of the journalists were well known to me as they had frequently contacted me prior to my appointment in the Advisory Group. Ian Templeton was a frequent and welcome visitor- although it was sometimes disconcerting to read the next edition of Trans Tasman with a very accurate summary of what appeared to be a fairly harmless conversation. This of course reflected on Ian`s skill.

Most of my government department contacts were with the Treasury and Reserve Bank and apart from person to person telephone calls were mainly through the formal departmental committee structure. I am not a good committee man and I was invariably faced by superior numbers of Treasury officials, chairman and secretary, all experienced committee people - and to be fair Treasury was probably 50% right. If I lost the battle, Bernie was an experienced backstop who could often reverse the decision if he so chose. He was very skilful in picking the issues to fight on - a very important departmental political attribute.

Relations between the PM`s Dept and Treasury were, on the whole, fairly cordial because it was obvious to all Treasury officials that Bernie was certain to become Secretary to the Treasury and would soon be their boss. In addition, Bernie had an excellent personal rapport with Henry Lang and Noel Lough the Deputy Secretary. I had worked under both when on loan to Treasury in 1961. On the other hand, Treasury whilst a strong proponent of contestability considered that economic policy, particularly fiscal policy, was an exception. Both Treasury and the Reserve Bank did not object to the PM`s Dept but were less than happy at it having at least an equal say with them on policy formulation - in fact in the all important monetary liberalisation policies the PM`s Dept took the dominant role. This is fully documented in Professor Boston’s excellent thesis paper.

I had spent 10 years with the Reserve Bank and had spent 6 months on loan to Treasury and then had spent five years with the Monetary and Economic Council - the latter’s office had been in the same building as Treasury. Hence, over the years I had had cordial relations with my opposite numbers - particularly in Treasury. This particularly applied to the Monetary and Economic Council reports over 1961/66 when I was the Council`s economist. My relations with the Reserve Bank, particularly with Alan Low, suffered from my highly critical approach to Monetary Policy over 1961/75 - which incidentally had increasing support amongst a number of Treasury and Reserve Bank economists. The point I am making is that my background greatly facilitated personal relations and avoided what could have been strong departmental antagonisms.

My relations with the Reserve Bank greatly improved after Alan Low was replaced by Ray White as Governor. I had a high opinion of Ray as a person and as Governor, but I have to say, with some regret, that this was not my opinion of Alan Low. Indeed I hold him largely responsible for New Zealand`s disastrous monetary policies and being unwilling to admit in the face of overwhelming evidence their manifold defects. When I joined the Advisory group I examined the Treasury and Reserve Bank monetary policy papers and immediately told Bernie they were extremely poor - and I had not joined the Advisory Group to implement such poor policies. Bernie agreed and showed his political acumen by suggesting I get in touch with Noel Lough and Ray White and suggest a meeting to provide a major joint policy rethink.- both were much more liberal than Henry Lang and Alan Low who were taking lengthy holidays. We had several meetings and a radical redraft was prepared by Christmas. Henry Lang and Alan Low, when they returned to work, were faced by a policy fait accompli - which I suspect, through Bernie`s influence, already had the support of the PM.

Subsequently, Henry worked hard to make the new policy a success - as I would have expected. Alan Low was not really in tune with the new policy. I talked this matter over with Bernie who arranged that Alan have a" friendly chat" with Muldoon. Subsequently, Alan took a more positive, if not enthusiastic approach. This monetary policy change attracted much attention in Australia and other countries and is fully covered in Professor Boston`s paper.

At the conclusion of my 20 month secondment, I was pretty exhausted - and yet I was under nothing like the pressure which Bernie Galvin experienced. Bernie did a magnificent job, was always cheerful and positive and was largely responsible for the Advisory Group`s success. I had great respect for Muldoon, Talboys and Gair - and for the other members of the Advisory Group. The concept of both a Prime Minister’s Department and an Advisory Group was excellent and worked well during the time I was a member. I am well aware that latter periods in the PM`s Dept were not so happy and fruitful but my task now is to outline events as I directly experienced them.

I greatly enjoyed my time and learnt a great deal - how the country was governed and decisions made. Parliament is a world of its own and has to be experienced at first hand since it is unique in its manner of operation. I was very grateful for having this experience which greatly influenced my subsequent attitudes.- hopefully for the better.

On the other hand, I felt that there were serious deficiencies in economic policy formulation.- far too much short term ad hoc action and too little strategic thinking or philosophy. All concerned were working like beavers responding to immediate concerns. As a result I wrote a pamphlet "A prosperous Mini State" published in mid 1978 which embodied both my concerns and my solutions.