Academic Politics
Between Aristocracy and Democracy

by

Michael S. Kochin
kochin@post.tau.ac.il

Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science
Tel Aviv University

and

Visiting Associate Professor (2003-04)
Department of Political Science
Yale University
P.O. Box 208301
New Haven, CT 06520-8301

The *Republic*'s account of the relation between talking about politics and doing politics illuminates the nature of political action. Political speech is seemingly primarily performative, constructive, constitutive, or creative, not representational or descriptive. Yet Plato's Socrates argues that those who ought to rule are those who know about politics and who know what politics is about, since political things are images of ideas. Socrates' alternative to democracy is thus an academic rather than an aristocratic elite. This academic elite is compatible with democratic politics, because it does not dispute the right of the people to decide between it, the aristocrats, and the men of the people.

Academic politics, it has often been said, is "so nasty because the stakes are so small." This paper will not reveal any department secrets. Instead, I want to discuss the relation between talking about politics and doing politics. In particular, I want to use Plato's quite extreme views on this relation to think about the nature of political action. I want to use the *Republic* to talk about the sort of things that there are in political discourse as against the sort of things that there are in academic discourse, in short the distinction between political ontology and academic ontology. *Ontology* is the discussion of the sorts of things that there are, and it is the examination of what each thing is, Socrates tells us, that is the peculiar concern of dialectic.[1]

First, political ontology: political action is accomplished principally through language.[2] To work in the field in politics is to meet with people and talk to them. This kind of talk is talking as acting: persuading, cajoling, promising, threatening, begging, pleading, inspiring, demanding and so on. Voting, too, is a performative use of language, the use of words to do something: we poke a hole (or two), write a party name or pick out a preprinted slip, put it in the appropriate box, and thereby cast a vote. Legislation is perhaps the most awesome performative use of language that one can imagine, (apart from "I do"). A text is produced, changed, amended, voted on, published appropriately, and then becomes a law, often a matter of life and death. Political speech is primarily performative, constructive, constitutive, or creative, and not, we might think, representational or descriptive. Suppose I asked you all what the subjects of your votes were, or what your votes were about. You would all look at me pretty strangely. Votes aren't in their central sense about anything, any more than are bank-checks, though votes can be rational or irrational. We talk politics and thus do political actions for reasons, but these actions are not usually *about* our reasons for performing them.

---

[1] *Republic* 533b, 534b.

[2] The basic works on acting in language are Wittgenstein 1953; Austin 1962, 1979; Searle 1969; and the papers on meaning in Grice 1989. The reader of Wittgenstein and Austin must work hard to reconstruct the relation of their work to the philosophical tradition; but despite appearances, the relations are in fact much closer and more significant than is often thought.

In the academy we talk about things more than we talk to do things. This is clearest in the case of the biological sciences, of which the social sciences are in a sense a branch. Zoologists talk about bears, but they don't do bearlike things, economists talk about foreign currency traders, and political scientists talk about citizens and politicians.

I can now state Plato's thesis: those who ought to rule are those who know about politics and who know what politics is about. This thesis implies that there is something that politics is about. Or, in Platonic language, that political things are images of something which is not itself an image: they are images, he says, of ideas.[3] In particular, all this talk about the good is but a dim reflection of the word's true meaning.[4] This would imply that we were wrong to suppose that political speech was not in some fundamental sense representational or descriptive: for Plato, political speech represents the ideas in images. By this move Plato does not dissolve the ontological structure of politics: rather, he claims to find something truer and more fundamental of which that structure is an effect. Plato's view is a critique of the mode in which citizens and statesmen relate to political speech. Citizens and statesmen relate to political speech as a political act, the expression of a political act, or the expression of a political intention, not as the image of anything.

Plato thus claims that there exists a kind of knowledge that according to him the business of life does not and cannot provide: knowledge of ideas as opposed to the image of ideas, knowledge of what political actions imitate or signify as opposed to knowledge of how to perform them.[5] Philosophy, as Plato understood it, is the representational use of language: the use of language to talk about things "as they are." In life, language does not seem to be *about* what is, *about* existence: rather, language seems to be the continuation of existence, since as Wittgenstein writes, "Commanding, questioning recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing."[6] It is Plato's contention that this apparent constitutive or

---

[3]*Republic* 520c.
[4]*Republic* 505c.
[5]On the contrast between what one can learn from inquiry and what one can learn from immersion in the business of politics see e.g. *Republic* 484d-485a, 539e, where the philosopher-rulers are acknowledged to need both.
[6]Wittgenstein 1953, sec. 25.

constructive uses of language in politics are mere images of what they are about. The principal philosophers of the last century, such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Austin, can be understood as critics of the aspiration of philosophers since Plato, whether rationalists, Idealists, or empiricists, to put speech into order by giving an account of the things that speech is about.[7]

In the *polis* the citizens were organized by speech, in that the benefits and duties of citizenship are determined by laws. The citizens were organized for speech, in order to form a community of speakers, to pass laws, render verdicts, make decrees, give orders, hear ambassadors, etc. These speeches were political actions and most of the business of politics in the *polis* was nothing other than these kind of actions. Yet some of these actions call for other kinds of actions, and so it would seem that politics is about things: about war, about building public buildings, about levying and collecting taxes. Now the Greeks had arts of each of these things, bodies of explicit knowledge handed from teacher to pupil in part through written tracts. With these arts in mind, Plato's Socrates claims repeatedly that politics should be seen as an art too, but as an art that governs these other arts, a "policy science."[8] Just as the skilled builders are few and the architectural laymen many, so too the skilled politicians are few and the political laymen many. How then, Socrates asks, sometimes quietly, sometimes explicitly, can the many who are unskilled in politics purport to judge what is best for the city?

It is on account of this line of questioning, moving from political speech as acting to political speech as reflecting some technical content that people who know one thing about Plato know that he was an enemy of democracy, that is to say, of our supposed form of government.

---

[7]The threads of this critique can be picked up in Heidegger 1998, Austin's "The Meaning of a Word" and "Performative Utterances" (in Austin 1979, and see Austin 1962, 729), Wittgenstein's *Blue Book* (1965), and the beginning paragraphs of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). For political reasons it was fashionable for many years to ignore the similarity between Heidegger and Wittgenstein on this fundamental point; the contemporary meeting of the ways was foretold by Ian Hacking more than twenty-five years ago (see Hacking 1975, 176), and perhaps accomplished by Robert Brandom (1998) and John McDowell (1996).

[8]See e.g. *Protagoras* 319b-d, *Gorgias* 455bc. All translations are my own, though I have consulted the Shorey, Bloom and Grube/Reeve translations of the *Republic*, Morrow's translation of Plato's seventh letter, as well as Joseph Libes' Hebrew translations. In my translations I try to bring out the hitches and hesitations of actual conversation that Plato faithfully represents in his dialogues.

They might even have heard that Plato was a totalitarian, as Karl Popper asserted. Of course stated this way the claim is absurd: totalitarianism is a view of the state. It is the claim that the state should mobilize society for its purposes.[9] The Greeks had neither state nor society, but only the *polis*. The state is something above and apart from the citizens, but the polis was the citizens organized in a certain way. To quote Moses Finley, "The polis was not a place, though it occupied a defined territory. It was a people acting in concert."[10]

From Karl Popper we learned, supposedly, that Plato was an enemy of democracy. I am not going to argue with this. But what about Popper? What was his view of democracy? He writes: "Although 'the people' may influence the actions of their rulers by the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense."[11] For all his antipathies to democracy Plato knew better than this. Plato, who experienced the democratic regime *par excellence*, the Athenian democracy, thought the rule of the people was possible but bad, whereas Popper thinks it is impossible.[12] Contemporary scholarship, liberated from state-centered understandings of politics, has demonstrated that the Athenian people indeed managed to get the power of making decisions into their own hands.[13] Popper's power to dismiss was institutionalized in classical Athens in a way that transformed it qualitatively: in the first place, there were no rulers who were secure from being deposed or worse at a meeting of the assembly or by a case brought in the popular law courts. Second, nearly all of the significant magistrates were drawn from the citizens themselves by lot: election was seen as suitable only when technical specialists, such as generals or doctors, were to be chosen on behalf of the city. Athens had no rulers but the sovereign people, only leaders (*prostatai*) and expert hirelings.

---

[9]As Malcolm Schofield (2000, 218) writes, citing Stephen Holmes (1979): "Socrates' thesis is not totalitarian if totalitarianism is construed as necessarily tied to the characteristically modern attempt at radical and coercive politicization of diverse forms of civil association hitherto independent of the state."

[10]*The Ancient Greeks* (London 1963) p. 56, cited in Berent 1998, 352 n. 78. This article by Berent provides the clearest discussion yet of the absence of a state in the classical *polis*.

[11]Popper 1963, 125.

[12]In addition to the passages from the *Republic* that I will discuss here, see *Gorgias* 481-482a, 487b, 488b-490a; *Laws* 659ac. On the distinction between Plato's critique of democracy as bad and the Michelsian critique (shared by Popper) of democracy as impossible see Dahl 1989, 2.

The Athenian Democracy was a struggle between elites for the favor of the people, and a struggle by the demos to establish itself as the arbiter of elite conflicts.[14] The elite frequently saw the prospect of being judged by the demos as degrading.[15] The people demand the affection of the beautiful people, the *kaloi k'agathoi*,[16] although they themselves are ugly, as Aristophanes acknowledges on their behalf in comedies presented for their approval. Demos, the splendid sovereign people of Athens, is readily caricatured as an old, repulsive, man who wants the affection of aristocratic young men (*Knights*). Worse, the Athenian people might be a group of old hags who demand to be serviced in turn (*Ecclesiazusae* 877-1111).

Now Plato was himself a member of the aristocratic elite: these are the principal characters of his dialogues.[17] In 404 BCE oligarchical plotters from the best families, "the thirty tyrants," overthrew the democracy and instituted a short-lived but deadly reign of terror until the democracy was restored in the same year. These included two of Plato's uncles: Critias, the leader of "the regime of the thirty tyrants," and his fellow junta member Charmides.

If one trusts the Seventh Letter,[18] Plato had his hopes shattered by the consequences of this aristocratic reaction:

> When I was young I felt the same as many did: I thought that as soon as I could make my own decisions, I would go straight to the common affairs of the city. And there befell me some opportunities from the acts of the city, namely these: In the regime at the time, jeered at by many, there was a change; and fifty-one men

---

[13]For a survey of the controversy see Ober 1989; 1996, chapter 3.

[14]These two constitutive conflicts of the Athenian democracy were brought to the forefront of scholarly attention by Josiah Ober (1989, 1996) and David Cohen (1995). As Ober writes (1996, 28): "The Athenian democracy channeled the activity of an aristocratic elite characterized by a highly competitive, agonal ethos into public competitions that benefited the demos and were judged exclusively by mass audiences."

[15]Cf. *Republic* (464d-465b), where Socrates states that in the best city quarrels between members of the elite are to be settled among that elite themselves, without appeal to popular courts.

[16]I owe this translation to Vlastos 1994, 99.

[17]Strauss 1978, 57; Ober 1999, 185n55.

[18]V. Bradley Lewis (2000) makes a compelling case for its authenticity; Ober (1999, 162-5), while refusing to come down on one side or the other on the question of authenticity, accepts that the fundamentally political orientation that the letter gives to Plato's political philosophy is consistent

> presided as rulers over the change, eleven in town, ten in the Piraeus... and thirty men ruling all, established as autocrats. Some of them happened to be relatives and acquaintances of mine, and indeed they called me straightaway to join them in what seemed to be fitting acts. And what I felt was not a surprise, given my youth, since I thought they would settle the city down by leading her from her unjust life to the path of justice, so that I eagerly paid attention to them, to what they would do. But I watched these gentlemen as they, in a little time, demonstrated that the preceding regime had been a golden age.[19]

The regime of the Thirty Tyrants was in fact the worst regime that the elite had seen.[20]

Plato displays his reaction to the monstrous excesses born of aristocratic revulsion at democracy not only in the *Seventh Letter* but in the *Republic* itself. The *Republic*'s great conversation about justice is set in the house of Cephalus in the Piraeus, the port of Athens that was a hotbed of democratic sentiment. Cephalus himself had died before the oligarchic coup of 404, but his family suffered greatly from the Thirty Tyrants. Polemarchus, Cephalus's son, was murdered and his house looted by the tyrants' henchmen, while Cephalus's other son, Lysias, was driven into exile.[21]

Present at the conversation, too, are members of some of the great aristocratic families, not only Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, but also Niceratus the son of the general Nicias.[22] After Socrates, the principal interlocutor, Glaucon and Adeimantus take the most important part in the conversation of the *Republic*. One way to read the *Republic* is as an answer to two questions: First, what was Socrates' relation to the Athenian aristocratic reaction? Second, why did Plato and his brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, despite their family connections, not participate in the oligarchic coup of the Thirty Tyrants? Obviously the *Republic*

---

with the dialogues.

[19]Plato, *Letter* VII 324cd.

[20]Josiah Ober rightly makes much of this disillusionment (1999, 5-6, and *passim*).

[21]See Lysias, *Prosecution of Eratosthenes* (Lysias 12).

[22]Regarding Niceratus, who does not speak, see *Republic* 327c; Niceratus receives more prominent mention in the *Laches*. Socrates alludes to the elite character of the group present in the house Cephalus at least once, when persuading Thrasymachus to continue in the conversation

is not intended to provide a historically accurate answer to this question. Yet as John Wallach has recently written, "The significance of [Plato's] 'external' historical references essentially constitutes the 'internal' philosophical meaning of his dialogues."[23]

When Plato's brother Glaucon takes over the conversation about justice in *Republic* II, he makes clear that he sympathizes with the extreme critics of democracy.[24] Glaucon gives a contract theory of the origins of the regime, wherein he describes how the many who are too weak to commit injustice and profit from it collect together in a pact of mutual restraint.[25] Thomas Hobbes famously uses the notion of contract to argue *for* submission to the state on the assumption of *equality* of the parties in their powers, but Plato's Glaucon uses the notion of a contract as the origin of the city and its justice to argue *against* submission. Hobbes assumes that human beings are *equal* in their capacity to kill one another, while Glaucon assumes that human beings are unequal in their capacity for injustice. He who is "truly a man" would never agree to abstain from injustice, and anyone who would refrain from injustice when he could get away with it would appear "most weak" and "senseless".[26] As Thrasymachus stated back in book I, democracy can, under the appropriate conditions, claim to instantiate the rule of the stronger.[27] Given the manifest differences between the individual natures of the few whom democracy exploits, the *kaloi k'agathoi*, and the many who do the exploiting, Glaucon is persuaded that

---

(345a).

[23]Wallach 2001, 91; cf. on this point Euben 1997, 220: "What we see in the *Gorgias* (or *Protagoras* or *Republic*) is that to know about power, justice, friendship, happiness, freedom, or courage entails knowing about one's character, outlook, social position, interests, ambitions, and concerns; that beliefs and experiences are deeply and yet unobviously connected; that arguments emerge out of and remain more or less embedded in one's way of life; and that philosophy is tied to interest."

[24]On Glaucon's contractarianism see Kochin 2002b, 35 and n. 23; on the contrast between Glaucon's love of individual glory and Adeimantus's attachment to the political see Craig 1994, 112-113, 178.

[25]*Republic* 358b-359b. As Kurt Raaflaub writes (1994, 129), for the aristocrats within the polis "there was a constant tension between personal and communal obligations-- a tension that was frequently resolved in favor of the former and cause the community much harm. Such attitudes were as much alive in the fifth century as they had been in the archaic age."

[26]*Republic* 359b, 360d.

[27]*Republic* 338d-39a; the claim that democracy realizes the rule of the stronger is given much

democracy is unjustified by nature, or by things in themselves apart from their social consequences. Yet by the end of the *Republic* Glaucon is persuaded to give up the hope of power on earth in favor of imitation in his soul of a model of the city "laid up in heaven." Glaucon comes around principally because he is persuaded by Socrates' repeated appeals to aristocratic values.[28] For example, Socrates portrays the life of tyrannical injustice -- the life that Glaucon initially valorizes -- as a life of effeminate enslavement to villainous desires.[29]

The Socrates of the *Republic* thus offers a third way between aristocratic and democratic politics as Plato's Athenian audience understood them. This is the meaning, in terms of Athenian political thought and practice, of the rule of philosopher-kings. After Plato's Academy, the school he founded in a sacred grove outside the walls of Athens, I am going to call this third way "academic politics."[30]

Socrates initiates Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus into this third way primarily by presenting them with images of political life.[31] They hear of the noble lie which the guardians and even the rulers of the best city ought to be made to believe, of the city as a ship and the city as a cave. In the remainder of this paper I will summarize the work that Socrates did on Plato's brothers by presenting these three images so as to elucidate their ontological import, that is, by presenting them in their political context.

---

more prominence in the Gorgias; see on this point Ober 1999.

[28]Of course values (in Greek, *aretai*) are in a profound sense inherently aristocratic: what democrats prize above all values such as health, wealth, beauty, virtue, or wisdom but freedom and the principal condition of freedom, equality. When Pericles praises the Athenian democracy in the funeral oration, he must ascribe to Athens aristocratic values (Loraux 1986, 180-220). That would suggest that our concern with "democratic values" is in fact a concern more the moderation or ennobling of democracy by the import of something that is intrinsically foreign to her.

[29]*Republic* 572d-576c; on Socrates' rhetorical appeals to the Greek ideals of masculinity see Kochin 2002b, chapter 3.

[30]The relation between the philosophic education described in the *Republic* and the course of research and instruction in Plato's academy is quite uncertain, and was certainly not an exact duplication. As many scholars have noted, Plato's students and companions would hardly have borne the proviso of the *Republic* forbidding students under the age of thirty from engaging in the dialectical inquiry into the images of political life (see *Republic* 537c-539e).

[31]On this education through images see the remarks by Danielle Allen (2000, 271-77).

Having described the education of warrior-guardians for the just city, Socrates then tells his listeners that rulers must be chosen out of these guardians who are eager to do whatever is useful for the city.[32] The rulers, and the warriors they command, must never lose the opinion that they must do what is best for the city and care for it as their own.[33] Accordingly, the prospective guardians must be tested by their rulers, and those who fail to retain the conviction that "it is necessary to do whatever they judge to be best for the city for them to do" must be purged from the regiment.[34]

It may be too much to claim that the city is not in truth one's own. Yet we can say that the process by which the city comes to be one's own is not a purely rational one.[35] Socrates proposes to seal the conviction that the city is their own city in the minds of the survivors of his final purge by the application of a lie, "some noble thing to persuade and thereby deceive the rulers themselves most of all, but if not them, then the rest of the city."[36] Our contemporaries find Socrates' Phoenician tale unbelievable because of the claim that the different souls have different metals.[37] Plato's brother Glaucon is more perturbed by the strangely egalitarian claim that the guardians should learn from the myth to regard their fellow citizens, irrespective of class, as "earth-born brothers." Socrates has drawn this legend of egalitarian autochthony directly from the myths promulgated by the Athenian democracy.[38] Even the supposedly inegalitarian myth that different souls are melded with different metals is used to justify a most unaristocratic institution,

---

[32]*Republic* 412de.

[33]The principal argument for guardianship over democracy is not simply that the guardians are smarter or better informed than those whom they rule but that they are also better motivated to seek the common good (Dahl 1987, 25-28; 1989, 61); an extreme version of this argument is set out clearly in Heinlein 1968, 143-46.

[34]*Republic* 413c-414b. The account here of the noble lie follows Kochin 1999, 409-411.

[35]In that way the imposition of a civic identity on the guardian-warriors is like the process by one acquires a particular individual as a friend, or the process by which a modern individual acquired a particular national identity; see Kochin 2002a, 2003.

[36]*Republic* 414bc. My translation follows Dobbs 1994, 276-77 n. 11.

[37]See e.g. Popper 1963, 46-56; Andrew 1989.

[38]Cf. *Republic* 414e with *Menexenus* 237bc; Loraux 1986; 1993, 7-8. This anti-aristocratic and thus democratic side to the noble lie is also noted by Strauss 1994, 262.

the preferment of the young on grounds of individual merit alone.[39] As Michael McKeon expounds Socrates' myth of the metals:

> "Nature" does not stabilize the "culture" of lineage and kinship relations; on the contrary, it programmatically destabilizes these relationships in service to a revolutionary criterion of natural aptitude that may be autonomous of, even in conflict with, the natural ties of kinship.[40]

The guardians must harden their hearts against considerations of family preferment, the essence of a hereditary aristocracy, in service to the good of the city. Thanks to the noble lie, these elite warriors are to be more loyal to the city than even the Athenian demos, not to mention the aristocratic clans to which young hot-blooded men like Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Plato belonged.

The qualities of a fierce but gentle warrior, combined with the conviction implanted by the noble lie, turn out to be insufficient qualifications for just rule. Rather it is philosophers, who devote their whole lives to the search for knowledge of things as they are, who must govern the guardians, the farmers, and the craftsmen.[41] Socrates goes on to distinguish the philosophers, the lovers of wisdom, from the lovers of sights and opinions. But after Socrates assigns numerous aristocratic qualities to these philosophers, Adeimantus is moved to object:

> Now someone could say that he cannot contradict you in speech on each of the things asked, but in deed he sees that however many bestir themselves toward philosophy, and do not give it up-- unlike those who took it up only when they were young for the sake of being educated-- but continue to waste time in it-- most of them become "very weird," shall I say, in order not to say "utterly

---

[39]*Republic* 415c-d. The first expression of Socrates' demand to revise all human relations in the light of the good appears in his conversation with Polemarchus (334c-335b), though it is Polemarchus who makes the first breech in the principal of family loyalty by stating that "It is likely that men will love those whom they believe to be worthy, but whom they believe to be base rogues, they are likely to hate." Polemarchus here asserts that opinion determines affection; the converse, that ties of affection determines opinion, is more frequently found.

[40]McKeon 1987, 137; this work is a history of the crisis of the aristocracy as exhibited in, and in part caused by, the rise of the novel to become the dominant literary form.

[41]*Republic* 473ce.

> villainous." But the ones who seem most balanced suffer this on account of the practice which you praise: they become useless to their cities.[42]

Adeimantus in short says politely: these arguments are but sophistries, and have nothing of the truth. You have given us a great many fine words, but I can point to the corruption of all of those promising young men, from the best Athenian families, who persisted in the study of philosophy past their youth.

Socrates begs leave to answer Adeimantus with the image of the ship.[43] He compares the democratic city to a ship whose owner is strong and healthy, more powerful in height and bodily force than any of the crew, but blind and deaf, and knows nothing of navigation.[44] The owner is the demos, the people, who have the ultimate power to decide but, as they know full well, neither the knowledge nor the perception to govern without the services of the few. The demos needs a crew to operate the ship, and this crew must be drawn from the elite.

These sailors fight for control of the helm; everyone shouts "I am the pilot." Yet they deny that navigation is an art, that there is anything to it other than keeping a firm grasp on the tiller. These sailors are the orators, the would-be rulers of actual cities who identify the ability to persuade the many with the art of rule.[45] The crew think that the only art to politics is the art of persuading the owner -- that politics is about nothing other than persuading others to accept your rule. The real pilot they condemn as useless, because they do not admit that his knowledge of sea and stars is of any use in steering the ship.[46]

This true pilot, is, of course the philosopher, who possesses the knowledge of the stars, the winds, and the sea sufficient to get the ship safely to port. It is not for him to beg to rule, to grovel before the people, Socrates says, but for those who would be ruled to beg him. This

---

[42]*Republic* 487cd.
[43]*Republic* 488a-489d.
[44]Socrates thus grants superiority in natural force to the joint force of the many as against the individual superiority of the few; compare *Gorgias* 488b-489d and *Republic* 358e-359b.
[45]*Republic* 488cd.
[46]Renford Bambrough (1956) objects that it is not the pilot's place to choose the destination, but in Plato's image the question of the destination does not arise, perhaps because the notion of a goal in the sense of a destination is the most important way in which a city and a ship are not analogous.

explains why the philosopher does not rule: he does not condescend to shout with the orators. His art by which he knows the good of the city does not extend to an art of seizing power, or even to an art of communicating his peculiar fitness to govern, and the people cannot hear well enough to pick out his calm wisdom in the din of the assembly.[47]

Now Socrates can answer Adeimantus as to why philosophers are corrupted in actual cities. The better natures are those more thoroughly corrupted by ill treatment, and the greatest injustices come from the best natures badly educated. The worst education comes not from sophists but from the cheers and groans of the multitude. The worst education is the education in political success, and the multitude has ample power to back up their lessons with punishments.[48]

We think of political corruption as that of the many by the few, but Socrates speaks of the corruption of the few by the many. The people, he says, are like a great beast, and the pretended art of sophistry is skill at learning its whims, rather than guiding them. All the sophists do is teach how to guess the whims of the many in regard to the good, or the bad, the beautiful or the ugly, the just and the unjust.[49] Political reputation is simply based on flattering the beast. It is not an activity suitable for refined, "beautiful people," or for real men.

This is an aristocratic argument against democracy, that flattering the people is an activity beneath those who fancy themselves the best.[50] The great difficulty, Socrates says, is that the very qualities that the young potential philosopher needs for a life dedicated to the passionate search for truth about things are those that will mark him out for political success. Since in the city as it is the best natures desert philosophic conversation for political speech-making, philosophy is left to those little men who have been maimed by their crafts.[51] Only those who by some accident are

---

[47]*Republic* 488d-89c.
[48]*Republic* 491c-492d.
[49]*Republic* 493; cf. *Gorgias* 510a-511b, 512e-513a-c.
[50]Socrates deploys a similar argument against Callicles in the *Gorgias*.
[51]*Republic* 494b-496a. One should keep in mind that Socrates' purpose is not to attack the notion of "philosophy for the working man" but to attract Glaucon and Adeimantus to the charms of philosophy by describing it as a beautiful maid from the *aristoi* that must be rescued from her boorish demotic suitor.

incapacitated or distanced from politics despite their good breeding come to philosophy with the proper qualities.[52]

The best a man can hope for is to abstain from doing injustice, unless he could find a city that suited him.[53] Only if philosophers are constrained to govern, or those born to rule take up philosophy, can this regime be realized. It is not impossible that the multitude be persuaded to adopt philosopher as governors. Yet the philosopher, says Socrates, would prefer to start with a clean slate, without obligations.[54]

The metaphor of the clean slate suggests that the one whose rule is justified would be able to transform every aspect of human nature. Socrates' image of the cave, an image that is supposed to apply to each and every city, even the best, suggests that political life is defined narrowly by its constraints. As he retells it to Glaucon:

> "Imagine as the following experience our nature in as much as it is concerned with education and lack of education. See human beings as though they were in an underground cave-form dwelling, having its entrance, a long one, open to the light along the whole of the cave. In it, from childhood their legs and necks are in bonds, so that they stay there and see only forwards, but for them to turn their heads around is impossible because of their bonds. Light for them-- a fire burning far above, behind them. Between the fire and the bound captives, and above them, there is a road, along which see a wall built up like the screen the puppetmakers set in front of people, above which they show their puppets."
>
> "I see," he said.
>
> "Then also see along this wall people carrying all sorts of fabricated things, which project above the wall, and human figures and other animals worked in stone, wood, and every kind of material; as is likely, some of the carriers utter noise, while others carry in silence."
>
> "You speak of a strange image," he said, "and strange bound captives."

---

[52]*Republic* 496b.
[53]*Republic* 496de.
[54]*Republic* 499e-501e.

> "Like us," I said. "For do you think such bound captives would have seen anything of themselves and one another, other than the shadows cast by the fire on the side of the cave opposite them?"
>
> "How could they," he said, "if they are compelled to hold their heads without moving during life?"
>
> "And what about the things that are carried by? Isn't it the same?"
>
> "Certainly."
>
> "If they were able to talk together with one another, don't you hold that they would consider these [shadows] to be the beings, the very beings which we see?"
>
> "It is necessary."
>
> "And what if the place of captivity had an echo, too, from the side opposite them? Whenever one of those going by happens would utter a sound, do you think they would hold that thing uttering the sound to be anything other than the shadow then passing?"
>
> "By Zeus I don't," he said.
>
> "Then in every way," said I, "such men would consider the true thing not to be anything else than the shadows of fabricated things."[55]

What the captives call truth is a fabrication. The captives think the truth to be nothing else than the images of fabricated things: they have no idea what things the cries they hear are actually about. The prisoners spend their lifelong captivity by bestowing honors on themselves for guessing what things will come next in the procession. Here too their talk can only be about shadows, of images of the stuff carried back and forth by the craftsmen. It is not about the ideas, much less about the fabricated things grasped as they are, grasped as fabricated things.[56] If a prisoner should be freed, he needs to be compelled to ascend, and after ascending, his eyes are

---

[55]*Republic* 514a-515c.

[56]As Monoson points out, Plato does not dignify the viewing and judging that occupies the bound prisoners with the name of *theoria* (2000, 222).

ruined for the contest within the cave.[57] The prisoner, of course, represents the philosophic nature, and his being freed from bonds and dragged up to the light represents his education in the beings as they truly are, in the things and ideas of which he previously knew only images and images of images.

Who are those who carry objects back and forth in front of the fire? These are not the sophists and poets,[58] but the people, the greatest and most dangerous sophist whose opinions rule the city and govern the few who pretend to legislate for them. The captives concern themselves, like the crew of the ship of state, with notions of justice and with honors. Those carrying things back and forth in front of the fire and uttering what sound to the captives like random cries are simply engaged in the business of life. They have no time or interest for conversation about things, they are too busy putting language to work to carry them on, both in their private and in their public lives. Wittgenstein writes that "the characteristic feature of primitive man is that he does not act from *opinions*."[59] What Wittgenstein ascribes to primitive men, Plato shows us here, is true of most men and women essentially all of the time: we use language as part of the business of life without forming an opinion about what we are saying; to quote Wittgenstein again, "We talk, we utter words, and only *later* get a picture of their life."[60] It is only those who do not have to work, that is say, primarily the young, idle, rich, who can and do occupy themselves with pondering opinions.[61] The few who make such grand speeches in the assembly and propose rewards and punishments for one another are simply riding on the epiphenomenal. They believe that they rule by manipulating conventional values, but their very dependence on these conventional values in ordering their own lives shows that they are enslaved to them, even more

---

[57]*Republic* 515e, 517.

[58]The identification of the carriers, whose shadows are projected on the wall, with the sophists and the poets is very frequently made by Plato scholars, but there is no direct textual evidence for this claim, and I cannot recall any writer who has made a sustained argument for it.

[59]Wittgenstein 1993, 137; accordingly, Wittgenstein notes that the appeal of religion does not rest on reasons or justifications (1980, 29). The claim that the law is good because it is divine is therefore, subversive of the law's authority, as Plato well knows (see Kochin 1998; Kochin 2002b, chapter 5).

[60]Wittgenstein 1953, p. 209; see also Searle's discussion of realism, in the philosophical sense, as a pre-intentional precondition of action rather than a belief (1983, 158-9).

than the many -- who live mostly without thinking about the values and opinions that the few ascribe to them.

The image of the cave therefore presents the Socratic paradox that "no-one does wrong willingly" in a new light. If some Socratic gadfly were to stop us while we were "carrying on" to ask whether what we were engaged was in fact good for us, our initial answer would presumably be "yes." Yet from the image of the carriers we must conclude that the action, which we had been engaged in unreflectively, would be the cause of our initial reflective opinion as to its goodness, rather than the opinion causing the action as the Socratic formula presumes at first sight, and as it is expounded, say, in the *Protagoras*. If the opinion *must necessarily* be formed if provoked, our ceasing to be able to form the opinion, perhaps as the result of the persistent questioning of the Socratic gadfly, would make it impossible for us to continue as we were. Opinion, and the examination and testing of opinions, remain highly significant for political life on the more sophisticated account of human action that Plato's Socrates provides in the *Republic*. It is for this reason among others that by attributing this account to "Socrates" Plato thought that he was saving the essential element of the teaching and practice of the Socrates he knew and by whom he had been stung.

It is the carriers who by their actions in fact determine the appearances of justice and human excellence for those who reflect on these actions, and they, unlike the bound captive, cannot be freed.[62] The captive is the young man who feels both emptied and trapped by political life, that is to say, an aristocratic dissenter in a democracy. The one who frees him and leads him up to the light is, of course, Socrates. Ascent, Socrates explains, is contemplation of the

---

[61]See *Apology* 23c, 33c-34a.

[62]The image of the cave is, as we have seen, presented explicitly as an image of "our nature inasmuch as it is concerned with education and lack of education" (514a). Education was itself an aristocratic attainment in Athens, as one can see from the confession of lack of education made by the Sausage-seller in Aristophanes' *Knights* (188-89; though Plato's image is an image "of *paideia* and lack of *paideia*" whereas the Sausage seller owns up to having studied "no *mousikē* apart from writing"). Thus the whole image is an image of the experience of aristocratic youths. Of course, this nuance may be intended to make Socrates' teaching more attractive to his callow and snobbish interlocutors, along the lines of the audience-building blazon employed by the Duke and the King in *Huckleberry Finn*, "Ladies and Children not Admitted."

intelligibles in place of the visibles -- that is to say, contemplation of truth about justice rather than its epiphenomenal shadow as cast by the many going about their business unreflectively.

To see the idea of good, that from which all descends by successive imitations, is to look up at the sun. But to look at the sun blinds man to the shadows of justice and makes them unfit for the debate about these shadows that consumes the few who pretend to be an elite worthy to rule in the city. Plato, for his part, insists that politics principally is about ideas, that the effective speech of politics is produced as an imitation of the true ideas of the just and the good. Yet his Socrates admits that concentrating on the meaning of political speech makes one less effective at using it.[63]

Socrates then, oddly enough, would force the philosopher back into political life, having made him blind to its details and deaf to its peculiar accents. Those who have seen the truth about justice, those who know what all this talk about justice actually means, these are the ones who should govern.[64] But are they better about judging the appearances of justice? Even if we were to grant that they know what justice is about, do they know how to do justice by framing laws, making speeches, and passing decrees?[65]

The whole burden of Socrates' argument for philosophical rule is to show that contrary to the expectations and experience that arise from life through language, it is precisely the inquiry into what political language represents that is the one thing politically needful. At the same time the ontological distance between the way the philosopher lives through language, the way he or she uses language in order to understand, and the way the many live through language, putting language to work, makes philosophical rule strange and unlikely even if salvational. The issue here is thus not the "descriptivist fallacy" attacked by Wittgenstein and Austin, the view that the principal function of language is to represent states of affairs in propositions that may either be

---

[63]*Republic* 516e-517a.
[64]*Republic* 519b-d.
[65]Cf. *Gorgias* 473e-474a, 486a-d.

true or false.[66] Plato, unlike Wittgenstein and Austin, is not trying to be true to the typical phenomena of linguistic behavior. The analytic philosophers of the "linguistic turn" are interested in a theoretical understanding of the uses of language, while Plato presents a radical critique of political life by examining the use of language in politics. It is by no means obvious, therefore, that Plato's understanding of language is inadequate to his purpose, notwithstanding its inadequacies for the purposes of Wittgenstein, Austin, Heidegger, and Searle.[67]

We must ask whether the philosophers govern just among the captives, or do they govern the bearers of objects as well. Perhaps philosopher-rulers are to displace the bearers of objects, to frame for us new practices, tools, and techniques of which new social ideas are but epiphenomena. Plato's Socrates, whom we see speaking principally to confused and distracted aristocratic young men, chose to attempt to govern among the captives alone.[68] Francis Bacon, a great student of the image of the cave, and his own follower Thomas Hobbes, seem to have set the philosophers up as primarily technical inventors, inventive in industry and medicine and equally so in politics. The result is that all aspects of modern life are governed by opinion, ideology, or world-views. On the basis of Plato's image of the cave and of a certain understanding of his doctrine of ideas, the architects of the modern world have made us all prisoners whose lives are dominated by shadows. For Plato the doctrine of ideas was protreptic rather than metaphysical, an account of how we ought to orient our lives rather than an account of what is that explains the being of all things. In the ontology of the *Republic* only some of the beings, albeit the most important, are

---

[66]See especially Austin 1962, 1-3; 1979, 233-4; Pitkin 1993, 2-3.

[67]The distance between the theoretical understanding of language in Platonic philosophy and ordinary language philosophy is far from clear: compare the Platonic political philosopher Leo Strauss's warning that "By simply condemning pre-scientific language, instead of deviating from usage in particular cases because of the proved inadequacy of the usage in the cases in question, one simply condemns oneself to irredeemable vagueness" (Strauss 1995, 217).

[68]Unlike Freud, who defines psychic health as being able to get on with one's work, Socrates did not set as the goal of his therapy to motivate the young men to take their place among those carrying on with their tasks

ideas, but we tend to think that all things that we encounter are interpreted by us through the prism of ideology.[69]

The philosophers, Socrates says, must be compelled to govern. Isn't this unjust, Glaucon asks.[70] Socrates answers that it is not unjust because the law, or justice, is concerned only with the happiness of the whole city, and not with happiness of any particular part. Moreover, it is just for the philosophers who were educated at the expense of the city to repay their education by taking part in ruling the city. Since the principal business of the city is the education of philosophers, to rule is to share in determining and perpetuating the regime of education. At least, one might say, they should govern the aspect of political life that is the education of other promising young men or women.

Socrates' alternative to democracy is thus an academic rather than an aristocratic elite. He proposes to choose the most promising young without regard for their class origin. This is the point of the myth of the metals: to justify preferment regardless of the depth of one's lineage. Socrates also claims that political capacity is a consequence of knowledge of what politics is about, and that this knowledge is not one of the virtues required for success in the ordinary business of life. The craftsmen are disqualified because, while they possess genuine arts, they are concerned with what they can get for the products of their arts, and not with the ontological differences between the things their arts produce and the other beings that are present for us. The craftsmen are lovers of gain, Socrates says, not of knowledge. The actual Athenian aristocracy is disqualified insofar as it is praxis-minded, focused solely on the glory and satisfactions of political practice, of ruling. They are lovers of honor, not of knowledge. Their actual education is a Laconophile, or would-be Spartan, combination of sophistical nonsense and pederastic play. Socrates satirizes this education most explicitly in the *Protagoras*, where the Spartans are said to be the greatest sophists among the Greeks, but devote great effort to concealing their sophistic studies by pretending to engage solely in physical training for war.[71] In the *Republic*, Sparta is a

---

[69]Heidegger 1977; on Plato's role in opening up the possibility of a lifeworld subjugated to worldviews see esp. 131, 139.
[70]*Republic* 519d.
[71]*Protagoras* 342-3.

corrupted imitation of the best regime, and its status in aristocratic opinion as the best among the actual regimes is put into question by its refusal to license conversations such as Socrates' with Glaucon and Adeimantus.[72]

The serious aspect of academic politics is our need for some sense of how much and what of each branch of knowledge should be taught when. This is why some of the most salient political disputes in the contemporary world occur around education. After the canon wars in American university education, the controversy of the place of multicultural education in schools and colleges, one would have to be both brave and contrary in order to see the stakes in academic politics as insignificant.[73] We cannot tackle this problem of the curriculum for all time, but only for our present circumstances. Yet it is Plato who taught us to think of this, academic problem, as the question that supersedes all other political questions.

This academic elite is compatible with democratic politics, because it does not dispute the right of the demos to decide between it, the aristocrats, and the men of the people, and does not despair of the possibility that the many will recognize the advantages of philosophic rule.[74] It does not aspire to rule, but only to govern. As a body it need take no position on how that government ought to be conducted on every issue: political science departments, or even law schools, do not have the role in determining policy that the theological faculties of medieval universities had in judging allegations of heresy. The academic elite as a body cannot say what ought to be done concretely insofar as we teachers lack timely knowledge of people and circumstances beyond the realm of education. To know these details requires immersion in the actual business of

---

[72]*Republic* 557de; cf. *Laws* 634de.

[73]Contemporary universities are governed by a bureaucratic pluralism that ensures that every position be fairly represented (Graff 1992, 125-143). The result resembles nothing so much as the every-pleasure-in-rotation agenda of Socrates' democratic man (*Republic* 561). The only serious question is whether these discussions can move beyond this pluralism in keeping with our commitment as rational beings, not to say University faculty members, to the pursuit of truth. Analytic philosophy could make its peculiar contribution to the reform of higher education if it would bring us to institutionalize Frege's critique of psychologism, this time as a critique of disciplinary and subdisciplinary peer review.

[74]*Republic* 499d-500a, 500e, 501c-e.

government. But although we do not necessarily know at every step what ought to be done, we have no doubt about who ought to govern: the academically trained.[75]

The notion of academic politics in this sense receives its most visible realization in judicial review. An elite, selecting itself for its education, moral character, and commitment to the regime, claims the authority to approve or veto all administrative and even some legislative decisions based on their conformity to the regimes' fundamental laws. I will only add that this description applies equally to the Supreme Courts of the United States, Canada, Israel, and other self-proclaimed democracies, and to the Council of Guardians of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To the best of my knowledge, these institutions can all trace their ultimate historical inspiration to Plato's critiques of democracy and aristocracy.[76]

---

[75]The political orientation and inadvertent Platonism of Jefferson's educational scheme is brought out clearly in Brann 1979; see esp. 97-98.

[76]It is through James and John Stuart Mill, primarily, that Plato influences the modern liberal notion of a constitutional court as a guarantor of the rights of the enlightened few against the benighted many; cf. Mill 1969, 14-15, and Turner 1981, 401-403, 406, 431-2 with Woodruff 1964, 15-16 and Mehta 1999, 6, 10. Robert Dahl gives the fullest treatment I have found of the tension between guardianship and democracy as exemplified in liberal constitutional states (1985, 1989; see esp. 1989, 163-192). Contrary to what many Plato scholars seem to believe, Dahl emphasizes correctly that Plato's case for government by the most qualified has been found and will continue to be found "perennially appealing," and that rule by guardians -- democracy's "ancient, enduring, and formidable rival" -- "has always been the strongest competitor to the democratic vision." Dahl also predicted, before Maastricht, the WTO, and other elements of the "New World Order," that as transnational organizations grow in strength, democratic governance would be attenuated in favor of "de facto guardianship" (1985, 21, 32, 90; 1989, 14, 320).

I would like to thank Matthew Crawford, Yoav Peled, Leon Craig, Marlene Sokolon, Patrick Coby, the panel audience at the 2001 American Political Science Association, and seminar audiences at Tel Aviv and Arizona State for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. My education began again in 1999 when I first heard Irad Kimhi lecture on Heidegger and Wittgenstein, from whom much here, if not enough, is doubtless derived.

References

Allen, Danielle S. 2000. *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Andrew, Edward. 1989. "Equality of Opportunity as the Noble Lie." *History of Political Thought* 10:577-595.

Austin, J. L. 1962. *How to Do Things With Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Austin, J. L. 1979. *Philosophical Papers*, third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bambrough. Renford. 1956. "Plato's Political Analogies." In *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, ed. Peter Laslett. Reprinted in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Gregory Vlastos, vol. II, *Ethics, Politics, and the Philosophy of Art and Religion*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971.

Berent, Moshe. 1998. "*Stasis*, or the Greek Invention of Politics." *History of Political Thought* 19(Autumn):331-362.

Brandom, Robert B. 1994. *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Brann, Eva T. H. 1979. *Paradoxes of Education in a Republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cohen, David. 1995. *Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Craig, Leon Harold. 1994. *The War Lover: A Study of Plato's* Republic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1985. *Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy Versus Guardianship.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dobbs, Darrell. 1994. "Choosing Justice: Socrates' Model City and the Practice of Dialectic." *American Political Science Review* 88:263-277.

Euben, J. Peter. 1997. *Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Graff, Gerald. 1992. *Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Grice, Paul. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hacking, Ian. 1975. *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heidegger, Martin. 1977. "The Age of the World Picture." In *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,* tr. William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row.

Heidegger, Martin. 1998. "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." In *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heinlein, Robert A. 1968 [1959]. *Starship Troopers.* New York: Berkley.

Holmes, Stephen. 1979. "Aristippus in and out of Athens." *American Political Science Review* 73:113-28.

Kochin, Michael S. 1998. "The Unity of Virtue and the Limitations of Magnesia." *History of Political Thought* 19 (Summer):125-141.

Kochin, Michael S. 1999. "War, Class, and Justice in Plato's *Republic*." *The Review of Metaphysics* 53 (December):403-423.

Kochin, Michael S. 2002a. "Nationalist Rhetoric and the Constitution of Political Power." Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 31.

Kochin, Michael S. 2002b. *Gender and Rhetoric in Plato's Political Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kochin, Michael S. 2003. "Friendship Beyond Reason." Presented to the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Denver, March 27. http://www.georgetown.edu/departments/government/gradpages/avramenr/friendship%20beyond%20reason.pdf

Lewis, V. Bradley. 2000. "The Rhetoric of Philosophic Politics in Plato's *Seventh Letter*." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 33:23-38.

Loraux, Nicole. 1986. *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City,* tr. Alan Sheridan. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, John. 1996. *Mind and World*, second edition, with a new introduction by the author. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McKeon, Michael. 1987. *The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mehta, Uday Singh. 1999. *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mill, John Stuart. 1969. *Autobiography*, ed. Jack Stillinger. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Monoson, S. Sarah. 2000. *Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ober, Josiah. 1989. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ober, Josiah. 1996. *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ober, Josiah. 1999. *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1993. *Wittgenstein and Justice*, reprinted with a new preface. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Popper, Karl R. 1963. *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume 1: The Spell of Plato*, fourth edition. New York: Harper and Row.

Raaflaub, Kurt. 1994. "Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens." In *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy*, ed. J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Schofield, Malcolm. 2000. "Approaching the *Republic*." In *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Christopher and Malcolm Schofield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech-Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John R. 1983. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strauss, Barry S. 1994. "The Melting Pot, the Mosaic, and the Agora." In *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy*, ed. J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Strauss, Leo. 1978. *The City and Man*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, Leo. 1995. "An Epilogue." In *Liberalism Ancient and Modern*. New York: Basic Books, 1968. Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Turner, Frank M. 1981. "The Victorian Platonic Revival." In *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Vidal-Naquet, Pierre. 1986. *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World*, tr. Andrew Szegedy-Maszak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Vlastos, Gregory. 1994. "The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy." In *Socratic Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallach, John R. 2001. *The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1965 [1958]. *The Blue and Brown Books*. New York: Harper and Row.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1993. "Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*," tr. John Beversluis. In *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Woodruff, Philip. 1964. *The Men Who Ruled India*, vol. I, *The Founders*. New York: Schocken.