American
durbar -- Indian troops in Iraq would signal the beginning of
a subsidiary alliance
By Mani Shankar Aiyar
We are not being invited to keep the peace. We are being
invited to consolidate an occupation. There are ample forces
available to the invading forces to stabilise what they have
destabilised. But they want us in for two reasons. First,
they wish to minimise their losses. Should our soldiers die
in their cause? Second, they want to co-opt us ex-post facto
in the outrage they have committed. Should we jettison the
national consensus expressed in Parliament’s unanimous
resolution? Moreover, should we do so at the behest of not
our national volition but those whom but a few weeks ago we
“ninda-ed” — the Hindi compromise for what
we either deplored or condemned but certainly did not approve
or endorse? If unanimous resolutions of Parliament can be
set aside so casually, what of another unanimous Parliament
resolution, the one which talks of the vacation of territory
acquired by aggression in Jammu and Kashmir?
We opposed the war in Korea. When that war reached military
stalemate, the belligerents found they could not sustain their
armistice without resolving the repatriation of prisoners
of war. India then chaired the commission which supervised
the repatriation. Our troops went abroad in the blue berets
of the UN to facilitate the armistice. Our action has helped
sustain that armistice for half a century. There was consistency
between the role of our armed forces and our larger political
goals.
We were not even invited to the Geneva conference on Indo-China
in 1954. V.K. Krishna Menon went anyway. He emerged on the
margins of the official meetings as the chief intermediary
between the belligerents. So signal was his contribution to
the decolonisation of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia that India
was the most trusted to chair the commission set up to supervise
and control the implementation of the accords. Indian troops
assisted the commission in its work. It was not a UN exercise
but so long as the commission served a purpose, it served
our purpose.
We opposed the 1956 UK-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.
When the US — for once on the side of the gods —
forced a disengagement, our troops went to Gaza to keep the
peace. It is in the self-same Gaza strip that the beginnings
of the Palestine state were eventually — 36 years on
— established. Our troops served the larger political
goals we were pursuing.
We sent our troops to the former Belgian Congo to keep the
Belgians “former”. My first diplomatic assignment
began in Brussels the week Belgian TV showed Gurkha soldiers
in UN blue berets mowing down — albeit by mistake —
frightened whites escaping the brutal internecine bloodbath
in Katanga. It was not a particularly brilliant moment for
“peacekeeping”. It was, however, an illuminating
precedent for what we are being invited to undertake in Iraq.
For the Kurdish region, where we are being cajoled and threatened
to station our troops, is the most bitterly contested region
of Iraq. It is there that Iraq will disintegrate or survive.
The contest is not only between the indigenous Kurds and the
non-Kurdish rulers of Iraq (be they yesterday’s Sunnis
or tomorrow’s Shias), it is an insurgency which spills
across borders into Turkey, Syria and Iran, with none of whom
have we any quarrel, as we have no quarrel with Kurd, Sunni
or Shia. Can our soldiers “stabilise” this incandescent
region while keeping their powder dry? Will our jawans be
armed with guns or lathis? Should we get our troops caught
up in someone else’s war, someone else’s insurgency?
For make no mistake about it: our troops are not being invited
to holiday in northern Iraq. There is a larger goal. It is
emphatically not our goal. It is the goal of those who invaded
Iraq and are now occupying it.
That occupation is a reality. We are being invited to endorse
that reality, consolidate that reality. We could — if
there were no other reality. But there is — the reality
of a resistance which is taking a toll of an average of one
American life a day. That resistance might be the terminal
death rattle of regime change. Or it might just be the beginning
of a long and painful attempt to win back the Iraqi nation
for the Iraqi people. The “stabilisation” of Iraq
is aimed at throttling the Resistance — whether it is
a last gasp or a new beginning. Our jawans are being invited
to apply their fingers to the gullet.
There are two kinds of lobbies at work urging us to “get
real”. The first is of those dripping at the mouth at
the prospect of “lucrative contracts”. The contracts
are being doled out by the occupying forces as blood money
calibrated to the contribution made to the consolidation of
their occupation. Should the Indian army be reduced to a mercenary
force collecting and enforcing such supari contracts?
The second lobby is the more serious. It is the comprador
political class, the true inheritors of the realist school
of the Rai Bahadurs and Khan Bahadurs who kept the Union Jack
flying. The Brits were much more the Indian reality then than
the US is in Iraq today. “Realism” and “national
interest” determined then — as we are being urged
to now do — that if you can’t lick ’em,
join ’em. The rewards were immense. Not only did the
princes who entered into subsidiary alliances with William
Bentinck and his successors ensure they were on the winning
side through the entire era of imperial rule, the wealth they
garnered and the influence they secured fostered their advancement
even after regime change brought India to Independence. It
is the descendants of the Rani of Jhansi who are not in Parliament.
What the Americans are inviting us to do is follow the example
of the princelings who, like Atal Bihari Vajpayee at St Petersburg,
were invited to the royal box at the Ascot races to bow before
their imperial majesties in return for the baubles they wore
with such pride on their puffed out chests. Non-alignment
was Independence. Subsidiary alliances are stabilisation.
We are asked to choose between the Delhi Durbar and homespun
khadi.
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