=dinosaur Start retype of a printout ca. 1989 from input of a manuscript written ca. May 1988. Retyped 8 Feb '04; interjections will be set off in {squiggly_braces} Best viewed under EinsteinWriter Einstein Layout: Staggered block-indents as follows: LM as follows: .l1=FL; .l2=+5 chars; .l3=+10 chars, .l4=+15 chars, .l5=+20 chars, .l6=+25chars LL=60 chars I think, but that's not important Layouts are removed in T.EXE and I think ETRANS.EXE convertes to *.txt; so I flag them with #l(Layout number), eg #l1 or #L1, etc. Despite a most provocative title, this is a serious essay; and I think not unduly disrespectful of orthodox and ultra-orthodox Judaism. I did of course, and do, approach it from a non-orthodox standpoint, quite an eclectic standpoint; I try to retain rather than repudiate whatever I may have somewhat learned in practice of other paths (the sort of hippy-Indian way at New Buffalo; and my association with the SO); but also the secular/intellectual/socially-conscious ambience in which I was raised: Anglophilic in style, Jewish in social conscience. The typical liberalism of the '60's from those whose parents had some association with the so-called 'radicalism' [ in fact a deeply, almost romantically pro-American social conseratism with [what in retrospect now appears to have been ] an unduly romantic notion of socialism, extended [ in ignorance of the corruption and excesses of Stalinism ] to totalitarian socialism.] That was of course compatible with whole-hearted participation in the World War II War effort [ the CP-USA then being, of course, in a United Front position, a very conservative movement, in style even more than in positions I think; in which posture it tends to remain. Of course the opportunists of the McCarthy era might have made something quite horrendous of what at the time seemed in trivial duality of affiliation. [ I'm speaking here with deliberate obscurity; which I rarely do on purpose. ] ---------------------------------------------------------------- PART I: TO KILL THE DINOSAUR Toward a de-legitimization of orhtodoxy as normative Judaism* 1.0 It is necesary to show that 'orthodoxy' is nor normative for the religion of Judaism. And that 'ultra-orthodoxy' is not the quinteessence of orthodoxy. #l2 1.01: The purpose is to un-block the livng stream of Jewish religious insight, to let the 'message' of Judaism assume its proper 'form in our time'. #l3 {N.B.: This is a play on PVK's title of his book on HIK: 'The Message in our Time'. PVK subsequently remarked (so Aziz told me at the time) that the book contained, [as I recall Aziz telling me] many inaccuracies, and that for that reason he would not wish to republish it. It was a beautifully produced book, but in the Preface PVK said , with his typical politeness, that the publisher had made him cut it down from one about 4 times the length. It is that original manuscript/typescript or whatever that I would hope to see published. sa Feb '04} That is always the project of religion; verily, of any intellectual project. As Whitehead said, in 'Process and Reality', and no doubt as Rav Kook said better, there is always a dialectic tension (or as Buckminister Fuller would put it: an optimal harmony of the pull to conserve, and the push to break free and innovate. #l3 {Cf. PVK: [apr., quoted from memory: ÷'The push of the future is stronger than the push of the past.' [Keyboard note: ÷ =: 'approximately equal to' (a squiggly equals sign; used in technical typing; I don't now know the ASCII value. Accessed in EinsteinWriter with Alt+G and then the Spanish cedilla (keyboard top row, lst key to the left; #l2 l.02: Innovation for the sake of expediency is irrrelevant to this project. Reform Jusaim in America appears as anachornistic as the Rocketttes. #l3 "We have met th enemey, and they are us" (Walt Kelly). The rigiditg of orthodoxy is the overwhelmingly greatest casuse of alienation from Judaism. #l4 {N.B.: I surely had in mind my father's experience: his mother was strictly observant, as far as I know -- she kept a kosher home -- and his father, although apparently not strictly observant, deferred to his wife. My father was raised with the whole bundle: Sunday School, Hebrew school, violin lessons, working after school in his father's business (woolen goods, as I recall; #l5 my father retained excellent taste in clothing, and would take me out to get clothes and shoes; he once, at the Harvard Coop, helped me get an excellent wool woven sports' jacket, quite like a Harris tweed (and maybe it was); I was about 12 at the time. And of course in those days, the 1940's, one was always measued for shoes by width as well as length.} #l6 {{ One thing I am trying to do in whatever I write or type is to re-write piecemiel my Autobiography, presently lost. }} #l4 (Whatever I can say is only an academic footnote to R. Zalman Schachters' teaching; not to imply that he'd endorse this. Hower, I have tucked into this essay academic conclusions, disguised as flip remarks, some of which it took me years to develop.) #l5 {The main essay I had in mind was one I wrote for a philosophy class, I think by Mrs. Iyer, at UCSB ca. '68, 'Quodlibet est, est unum, verum, bonum.' I don't now have a copy of that. It boiled down to a sort of Kantian 'transcendental deduction' of the necessary existence of Deity -- so one could term it a 'transcendental ontologic proof'. It boiled down to: we cannot but imagine the existence of the Infinite, therefore it is meaningless to say that it does not exist (by the verifiability criterion of meaning: that something is meaningful if and only if 'criteria' (in Wittgenstein's sense of the term) could be imagined for predicating its applicabillty and non-applicability.) A secondary essay, also presently not available, was 'On Community', originally written at New Buffalo, ca. 1971. New Buffalo was, in its own hippy-Indian way, profoundly religious; that essay was my rather coloful rationale for it.} #l2 1.1: In both cases, the 'surface grammar' (Witggenstein) implies that it is: that orthodoxy is by self-definitino, the set of correct opinions; and that ultra-orthodoxy is the distillate of whatever orthodoxy is. Obviously silly; yet that's what circumscribes the politics of Isreaeli state religion. #l3 'Ortho-doxa-y' is a contradiction in terms. ortho-doxy = (Greek) ortho, correct + doxa, opinion. In Plato's refinement of this terminolgoy, doxa, opinon (belief) { as it is rendered in what in the USA if not England is termed Anglo-American [academic] philosohy } sands in contradistinctino of to nous, (usually translated 'knowlege'), and in Platonic epistemology/ontology, 'doxa' is relative, and 'nous' is absolute.) #l4 {Cf. PVK: Discussing the limitation and fallibility of personal belief, and as introduction to his teaching of practices intended to help one see things from the perspective of one's opponents, he remarked, in a tone of incredulity, 'People kill each other for beliefs.' This is Zenith 1999 or maybe a year or so before. } {OK,now I'll hop-skotch over to =purav*.* , continuing my "Why I am a Reformie" rap, tho that's written it not merely an ironic but an ostensibly facetious mode. A mystic disguised as a con-man -- that dude in Spain who wrote the Zohar in davka Aramaic, ostensibly as a Commentary on the Chumash.} He said, If I'm right, let this tree jump over the road. The tree jumped over the road. They said, What does a tree know from halacha. They said, the Tora (ie, halacha) is not in Heaven, it's on earth. I go with the Sadduces: Insofar as it's not in Heaven, it's not obligatory. That is a criterion of a non-orthodox position. Maybe the only criterion; I ain't thought that far yet. It's where I stand, on the fringe -- the 'cutting edge' maybe, and/or maybe not -- of the communithy. I don't say I'm right and they're wrong; if everyone "did what was right in his own eyes" the community would fall apart. But in Israel, given a stable community, a few of us are free to stand on the fringe. It ain't fair, but neither is love and taxes. Taxes anyhow. It's not the freethinker position, which is: the mitzvot are not obligatory. But it's close. Because the mitzvot in Heaven must be universal, and so must be free of any particular ritual. So what we have are not mitzvot per se, but the Forms of mitzvot. Which cannot be particularized. But expression of the Forms must be particularized: as it says in Esther, "each man in his own house". So ritual too may be obligatory, for one who stands within that path. If I am Jewish, I put on a tallit before entering the House of Prayer, if I am Catholic, I genuflect; if I am Muslim, I remove my shoes, if I am Buddhist, I bow; if I am Indian, I take a sweat bath. What's obligatory is that there be a pause before entering; some ackowlegement and demarcation that one is passing from secular to sacred. And so we can learn from each other's rituals, and incorporate parts of them. We wash our hands; the Muslims wash also their feet and nose. #l2 In modern empiricist epistemology #l3 {N.B. 'empiricist epistemology' is my term for what Wittgenstein stands counterposed to }, #l2 which may be seen as the methodology of a secular reductionism, 'opinion' is taken as equivalent to 'belief', and so as an exercise in academic epistemology one can derve e.g. the formula 'X knows A' = 'X believes A' & 'A is true' #l4 {This is a standard bit of sophmore theory of knowlege; I don't know why I dusted it off and stuck it in here.} #l3 (One might say that beliefs and statements in the category of doxa are (respectively) apprehended from and predicated of the phenomenal world (the world of maya) and that intuitions and statements (or following Wittgenstein in Tractatus, show-ings, indications) in nous, of the noumenal world. But since on the empiricst view one never has conclusive creitera for knowlege, under empiricist epistemology #l1 -------------------------------------------------------- END PRINTOUT P1, and about time ------------------------------------------------------- [START PRINTOUT P2] knowlege-claims must be said to be meaningless by the verifiablilty criterion of meaningfulness. #l4 (Since knowlege-claims obviously AIN'T meaningless, and if we take the verifiabilbity principle of meaningfulness as reasonable, empiricist epistemology is thus shown to be unreasonable. While not precisely a reduction ad absurdum, this discredits empiricist epistemology. As Kant showed in response to Hume, empiricist epistemology relegates knowlege to the "sphere of 'noumena'". But as Cavelll showed in lectures {UC Berkeley, '62}, you go off-track with Kant if you take noumena as existents rather than as a logical construct within academic epistemology -- noumena are the re-creation of an anachromism in the Museum of the History of Silly Ideas. (Ie, Kant falls neatly into place if you approach him from a Wittgensteinian perspective; but from a Hume-ian perspective Kant is a brick wall. Ashenbrenner, in Berkeley, approached Kant from a Humian perspetive with such conscientious persistence that you could read Kant's philosophy in reverse from teh lumps on his head.) But since perception (more accuratley, non-mystic perception, which, if we follow the empiricists AND Wittgenstein's crituqe of empiricism, in disallowing mysticism #l5 (and W.'s failure to challenge that disavowal is the critique, limitation, boundary of W.'s critique of empiricist epistemology. That falling from the transcendent brilliance of his youth, expressed in the Tractatus (how the positivists missed its coherence; only maybe Spinoza had such lean brilliance) #l6 (like the Ideal lof Bauhaus architecture at its best, slender skycscrappers of glass and steel in the sun, making Platonic ants of the humans) #l5 -- the Tractatus, more than Spinoza's Ethiics which it of course resembles in superficial form, is a gem -- ("I should have been a star" said W. (quoted in Malcolm's biography(?)) -- that decline into what was, obviously iin retrospect from Malcolm's biography (honest Boswell that the fool was) a lifetime melancolia (from a fastidious to an indiffernt dresser; "though I am incapable of giving affection, I have a great need for it" (ibid) -- etc. etc. -- which Malcolm, that stody {stody: a stodgy toady, I presume} saw only as eccentrity [END PRINTOUT PAGE 2] {I've come to the position that Wittgenstein's PI and related later Nachlass , as he said himself, ain't -- well, it may be a 'Copernican Revolution', but a Copernican revolution is merely a shifting of the axis point, or as PVK would put it, of one's focus -- merely another way of looking at things; it's not that this is discovered to be right and all that is discovered to have been wrong. Both may have their uses) (And W. said, in his Preface to PI, that he feared he had merely introduced a new jargon. And Cavell once said: What passes for a 'Wittgensteinian' position nowadays (60's; by now everyone seems to ignore the poor old dude) is merely making oneself invulnerable to Wittgensteinian criticism. A sort of academic intellectual correctness, as shallow as realworld 'political correctness.' I mean, if Woody Allen is into it, it must be high-grade shlock; Woody Allen diligently avoids the realworld, taking refuge in a whimsical irony that veils the curish snarl of a cynic. So Wittgenstein, ironically for his sensibility -- I mean, posing an Englishman -- or a working-class Englishman, if they count in England -- is your basic beef-and-potatoes at the High table philosopher -- really an apologist for Moore, who had barely a brain in his head but got a good salary as a Hereditary Don -- like, Wittgenstein is ok in the middle-range, but fails in both the micro (ie, "the agenbite of inwit" (James Joyce, Finnegan's Wake, quoted by Jack Kerouac if memory serves), the sort of Hamlet-like introspection that fueled Hume-ian philosophy), and in the macro level (mysticism, which some mistake introspection for -- PVK often has made this point) [END RE-INPUT WITH {ADDED COMMENTARY} OF PRINTOUT PAGE 2] -------------------------------------------------------------- [START INPUT OF PRINTOUT PAGE 3] #l2 [COPIED FROM PAGE 2] -- that decline into what was, obviously iin retrospect from Malcolm's biography (honest Boswell that the fool was) a lifetime melancolia [RETYPED FROM PAGE 3]: #l5 to never again rise above empiricism, himself the fly in his own fly bottle -- [this is a standard quote from PI: "what is the purpose of philosophy -- to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle"] which melacolia he furnished, wtill with the impeccable taste (von Wright's momoir?) of his youth, with all the trappings of empiricist epistemology, which he detailed with a meticulousness wasted on is followers (as W. observes in his introduction fo PI, much of what he says in PI is a making_explicit of the suppressed, between_the_lines steps in the empiricist chain of thought -- it is only in PI that one sees how many steps the empiricists omitted from what modern academic philosophy mistook for self-evident derivations {or better: observations} but since perception is necesarily of phenomena, noumena are not, logically speaking, entities in an existent realm. The noumenal is not a realm of existence that "we poor mortals" (PVK) can't apprehend; it's merely an epistemologist's model of what knowlege AIN'T; an oblique of way of saying that our percerption are ncessarily pre_conceptualized by what Kant called "categories of perception" and W. called "grammar: { this is all how I heard Cavell in '62} #l3 Hence the notion of ortho-doxa, correct opinion, rests within empiricist epistemology, and can be shown on Wittgensteinian grounds to be meaningless. {Note (sa, Aug '04): But one might better say: it's merely a societal convention -- an agreement that, to preserve the community, one must agree on common practices, even though in many cases those practices would fall far short of the Ideal.} So much for orthodoxy. #l3 Except that the problem is that Wittgesteinian analysis ain't adequate to (mystic) religious knowlege.) (And this relflects on the level of epistemology W.'s own existential failure (and one can't dismiss his perception of his own life as a failure as quaint modesty; the strategic fall of a giant of thought may (Finnegan) make_be a monument of academic phlosophy, but academic thoguht is the dungill of intellectual culture (to put it with my customoary tact & delicacy; "Me and my friend, we don't profess no social graces." Or as I say: There are three Graces, and ain't one of them named Steve. ) 1.3 One mus acknowlege and confront the extent to which orthodoxy presents and (misrepresents itself as the dogma of Judaism. Hersche Grossman, an American Rabbi and fauculty member of Yehsiva University Los Angeles, offers a delightfully #l1 [END PRINTOUT PAGE 3] ----------------------------------------------------------------- [START PRINTOUT PAGE 4] #l2 simplistic defintion of orthodoxy (Jerusalem Post, 4/12/88, p4) "Our own guidelines have always been very clear: -- The closing of the Talmud is the culmiination of Oral transmission. Its rulings ae binding and its authority is unquestioned. -- Since that time, all subsequent Halachhic decisions must find their basis in Talmudic literature. -- The decisons of today's Halachic authoorities are as binding upon as the word of G_d at Mt. Sinai. Obviously, the notion of dogma is not part of Judaism. #l2 {I am tempted to take what RSC said of Reform and apply it to ultra-orthodoxy, especially is misogynistic aspect: "It's cute and sweet, but it's not Yiddishkeit." Eg autobuses woman to enter and be seated from the rear, so to speak, so that men need not have to avert their gaze from the rounded form of a grounded femme. ("A tip o' the hat" to AS). I mean, talk of square; this one's for Saul Steinberg. #l1 One might ground this in the postualte that Judaism is inherently process-ional, constatntly refining one's prehension of (Yis-ra- el, one who 'wrestles with' the Higher {even Hegel has his places}), and working TOWARD, rather than presupposng, the nature or attainment of salvation. And one might derive THAT from the onto_logic postualate that Judaism is essentially transcendental, this_world oriented, where Xianity is essentiallyl next_world oriented. #l2 (And in fact it was conceived as an apocalyptic religon in an historic context which made that a reasonable world-view: in Israel when Jewish zealots were stting in motion forces that would provoke Rome to virtually destroy the Jewish people, culture, and religion. #l3 (In this sense one may see the teachings of Jesus politically not as as revolutionary (for which he was excecuted) but on the contrary as conciliatory; had they prevailed they might have effected enough social reform to appease the impoverished among the zealots {eg, Judas Iscariot, Yehuda Ish Keriya, a Jew from the City (Jlem I assume; what other city was there; who says, Who cares if this guy's the 'Messiah', whatever that means here; that whore's ointment should have been sold to feed the poor} , and have down-played the role of priesthood to the point that conflict with Rome was averted. If one further acknowleges that (as a Zen teacher observed) his teachings do lead toward a certain type (one amongst 'many mansions') of Enlgihtenment, then one could say that he was a 'Messiah' in the sense that his teachings offered both personal (in a very limited sense, i.e. very limited by the political realities of a time of dominant Roman Imperialism) political salvation. But to take him as THE 'Messiah' in the popular sense of that term (as many of his contrivances might incline one to do, notably contriving to enter Jerusalem on a donkey as foretold by one of the "prophets", as if a prophecy could be fulfileld by one who contrives to enact its fullfilmment) -- {I mean, if this guy really was the Messiah, then when that chick went to annoint his feet (rather a Hindu custom, that), he would have said, Cool it Mama, sell that goo and buy bread for the babies Lady.} #l1 [END PRINTOUT PAGE 4] ------------------------------------------------------------------- [START PRINTOUT PAGE 5] #l3 -- and to further take him as some sort off High_priest__like Rebbe, mediator between man and the Highest #l4 (as many of his reported teachings claim, notaably the Rebbe_like use of 'Yoter''d motzi as what Xianity came to conceptualize, accurately, as a sort of trans_substantiated 'communion' #l3 sets the stage for confrontation. #l4 {And Jesus called himself 'the son of Man'. So what does that mean. In modern Hebrew it's 'ben Adam' which is a phrase usef to mean 'anybody' or 'a nobody'. "The lowest of the low" , to borrow R. Shlomo's phrase. Humility_plus. I think of the 'Mudhead's who come to dance at Zuni Shalako (unless I'm confusing that with Hopi dances.) 'Ben Adam' is not the quintessence of humanity; it's more like the servant of humanity. #l5 (Caliban maybe; there are few great ideas that Shakespeare doesn't get wrong.) #l3 One must come to terms with the ways and extent to which galutz Judaism has been colored by Xianity especially in its Dark Ages. Most obviously in the misogyny and dress affected by those who pretend to 'ultra-orthodoxy'. {Again: it is useful to see the the ultra-orthodox as the least, not the most, Jewish (in terms of religious expression) of the Jews.} {And also: that notion, quoted above, that: "-- The decisons of today's Halachic authorities are as binding upon as the word of G_d at Mt. Sinai." sounds like, not Judaism -- surely not the free-wheeling give-and-take of Talmud -- rather, it sounds like Roman Catholicism. Only in practice the Catholics are a lot cooler than halachic Jewish practice.} #l1 1.4 Although the set of, so to speak, "religious facts" (to borrow and adapt the notion of 'fact' from Wittgenstein's Tractatus) is -- necessarily -- complete and consistent, no set of statements of purported religious revelation is necessarily entirely accurate, complete, or consistent [ and per Godel, is necesasrily not both complete and consistent.] 2.0 The implicit assumption and sometimes explicit claim taht ultra-orthodoxy is the quinteswence of orthodoxy, is most misleading. #l2 {Oy, this is beginning to sound like a Brahms concerto; all the action is in the variations; the theme is merely a setting, sort of like a minimal stage set. #l2 2.1 The surface grammar of 'ultra-orthodoxy' is that it is the quintessence of orthodoxy. #l2 {'Surface grammar' is a term from Wittgenstein's PI.} #l1 (Thought one might instead say that the rterm 'ultra-orthooxy' is redudnan on the face of it, and say that the term is an inherently meaningless jingoism, like '101% American'; #l2 To add to what is already corect is not to become 'more correct' but merely to decline into the vices of excess (as Aristotle would say), e.g. obsessive or at leas supersititous behavior #l3 (e.g. the use of 'hat v'shalom', and less clarely 'bezrat H'''; insofar as that expresses a superstitous custom, it was most properly ruled out for military correspondence by Rabin), or obsessive behavior.) [END PRINTOUT PAGE 5] ----------------------------------------------------------------- [STASRST PRINTOUT PAGE 6] PART II: RE-INVENTING THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION: Toward an articulation of the principles of non-orthodox Judaism. I. Individual religious freedom is the caregory_al [a Kantian term more usually, colluqially, and mileadingly rendered 'categorical'] obligation of religiosity. #l2 1.1.: Hence religious freedom is an inalienable individual right -- one cannot alienate one's relgious freedom to another -- nor rebbe, rabbi, guru, rulebook, etc. -- and still be fully free. 1.2: Accordingly, non_interpersonal mitzvot cannot be taken as binding. #l3 (Nor is it clear what it would mean, apart from an anthropomorphic context, to say that they are binding. #l4 (Interpersonal mitzvot may have an ethical justification, and thus be binding. #l5 [Note that an intpersonal mitzva may be 1_personal, eg suicide is a 1_person interpersonal act (with self as subject and object) #l2 1.3 and hence there is no necessary hierarchy of religious authority #l3 -- while there may be hierarchies of acadeemic scholarship (Cf. the rabbinic tradition, eg mitnaged) revelation may come as grace (to invoke a Christian idea) to anyone. #l4 (Cf. numerous hasidic parables, but note that these too are modern_day midrashim, and should not be taken factually.) #l2 1.5: Of course no sect should be given political power in any sector over anyone but its own {freely-joined} members; that should be unconstitutional (eg giving the Ministry of Interior as a political plum to an anti-Zionist sect.) Hence it is a categorial obligation of religiosity to de_LEGIT_imize [Latin] soi_disant [French] ortho_dox[a]_y [Greek] as normative (Judaism), but not of course to supplant it with a competing sect #l3 (nor oligarch of sects, eg a 'religious pluralism' where reform, conservative and orthdox carve up the cake, perhaps cutting in secular Zionism) Well childishneess never cease? 2: "Gesher tzar meod": one can err on either side: foolish or expedient innovation as much as obsessive repressive/legalistic formalism. Thus the contemporary disputes between relatively progressive and relatively traditional schools of Judaism (though we have neither authentic tradition nor truly creatively evolutionary prgress) are dialectical, in the interest of a higher synthesis, "for the sake of heaven." 2.1: Religious innovation is mere art_ifice, fac_ial Though the motivation of Reform and Cosnervative is correct, what I have seen of their practice, in the USA and amongst the English oriented members in Israel -- * -- the Sabras may produce something far moore authentic - is not that helpful. #l1 * [END PAGE 6 OF PRINTOUT] ------------------------------------------------------------------- [PAGE 7 OF PRINTOUT] #l2 One msut take the orthodox and ultra-orthodox critics of "progressive" Judaism seriously. 3. Religious statments hsould be taken as windows, not walls. #l2 A certian spicing of irreverence in one's makeup is essential to the religous quest; one trust mot those hwo, working hard and selflessly, move competently and comfortably through the forms, and maintain enough true humility to use humor as a defense against thepitfalls of piety.). #l3 Thus a tzaddik may remain hidden not out of humility but merely practical arrogance; to accept an exalted self0- mage is to freeze on'es growth. Since hoi polloi started exalting the personna of Ye Humble Monk, the trusly humble aspirant has found it sometimes necessary to assume the personna of a clow; thatmove underlies many of the stories of hasidism. #l1 4. It will not do to presuppose that the historic progression of commentaries are a sort of convertign infinite series aspproaching truth as teh limit. this is the orthodox viewpoint, and it's neat and tidy, but rlase. #l3 " ... the use of the term 'autnetic' to judge doctrinal difference which are essentially philosophical ... ' (Shubert Spero, Jlem Post Monday Aug 24, 1987) (Except that contemporary differences within Judaism are not matters of doctrine [as, eg, the dispute over wht er or not the dead resurrect in [typescript 'the', but most likely, 'their'] bodies, nor philosophical [as in the history of Thomism]; but more nearly an expression of didfferent dispositonal preferences of lifestyle. Neo_fundamentalism is the cannabis [text: 'pot'], if not opiate, of the masses; Reform is the Perrier of the yuppies. cosnervative is for overweight persons of moderate IQ, and shirtsleeve Isreali modern orthodoxy is for go-getter's.) #l2 4.1 With the canonizastino of oral Torah, written + oral = new written Torah (Tora in the sense of Shas=Chumash+Mishna+Gmora) and ultra-orthodoxy becomees the new Sadd8cik movement, with modern orthodoxy assumign the Pharasitic positon (viz., further onctemporary inteerpreteation is necessary and justified.) MOrevoer, ultra-orthodoxy does assume priestly characteristics (rebbe akin to a local high pries, inclined toward a theocatic oligarchy) with modern orthodoxy retaining the rabbinic (democratic, intellectual.) 4.2 More to the pirnt, though, is that modern orthodoxy is commited to active 'co-craewtion' in a Zionist context (ie rebuilding Israel as avoda), while ultra-orthodoxy retains the passive apocalypse_is_imminent posture of a DOG ATE TEH MANUSCRIPT most clearly seen in different conception of redemption and Messiah (idnvidual event in whcih the redeemed are passive, passive atomistic event vs. active histoirc process=societal event in which indiviudals are essential co- creators.) [END PRINTOUT PAGE 7] ----------------------------------------------------------------- [START PRINTOUT PAGE ] Though these distinctions may be characterized philsoophically, the motivation behind them is not philosophic. 5. NOTES ON THE GRAMMAR OF REVELATION 5.1 Revelation is intuitive perception. #l2 5.1a It is contingently private access to a universal domain [Heraliitus: "Though the logos is one, each man acts as if he has his own private stash:' #l3 5.1a1 Revelation is of necesasry turth. A secondary revelation is of its expresison, in word and practice, to the conditions of one's time. (Cf. PVK's book on HIK: "The Message in our Time") #l4 [The orthodox view of revelation rests on the anthropomorphic fallacy (one variety of Whitehead's 'Fallacy of Misplaced Concretion') [As if a supernatural hand emerged from the clouds and handed a set of stone tablets -- #l5 or memos #l6 (see how quickly the bathetic fallacy #l7 ['bathetic' -- from pathos to bathos] #l6 becomes obvious. (Cf. Wittgnestin, "my aim is to move from disguised nonsenset to patent nonsense", PI ______) #l4 to a man on a mountain-top #l5 [and again King Kong ascends our Tower of Abel, poor misdirected ape in consumerland, looking for sigms on the horizon of a second coming, as if the original was passe] #l6 {from my Imitation of Carmina Burana: "rex sedet in vertice -- caveat ruinum" / "Let King Kong noblesse the throng / Lotsa Luck, Big Daddy " } #l2 5.2 Revelation, like any other faculty of perception_apprehension, is a more or elss fallible capacity of any human being, (as-it-is-said, "would that all of the LORD's people would be prophets" (Bamidar, if I recall) and like all forms of perception is necessrily mediated and obscured through successive coceputalization, expression, and repetitive dissemination. 5.2a Hence the "canon of prophecy" is not closed #l3 [eg with Moses, as that popular imitation of a cathechism "Yigdad" (even the tune it's usually set to hereabouts is childish) suggests) , nor with the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be to him), though that's an essential article of fatih in Islam] #l2 nor the bodies of secondary revelation #l3 [Midrash, or the various levels of lesser fleas #l4 as it is said, "The big old felas have little fleas upon the backt to bite 'em / The little flease have littler fleas, and so ad infinitum":) #l2 5.2b Hence ond need not presuppose single authorship, much less infallibilty or consistency, for the set of propostions of Torah 5.2c Hence the proper appraoch to the study of the statements of one's religion -- eg, in Judaism, Torah, Haftorah, Talmud, halakot -- is, so to speak, to work "backwards" toward a personal re-apprehnsion of the underlying revelation (As in all philosohy, one must treat the stastements as windowes, not walls. More generally, a certain spicing of irreverence in ones's [END PRINTOUT PAGE 8] -------------------------------------------------------------- --- makeup is essentiall to the religous quest (don't forget old Sancho Pancha, oh Noble Knight); one trsts most those who, working hard and selflessly, move competently and comfortably through the forms, and maintain enough true humility to use humor as a defense against the pitfalls of piety. ---------------- [NOTE: The orthodos Zionists lost nerve and heedlessly abdicated relious leaderhiop of Israel to the conglomoerate of non- and anti- ultra-orothodox, which has practiccally exhausted its credit in faction-fighting powers plays over intrinsically trivial issues. {N.B.: I think this was a fair remark at the time I wrote it, ca. 1988, but has not had much applicability since.} **** ============================================================= SHANTI CHANTILLY SHIKSABOB ------------------------------------------------------------ sa Written 1988; Retyped with {additional comments} sa, Mevo Modi'n, Rosh Hodesh Av, 30 Av (17 Aug '04) ============================================================