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To the Moshav Newsletter:

Speaking of avoda zora, Leary once said of marijuna (best's I
recollect):  "Not one person in a hundred knows the proper use of
this delicate, exquisit drug." [On which basis the Moshav can
afford at most two licensed tokers.]  It is especially
problematic, (as I've heard on two paths), conjoined with
spiritual/religious or religious/spiritual practice.  I'm told
that RSC once said of pot (if memory serves):  "Chevre, it's time
to get out of diapers."    

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To the JP:

In his inept way, Sharon, the most subservient leader of the state
since Herod,  seems to have already staged a coup d'etat.  He
refuses to be bound by decisions of his party, and of his now-
repacked Cabinet.  If he cannot buy a Knesset majority (as Rabin
did with the Oslo Agreement) will Sharon accept a Knesset vote.  

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To the JP:

I have heard that Chabad does not recognize Ethiopian Jews as
Jewish.  And it may be that this opinion, which is not accepted in
Israeli Judaism, governs decisons of some Israeli Chabadniks, in
terms of hiring, firing, etc.  If such is the case, then this is
blatant and unjustified discrimination, apparently racist, and is
quite unacceptable in Israel.
                                                         
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By a 6 -- 1 vote the Supreme Court has relegated itself to
mediocrity.

[ Supreme Court rejects petitions to over-rule the AG's decisionk
citing lack of sufficient evidence, to over-rule the State
Prosecutor's recommendation to indict Sharon for bribery. ]

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As if it were clearer than a summer sunrise, the Post remarks
editorially (19 Aug '04) "some 75% of Israelis want out of Gaza". 
But it is not obvious that this is true, nor how that conclusion
was reached, nor even what it means.  The meaning of polls is
usually ambiguous, and depends largely upon the wording of the
question.

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The Supreme Court decision to reject petitions to over-rule the
AG's decision not to indict Sharon for receiving a bribe, shows
weak logical links. 

First of all, the Court could coherently have refused to hear teh
case, on the basis that it had no [quaisi-] constituitonal right
to overrule a decision by the AG , not to indict, due to lack of
sufficient evidence -- sufficient evidence, not of a reasonable
likelhood of guilt, but of a reasonable likelihood that the Court
would convict.

But having agreed to hear the case, the Court was then obliged to
determine whether or not the AG's decision was reasonable.      
It cannot then base its ruling on the fact that it has never
previously over-ruled an AG.

That being the case, it seems improper that the plaintiffs were
not allowed to see the evidence on which the AG (ostensibly) based
his decision.                                               

(Obviously the fact of the matter is that in response to Sharon's
about face on ceding territory to the Palestinians, the AG gave a
politically corrupted ruling supported by sophistry; and that
Sharon made his about-face in an attempt to induce that ruling. 
So the charge of financial corruption is morally overshadowed by a
case of mutual political corruption -- Sharon abandoned his
political principles, and the AG abandoned his objectifity.)

Now again:  a prosecutor properly brings an indictment when and
only when he finds sufficient evidence to be reasonable sure that
the accused is guilty.  A prosecutor does not properly bring an
indictment only when be believes there is sufficient evidence to
obtain conviction.   It is improper for a prosecutor to indict
someone he believes innocent, and improper for him to refrain from
indicting someone he believes guilty.
The prosecutor should not try to second-guess the Court.  For one
thing, the prosecutor cannot know what additional evidence will
emerge during the Court proceedings.
For another thing, trying to anticipate the outcome of a case
invites the prosecutor to take a cynical rather than idealistic
view of the Court.

The Majority Opinon (written by Judge Mazza) held that the fact
that the AG and the State Prosecutor held contrary opinions does
not entail that either side was unreasonable.  That's a truism;
but neither does it entail that neither party was unreasonable. 
One must examine the particular reasoning in question.

Moreover, the Judge evades an important distinction:  the State
Prosecutor moved to indict based on an opinion that Sharon was
guilty of accepting a bribe.  The AG quashed the indictment, not
on an opinion that Sharon was not guilty -- indeed, he implied
that he was guilty - but on an opinion that a Court would not
convict.  But the AG did not even state why he believed a Court
would not convict.

Mazza also writes, oddly:  "Actions and statements by Sharon which
the state attorney interpreted as incriminating [ eg, presumably, 
"is the island ours" and Appel's "your boy is going to make a lot
of money"] were found(!) by the AG to be proof of Sharon's
innocence and that fact that he was unware he had done anything
wrong." 

(Well, it's not easy to illustrate that; it's the sort of
statement that could be true only under extraordinary
instantiation.  
To contrive an illustration:
When Appel offered the son a job, Sharon was indeed suspicious
that this was an attempt to curry his Ministerial favour, and was
on the verge of telling the kid not to take it.  But when Appel
mentioned a starting bonus of half a million, Sharon was
dumfounded -- only a great tzadik would offer such a gift, and
surely a great tzadik would never attempt to bribe anyone; so it
was ok to take the money and put in in the joint bank account. 
Thus he evidence that the state prosecutor cynically used as a
basis for indictment, was reasonably seen by Mazuz as evidence of
Sharon's innocence; for only someone sublimely innocent of all
money matters could have been unaware that something would be
expected in return.

Now a little quibble:  Someone who is unaware that he has done
something wrong is not necessarily innocent.  He may be a
psychopath, or at least a sociopath.  Or a professional politician
terrified of unemployment.

But it would take a bit of creative imagination to imagine a case
that would fit Mazza's description:  evidence that may reasonbly
be interpreted either as incriminatory or as proof of innocence
(or at least as proof of ignorance of guilt).
                               
Mazza correctly notes that, merely for reasons of the efficiency
of his office, a prosecutor should not indict unless he believes
that the evidence is sufficient for "a reasonable chance of
winning a court conviction".  But Mazza does not explain why he
concluded that Mazuz could reasonably conclude that the available
evidence did not.

Again:  What is at issue is whether Mazuz decision not to indict
was reasonable.  Because if it is not, then Mazuz is either
incompetent or corrupt (politically if not financially).
And it is entirely proper for a Supreme Court to hear a case that
sets standards for reasonableness of criteria used by the AG in a
decision whether to indict.

One might add that the Supreme Court, apparently with a short-
sighted regard only for this particular case, has set an almost
chaotic precedent.  If Mazuz reasoning was reasonable, what would
count as unreasonable reasoning.  And although this case
legitimized far-fetched reasoning used to support a decision not
to indict (and so erred on the side of mercy, in the short-term
particular if not the longer-term general case), this precedent
set by this Supreme Court decision could as well support
repressive decisions to indict.

As for Mazza's endorsement of the notion that a decision to indict
a Prime Minister requires "even more care" though not "different
criteria" [JP paraphrases] than a decision to indict a Commoner --
well, this does seem, if one can get past the double-talk, to
trash the democratic principle -- also explicit in the Chumash --
that all citizens are equal before the law.   On the other hand,
care is required to insulate the decision from political pressure;
accordingly the U.S Constitution specified that only the House of
Representative could, by majority vote, indict the President.
The House of Reprsentatives was then the only branch of the
government elected directly by the people; the Senate was elected
bythe State Legislatures, and the President was elected by the
Electoral College.

HaAretz notes that Mazza said that Mazuz decision "was based on
two consideratins -- lack of evidence that Sharon had helped David
Appel's buisness interests, and lack of sufficient evidence to
contracit Sharon's explanations of how aware he was of the
suspicious circumstances." 

As to the first consideration:  it's irrelevant; a bribe does not
have to succeed to be a bribe.  And the one who accepts a bribe is
guiltly of doing so even if he does nothing for the one who gave
it.

As to the second consideration:  In the USA there is a saying (or
was 50 years ago):  'Ignorance of the law is no excuse.'
Nor are the criteria for being aware necessarily private.  Under
certain circumstances one is presumed to have been aware.
Nor does the burden of proof fall equally on both sides; it
depends on the circumstances.

To illustrate:
If my night shift is cancelled and I come home to find another man
in my bed, and my wife professes herself as surprised as I --
"Darling, I just got home myself, and I was so exhausted -- I just
thought you had left your socks teddy bear in bed, as usual, so I
just kicked it down to the bottom of the bed and went to sleep --
" -- I will not necessary need "sufficient evidence to contradict"
her explanation -- "But love, the night doorman says he did not
see you; have you been borrowing the helicopter again?" -- before
filing for divorce. 

Or if my son, who lives in my home, receives half a million
dollars for a job that usually pays NIS 20/hr., I may surely claim
to have been unaware of it, and that claim may well be true -- eg,
if I was in a coma, or a space capsule with re-entry problems
managed by a third-world nation at the close of last fiscal year -
- but not that much evidence will be needeed to rebut my claim
("The gig is up Moriarity; we found the hologram projector on
Mars.").





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