Panpsychism in
the West (Skrbina)
Panpsychism as a concept, it may be proposed,
has
three essential characteristics: (1) Objects have experiences for
themselves;
that is, the mind-like quality is something internal to or inherent in
the
object. (2) There is a sense in which this experience is singular;
to
the extent that a structure of matter and energy that we call an object
is one
thing, this oneness is reflected in a kind of unitary mental
experience. (3) An
object is a particular configuration of mass/energy, and therefore any
configuration or system of mass/energy should qualify in the same
sense.6 Thus,
a functional definition of panpsychism might be “All objects, or
systems of
objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them.”
Such a
definition is useful while avoiding some of the more contentious (and
ambiguous) words that one finds in other definitions. (16)
Definitions of panpsychism are one source of
confusion; synonyms are another. The philosophical literature contains
a number
of terms that are related to panpsychism. These terms, in no particular
order,
are ‘animism’, ‘hylozoism’, ‘panbiotism’, ‘pansensism’, ‘pantheism’,
‘panentheism’,
and ‘panexperientialism’. (19)
[I]n 1982 the physicist Bohm posited that “in a
way,
nature is alive . . . all the way to the depths” (39).
2.1 Ancient Greece and the “Hylozoist”
Tradition—The
Pre-Socratics
In the context of the present discussion,
pre-Christian-era
Greece may be divided into three periods: that of the pre-Socratics,
that of
Plato and Aristotle, and that of the Hellenists. These groups of
thinkers had
unique and increasingly sophisticated perspectives on panpsychism.
Pre-Socratic
philosophy covered a range of roughly 200 years, from the emergence of
Thales’
philosophy (circa 600 BCE) to the death of Socrates (399 BCE). There
were a
dozen or so major philosophers1 from the Greek world in these two
centuries,
and we traditionally group them into these roughly chronological
subdivisions.
Milesians: Thales (625–545 BCE), Anaximander (610–540
BCE), Anaximenes (585–525
BCE)
Mystic: Pythagoras (570–495 BCE)
Eleatics: Parmenides (545–460 BCE), Zeno of Elea
(505–450 BCE), Heraclitus
(505–450 BCE)
Pluralists: Anaxagoras (500–428 BCE), Empedocles (495–435
BCE)
Atomists: Leucippus (485–425 BCE), Democritus (460–370
BCE)2
Perhaps with the exception of Anaximander and
Zeno,
all these men advanced ideas relevant to an inquiry into panpsychism.
All were,
to some degree, panpsychists.
What must be examined, though, is precisely
what
quality these ancient Greeks attributed to the basic substances of the
world.
The term ‘hylozoism’ indicates that this quality is life (zoe), but it
is not such a straightforward matter. In fact, to call them hylozoist
is
misleading; none of them actually used the word ‘zoe’ to
describe this mysterious quality of all matter.3 Thus, any reference to
this
notion of life or to the Greek conception of hylozoism must be
qualified. As is
elaborated below, the Greeks were more careful and precise in their
attribution
of a spiritual or mental quality to all matter, or to all substance.
The Milesians viewed the natural world as having three fundamental qualities:
(1) as a rational
order, governed by a logos, a system of
coherence and comprehensibility,
(2) as evolutionary, in the sense that things moved through the
world and
developed or changed over time, toward some kind of telos, or end,
and
(3) as inherently
animated.4
The rationality of their philosophy was
manifest as materialist monism—they each sought to reduce the plurality
of
things to a single underlying substance or entity. This single underlying substance had certain
characteristics, foremost of which was its capability
of producing the movement, life, and soul that were apparent in the
everyday
world. If
everything is one, and if that one yields spontaneity and life, then a
reasonable conclusion is that everything possesses these qualities to
some
degree. For the Milesians this was the most
compelling and intuitive
alternative. If one were to disagree, one would assume the burden of
proof to
show, at least, (a) why some things have life and other do not and (b)
how such
a phenomenon as life might plausibly emerge over the course of time.
Apparently
no one in ancient Greece argued for such a position. Hylozoism was
simply
accepted as a brute condition of reality. As Guthrie pointed out
(1962–1981,
volume 1: 145), “the union of matter and spirit in a material substance
. . .
is [for the Milesians] an assumption that raises no doubts and calls
for no
argument or defense.”
Consider Thales, who was widely known for his
panpsychist views. That he is also regarded as the first true Western
philosopher demonstrates something of the degree to which panpsychism
was an
integral part of the early Western worldview. Thales is best known for
his
theory of water as the cosmic arche, the fundamental principle underlying all
material
things. But there are two significant fragments on Thales, and they
give some
idea of his panpsychist leanings. Both fragments are found in
Aristotle’s De anima. First, we have the famous passage on the
lodestone (magnet):
. . . Thales, according to what is related of
him,
seems to have regarded the soul as something endowed with the power of
motion,
if indeed he said that the lodestone has a soul because it moves iron.
(405a19)
Here we have two distinct ideas: that the thing
called
‘soul’ is defined as that which moves or produces motion, and that the
lodestone itself has a soul because it can attract iron. In the
original Greek,
Aristotle (and presumably Thales) used the word ‘psyche’, commonly
translated
as soul. ‘Psyche’
has other meanings, though, including spirit, life, breath, and mind.
The
psyche was associated with the life energy of living things, with the
divine
animating spirit that produced motion in physical objects, and with the
activity of the mind. At this early stage in philosophy there was not
yet the
distinction between “having a soul,” “being alive,” and “possessing a
mind”;
all these were treated more or less as equivalent.5 To the
pre-Socratics,
psyche was virtually as much mind-like as it was soul-like. In the
first book
of De anima Aristotle takes pains to note that most
everyone
before him, through and including Plato, did not clearly distinguish
between
soul and mind (nous). For example, we find the following passage on
Democritus:
“Soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing.” (405a10) And
Anaxagoras
only “seems to distinguish between soul and mind, but in practice he
treats
them as a single substance” (405a13). From this perspective we can
propose a
more complete definition of ‘psyche’: the energy that animates and
produces
movement in all things, including the movement of thoughts and ideas.
Humans and animals possessed psyche, and in a
monist
universe anything else that demonstrated the qualities of “aliveness”
(e.g.
self-moving, or causing motion) possessed it too. The lodestone clearly
showed
that it had the power to move other metal objects, something that must
have
been a rather miraculous event to the ancients. And yet the lodestone
was
obviously in many ways just a rock like any other. That some rocks
exhibited greater
powers of psyche than others was comparable to the notion that humans
were just
animals of a certain type that exhibited distinctive noetic powers.
Apparently
Thales concluded that all things possessed psyche, to a greater or
lesser
degree. We see this clearly in the second major fragment: Certain
thinkers say
that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for
that
reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of
gods. (De anima, 411a7) Aristotle (again presumably following
Thales) used the word theon, which is translated as gods. The power of
psyche was seen as a
god-like, divine power, or perhaps as the power of the gods themselves.
There
are two possible explanations of Thales’ choice of this word: (1) It
may have
been a throwback to the mythological and pantheistic tradition of Homer
and Hesiod.
(2) It may have been merely a linguistic convention; perhaps it made
more sense
to him to say that “things are full of gods (theon)” than that “things are full of souls (psychein).”6 And even from the use of ‘psyche’ in
Aristotle’s sentence (“soul is
intermingled . . .”) one can see that “gods” and “souls” were seen as
roughly
equivalent, or at least intimately linked.
Furthermore, an essential quality of a god is
that it
is a single being, a unitary presence, with a singular sense of
identity and
personality. Contrasted with a relatively amorphous, diffused power
like
psyche, one may conclude that Thales believed that all things possessed
a
singular sense of identity, which was simultaneously of a mind-like
nature.
The essence of Thales’
argument for panpsychism is this: Material objects (humans,
animals, wind, sea, magnets, heavenly bodies) have the power of motion,
either
of themselves or with respect to surrounding things. The material objects we know most
intimately—our own
bodies—possess an energy, called ‘psyche’, that accounts for our power.
Under
the assumption that the world is rational and that humans are not
ontologically
unique, a reasonable conclusion is that all things possess some degree
of
motive power7 and hence some degree of the god-like psyche. This
argument makes
the case for panpsychism by appealing to
powers of a particular kind that are inherent in material objects, then
relies
on analogy with human experience. This Argument by Indwelling
Powers is the first of several arguments for
panpsychism that
we find throughout history.
----
Like Thales, Anaximenes[i]
argued for a
monist worldview, but with an underlying principle of air (pneuma).
The
word ‘pneuma’ has an interesting array of meanings that are strikingly
close to
those of ‘psyche’: Besides air, it also can mean breath, soul, spirit,
or mind.
Whereas the primary meaning of ‘psyche’ is mind/soul, the primary
meaning of
‘pneuma’ seems to be breath, as in “breath of life.” For Anaximenes,
the breath
of life was the living, animating principle of all things. This again
was a
logical conclusion. In every animal, breath equals life: no air, no
life; no
life, no breath. And air seems to be everywhere, as does motion, so it
is not
unreasonable to argue that pneuma is the underlying principle of the
cosmos.
Anaximenes offered a different kind of argument
for
panpsychism than Thales. He saw in air a principle of continuity
throughout all
things. If this principle can be argued to account for our soul/mind,
then a
similar manifestation is likely present everywhere. Let us call this
the Argument by Continuity. Panpsychism is a natural and logical position
to hold in a monistic
worldview; in fact, to be a monist and dispute the Continuity argument
demands
either an explanation of the unique emergence of mind (no small matter)
or a
denial of mind altogether. That the Continuity argument differs from
the
Indwelling Powers argument of Thales is clear: Thales makes no
connection
between panpsychism and his arche
of water, nor does water account for the
existence of soul; Anaximenes
fundamentally links his arche of air to mind/psyche. Both arguments, however, appeal to an analogy
with
basic human experiences of our own minds and selves.
Anaximenes also makes a kind of appeal to the
concept
of indwelling power. Air, in the form of soul, has a cohesive power in
the
world. It holds things together, animates them, and maintains their
existence
as discrete objects enduring over time. “As
our soul . . . being air, holds us together and controls us, so does
[breath]
and air enclose the whole world.” (Aetius I, 3, 4; in Kirk et
al. 1983:
158–159)
[…] Chronologically, the next major philosopher
after
the Milesians was the enigmatic Pythagoras. No
other philosopher had as much
influence on Greek society in general. He lectured on mathematics,
ethics,
health, and metaphysics. Yet, like Socrates, he apparently wrote
nothing. His
closest followers formed a secretive cult, so we have few directs on
him; most
of what is known is indirect and anecdotal. Cicero (ca. 50 BCE)
recounts that
Pythagoras “held that mind was present
and active throughout the whole universe, and that our minds were a
part of it”
(On the Nature of the Gods, I, 26–28). This
“divine mind,” or “pure spirit,” was seen as “infused and imprisoned in
the
world” (ibid.). Other reports attribute to Pythagoras the
view that everything is intelligent,
but this is
difficult to confirm with much certainty. It seems clear that he held
to a mystic, pan-spiritual view of the
universe,
so it is likely that he held some variation of panpsychist philosophy.
[i] In Plato's Timaeus (55d) speaking about air, Plato mentions that
"there is the most translucent kind which is called by the name of
aether
(αίθηρ)". Aristotle, who had beenPlato's student at the Akademia, disagreed with his former mentor and added aether to the
system of the classical elements of Ionian philosophy as
the "fifth element", He noted that the four terrestrial classical elements were
subject to change and naturally moved linearly. Aether however, located
in the
celestial regions and heavenly bodies, moved circularly. In Aristotle's
system
of classical elements, aether
had none of the qualities the terrestrial classical elements had.
Aether was neither hot nor cold, neither wet nor dry. Aether did not
follow Aristotelian physics either. Aether was also incapable of motion of
quality
or motion of quantity. Aether was only capable of local motion. Aether
naturally
moved in circles, and had no contrary, or unnatural, motion.[4] Aristotle also noted that crystalline spheres made of
aether
held the celestial bodies. The idea of crystalline spheres and natural
circular
motion of aether led to Aristotle's explanation of the observed orbits of stars
and
planets in perfectly circular motion in crystalline aether.
Medieval
scholastic philosophers granted aether changes
of density, in which the
bodies of the planets were considered to be more dense than the medium
which
filled the rest of the universe.[5] Robert Fludd stated
that the aether was of the character that it was "subtler than
light". Fludd cites the 3rd-century view of Plotinus, concerning the aether as penetrative and
non-material.[6]
The
tetractys is one of the symbols in sacred geometry that is made very
interesting by its complex layers of meaning. It is a design
that is very
mathematical in structure and yet holds mystical significance among the
Pythagoreans and the followers of the Kabbalah.
Basically, the tetractys is a triangle composed of ten points rising
upward. The Greek philosopher and
mathematician Pythagoras once called the tetractys the
symbol of the musical, arithmetic and geometric ratios upon which
the universe is built. For Pythagoras and his
followers, each line of
the tetractys holds these meanings:
·
First row. The first row is made of a single
point.
This point is the divine dimension from which everything is
created.
Because of the nature of this point, it is usually associated with the
virtue
of wisdom.
·
Second row. The second row is a line connecting
two points
and signifies the first dimension. For the Pythagoreans, the
second row
represents “Neikos” or Strife. Strife is the power of
division and is
often associated with the virtues of movement and impulse.
Movement and
impulse, in turn, gives birth to courage and strength.
·
Third row. The third row is a line connecting
three
points. It is a representation of the second dimension and of
“Philotes”
or Harmony. Harmony is the marriage of physical beauty and
mental
balance.
·
Fourth row. The four points connected in the
fourth row
indicates the four elements of the ancient world: earth, air, fire and
water.
Pythagoreans used to swear
upon the tetractys in their hopes of attaining purity of mind and
harnessing
its power.
Relation to Kaballah…
http://www.ka-gold-jewelry.com/p-articles/tetractis.php
1. the first
row represented zero-dimensions (a point)
2. the
second row represented one-dimension (a line of two
points)
3. the third
row represented two-dimensions (a plane defined
by a triangle of three
points)
4. the
fourth row represented three-dimensions (a tetrahedron defined
by four points)
http://www.slideshare.net/virajoshi/sacred-geometry-7798937
**************************************************************************************************
TETRAKTIS
DRAGON TRIANGLE BOOK OF SAINT GERMAIN
A Treasurehouse of Lore
http://trianglebook.weebly.com/
The music system of Pythagoras was based on the
Tetraktys
The Quadrivium was first formulated and taught by Pythagoras
as the
Tetraktys around 500 BC…it arises out of the most revered of all
subjects.
Number. The first of these disciplines we call Arithmetic. The second
is
Geometry or the order of space as Number in Space. The third is Harmony
which
for Plato meant Number in Time. The fourth is Astronomy or Number in
Space and
Time.
********************************************
http://soundpossibilities.wordpress.com/2010/12/13/tetraktys-in-seed-of-life/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAukInaCgas
Platonic Forms à relation to elements…
*******************************************************
PANPSYCHISM IN THE WEST à
MOVE TO PARMENIDES…
Parmenides argued ingeniously that only Being is possible and therefore only Being
exists. Furthermore, since change represents the coming into being
of some thing or state that did not previously exist, and this is impossible
(because “only Being exists”), change is impossible. Rather, what appears to be
change is an illusion. This was a radical view; it contradicted the widely held
belief that motion was a central characteristic of the world.
Also, since “thought” was acknowledged by Parmenides
to be an undeniable aspect of reality, it followed that thought, or mind, must be an essential aspect
of Being. The otherwise homogeneous and unchanging Being has this
unique, positive property, which apparently is unlike any other conceivable
property of existence (since no others are held in the same standing as
“thought”). Parmenides concludes, then, not only that Being “has” thought but
that Being is thought. There are two central fragments that explicitly make
this claim, and both are subject to an unusually wide range of interpretations
and translations. The first is fragment 3, transliterated from the Greek as “To gar auto noein estin te kai einai.” Among many translations, one finds the following:
For it is the same
thing to think and to be. (Freeman 1948: 42)
For thought and being
are the same thing. (Smith 1934: 15)
What is . . . is
identical with the thought that recognizes it. (Lloyd 1959: 327)
For thinking and being
is the same. (Cleve 1969: 528)
For the same things
can be thought of and can be. (Barnes 1987: 132)
At issue, clearly, is the meaning of the idea that
“thought is identical with being.” This concept potentially has a double
implication: that all thoughts constitute being and that all things that can be
said to think. The latter meaning has an implicit panpsychist interpretation.
Yet it is not clear that things in themselves are “thinking things,” if for no
other reason than that in Parmenides’ worldview there are not really distinct
individual objects but only a monistic one Being. If all things, as a whole,
think, then such a view would constitute a kind of pan-noetic
ontology—something like a pantheism, or world-soul, but without personality,
just pure thought. This is arguably not panpsychism, which, as defined in
chapter 1, requires things individually to possess mind. Parmenides’ intentions
on this point are vague.
The second fragment continues the same line of
thinking, though with equally ambiguous results: “Tauton d’ esti noein te kai ounechen esti noema.” (fragment 8, line 34) Here we find no direct
mention of ‘being’ (einai) but instead a focus on noein (thinking) and noema
(thought or consciousness). The identification is
made between thinking and the object of thought:
To think is the same
as the thought that It Is. (Freeman 1948: 44)
Therefore thinking,
and that by reason of which thought exists, are one and the same thing. (Smith
1934: 16–17)
Thinking and the
object of thought are the same. (Cleve 1969: 537)
The same thing are
thinking and a thought that it is. (Barnes 1987: 135)
Cleve is sensitive to the panpsychist implications in
these two fragments. He observes that Being, though technically unextended and
incorporeal, is yet permeated by thought: “. . . being itself . . . is inextensive incorporeal thinking that is present whole
and undivided in each and every part of seeming space” (1969: 536). He adds that “the only being is consciousness, noema, that,
however, must not be split into act of thinking and content of thinking”
(ibid.: 537). Thus, it seems clear that thought permeates Being, that anything
that exists must also be said to be identical with thought. Since the
metaphysical status of distinct things is not clear, we cannot determine the
degree to which Parmenides’ view is true panpsychism. Yet, in view of the
“hylozoist” milieu into which he was born, one certainly cannot rule out a
panpsychist interpretation. Parmenides’
notion that thought is identical to being anticipates the discussion in Sophist
in which Plato puts
forth a similar view: that (the Form of) Being possesses the qualities of
“life, mind, and soul.” Plato, as
we know, held Parmenides in high regard, and thus it is not surprising to find
elements of his ontology.
In opposition to Parmenides’ static world of pure
Being, Heraclitus
conceived a worldview in which change and motion were the essential reality.In
a fitting manner, fire became his arche. To the ancient Greeks fire was a form of pure energy, and it is
interesting that Heraclitus developed an energeticist worldview 2,300 years
before it became the fashion in physics.
Fire, like the pneuma of
Anaximenes, was associated with life-energy. Significantly, Heraclitus referred to this fire not
merely as pyr but as pyr aeizoon—ever-living
fire. Consequently, this spiritual life-energy was seen as responsible for
creating and sustaining everything. Diogenes Laertius reported in his Lives of the Philosophers (ca. third century CE) that Heraclitus held to the
view that “all
things are full of souls and spirits” (IX: 5–12). Again, ensoulment
is universal and equated with motion and change.
More specifically, the pyr aeizoon possessed
a kind of intelligence or cognitive ability. In the only directly relevant fragment, Heraclitus
says that thinking
is “common to all” (fragment 113; Barnes 1987: 109). Heraclitus evidently
followed the logic of his predecessors in believing that in a monist cosmos
intelligent spirit or life must exist in all things. Here we have a combination
of the Indwelling Powers argument (in the energy of the pyr aeizoon) and the Continuity argument (pyr in all
things).
[Empedocles,] more than any other pre-Socratic,
made panpsychism central to his worldview. Guthrie states that “it was in fact
fundamental to Empedocles’ whole system that there is no distinction between
animate and inanimate, and everything has some degree of awareness and power of
discrimination” (1962–1981, volume 2: 233). The mere fact that Empedocles chose
Love and Strife as his two central forces indicates his belief that animate
powers were at work in the cosmos.
Further evidence of Empedocles’ panpsychism is found
primarily in three fragments.
Fragment 103, in transliterated Greek, reads “tede men oun ioteti tyches pephroneken apanta.”
Smith (1934: 31) translates this as “In this way, by the good favour of Tyche, all things have power of thought.” Barnes (1987:
178) translates it more literally: “Thus by the will of chance all things
think.” This is an advance in philosophical reasoning; earlier philosophers’
references to gods, souls, or spirit are replaced by an ability, a power, in all things: the power to think. This power is granted by tyches, interpreted either as the god Tyche or (more likely) as simply the
process of chance, or rather luck. Empedocles is saying, in effect, “By good
fortune, all things are able to think.”
The second important passage is from Aristotle:
“Empedocles [says that the soul] is composed of all the elements and that each of
them actually is a soul.” (De anima 404b11) The two ideas here are (1) that souls (psychein) are material
and composite and (2) that each element, in itself, is ensouled. Clearly, if
each element is a soul, and if these elements constitute the whole world, then
all things are souls or soul-like. Empedocles thus seems to use ‘psyche’ as a
synonym of ‘mind’, but not as involved with the power of motion. Movement comes
from the forces of Love and Strife, which, although animate, apparently are not
psychein.9
Third, we have this striking fragment, recorded in
Hippolytus’ Refutation of
All Heresies (ca. 210 CE):
If thou shouldst plant
these things in thy firm understanding and contemplate them with good will and
unclouded attention, they will stand by thee for ever every one, and thou shalt
gain many other things from them; . . . for know that all things have wisdom and a portion of
thought. (fragment 110; Guthrie, volume 2, p. 230)
The final phrase—“panta gar isthi phronesin echein kai nomatos aisan”—is, as usual, subject to varying translations. For
example: “For know that they all have thought and a share of mind.” (Barnes
1987: 163) “Do not forget, all things have mind and a share in cognition.”
(Cleve 1969: 369) Freeman (1948: 64) translates phronesin as intelligence. In any case, we find here a poetic
passage that is at once beautiful and insightful. Empedocles is indicating that
a particular method of thinking, a way of approaching the world in a
sympathetic fashion (“with good will”), will yield abundant fruit. He is clearly
advocating a way of thinking about things with clarity and compassion,
centered on the idea that, like ourselves, “all things
have wisdom.”
Panpsychism is seen as the path to true and lasting
insight.
Empedocles thus relies on two variations of earlier arguments for panpsychism, and introduces a new, third argument. First he employs the Indwelling Powers argument by claiming that everything has the power of thought. This of course is a different power than motion, but it is taken as equally real and equally demanding of explanation. Second, he uses the Continuity argument in a pluralistic fashion, appealing to inherent soul nature of the four elements that constitute all things. Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, mind is clearly an inherent part of his cosmic system, and as such it constitutes a kind of “first principle” (metaphysically speaking). Thus, we may designate this as the First Principles argument for panpsychism. Mind is not derivative or incidental, but central and primary. This was also the case for Anaxagoras, but because the status of his panpsychism is in doubt we may better attribute it directly to Empedocles.