The following are excerpts from the books cited below. Only a few primary sources are mentioned here, and the rest is in the books themselves.

Dunn, Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis. Praeger Publishers.1994
Dunn, Walter S. Kursk. Praeger Publishers.1997

“After Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Hitler had assumed or may have known positively, that there would be no second front in 1943. The Germans stripped their armies in France to the bone. Hitler had reinforced the 5th Panzer Army in Tunisia in late 1942 to delay Western power’s efforts in the Mediterranean, but in May 1943 he abandoned Sicily, leaving only a few German divisions newly formed from replacement battalions. Italy eventually received training divisions bearing the numbers of divisions that had been destroyed at Stalingrad. France had only occupation divisions armed with captured weapons and little transport and reserve divisions made up of replacement training battalions. Practically all of the German combat-worthy divisions moved to the Eastern Front in early 1943.” (Dunn Nemesis 142)

“Of the tanks damaged by enemy action, the Russians sent 10% to army or front workshops for repair and 15% to the rear for rebuilding in factories.” (Dunn Nemesis 154)

"A report in 1944 stated that of tanks hit by the Germans, 75% were a total loss, 10% could be repaired at the front, and 15% went to factories to be rebuilt." (Dunn Nemesis 163)

"The British and Americans sent 14, 430 tanks to the Soviet Union, making up a considerable portion of Soviet tank strength, about 14%. The Americans sent 1,676 light tanks, 1,386 Grants, 2,007 Shermans with the 75mm gun, and 2,095 with the 76mm gun to the Russians. The British sent 3,782 Valentines and 1,084 Matildas. The Canadians also sent 1,400 Valentines. The rate of delivery varied. In 1942, 4,500 tanks were delivered - 2,000 U.S. and 2,500 British. In 1943 the total dropped to 3,650. The remaining 6,000 were delivered in 1944 and 1945." (Dunn Nemesis 158)

"Of the 22,000 tanks in the Red Army in 1941, 44% required rebuilding and 29% required replacement of a major component such as an engine or a transmission." (Dunn Nemesis 162)
That leaves 27% of the total - 5940 tanks battle ready - now need to find out how many of these were available to fight the Germans.

"The heaviest losses had occurred in the early years when the Germans were advancing rapidly and the Soviets could not salvage damaged tanks.
Once the Russians began to advance, the battlefields remained in their possession and they could salvage tanks. At the same time the Germans were denied this advantage." (Dunn Nemesis 165)

"These examples provided concrete evidence that although the Red Army had suffered serious losses at the Battle of Kursk and in the following offensives, there were good reserves of weapons to replace losses and a functioning replacement system for men. Soviet production was increasing rapidly in the summer of 1943. Not only were the losses at Kursk quickly replaced, but the armored formations became stronger. The German panzer forces never regained the level of July 1943, but Soviet tank production replaced losses and built reserves." (Dunn Nemesis 144)

"The heavy Russian losses in 1942 resulted from the overwhelming defeat of the Red Army tank forces at Izyum and in the Don Basin battles. The heavy Soviet losses included not only tanks destroyed by German fire but also tanks that had run out of fuel. (Or mechanical) The Germans lost fewer tanks in the same period because the Germans retained control of the battlefields. The Russians lost tanks that were immobilized by light damage or lack of fuel while the Germans were able to recover and repair even heavily damaged tanks. The Germans began with 4,362 in January 1942, produced 6, 189 during the year, and ended the year with 3,383 with an apparent loss of 7,446, although the published figure was 7,168. The average number of German losses was about 600 per month. According to one report, in the months of March through October 1942 the Germans lost only 1,693 tanks to enemy action. During this period the Germans controlled the battlefields and lost about 200 tanks per month. In early months of the year and in the final months, the Russians controlled the battlefields after the actions. The Germans losses were much greater and they apparently lost over 1,400 tanks per month." (Dunn Nemesis 152)

"The Germans usually held the battlefields at the end of each day as the Russians were being forced back by the initial onslaught. The German salvage crews were able to pick up slightly damaged tanks on the field during the night, while the Russians rescued damaged tanks only with great difficulty. After July 15, the positions were reversed, and German tank losses escalated." (Dunn Kursk 167)

"The Russians lost more tanks than the Germans because immobilized Soviet tanks fell into the hands of the advancing Germans even with only minor damage. The German order to blow up these immobilized tanks when the retreat began was revealing. Minor damage to German tanks was quickly repaired because the German repair crews had worked ont he German-held battlefield after almost every engagement. When the Germans were driven back by the Soviet offensives that followed, German tank losses escalated rapidly, while Soviet tank losses leveled off." (Dunn Kursk 189)

"When Manstein stated that the Soviet reserves were beaten, he was careful to modify the term reserves, first as operational, 'operativen,' and later as available, 'greifbaren.'" (Dunn Kursk 190)

"The major battle was fought on July 12, southwest of the town of Prokhorovka. It was not a battle with tanks charging on one huge field, but rather a series of attacks and counterattacks across a stretch of countryside ranging in an arc about 20 km wide south and west of Prokhorovka, from the village of Ivanovka on the south to the south bank of the Psel River on the north. The weather was cloudy with some heavy rain (so much for the clouds of dust mentioned in several accounts), which made the roads impassable for wheeled vehicles. The inability to move would add to the difficulties of the German forces on this crucial day." (Dunn Kursk 154)

"The Russians estimated that the three divisions had 500 tanks including 100 Tigers and Ferdinands, but this number is unlikely as the corps began the campaign with only 456 tanks and 137 assault guns, including only 35 Tigers. However, there were forty-five Tigers assigned to the 10th Panzer Brigade, which had been formed on June 23, 1943, just before the Kursk offensive began. The brigade was apparently a training units for new Tigers and their crews, rather than a combat unit. The sources do not mention the involvement of the 10th Panzer Brigade in the fighting, but the Tiger battalion of the brigade could have been brought up to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 11, which would have raised its strength to over seventy Tigers. All of the Ferdinands were on the north face with the 9th Army and could not have been involved at Prokhorovka. Given the attrition of the previous seven days, the combined strength of the 2nd SS Corps was probably much less that 400 operational tanks and assault guns including 70 Tigers." (Dunn Kursk 154)
Original sources:
G. A. Koltunov, Kurskaya Bitva p. 167; Ivan Parotkin, ed., The Battle of Kursk, p. 104; Silvester Stadler, Die Offensive Gegen Kursk, p. 34; Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1933-1945 vol. III, p. 221.

"For the period from July 5 to July 17, the 2nd SS Corps claimed 1, 149 Soviet tanks destroyed and 18 captured, 85 aircraft shot down, 459 antitank guns, 4, 262 Russians killed, 6, 441 prisoners, and 561 deserters. The 48th Panzer Corps claimed about 500 Soviet tanks destroyed, for a total of over 1, 650 tanks, not including tanks lost to Army Detachment Kempf. Many of the tanks claimed as destroyed were only damaged and probably returned to action, because the total number of Soviet tanks in the Voronezh Front facing the 4th Panzer Army on July 5 was only 1,657 tanks and 42 SUs. The 5th Guards Tank Army and other tank units from the Steppe Front entered the battle later and suffered far fewer losses. If we accept the Germans' claims of destroyed tanks, there would have been nothing left of the 1st Guards Tank Army and other tank units in the Voronezh Front, and that was obviously not true. On August 7, 1943, the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 2, 319 tanks compared to 3, 173 on July 5. The Russians probably lost about 1,000 tanks during the Kursk battle and more in the two weeks that followed. However, many of the losses were replaced with tanks arriving from the depots." (Dunn Kursk 166)

"Hitler did not cancel the offensive at Kursk primarily because of the invasion of Sicily. Only one German division, the 1st Parachute Division from France, was sent to Sicily after the invasion to reinforce the four German divisions being reconstructed from fragments of divisions that had not been able to reach their parent formations in Tunisia and some replacement battalions. Other divisions in France continued to flow to Russia in July and August of 1943." (Dunn Kursk 191)

"Although German tank losses were minimal considering the intensity of the battle, the cost in infantry was high. The three SS divisions lost 20,000 killed, wounded, and missing, mainly in the panzer grenadier companies. There were 120 panzer grenadier companies with about 200 men each in three divisions for a total strength of about 24,000 men. Given the number of losses, these companies were likely mere shadows by the battle's end on July 12, as the SS infantry was repeatedly left to defend itself from the Soviet tank supported counterattacks. Without the panzer grenadiers, the SS tanks could not hold ground as indicated several times late in the battle when the SS tanks withdrew several km in the evening to a more defensible area for the night, leaving the battlefield to the Russians." (Dunn Kursk 188)

"The Russians lost more tanks than the Germans because immobilized Soviet tanks fell into the hands of the advancing Germans even with only minor damage. The German order to blow up these immobilized tanks when the retreat began was revealing. Minor damage to German tanks was quickly repaired because the German repair crews had worked on the German-held battlefield after almost every engagement. When the Germans were driven back by the Soviet offensives that followed, German tank losses escalated rapidly, while Soviet tank losses leveled off." (Dunn Kursk 189)

"In fact, only one German SS division left the east, along with the headquarters of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. As Hitler stated, the SS units were sent to Italy for political purposes, hoping the SS soldiers would infuse some spirit in the Italian Fascists. The Sicily operation did worry Hitler, however, as well as the threat in August of Italian defection, and he ordered the transfer in August of skeleton reforming divisions from France to deceive the Italians that there was a creditable German presence in northern Italy." (Dunn Kursk 191)

"The Germans failed to win the battle because they did not achieve their objective (they did not close the pocket). The Germans did not lose because the panzer divisions emerged from the battle weakened but still powerful enough to play a major role in delaying the Russian offensives that followed.
The Russians did not lose the battle; they prevented the Germans from closing the pocket. The Russians did not achieve a great victory by destroying the German divisions and driving them from the field of battle. Instead, having suffered heavy losses themselves, the Russians did little to harass the retreating Germans until a new Soviet offensive was launched in August 1943." (Dunn Kursk 191)