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On 26 December 1971, the then President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up the War Inquiry Commission. Its brief was to “inquire into the circumstances in which the commander, Eastern Command, surrendered, and the members of the armed forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms”.
Headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman, the other two members of the Commission were Justice S. Anwarul Haq, of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and Justice Tufail Ali Abdur Rahman, Chief Justice of Sind and Baluchistan, its military adviser Lt Gen (retd) Altaf Qadir.
During its secret inquiries, the Commission examined nearly 300 witnesses, mostly Pakistani officers. A provisional report was submitted in July 1972, awaiting witnesses who were in Indian custody. The final report was finished on October 23, 1974.
It was in effect Pakistan’s truth commission, a searching examination of the Pakistani army's role in splintering that country. The report of course dwelt on India's covert and overt role in supporting the East Pakistan freedom movement and the final Indian military push to capture Dhaka in the winter of 1971.
But because of its scathing, explosive indictments of the military establishment—the Commission went into details of war atrocities, command failures and recommended court-martials and public trials for most of the top generals involved—the report was never released. It became the subject of intense speculation in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, with frequent demands made for its release to this day. Instead all copies were ordered destroyed, supposedly by former Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Here finally, after 28 years, is a copy of the elusive, explosive report.
The Hamoodur Rahman Report
This is a story not told in Pakistan. A secret inquiry into the splintering of Pakistan in 1971 held army atrocities, widespread corruption, cowardice, even loose morals, among its generals in East Pakistan as prime reasons in losing the war. The Hamoodur Rahman report, has never seen the light of day—until now
Pakistan probes leak of 1971 War Report to NEWS TODAY
As the Pakistan government tries to find out how the Hamoodur Rahman Report on Pakistan's surrender in Dhaka in 1971 reached INDIA TODAY GROUP ONLINE, its authenticity is confirmed by former Pakistani generals.THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT
Introduction
Cabinet note
Press release
Chapter 1: The moral aspect
Chapter 2: Alleged atrocities by the Pakistan Army
Chapter 3: Professional responsibility of certain Senior Army Commanders
Chapter 4: Conclusions
Chapter 5: Recommendation
Annexure: The sequence of the signals
THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT ANALYSED

THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT
Introduction

REASONS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, 1971 to inquire into and find out "the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern command, surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." After having examined 213 witnesses the Commission submitted its report in July 1972. 2. Before we submitted that report of necessity we did not have the evidence of most of the persons taken as prisoners of war, including the major personalities, who played a part in the final events culminating in the surrender in East Pakistan with the exception only of Major General Rahim. Although we did our best to reconstruct the East Pakistan story with the help of such material, as was then available, inevitably our conclusions had to be of a tentative character. We also felt that since we had found reasons adversely to comment upon the performance of some of the major figures involved it would have been unfair to pass any final judgment upon them without giving them an opportunity of explaining their own view point. For this reason we said that "our observations and conclusions regarding the surrender in East Pakistan and other allied matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to modification in the light of the evidence of the Commander, Eastern Command, and his senior officers as and when such evidence becomes available." (Page 242 of the Main Report). Commission Reactivated 3. Accordingly, after the prisoners of war and the civil personnel who had also been interned with the military personnel in India returned to Pakistan, the Federal government issued a notification directing "that the Commission shall start inquiry at a place and on a date to be fixed by it and complete the inquiry and submit its report to the President of Pakistan, with its findings as to the matters aforesaid, within a period of two months commencing from the date the commission starts functioning." A copy of this notification is annexed as Annexure A to this Chapter. Lt. Gen.(Retd.) Altaf Qadir, who had also previously acted as Military Adviser to the Commission, was re-appointed as such as also was Mr. M.A Latif as Secretary to the Commission. At the request of the commission the government also appointed Col. M.A Hassan as Legal Advisor. 4. The commission issued a Press Release on the 1st June, 1974 offering an opportunity to the prisoners of War and others repatriated from East Pakistan to furnish such information as might be within their knowledge and relevant to the purposes of the Commission. A copy of this Press Release is in Annexure B to this Chapter. Proceedings 5. Commission held an informal meeting at Lahore on the 3rd June, 1974 to consider various preliminary matters and then decided to resume proceedings at Abbottabad from the 16th July, 1974. In the meantime a number of questionnaires were issued to various persons, including those who were at the helm of affairs in East Pakistan, at the relevant time and others whom we considered likely to have relevant knowledge. Statements were also sent from members of armed forces, civil services and the police services involved and we then proceeded after scrutiny of these statements to summon the witnesses. We recorded evidence of as many as 72 persons and these included particularly Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, Commander Eastern Command, Major Generals Farman Ali, Jamshed ad the generals who held during the relevant time commands of divisions, Rear Admiral Sharif, who was the senior most Naval Officer, Air Commodore Inam the senior most Air Officer, and civilian personnel, including the then Chief Secretary Mr. Muzaffar Hussain and the Inspector General of Police Mr. Mahmood Ali Chaudhry. Besides, Maj. Gen. Rahim was reexamined. The only exception which was unavoidable was that Dr. Malik who till very nearly the end was the Governor of East Pakistan, but in his case also we had firsthand evidence of every important event and we, therefore, now feel ourselves competent to submit our final conclusions.

Cabinet note

THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT : ANNEXURE

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN CABINET SECRETARIAT (Cabinet Division) Rawalpindi, the 25th May, 1974 No. 107/19/74-Min -Whereas the Commission of Inquiry appointed under the late Ministry of Presidential Affairs Notification No. 632 (1)/71, dated the 26th December, 1971, had, in its report of 8th July, 1972, submitted, inter alia, that the Commission's findings with regard to the courses of events in East Pakistan were only tentative and recommended that "as and when the Commander Eastern Command and other senior officers now prisoners of war in India are available, a further Inquiry should be held into the circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan"; AND WHEREAS all the prisoners of war and civil internees have now returned to Pakistan; AND WHEREAS the Federal Government is of the opinion that it is necessary in the light of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry to finalise the said inquiry as to the circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan, after examining any of the said prisoners of war and civil internees whose examination is considered necessary by the Commission; Now, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (I) of Section 3 o the Pakistan Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1956 (VI of 1956) the federal government is pleased to direct that the commission shall start inquiry at a place and on a date to be fixed by it and complete the inquiry and submit its report to the President of Pakistan, with its findings as to the matter aforesaid, within a period of two months commencing from the date the Commission starts functioning. Sd/ VAQAR AHMAD Cabinet Secretary.

Press release
THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT : ANNEXURE

Lahore, the 1st June, 1974 PRESS RELEASE The War Inquiry Commission which has been asked by the government of Pakistan to resume its deliberations and submit a final report was appointed by the then President of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on the 26th December, 1971 to enquire into the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern Command surrendered and the members of the armed forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission is headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The other two members of the Commission are Mr. Justice S. Anwarul Haq, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan and Mr. Justice Tufaif Ali Abdur Rahman, Chief Justice of Sid and Baluchistan High Court. Lt. Gen (Rtd) Altaf Qadir and Mr. M.A Latif, Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan are Military Adviser and Secretary of the Commission, respectively. The Commission which had started its proceedings in camera in Rawalpindi on the 1st February, 1972 recorded evidence of 213 witnesses. It had submitted its report to the then President of Pakistan on the 12th July, 1972. In the Report the Commission had observed that its findings with regard to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan were only tentative. It, therefore, recommended that as and when the Commander, Eastern Command and other senior officers who were in India at that time were available, a further inquiry should be held into the circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan. Now that all the prisoners of war and civil internees have returned to Pakistan, the Government has asked the Commission to complete this part of its inquiry. A temporary office of the Commission has been set up for the present in the Supreme Court building at Lahore and the Commission has decided that before commencing its proceeding a place to be announced later on the members of the public civil services and the armed forces who were either prisoners of war in India or were otherwise repatriated from East Pakistan should be given an opportunity to furnish to the commission such relevant information as may be within their knowledge relating to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan. This information should be submitted in writing, preferably 5 copies, as briefly as possible by the 30th June, 1974 at the latest to the Secretary of the Inquiry Commission care of Supreme Court of Pakistan, Lahore. The informant should also state whether he will be willing to appear before the Commission. All such information and particulars of the persons given the information will be strictly confidential. It may be mentioned that according to a public announcement of the Government of Pakistan published in newspapers on the 11th January, 1972 all proceedings before the Commission would be in camera and the statements made before and addressed to it would be absolutely privileged and would not render a person making any such statement liable to any civil or criminal proceedings except when such statement is false. The Commission is empowered to call before it any citizen of Pakistan to seek information. The Commission can if necessary even issue warrants to secure the attendance of any person unless he is otherwise exempted by law from personal appearance before a Court. The serving personnel of defence services who are willing to give evidence before the Commission should have no apprehension of victimization for assisting the Commission in its task.

The moral aspect
T THE MORAL ASPECT Introductory In Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report, we have dealt at some length with the moral aspect of the causes of our defeat in the 1971 War. This became necessary in view of the vehement assertions made before the Commission by a large number of respectable witnesses drawn from various sections of society, including highly placed and responsible Service Officers, to the effect that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior Army Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war. It was asserted by these witnesses that men given to a disreputable way of life could hardly be expected to lead the Pakistan Army to victory. 2. After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Armed Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, and that there was indeed substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership. 3. We then offered specific comments on the conduct of certain high officers including the Commander, Eastern Command, Lt. Gen A.A.K. Niazi. However, we observed, in Paragraph 35 of that Chapter, that "as we have not had the opportunity of putting these allegations to Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi any finding in this behalf must await his return from India where he is at present held as a prisoner of war". We have now examined not only Lt. Gen. Niazi but certain other witnesses as well in relation to his personal conduct, and the general allegations made against the Pakistan Army during its operations in the former East Pakistan, and are accordingly in a position to formulate our final conclusions in the matter. Effect of Martial Law Duties 4. In the situation that developed after the military action of the 25th of March 1971, the civil administration in East Pakistan practically came to a standstill, and the burden of running the Province fell heavily upon the Army Officers. Their involvement in civil administration continued unabated even after the induction of a sizable number of senior civil servants from West Pakistan, including the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and at least two Division Commissioners. 5. According to the Inspector General of Police, Mr. M.A.K Chaudhry (Witness No. 219), "after the disturbances of March-April 1971, there was a Military Governor with a Major General as his adviser at the head of the civil administration. There was a parallel Martial Law administration at all levels. All wings of administration, relating to law and order were under the control of Martial Law Authorities. A West Pakistan Deputy Inspector General of Police in the field was not permitted by the local Martial Law Authorities to come to the Provincial Headquarters" for a conference with the Inspector General of Police. In the view of Syed Alamdar Raza (Witness No. 226), Commissioner of Dacca Division, "efforts were made to make civilian officers responsible or at least routine matters within the general supervision and control of the Army Officers, but no substantial results could be achieved. Those Bengali Officers who had been restored lacked confidence and were not sure if their loyalties were not suspected. Action was taken against them, even their arrests were ordered without any body knowing about it, including their superiors or the Government of East Pakistan."

Alleged atrocities by the Pakistan Army

Alleged atrocities by the Pakistan Army As is well-known, the conduct of the Pakistani army, while engaged in counter-insurgency measures is East Pakistan since March 1971, has come in for a lot of criticism from several quarters. We had occasion to deal with the subject in Paragraphs 5-8 of Chapter II of Part V of the main report. We have examined this question further in the light of fresh evidence recorded by us. Misdeeds of the Awami League Militants: 2. It is necessary that this painful chapter of the events in East Pakistan be looked at in its proper perspective. Let it not be forgotten that the initiative in resorting to violence and cruelty was taken by the militants of the Awami League, during the month of March, 1971, following General Yahya Khan's announcement of the Ist of March regarding the postponement of the session of the National Assembly scheduled for the 3rd of March 1971. It will be recalled that from the 1st of March to the 3rd of March 1971, the Awami League had taken complete control of East Pakistan, paralysing the authority of the federal government. There is reliable evidence to show that during this period the miscreants indulged in large scale massacres and rape against pro-Pakistan elements, in the towns of Dacca, Narayanganj, Chittagong, Chandragona, Rungamati, Khulna, Dinajpur, Dhakargaoa, Kushtia, Ishuali, Noakhali, sylhet, Maulvi Bazaar, Rangpur, Saidpur, Jessore, Barisal, Mymensingh, Rajshal??, Pabna, Sirojgonj, Comilla, Brahman, Baria, Bogra, Naugaon, Santapur and several other smaller places. 3. Harrowing tales of these atrocities were narrated by the large number of West Pakistanis and Biharis who were able to escape from these places and reach the safety of West Pakistan. For days on end, all through the troubled month of March 1971, swarms of terrorised non-Bengalis lay at the Army-controlled Dacca airport awaiting their turn to be taken to the safety of West Pakistan. Families of West Pakistani officers and other ranks serving with East Bengal units were subjected to inhuman treatment, and a large number of West Pakistani officers were butchered by the erstwhile Bengali colleagues. 4. These atrocities were completely blacked out at the time by the Government of Pakistan for fear of retaliation by the Bengalis living in West Pakistan. The Federal Government did issue a White Paper in this behalf in August 1971, but unfortunately it did not create much impact for the reason that it was highly belated, and adequate publicity was not given to it in the national and international press. 5. However, recently, a renowned journalist of high-standing, Mr Qutubuddin Aziz, has taken pains to marshal the evidence in a publication called "Blood and Tears". The book contains the harrowing tales of inhuman crimes committed on the helpless Biharis, West Pakistanis and patriotic Bengalis living in East Pakistan during that period. According to various estimates mentioned by Mr. Qutubuddin Aziz, between 100,000 and 500,000 persons were slaughtered during this period by the Awami League militants. 6. As far as we can judge, Mr Qutubuddin Aziz has made use of authentic personal accounts furnished by the repatriates whose families, have actually suffered at the hands of the Awami League militants. He has also extensively referred to the contemporary accounts of foreign correspondents then stationed in East Pakistan. The plight of the non-Bengali elements still living in Bangladesh and the insistence of that Government on their large-scale repatriation to Pakistan, are factors which appear to confirm the correctness of the allegations made against the Awami League in this behalf.

Professional responsibility of certain Senior Army Commanders

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CERTAIN SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS In Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Part 5 of the main report we have dealt with the moral and disciplinary aspects of tee events and causes leading to the defeat of the Pakistan Army in the 1971 war, and have also touched upon the individual responsibility of certain senior officers. In the preceding two chapters of the Supplementary Report, we have offered further observations on these aspects and have commented upon the conduct of certain Army Officers posted in East Pakistan. There, however, still remains the question of determining whether any disciplinary action is called for against certain senior army commanders for their failings in the discharge of their professional duties in the conduct ad prosecution of the war in East Pakistan. Nature of Disciplinary Action 2. In view of the glaring weaknesses and negligence displayed by some of the senior officers operating in East Pakistan, we have anxiously considered the nature of the disciplinary action required in the case. We find that there are several provisions in the the Pakistan Army Act 1952 having a direct bearing on this matter. In the first place, there is section 24 which is in the following terms:- "24. Offences in relation to enemy and punishable with death. Any person to this Act who commits any of the following offenses, that is to say,- (a) Shamefully abandons or delivers up any garrison, fortress, airfield, place, post or guard committed to his charge or which it is his duty to defend, or uses any means to compel or induce any commanding officer or any other person to do any of the said acts; or (b) in the presence of any enemy, shamefully casts away his arms, ammunition, tools or equipment, or misbehaves in such manner as to show cowardice; or (c) intentionally uses word or any other means to compel or induce any person subject to this Act, or to the Indian Air Force Act, 1932 (XIV of 1932) or Pakistan Air Force Act 1953 or too the Pakistan Navy Ordinance, 1961, t abstain from acting against the enemy or to discourage such persons from acting against the enemy; or (d) directly or indirectly, treacherously holds correspondence with or communicates intelligence to, the enemy or who coming to the knowledge of such correspondence or communication treacherously omits to discover it to his commanding or other superior officer; or (e) directly or indirectly assists or relies the enemy with arm, ammunition, equipment, supplies or money or knowingly harbours or protects an enemy not being a prisoner; or (f)treacherously or through cowardice sends a flag of truce to the enemy; or (g) in time of war, of during any operation, intentionally occasions a false alarm in action, camp, garrision or quarters, or spreads reports calculated to create alarm or despondency; or (h) in time of action, leaves his commanding officer, or quits his post, guard, picquet, patrol or party without being regularly relieved or without leave; or (i) having being made a prisoner of war, voluntarily serves with or aids the enemy; or (j) knowingly does when on active service any act calculated to imperil success of the Pakistan forces or any forces-operating therewith or of any part of such forces' shall, on conviction by court martial, be punished with death or with such less punishment as it is in this Act mentioned",

Conclusions

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CERTAIN SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS In Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Part 5 of the main report we have dealt with the moral and disciplinary aspects of tee events and causes leading to the defeat of the Pakistan Army in the 1971 war, and have also touched upon the individual responsibility of certain senior officers. In the preceding two chapters of the Supplementary Report, we have offered further observations on these aspects and have commented upon the conduct of certain Army Officers posted in East Pakistan. There, however, still remains the question of determining whether any disciplinary action is called for against certain senior army commanders for their failings in the discharge of their professional duties in the conduct ad prosecution of the war in East Pakistan. Nature of Disciplinary Action 2. In view of the glaring weaknesses and negligence displayed by some of the senior officers operating in East Pakistan, we have anxiously considered the nature of the disciplinary action required in the case. We find that there are several provisions in the the Pakistan Army Act 1952 having a direct bearing on this matter. In the first place, there is section 24 which is in the following terms:- "24. Offences in relation to enemy and punishable with death. Any person to this Act who commits any of the following offenses, that is to say,- (a) Shamefully abandons or delivers up any garrison, fortress, airfield, place, post or guard committed to his charge or which it is his duty to defend, or uses any means to compel or induce any commanding officer or any other person to do any of the said acts; or (b) in the presence of any enemy, shamefully casts away his arms, ammunition, tools or equipment, or misbehaves in such manner as to show cowardice; or (c) intentionally uses word or any other means to compel or induce any person subject to this Act, or to the Indian Air Force Act, 1932 (XIV of 1932) or Pakistan Air Force Act 1953 or too the Pakistan Navy Ordinance, 1961, t abstain from acting against the enemy or to discourage such persons from acting against the enemy; or (d) directly or indirectly, treacherously holds correspondence with or communicates intelligence to, the enemy or who coming to the knowledge of such correspondence or communication treacherously omits to discover it to his commanding or other superior officer; or (e) directly or indirectly assists or relies the enemy with arm, ammunition, equipment, supplies or money or knowingly harbours or protects an enemy not being a prisoner; or (f)treacherously or through cowardice sends a flag of truce to the enemy; or (g) in time of war, of during any operation, intentionally occasions a false alarm in action, camp, garrision or quarters, or spreads reports calculated to create alarm or despondency; or (h) in time of action, leaves his commanding officer, or quits his post, guard, picquet, patrol or party without being regularly relieved or without leave; or (i) having being made a prisoner of war, voluntarily serves with or aids the enemy; or (j) knowingly does when on active service any act calculated to imperil success of the Pakistan forces or any forces-operating therewith or of any part of such forces' shall, on conviction by court martial, be punished with death or with such less punishment as it is in this Act mentioned",

THE HAMOODUR CONCLUSIONS 1.This Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in Dec 1971. After examining 213 witnesses, we submitted the Main Report in July, 1972. However, at that time we did not have before us the evidence of the major personalities, except Major General M. Rahim Khan who had played a part in the final events culminating in the surrender in East Pakistan. Accordingly, we stated that "our observations and conclusions regarding the surrender in East Pakistan and other allied matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to modification in the light of the evidence of the Commander, Eastern Command, and other senior officers as and when such evidence becomes available". 2. After the repatriation of prisoners of war from India, the Commission was reactivated in May, 1974. At theb resumed session, we have examined as many as 72 persons, including Lt Gen A.A.K.Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command, all the Major Generals and Brigadiers who had served in East Pakistan, Rear Admiral Sharif, Flag Officer Commanding the Pakistan Navy, Air Commodore Inam, the senior most Air Force Officer, and several civilian officers like the chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police, two Divisional; Commissioners etc, Maj.Gen M.Rahim Khan was re-examined at his own request. 3. As it appeared to us that the defeat suffered by the Armed Forsec of Pakistan was not merely the result of military factors alone, but had been brought about as the cummulative result of political, international, moral and military factors, we examined all these aspects in our Main Report at some length. We have followed the same pattern of study in the present supplementary Report. Although we are now naturally in possession of far more detailed information as to the events in East Pakistan, yet the main conclusions reached by us on the earlier occassion have remained unaffected by the fresh evidence now available. In the paragraphs that follow, we intend briefly to summarise our conclusions on these major aspects of the causes of surrender in East Pakistan, making reference, wherever necessary, to the conclusions already embodied in the Main Report. POLITICAL BACKGROUND 4. In the Main Report, we have traced the genesis of the Pakistan movement, the events preceding the establishment of Pakistan, and the political developments which took place between 1947 and 1971, including a detailed study of the effects of the two Martial Law periods in hastening the process of political and emotional isolation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. 5. We have also, in the Main Report, examined at length the role played by the two major political parties, namely, the Awami League in East Pakistan and the Pakistan Peoples party in West Pakistan, in bringing about the situation resulting in the postponement of the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Daccaon the 3rd of March, 1971. We have then examined the events occurring between the 1st and the 25th of March, 1971, when the Awami League had seized power from the Government of General Yahya Khan, necessitating resort to the military action of the 25th of March, 1971. We have also touched upon the negotiations which Gen Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sh. Mujibur Rahman on the one hand and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dacca on the evening of the 25th of March, 1971, leaving instructions behind for military action to be initiated when his plane reached the Karachi area.

Recommendation AN REPORT

RECOMMENDATIONS In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the debacle of 1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh evidence which we have now recorded: while the need for the others has only been further emphasised. We believe that the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised only of appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these recommendation. 2. Even though it involves a repetition of what we have already said in the Main Report, we consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and justification for these recommendations will be found in the relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this Supplementary Report. We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been implemented, but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final summing up. 1. Trials 3. There is concensus on the imperative need of bringing to book those senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation's demand for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay. : - (i) That General Yahya Kina, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently tot he surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan: (ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (i) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war (iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and wilful neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500 villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to the enemy without a light and as a consequence the Army offensive in the south was seriously jeopardised; (iv) That Maj Gen Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div, be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful surrender of a large area comprising nearly 98 villages in the phuklian salient in the Sialkot district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of Marala Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ in the dark about Indian occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after the war. (v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18 Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that his offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area (Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert. (vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on 15 charges as set out in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the defence of East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces tot he Indians at a juncture when he still had the capability and resources to offer resistance. (vii) That Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the defence of Dacca and showing complete Jack of courage and will to fight, in acquiescing in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to put up resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for wilfully neglecting to inform the authorities concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.50,000 by him out of Pakistan currency notes and toher funds at his disposal or under his control in East Pakistan. (viii) That Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops and area of responsibility and Vacating his Divisional Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December, 1971; for his wilful insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to himself and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his abandoning valuable signal equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the 12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and for wilfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at Chandpur. (ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court martial on nine charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of defence plans, appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans, abrupt changes in command, friendliness with he Indian during captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by threats and inducements to present a co-ordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan. (x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107 Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on four charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan for the defence of the fortress of Jesore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade counter-attack at Gharibpur, for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessor and delivering intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the GOC 9 Divison, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore; (xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division, East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative, determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare defences at Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy from Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to properly organise oxfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his troops on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham 124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about the proposed vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy

ANNEXURE

THE SEQUENCE OF THE SIGNALS We now propose to examine how the situation developed from the beginning of the war, i.e. the 21st November, 1971 till the surrender and it will be necessary for this purpose to quote extensively from the signals exchanged during the period between the relevant authorities for only then will it be possible to paint the full picture. 2. The first relevant signal is dated 21st November, 1971 numbered G-1104 from the Commander to the Chief of General Staff. "from COMD for CGS (?) one ( .) as you must have noticed from strips, INDIANS have aggressed and started attacking in strength along with rebels (.) fighting taken place in areas JESSORE, BHURANGAMARI, SYLHET, CHITTAGONG AND DACCA suburbs (.) JESSORE airfield shelled by INDIAN med guns (.) in view this pressure own razakars stated blowing up bridges and laying ambushes against own troops (.) two (.) highly grateful for having allotted additional infantry battalions (.) three (.) move programme for all elements very slow (.) time against us 9.) Therefore request move all battalions on emergency basis as done during war (.) new raising likely to take time therefore despatch battalions already raised (.) also since full DIV NOT being provided, provisions of two more infantry battalions raising total to ten battalions, squadron tanks, one BDE HQ extremely essential which be considered and despatched immediately (.) request confirm." 3. It will be seen that, right from the commencement, the note struck by the Commander is far from a happy one, although not quite as dismal as the later signals were. The picture given is of fighting having started in various areas and a demand is made for two more battalions, i.e. in addition to the 8 already promised him. 4. From the record of the signals we do not find any answer to this request; the next signal, that is on record is dated 22nd November and numbered G-1086 from the Chief of Staff to the Commander warning him that the enemy is aiming at capture of CHITTAGONG from land and sea and requiring him, therefore, "to reinforce defences CHITTAGONG area by pulling out troops from less important sectors as necessary." 5. One the 28th November, 1971 the Commander sent a signal in the following terms: - "G-0866 (.) CONFD (.) for COMMANDER IN CHIEF from COMD (.) G-022, of 27 Oct. (.) most gratefully acknowledge your kind consideration in conveying highly inspiring appreciation at performance of our basic duty EASTERN COMMAND and myself (.) indeed indebted fro great confidence that is reposed in us (.) nevertheless reassure you that all ranks by grace of ALL are in high morale and fine shape and imbued with true spirit of extreme sacrifice to zealously of defend the priceless honour, integrity and solidarity of our beloved PAKISTAN (.) rededicating at this critical juncture of our history I pledge on behalf of all ranks that we are at the highest STATE of readiness to teach a lasting lesson to HINDUSTAN should they dare cast an evil eye on our sacred soil in any manner, may be through open aggression or otherwise (.) trusting in GOD and your kind guidance, the impact and glorious history of our forefathers would INSHALLAH be fully revived. maintaining highest traditions of our army in case such a GRAND Opportunity afforded." It will be noticed that at this stage the Commander not only expresses his determination to fight but even boasts of hoping to teach a lasting lesson to Hindustan and looks upon the coming events as a "grand opportunity afforded". 6. As we have noticed elsewhere the Indian intention to attack openly and ..Quote(illegible) Out in all out war was not merely a possibility but a distinct anticipation of which the Commander had been forewarned much earlier, nevertheless, on the 5th December, 1971 by message numbered G-0338 the Chief of Staff stated this clearly in the following terms: "exclusive for COMMANDER from CHIEF OF STAFF (.) It is now evident from all sources including intelligence channels that INDIANS will shortly launch a full scale offensive against EAST PAKISTAN (.) mean total war (.) the time has therefore come when keeping in mind current situation you redeploy your forces in accordance with your operational task (.) such positioning would of course take into consideration areas of tactical, political and strategic importance we are all proud of our EASTERN COMMAND (.) well done." A clear command was thus given to the Commander to redeploy his forces in accordance with his operational tasks. The fact the message also talks of taking into consideration areas of tactical, political and strategic importance implies, we think, liberty to give up other territory if necessary. However, that has been made clearer later.

THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT ANALYSED

Pakistanis tend to blame the creation of Bangladesh on an elaborate Indian conspiracy. It’s true that India whole-heartedly encouraged and trained the Bangladeshi army of liberation, the Mukti Bahini. It’s also true that Indira Gandhi finally ordered Field Marshal Sam Maneckshaw’s men to “liberate” East Pakistan. Over the years, India became the chief villain in the creation of Bangladesh. School history text books in Pakistan today even say Bangladesh was created against the will of its people, by armed Indian intervention. That was not the way the War Inquiry Commission—appointed by the President of Pakistan in December 1971—saw it. In its secret report, never made public in Pakistan and now in the possession of INDIA TODAY GROUP ONLINE, the commission, headed by then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman, held widespread atrocities, other abuses of power by Pakistani generals and a complete failure in civilian and martial-law leadership responsible for the loss of East Pakistan. It recommended a string of court-martials and trials against top officers (see box). Nothing ever happened. The army’s role in splintering Pakistan after its greatest military debacle was largely ignored by successive Pakistani governments. Obviously, the report is kept under close wraps in Pakistan, despite persistent demands for its release over 28 years, both in Bangladesh and Pakistan. After Kargil, there were repeated references to the report in the Pakistani media. Many commentators said an inquiry into Kargil would end up being buried like the Rahman report. To most Pakistanis, the fate of the report is a mystery. “When Justice Hamoodur Rahman in his official enquiry recorded the truth of 1971, Bhutto as prime minister personally ordered that each and every copy of the report be burnt, and burnt to ashes it was,” said political analyst Prof Jamaluddin Naqvi in The Dawn of Karachi. “Not one copy was saved. And to-date no attempt has been made to reconstruct the causes that led to our dismemberment. ” A copy was indeed saved. And the reconstruction that many Pakistanis—and Bangladeshis—seek is exactly what the Commission did. It was in a sense, Pakistan’s truth commission. “There is a consensus on the imperative need of bringing to book senior army commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capabilities and resources to resist the enemy,” the report said. The Commission examined nearly 300 witnesses and hundreds of classified army signals (many are quoted in the report) between East and West Pakistan. The final report was submitted on October 23, 1974, detailing how political, administrative, military and—there are repeated references to this—moral failings, were responsible for the surrender to Indian forces in East Pakistan in 1971. “The publication of the report is all the more necessary in the context of the present-day political situation in Pakistan,” Pakistani journalist Akhtar Payami said in an article in The Dawn in December 1999. The report, say analysts, has a bearing on General Pervez Musharaff’s modern-day Pakistan because it describes in detail how prolonged administrative power corrupts and weakened the army. There could also be a lesson for India: it illustrates how an administration dominated by the army can backfire severely in any area of local alienation. The report dwells on a range of sins: killing of thousands of Bangladeshis—both civilians and “Bengali” soliders—rape, pan smuggling, looting of banks in East Pakistan, drunkenness by officers, even an instance of a Brigadier “entertaining” women while his troops were being shelled by Indian troops.

THE HAMOODUR RAHMAN REPORT ANALYSED

The Genesis of Defeat “How many Hindus have you killed?”

It was a process euphemistically called “being sent to Bangladesh”. The killing and torture of respectable East Pakistanis incensed an already hostile people. A host of army officers who were ordered to—and carried out—these atrocities, provided details to the Commission. “Brigadier Arbab … told me to destroy all houses in Joydepur. To a great extent I executed this order,” said Lt Col. Aziz Ahmad Khan, then commanding officer of 8 Baluch in his deposition. “General Niazi asked as to how many Hindus we had killed. In May, there was an order in writing to kill Hindus.” There are other similar depositions. The report said a high-powered inquiry further needed to inquire into “persistent allegations of atrocities said to have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March to December 1971”. It further said that those responsible must be tried; they had “brought a bad name for the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by their wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people”. The overwhelming portion of the blame falls on the ham-handed incompetence of Pakistani officers, and the role they played in alienating East Pakistan from the rest of the country. It all began, officers told the commission, when they took over the country.
“The foundation of the defeat was laid way back in 1958 when the Armed Forces took over the country,” said Rear Admiral M. Sharif, then Flag Officer commanding the Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan in his deposition. “While learning the art of politics in this newly assigned role to themselves, they gradually abandoned their primary function of the art of soldering; they also started amassing wealth and usurping status for themselves.” The Rahman Commission concluded that the “highly corrupting influence”, of power seriously affected its professionalism and quality of training, which, the report laconically noted, “the officers could not impart to their units for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for this purpose, and many of them also lost the inclination to do so”. A civilian administration took over from military administrators in East Pakistan, but as Mohammed Ashraf, former Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, deposed: “The installation of a civilian governor in September 1971 was merely to hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad.” This was the time Pakistan—between May and September—lost its greatest chance at a political settlement. There was reasonable normalcy in East Pakistan after military intervention and though the countryside was aflame with rebellion, order was restored in most urban areas. “However, no effort was made during these months to start a political dialogue with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan,” the report noted. “Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted.” At the end of a season of torture and killings in 1971, Hindus and Awami League leaders joined a large-scale exodus to India. “Precious months were thus wasted, during which the Indians mounted their training programme for the Mukti Bahini and started guerilla raids into Pakistan territory,” the report noted. Then a set of fraudulent by-elections—a Pakistani major general selected the candidates—to replace dismissed Awami League representatives. The Commission said General Yahya Khan’s “culpable failure” to a political settlement with the Awami League during the crucial months preceding the war that “completely alienated the sympathies” of the East Pakistanis

The Loss of Character

“Lust for wine, greed for houses” The Commission recommended that a coterie of generals—General Yahya Khan, Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt Gen S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt Gen Gul Hasan, Maj Gen Umar and Maj Gen Mitha—be publicly tried for criminal conspiracy because in agreement with one another they brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of troops and the dismemberment of Pakistan. This extensive involvement of the Pakistani Army in martial law duties and civil administration was particularly “disastrous” on its professional and moral standards”, the Commission noted. Indeed, it said repeated and “vehement” depositions from a large number of witnesses, including “highly placed and responsible service officers” forced it to dwell at length on the moral aspects of the causes of defeat in the war. “Due to corruption arising out of the performance of martial law duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war,” the Commission observed.

The rot began at the very top from the East Pakistan army’s commander, Gen Niazi, who the Commission said acquired a “notorious reputation for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling of paan from East to West Pakistan.” The inevitable consequence was that “he failed to inspire respect and confidence in the mind of his subordinates, impaired his qualities of leadership and determination; and also encouraged laxity in disclipline and moral standards among the officers and men under his command”. The report then recommended a moral makeover for the Pakistan armed services: +# That moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour, particularly at higher levels. # That moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of promotion to higher ranks # That serious note should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt practices. The only general to come largely unscathed from the mass indictment was Maj Gen Farman Ali, an artillery officer who held various civil appointments in East Pakistan, ending with adviser to the governor of East Pakistan. Gen Ali and Gen Niazi are known to have had differences, and it was to Gen Ali that Gen Manekshaw addressed propaganda leaflets, describing him as the commander of the Pakistan army, mainly because Gen Niazi had not been seen outside his command bunker around Dec 9, 1971. Gen Ali functioned as “an intelligent, well-intentioned and sincere Staff Officer”, the report said, adding that at “no stage did he advise or himself indulge in actions opposed to public morality, sound political sense or humanitarian considerations”. Indeed, if Gen Niazi had accepted Gen Ali’s advice on various occasions, many of the “disgraceful episodes” of the war might have been avoided. The Commission's comments and Gen Niazi's subsequent adverse comments about Gen Ali after the war, especially in his book, indicated the kind of divide that existed within the military.

The Capitulation

“Further resistance is not humanly possible” After duly examining the role India played in training the Mukti Bahini and finally intervening directly, the Commission said that the Pakistan army capitulated without much of a fight--after first digging its own grave. “The refusal of General Yahya Khan to negotiate with the Awami League becomes all the more significant when we remember that two of its top leaders, namely Sheikh Mujibur and Dr Kalam Hussain were in his custody in West Pakistan, and that almost all the friendly countries had advised him to arrive at a political settlement in view of the looming Indian threat of military action.” These two “direct and devastating consequences”, the report said, ensured that the Pakistan Army “was obviously fighting a losing battle from the very start”. And as the Indian army finally stepped in during the winter of 1971 and made its final push to Dhaka, the corrupted superstructure of the Pakistani army came crashing down. The final days, observed the Commission, were a litany of cowardice and misleading signals to Dhaka’s unwilling defenders that help was on its way from China and the U.S. Seventh Fleet parked in the Bay of Bengal. A series of classified signals between the Pakistan government and Dhaka’s defenders graphically indicate how in less than two months army went from bluster, to hope of intervention from China and the U.S., to a hasty, ignominous surrender. Forgotten were the initial boasts of defending Dhaka to the “last man, last round”. “Reassure that all ranks by grace of ALLAH are in high morale and fine shape and imbued with the true spirit of extreme sacrifice to zealously of defend the priceless honour, integrity and solidarity of our beloved PAKISTAN (.),” said a signal from Gen Niazi to the Chief of Staffon 28th November 1971. “Rededicating at this critical juncture of our history I pledge on behalf of all ranks that we are at the highest STATE of readiness to teach a lasting lesson to HINDUSTAN should they dare cast an evil eye on our sacred soil in any manner, may be through open aggression or otherwise (.) trusting in GOD and your kind guidance, the impactful and glorious history of our forefathers would INSHALLAH be fully revived, maintaining highest traditions of our army in case such a GRAND opportunity afforded.” Such bombast evaporated rapidly. Instead repeated messages urged East Pakistan to hold out somehow. On December 5, 1971, as Manekshaw’s thrusts speared towards Dhaka, a message from the Chief of Staff (G-0235) told Gen Niazi, that “the enemy will attempt to capture EAST PAKISTAN as swiftly as possible and then shift maximum to face WEST PAKISTAN (.) this must NOT be allowed to happen (.) losing of some territory is insignificant … every hope of Chinese activities very soon (.) good luck and keep up your magnificent work against heavy odds (.) may Allah bless you”. The Commission said it could not help observing “that not only at this stage but elsewhere the GHQ held out vague or even fraudulent promises of foreign help”. These promises grew as the messages from Dhaka started becoming increasingly desperate. Worse, Gen Niazi was falling apart. “He was in terrible shape, haggard, obviously had no sleep,” Gen Farman Ali told the Commission. “The Governor had hardly said a few words when Gen Niazi started crying loudly. I had to send the bearer out. The Governor got up from his chair, patted him and said a few consoling words. I also added a few words saying `your resources were limited. It is not your fault etc’.” Finally on December 7, 1971, with Dhaka’s holding only seven days of food stocks, the Governor sent a message (A-6905) to the President of Pakistan saying it was imperative that the “correct situation” be brought to his notice. After detailing the severe resources, he said, “millions of non-BENGALIS and loyal elements are awaiting death (.) No amount of lip sympathy or even material help form world powers except direct physical intervention will help (.) if any of our friends is expected to help that should have an impact within the next 48 hours (.).” If not, the governor said, please negotiate a “civilized and peaceful transfer”. He concluded: ‘is it worth sacrificing so much when the end seems inevitable (.).” But the desperate fantasy of outside intervention continued. On December 11, 1971, the Chief of Staff sent Gen Niazi a signal saying, “the NEFA front has been activated by CHINESE although the INDIANS for obvious reasons have not announced it(.).” He also said the U.S. Seventh Fleet “will be very soon in position”. The Commission was incredulous. “On what basis the Chief of Staff was stating (this) we cannot even conjecture.” The next day Gen Niazi saw new hope and promised to turn Dhaka into a “fortress and fight it out till end”. But in the next couple of days, there were two unclassified messages—meaning they could easily be listened to by India—that the Commission held as evidence of a surrender plan and justification. One (G-1279) came from Gen Niazi, talking of an Indian threat of handing over prisoners to the “Mukti Fauj for butchery” if the Pakistan army did not surrender. The other (G-0013) was sent on Dec, 14, 1971, from the President to the Governor and Gen. Niazi. It read: “you have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds (.) the nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration (.) … you have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer HUMANLY possible nor will it serve any useful purpose (.).”

These, in effect, said the Commission, was an indication to India that Pakistan was ready to surrender. “We think it might well have prompted General Manekshaw to insist upon a surrender even though General Niazi was only proposing a cease-fire.” Indeed, the word “surrender” was used by Gen Manekshaw for the first time only on December 15, 1971. A day later, the details didn't matter. The surrender was signed, Pakistan was splintered, and a new nation was born.

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