Introduction

pg. 2

SECTION ONE:  THE CASE AGAINST WAR

Depleted Uranium	pg. 4
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism	pg. 7
The Terrorist Threat	pg. 11
Preemptive War and Unilateralism	pg. 13
Economics and War	pg. 15
Humanitarian Concerns	pg. 16
Iraq After a War	pg. 18

SECTION TWO:  A HISTORY OF THE GULF WAR

Iraq Before the War	pg. 19
The Gulf War	pg. 22
After the War	pg. 25

SECTION THREE:  U.S. POLICY AND OIL

The Question of Oil	pg. 28
U.S. Regional Positioning and Global Markets	pg. 30
A Strategy of Destruction	pg. 32

Epilogue

pg. 34

          The purpose of this analysis is to address the impending war between the U.S. and Iraq, and to make the case as strongly as possible against the war.  It attempts to address as many relevant facts and issues involved as possible, including many of the facts and issues used by those who argue in favor of the war.
           Obviously, it is impossible to know exactly what will ultimately happen, and in all likelihood many things will occur that nobody expected.  However, it is of utmost importance when facing a crisis such as this to consider all of the possibilities, even at the risk of overstating some of the dangers and "worst-case scenarios", especially when (as is the case) the worst-case could be global warfare and the use of nuclear arms and chemical or biological weapons.
           In an effort to be as forthright as possible, it should be stated that any appearance of bias in the tone of writing may be attributable to the truth that such a bias does exist, although all attempts have been made to present the facts without any intention of misrepresentation.  When opinion or interpretation of the facts is presented, an attempt has been made to state this clearly or pose such opinions and interpretations in a way as to leave no doubt that conclusions are being drawn from the information.
           This analysis will be broken into three parts.  It begins with the most serious issues concerning the effects of a potential war with Iraq.  Then, there will be a synopsis of the history leading up to the Gulf War, events during the war, and the immediate aftermath.
 Finally, there will be an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. interests and policies with regard to oil, in both the Middle East and North and South America, and the global implications of those interests and policies.  This last section will contain much more opinion and interpretation of the facts than the rest of the analyses.
           The analysis has been structured in this way for a few reasons.  The facts concerning the current crisis with Iraq are the most immediately important from a practical standpoint, and thus are dealt with first.  In addition, the issues which follow the first section are addressed here precisely because of their relevance to the current crisis, thus while they are of no less importance they must be relegated to a subordinate position within the overall analysis.  This being the case, the section regarding the impending war with Iraq should be read as the primary argument set forth, and the following sections viewed as "supporting material".
           These later sections, while each is capable of standing alone as analysis of their respective topics, also are interrelated, and when viewed outside the context of the main argument regarding impending war, they can be taken together as an analysis of U.S. policy in the Middle East irrespective of the case made against waging another war with.  The issues discussed in the Gulf War section are based on historical facts, which are (by and large) not open to personal opinion; in other words, these things happened, these were (and are) U.S actions and policies.
           As mentioned earlier, the final section does fall to a large extent into the realm of interpretation and opinion, but relies on facts and events to draw conclusions which should seem reasonable to anyone who views the evidence honestly.  This last portion also considers some worst-case scenarios, and while these are quite extreme as far as policy interpretation is concerned, they are nevertheless plausible and worth mentioning.
           Something should also be said regarding the obvious omission here of any detailed analysis of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the incredibly important role that relationship has played in U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle East.  This omission is primarily because such a discussion is a whole other work in and of itself, and would require a major deviation from the central topic being addressed.  Several excellent books have already been written which deal with the subject probably as well as is possible (Chomsky, "The Fateful Triangle", and Said, "The Politics of Dispossession", to name but two).  Any half-attempts or abridged version of the facts here would be worse than simply avoiding this issue and referring the readers elsewhere.
           As a final note, 3 sources contributed much to this analysis.  The first is "The Fire This Time:  U.S. War Crimes In The Gulf" by Ramsey Clark (former Attorney General), which meticulously documents the death and destruction suffered in Iraq, and how the U.S. government manipulated Saddam Hussein into war.  The second is "War and Television" by Bruce Cumings.  This book focuses on the role of the media during war, and how the U.S. media colludes with the government to manipulate or censor facts for public consumption.

           This analysis begins by considering a danger not discussed by the U.S. government or the media, although it is one threat that is dangerous to all parties involved, and to the Middle East in general.
           In the production of nuclear weapons and at nuclear power plants, radioactive waste is produced.  While this waste has had much of its radioactive property removed, it still remains toxic.  What many people are unaware of, however, is that this waste is not merely destroyed or stored safely away.
           The fact is that much of this waste is given free to the Pentagon for the production of weapons.  For over a decade, the U.S. military has been producing what is known as depleted uranium (DU) ordnance, using uranium 238 for warheads on missiles, rockets, anti-tank weapons, armor piercing ammunition, and possibly more.
           Uranium 238 is considered the best material to produce these weapons for several reasons:  it is highly dense and thus excellent for penetrating armor and bunkers; it is provided free of charge; it has residual effects, like producing radioactive particle harmful and potentially fatal when inhaled, swallowed, or as residue on skin and clothes; these particles can poison the soil, water, food supplies; and other dangerous conditions which may be desirable when occurring in an enemy territory.
           When these weapons are fired, the uranium bursts into flames, liquefies, and sears through even the steel on heavily armored tanks.  Any diesel fuel vapors inside the tank explode due to the intense heat from the burning uranium.  The fire creates uranium oxide, spreading and contaminating the corpses, equipment, and soil.
           The dust particles and larger pieces are scattered all over the battlefield, creating radioactive, carcinogenic clouds of smoke.  Uranium 238 settles in the lungs, kidneys, testicles, and bones of persons exposed to its effects.  It also settles in the placentas of pregnant women.
 Radioactive debris from DU weapons remains radioactive for over 4.5 billion years.  In Minnesota and New Mexico, where DU weapon testing occurs, the testing grounds are now permanently radioactive.
           The facts above clearly expose the danger of using these DU weapons, but the danger has not stopped the U.S. from employing DU ordnance in warfare.  The results of this use have been catastrophic, and not only for the enemy combatants and territories.  Indeed, there have been a set of surprising casualties resulting from the U.S. deployment of DU weapons, casualties ignored by both the U.S. government and the U.S. media.
           Who are these hidden casualties?  U.S. troops, European troops, and their families.
           The U.S. used DU ordnance in the Gulf War, in the NATO bombing campaign in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and is now preparing to use these weapons in the impending war with Iraq.  From what has already been noted about these weapons, the implications of their widespread use again are obvious.  However, to get an even clearer picture of what can be expected if DU weapons are employed in another war with Iraq, consider the following facts (and facts they are).
           The first confirmed use of DU weapons in battle was in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War.  The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, in an April 1991 report, confirmed the U.S. fired between 5,000 and 6,000 DU armor piercing shells, and about 50,000 DU rockets and missiles, leaving tons and tons of radioactive and toxic rubble in Iraq and Kuwait.  The UKAEA report also said the 40 tons of radioactive debris left behind could cause up to 500,000 Iraqi deaths.  The total number of all DU rounds fired in the Gulf War comes to roughly 944,000, or 2,700 tons of weapons.  The Pentagon admits to "only" 320 metric tons of DU left on the battlefield after the war, but Russian military experts claim the actual amount is 1,000 metric tons.

           The current drive to war is being fueled by a single issue:  weapons of mass destruction.  Whatever real motives may ultimately lie behind the Bush administration's war policy, the questions about Iraq's WOMD program are the founding principle of their argument for war.  To legitimize a U.S. invasion, the U.S. has focused on convincing the U.N. and U.S. citizens that Iraq has a large, secret chemical and biological weapons program that is a direct threat to the region and to the U.S. itself.
           In attempting to drum up support in America, the Bush administration has repeatedly conjured images of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, saying again and again that Iraq could give WOMD to terrorist organization, with Bush himself saying Saddam Hussein plans to use al Qaida as his "forward army" to attack the U.S. without leaving his "fingerprints".  The invoking of September 11 has been a recurring theme in the administration's attempts to explain the unique American determination to deal with the alleged "Iraqi threat".
           However, the facts regarding Iraq's WOMD and the actual threat posed to the U.S. are quite different from the image put forth by President Bush and his government.  In fact, the most telling evidence contradicting Bush's assertions of the "Iraqi threat" actually comes from the U.S. intelligence community itself.
           In a report leaked to the media, the CIA stated that all intelligence they have gathered suggests clearly that Saddam Hussein would not use Iraqi WOMD or give such weapons to terrorists unless Hussein was attacked and felt he was surely going to loose power.  The report cites the fact that Iraq is isolated regionally, without any allies, and was left so damaged and economically weak after the Gulf War that it is unlikely Hussein could pursue any large-scale WOMD programs.
           Additionally, the report notes that (contrary to repeated claims by the Bush administration that Iraq has had "12 years" to come clean) Iraq was subjected to a rigorous U.N. inspections regime which had, by 1998, eradicated roughly 95 percent of Iraq's WOMD and facilities for producing such weapons.  The CIA further points out that Iraq has, since the Gulf War, been subjected to constant surveillance by the U.S. (including spying by the U.S. during the U.N. inspections) and over-flights by U.S. and British warplanes in the "No Fly Zones".
           All of these facts lead the CIA to conclude that if Iraq does possess any WOMD programs, it is a very small one and poses no clear or immediate threat to either the U.S. or Iraq's neighbors.  Also, due to the animosity between Hussein and Islamic fundamentalists (because of Iraq's secular government and repression of the Shiite majority), it is unlikely Hussein would provide WOMD to groups who might very well use them to battle the Iraqi regime.
           The only scenario the CIA imagines in which Iraq would use any WOMD or provide them to terrorists, then, is the exact situation being created by the U.S. under the pretense of preventing precisely what they are encouraging.  This is backed up by U.S. government statements that Hussein has ordered his generals to prepare to use WOMD against U.S. troops.  If this is true, it merely highlights the CIA's point.
           This conclusion is likewise reached by British intelligence.  The BBC obtained and made public "top-level British intelligence reports" stating that there are "absolutely no ties" between Iraq and al Qaida.
           There is an even more damning set of facts about the CIA denial of an Iraqi threat.  Currently, there are up to 30 CIA and other intelligence officials who have sought refuge in Sweden after that nation granted amnesty for them.  These U.S. intelligence agents claim they are being silenced and threatened by the Bush administration, and that they cannot speak freely about the facts concerning CIA intelligence on Iraq.  They also assert that the administration demands intelligence reports be shaped to make the case against Iraq, and apply pressure to CIA operatives who resist "politicizing" the intelligence reports.

           Chapter Two touched on the issue of terrorism as it is linked to the question of Iraq and WOMD.  This chapter intends to look at the issue of how a war against Iraq is likely to increase anti-U.S. sentiment, potentially increase the threat of terrorism against U.S. and European targets, and ultimately disrupt regional stability throughout the Middle East.
           A U.S. war against Iraq will likely increase anti-American sentiments in the Middle East.  The build-up to war has already done so (and not just in the Middle East).  There are several reasons for this, beyond the obvious objections to unilateral war.  Many citizens of Middle East nations feel there is a decidedly anti-Muslim, anti-Arab bias in U.S. foreign policy, a feeling accentuated by the U.S.-Israel relationship.  U.S. support for regimes in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the former U.S. support for the Shag of Iran and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, point towards a U.S. policy favoring governments friendly to U.S. economic (read "oil") interests, with little regard for how those governments treat their citizens.  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. support for Israeli repression and violence against Palestinians, fits into this category as well.
           This last goes back to post World War I policies, when the West encouraged Arabs to break from the Ottoman Empire, under the pretense that the allies would recognize Middle Eastern independence.  Obviously, that is not quite what the allies actually had in mind, as the subsequent colonialism proved (with Syria and Lebanon placed under a French mandate, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan under a British mandate).  The "right" for Jews to a national homeland in Palestine was recognized in this same period.  It should also be remembered Kuwait was actually created by the British government in 1921, by Sir Percy Cox of the Colonial Office, who took a section of the Basra province from Iraq to cut Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf.
           U.S. policy was no better in the following years.  The CIA-backed overthrow of the Mossadegh government of Iran in the 1950s, the CIA-backed overthrow of the Kassem government in Iraq (leading to the Baathist take-over and Hussein's rise to power) in the 1960's, both situations a reaction to nationalization of western oil companies, are just two examples.  There are others, such as U.S. support for separatist factions across the region, U.S. manipulation of oil through client states, U.S. arms shipments to warring nations (usually both sides of the conflicts), and ultimately U.S.-led warfare against Middle Eastern states.  U.S. military and support for Israel, and U.S. funding of Jewish settlements (largely through private donations) is another big part of the over-all equation, when calculating the causes of anti-American sentiment.
           As can easily be seen, there is much history that contributes to distrust of U.S. actions and interests in the Middle East.  It is, therefore, not difficult to understand why another war against Iraq would increase animosity towards the U.S.  Whereas Americans are (for the most part) unaware of much of the actual devastation that occurred in the recent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and the even worse destruction caused during the Gulf War, people in the Middle East are not.  The apparent U.S. disinterest with the death and ruin caused by its actions, coupled with apparent U.S. lack of sympathy for the plight of Palestinians, only make matters worse.
           Moreover, the U.S. has made it clear that after a war with Iraq, the U.S. would maintain an occupation force and U.S. control over the governing of Iraq for at least one-to-two years, and the public discussions about U.S. control of Iraq oil (some administration officials have said Turkey risks loosing out on the "oil spoils" for its lack of support for a U.S. invasion) increase opposition for U.S. policies in the region.

           Although the U.S. is working feverishly to gain U.N. sanction for a war against Iraq, the efforts do not appear successful.  President Bush has said, however, that the U.S. will go to war with or without U.N. approval.  An invasion, "preventative" according the administration, "preemptive" by actual definition, would be illegal on several grounds.  In fact, the words "preemptive" and  "unilateral" have appeared in U.S. statements lately, along with the more benign-sounding "preventative".
           Unilateral warfare violates international law.  Secretary General Kofi Annan has said publicly that a U.S. invasion without the approval of the Security Council would violate the U.N. Charter.  A reading of the Charter proves this is definitely true.
           Article 2, Sections 1 through 4 recognize the "sovereign equality" of all nations and restrict the use of force (and the threat of such force) against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".  Article 24, Section 1 grants the Security Council the authority "for the maintenance of international peace and security", and Section 25 states explicitly that "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council".  Articles 33 through 43 outline the duties and authority of the Security Council to settle disputes between nations, and restrict the use of force not sanctioned by the Council.  A U.S. war against Iraq would clearly violate the U.N. Charter if the invasion were carried out without approval.
           Likewise, Article 2, Sections 4 and 7 recognize the "political independence" and "sovereignty" of nations, and it is reasonable to conclude that overthrowing or assassinating Saddam Hussein violates the "political independence" of Iraq.  "Regime change" and "political independence" appear to be a bit mutually exclusive.  The question of "regime change" and how it should be achieved is the topic of much debate.  Not much is said about whether it should be achieved.  Another problem with the U.S. plan is that actually targeting Saddam Hussein for death violates U.S. laws, which explicitly forbid the targeting of foreign leaders for assassination (even, it must be noted, during wartime).
           The Bush administration repeatedly claims that it does not need further U.N. approval for a war against Iraq, saying Resolution 1441 already provides authority for action.  This argument is seriously damaged by the obvious fact that, if the U.S. believed it to be true, they would not be attempting to get a Security Council Resolution formally authorizing force.  Further, the claim ignores the overwhelming majority of opinion in the U.N. that Resolution 1441 did not grant approval for war (military action must be conducted explicitly through the Security Council, as noted above).  U.S. attempts to obtain a second Resolution are directly in response to this fact.  Thus, claims that authorization already exists appear absurd in light of U.S. action and U.N. objections.
           There is not a small bit of irony in the fact the Gulf War was fought because of unilateral action by Iraq, when it invaded Kuwait over the issues of illegally priced oil, slant-drilling, and the fact the Kuwaiti oil fields in question were seized by Kuwait from Iraq a few years earlier when Iraq was at war with.  The U.S. and U.N. response to Iraq's "unilateral" use of force against Kuwait is obvious.
           It is legitimate to note that the U.N. is not even considering military action against the U.S. if it "unilaterally" invades Iraq.  More to the point, it is difficult to reconcile the U.S. policy of violating international law and the U.N. with the reason it is being done – to punish Iraq for violating international law and the U.N.  Who will punish the U.S. for these violations?  Apparently, not the U.N.
           U.S. violation of international law would remove the validity of opposing such violations by other nations, emphasizing the hypocrisy of both U.S. "unilateral" action and U.N. inaction against U.S. policies.  This will create a global atmosphere of instability, as it puts into question the strength and validity of the U.N. and international law, opening the door for any nation to act "unilaterally" for "self defense".

           If the U.S. goes to war, the timing could not be worse, from an economic standpoint.  The U.S. economy is still doing poorly (as is most of the world economy), unemployment is rising, and several large U.S. industries (the airlines, for example) are warning that a war could mean massive layoffs and further loss of profits, possibly leading to bankruptcy for some companies.  Energy costs worldwide are increasing (an issue addressed in more detail below).  A war could make all of these situations much worse.
           The U.S. federal deficit is estimated to remain at about $300 billion per year, before the costs for a war are figured into the budget, not to mention the costs of post-war occupation.  Cities and states across the U.S. are in a budget crisis now, due to lack of funds to run education, policing, and health programs (largely due to cuts in Federal funding to states).
           A war would add an estimated $200-to-$300 billion to the Federal deficit, and the additional cost of a U.S. post-war presence in Iraq is expected to easily run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.  This means worsening budget constraints in the future, so the ability of the Federal government to adequately fund important programs (including education, policing, and health programs at the state level) may further diminish.
           Congress is about to enact some form of President Bush's huge tax-cut, trimming almost another one trillion dollars (maybe more) from the Federal budget.  Such huge losses of budgetary dollars, at a time when the U.S. is about to go to war, will enhance the financial difficulties.
           War will likely drive up energy costs, especially if Iraqi or U.S. bombings destroy oil wells.  During the Gulf War, U.S. bombs ignited Iraqi oil wells, refineries, and storage tanks (this is discussed in detail in the history of the Gulf War, below), taking months to extinguish.  A similar scenario could occur if the U.S. attacks again, especially since the U.S. plans a bombing campaign much larger than in the previous war.  The U.S. claims Iraq is preparing to detonate oil wells in the event of war, a claim denied by Iraq, but nevertheless one more possibility to keep in mind.
           Availability of oil will likely diminish even if oil wells survive intact, since production will obviously cease during the war.  Assuming the Iraqi government is overthrown, there will be at least a temporary lack of functioning authority to insure production continues; presumably, the U.S. will get production going again, but only after the war is over.
           A war's effect on the oil markets will almost surely cause the price to rise regardless of supply, for a few reasons.  Because of uncertainty about what will happen to the oil fields, how soon they will begin pumping again, and exactly who will get the profits, the price of oil can be expected to increase.  Or, cynically, the profiteering that took place by energy companies in winter of 2000 might lead some to conclude that artificial price-hikes will take place, simply because war would create a public assumption that higher prices for oil/gas/energy are justified.  Already, some states have begun investigations of energy companies precisely due to suspicions of price gouging.
           The situation in Venezuela must not be forgotten either.  Interestingly, Iraq has actually been increasing oil production to make up for lost production in Venezuela, but has not received credit for helping reduce energy shortages.  The Venezuelan oil market seems to be mostly out of crisis, but the tensions that still exist could manifest again and create another shortage of South American oil. While not an imminent danger, the crisis was alleviated only a very brief time ago.  Its immediacy should caution the U.S. not to ignore the uncertainties that exist in the energy market.
           The signs are not encouraging.  Not only the U.S., but also the world, faces serious economic problems, and a U.S. war against Iraq could easily send economies spiraling downward.  Huge deficits, rising energy costs, cuts in essential state programs, higher unemployment, and bankrupt businesses could be among the casualties of this war.

           These final two chapters will deal with perhaps the most important reason to avoid a war with Iraq:  the humanitarian cost paid by the Iraqi people should a war take place.  Little or no commentary is necessary, as the facts and numbers speak loudly and clearly for themselves.
           To begin with, here are some important (and disturbing) numbers to consider.  The World Health Organization estimates 100,000 direct and 400,000 indirect civilian casualties from the war, in their December 10, 2002 U.N. report "Likely Humanitarian Scenario".  The W.H.O. report estimates "as many as 500,000…to a greater or lesser degree…" will be injured.  Regarding refugees, the U.N. estimates that 2 million Iraqis will be displaced, including 900,000 seeking refuge in neighboring countries.
           Further, the report notes "…the outbreak of diseases such as cholera and dysentery in epidemic if not pandemic proportions is very likely", and "…39% of the population will need to be provided with potable drinking water".  The U.N. also warns that 2.03 million children under five, and one million pregnant women, will face moderate to severe malnutrition due to a war.  Lack of adequate U.N. humanitarian relief (due to the suspension of the "Oil for Food" program) will overwhelm attempts to assist Iraqis, of whom 16 million (60 percent of Iraq's population) rely completely on food rations provided by relief efforts.  Suspension of these programs, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization representative in Iraq, "…will be really disastrous…starvation will come like this [snaps his fingers]".
           Any U.N. agencies and international relief NGOs able to provide assistance assume they will work with the U.S. military (according to the same UN report), despite the fact this violates the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, Article 81, which demands humanitarian operations must be independent of those engaging in war.  The effectiveness of relief efforts in the midst of an ongoing military campaign can be imagined.
           Although the Bush administration says publicly that civilians will not be targeted and that U.S. war-plans are designed to limit innocent deaths, those very war-plans call for the targeting of civilian infrastructure.  Electrical, sewage, and water treatment facilities are all targets, as are hospitals and some "military targets" residing within civilian population centers.  There is absolutely no way to target such sites without causing massive civilian casualties (as happened in the Gulf War, and discussed in detail in the history of the Gulf War below).  As a result, the humanitarian crisis during and following the war will be even worse, due to these war-plans.
           As mentioned in Chapter One, U.S. depleted uranium weapons have been extremely deadly to Iraqis, and the intense level of bombing expected if war occurs will be devastating.  Cancer, leukemia, kidney and lung disease, birth defects, and other serious health effects will likely exceed those seen after the Gulf War.  Toxic and carcinogenic clouds, poisoning of the soil, and further environmental damage from the DU bombings can also be expected on a large scale.
           Other humanitarian concerns arise from the danger of instability and ethnic or religious conflicts.  Different ethnic and religious groups may attempt to exert control in their regions of dominance, reacting to one-another's exertion of control, settling old scores (a danger to the ruling class, discussed below), etc.
           Northern Iraq in particular may see much instability and bloodshed.  There is very real potential for harsh treatment of Kurds, due to Turkish fears of Kurdish independence.  This may lead to repression of Kurds who want autonomy, and in turn may spark a Kurdish uprising, leading to civil warfare, possibly even expanding into Turkey.  Such fears could convince Turkey to preemptively repress Kurds in Turkey, to prevent them from joining Kurds in Iraq.  In addition, the U.S. has an agreement with Turkey for Turkish troops to move into northern Iraq to help "stabilize" the area, based on Turkey's aforementioned fears, and U.S. concerns both about stability and about Kurdish seizure of Iraq's northern oil fields.

           Although "liberation" is a commonly stated goal for a war against Iraq, in fact the U.S. post-war plan calls for a U.S. military commander to run Iraq (much like in Japan after WWII), followed by a transfer of control to a U.S. civilian administrator.  The "blueprint" for an Iraqi government is being based on the post-war government in Afghanistan, which ended up being a U.S.-installed government, not based on any of the choices of the Afghan groups "consulted".
           With the differing ethnic and religious groups in Iraq having a history of animosity and violence towards each other, it will be difficult to get a representative democratic government, without concern for the repression that might occur to some of the minorities such as the Kurds.  This is, of course, aside from the obvious concern for the repression that is actually inherent in any "occupation", even a "liberating occupation".
           As mentioned in the preceding chapter, there is the very real possibility of civil warfare at least in some regions (the northern Kurdish zone, for example, where secular Kurds face not only the Turks and U.S. who both intend to repress rebellion, but also the presence of Ansar al-Islam).  It will be difficult to contain civil strife, requiring a large-scale military presence and all the obvious problems (economics, physical dangers, the "liberation-under-massive-military-control" issue, etc.) that such a large force would entail.
           There is a serious question regarding the control and autonomy of Iraqi oil.  U.S. officials have (surprisingly) been quite open and frank in stating that the U.S. intends to ensure control of the oil, however it ends up, will be exerted a way that benefits U.S. interests.  Although this is in complete contradiction to President Bush's public claims about Iraqi liberation and the oil issue, Pentagon and other U.S. plans released to the public are very explicit about U.S. control and administration of Iraq's oil supply.
           This chapter will now end on a "selfish" note, regarding how a post-war Iraq might not turn out as the U.S. hopes.  Indeed, based on the suggestions below, a truly "liberated" Iraq could look very disturbing to other nations in the region.
           This difficult (for the U.S. and its client-states in the region) issue concerns the Shiite nature of the majority of Iraqis.  Ultimately (no matter how the West feels about the subject), the Iraqis have a right to self-determination in their choice of government (as stated in the U.N. Charter and President Bush's repeated public promises) and should be allowed to pursue their own destiny.  The fact is, however, there is a very strong probability that (assuming, of course, the Iraqis are actually aloud to chose a government without U.S. interference) whatever government Iraq chooses will reflect the majority's Shiite nature to some degree.
           Since they have had their beliefs repressed for so long under Hussein, it might be reasonable to expect Iraqis to adopt a religious government. That would bring multiple possibilities into play (for example, would a religious government resemble Iran's?), some of which may have a very ominous impact on the U.S. and other nations friendly to the U.S., like Saudi Arabia.  This is only recognition of these possible developments, not a judgment of them nor a condemnation of such an outcome (indeed, it could be argued that this would benefit the region in the long run); but they are certainly serious developments for the Middle East and the West.
           It is clear, then, that there are many issues regarding the shape of a post-war Iraq that do not bode well for the U.S. or Iraqis.  For the U.S. to invade Iraq and overthrow the government in the midst of so many dangers to Iraq, the U.S., and the region as a whole, would be folly.

           Iraq was one of the more prosperous Middle East nations, regarding its level of industrialization. Iraqi citizens enjoyed high literacy rates, a good standard of living for the region, free health care, and free education all the way through college.
           Iraq had a secular government, not enforcing Islamic laws.  Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (U.S. allies) are monarchies, with no voting, no equality for women, women must wear veils in public, etc.  These are about the same legal standards as Iran (although there is voting in Iran), compared to Iraq, in which women have the same rights as men.  Granted, it was and is still a dictatorship with much repression, but no more so than other countries which enjoy relations with the U.S. or which have in the past.
           Indeed, the U.S. supported Iraq for many years of Saddam Hussein's rule, mostly during the Iraq-Iran war.  The U.S. supplied arms to Iraq and even the materials used by Iraq to manufacture WOMD, which they used against Iran with U.S. support.  It was the Reagan/Bush administration that blocked Congressional attempts to place sanctions against Iraq for its use of WOMD, and Colin Powell was an active participant in blocking those Congressional attempts.
           When roughly 5,000 Iraqi Kurds were gassed, the U.S. still supported Iraq, even going so far as to deny Iraqi responsibility for the gassings.  The U.S. blamed Iran (based on a study conducted by the War College which ignored the eyewitness testimony of Kurds who insisted it was Hussein's regime that used the gas), continuing to deny that Iraq gassed the Kurds until September 8, 1988, six months after the very worst incident at Halabja in March of 1988.  Prior to September 8, the U.S. also ignored Kurds protesting the gassing with a hunger strike at the U.N.
           There had long been border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait.  During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait "unilaterally" moved its border north 900 miles into Iraq, seizing the Rumaila oil fields with no prior claim, no justification whatsoever.  Contrary to U.S. denials, invoices prove the U.S. supplied Kuwait with slant-drilling techniques and equipment, which Kuwait used in the Rumaila oil fields to tap into the oil on the Iraq side of the border (the new "border" Kuwait created, remember).
           The situation deteriorated even further.  Iraq had complained repeatedly that Kuwait was selling oil at prices lower than those set by OPEC, and Iraq alleged this was being done specifically to harm the Iraqi economy.  In fact, there is much evidence to support Iraq's claims.  This evidence also implicates the U.S. government.
           On Aug 8, 1988, one day after the Iraq/Iran war ended, Kuwait began to radically increase oil production and drive down oil prices from $21 to $11 per barrel, costing Iraq $14 billion per year at a time when Iraq's war-ravaged economy needed the funds to rebuild.  Kuwait then demanded immediate repayment of loans made to Iraq during the war with Iran, loans totaling $30 billion.  Iraq, its economy weakened by the eight-year war, could not possibly repay the loans immediately.
           A memo surfaced of a meeting between Kuwaiti Brigadier Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd, director general of Kuwait's Department of State Security, and CIA director William Webster, on Nov. 22 of 1989, concerning "…[steps] to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government…"  This memo [submitted to U.N. Secretary-General de Cueller in 1990 by Iraq after it was captured prior to the invasion of Kuwait] has been authenticated by many experts and the CIA itself confirms the meeting took place, but they deny Iraq was discussed.
           Beginning in 1988, the U.S.-Iraq relationship took a sudden, sharp downturn.  Publicly, the U.S. began to use harsh terms referring to Iraq, putting strict sanctions on funds and materials to Iraq.  In private, however, Iraq was told that this was merely public rhetoric, and the U.S. was saying relations would improve again.

           The U.S. launched Operation Desert Storm on January 17, at 7:00 pm (during "primetime" television hours).  What followed was a 42-day aerial bombardment, consisting of over 109,000 overflights.  Over 88,500 tons of explosives (more than 80 million pounds of bombs) were dropped on military placements, with an average of one overflight every 30 seconds every minute of every day for the entire 42 days.  Within the first hour, 85% of all electrical power in Iraq was destroyed.
           During bombing, targets were not limited to military sites.  On February 13, the Amariyan bomb shelter full of women and children was bombed twice, killing between 1000 and 1,500 people.  While the U.S. claims only about 400 civilians died, there are two pieces of convincing evidence which seem to prove at least 1000 people were certainly in the bunker:  first, the  sign-in sheet at the bunker listed 1000 names, and witnesses say people stopped signing in later in the evening; second, the shelter has 1,500 beds, and was so full that night that people were sleeping in the halls.
           Only 17 Iraqis survived, and most were sleeping in the hall due to the lack of bed space.  Dr. Mouloud, President of the Algerian Red Cross, testified at the March-April European Parliament hearings on war crimes that he personally counted 415 dead children.  The doctor at the shelter testified that over 1000 people were at the shelter.
           Although the Pentagon has publicly claimed the shelter was being used as a "military facility", the U.S. air surveillance of this neighborhood was frequent, with hundreds or more civilians seen entering and leaving the shelter each day.  "The Nation" reported on June 3, 1991 that Pentagon evidence shows the bunker was targeted with a GBU-27 laser-guided bomb (carried by a F-117 Stealth bomber) because it was reserved for the Iraqi elite and their families.  It was hoped Saddam Hussein would be present and thus assassinated, or that at least the attack would kill the families of Iraq's High Command.
           This is only one example of many bombings resulting in large numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties.  Moreover, there is much evidence civilian targets were purposely bombed.  In September, Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan told reporters referring to a list of only military targets, "That's a nice list of targets…but that's not enough," then proposed an additional list including Iraqi power stations, roads, railroads, and domestic petroleum production sites.  He was fired days later for revealing targets that were, in fact, eventually hit by U.S. bombing raids.
           Most infrastructure damage occurred in the first few weeks of the air campaign using the very "smart" weapons that were supposed to prevent civilian casualties.  These "smart" bombs (which in theory allow for pin-point targeting to insure the intended sites are hit) destroyed Iraqi water treatment, electrical, communication, and transportation facilities, as well as oil refineries, in those first weeks.  Furthermore, the Pentagon has admitted it targeted civilian structures to "demoralize" the population and to "exacerbate the effects of the sanctions".
           So how much non-military damage was done by U.S. bombings in Iraq?  What follows is a fairly detailed but still only partial list.  And it is staggering.
           Iraqi electrical plants were hit with Tomahawk cruise missiles, laser-guided GBU-10 Paveway II bombs, as well as free-fall bombs.  31 water and sewage systems were hit with bombs and missiles:  water purification facilities nationwide were fully incapacitated; all eight of Iraq's major multifunctioning dams were hit over and over (which destroyed flood control, water storage, irrigation, and hydroelectric power); every single irrigation system serving Iraq's agriculture and food processing, storage, and distribution were bombed, cutting food production immediately in half.
           Food warehouses were hit all over the nation (including all of Iraq's General Company Foodstuffs warehouses in one province).  90 percent of poultry production was  totally destroyed, and over one-third of the 10 million sheep herds were decimated.  The country's biggest frozen-meat storage and distribution center was destroyed, and grain silos all over the country were also destroyed.  The combination of the devastated irrigation systems and the massive loss of food supplies spelled disaster for Iraq.

           This chapter will begin with the cease-fire, and discuss the situation in Iraq since the war ended.  The final death-toll, however, will not be discussed until the end of the chapter.  This allows the concluding of accounts about events at the end of the war, before the detailed analysis of casualties is conducted.
           After the cease-fire, the U.S. had the opportunity and means to stop the Iraqi suppression of a Kurdish uprising.  However, the U.S. allowed Iraq to put down the rebellion, in order to prevent "instability" in Iraq, and to avoid problems with Turkey (which opposes Kurdish autonomy).  There were uprisings in southern Iraq as well, which the U.S. also permitted Hussein's troops to suppress.  Gerneral Schwarzkopf, in the documentary film "Hidden Wars of the Gulf", states that he was ordered to inform the Iraqi military could use their helicopters, which the Iraqi troops promptly used in putting down the rebellions.
           These multiple cases of Iraqi troops suppressing rebellions were taking place directly in front of U.S. and allied forces, who were under orders not to interfer.  Some U.S. soldiers say they witnessed attacks on Kurdish and Shiite civilians, but were under orders not to act.  In public, President Bush was calling on Iraqis to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and this was broadcast into Iraq by the U.S., which promised to support any rebellions.
           The U.S. imposed "No Fly Zones" over northern and southern Iraq, supposedly to protect Kurds and other Iraqis from attacks by Hussein's forces.  It is difficult to reconcile this claim with the U.S. policy of allowing Iraqi troops to suppress rebellions, often killing large numbers of Kurds and Shiites.
           In the event, the U.S. and British warplanes subsequently bombed Iraqi radar and anti-aircraft sights while patroling these "No Fly Zones".  These areas were imposed on Iraq by the U.S.; they were not part of any U.N. resolution, and the U.N. was never consulted about this matter.  Therefore, the "No Fly Zones" violate international law, and the U.S. bombings of sites within these areas (hundreds of bombing raids have been conducted since the war ended) violate both international law and the U.N. Charter.
           An inspection regime was instituted after the cease-fire.  While it is true that there were tensions for the 7 years of inspections (including those caused by the U.S., as when the U.S. put spies on the inspection teams – a fact that is not even disputed by the U.S.), ultimately the inspectors were able to fully dismantle Iraq's nuclear facilities, and by 1998 the inspectors reported that Iraq's WOMD programs were 95-98 percent dismantled.
            The inspection regime was halted in 1998.  Inspectors voluntarily left when they were told a U.S. attack against Iraq was imminent, and the U.S. began Operation Desert Fox.  Inspectors did not return again, until 2003.  Since that time, the U.S. government and the media have claimed that Iraq kicked the inspectors out.
            As already mentioned, at most 5-percent of Iraqi WOMD programs were left when inspections ended, 5-percent of a program it took Iraq years to acquire.  With regard to the discussion in Section One on WOMD, the fact is Iraq has had only a little over 4 years to rebuild its WOMD program (assuming it has even done so), and would have been doing so while under U.S.-British overflights, with an intense sanctions program in place, and with U.S. satellites ever-vigilant.  It is difficult to imagine Iraq could have a built a WOMD program capable of threatening its neighbors, let alone the U.S.
           The sanctions imposed on Iraq after the war have left if wrecked.  Food is rationed due to inadequate supplies, with 16 million Iraqis (60-percent of the population) relying on the "Oil For Food" program just to avoid starvation.  Iraqis also suffer from an almost complete lack of health care.  Medicines desperately needed are forbidden under the sanctions, and doctors are helpless to treat many patients, especially children.  This lack of health care is all the worse in light of the effects of DU weapons.

           This portion of the analysis will look at U.S. foreign policy, and the question of how oil influences policy.  To begin, consider a few facts about Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Afghanistan.
           Iraq has 11-percent of the known world oil reserves, almost half that of Saudi Arabia (with 25-percent).  Iraq is positioned (along with Kuwait) to allow control of shipping in the Persian Gulf.  Iraq borders Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both potentially at risk of civil unrest within their Islamic public.  It also borders Iran (one of the so-called "Axis of Evil", along with Iraq and North Korea), which also has oil fields and which has an Islamic government.  It has been recently announced that Iran has an advanced nuclear program.
           Remember that U.S. bases exist in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait, and U.S. forces will soon be based in Iraq after a war.  Thus, U.S. military forces will be in position to control about 40-percent of the world's oil, not to mention the oil supplies in the U.S. and South America  (Venezuela is expected to open its oil industry to "privatization", i.e. domination by U.S. oil companies).  The total amount of oil under direct or indirect U.S. control will be enormous.
           Going back to Iran for a moment, the U.S. animosity towards Iran, as evidenced by the phrase "Axis of Evil", coupled with the revelations about Iran's nuclear program, and the designation of Iran as a "state sponsor of terrorism", should lead that country to view the imminent U.S. invasion of Iraq with some alarm.  With massive forces already in place at bases in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan, the U.S. could easily mount a quick campaign against Iran next, under the same "preemptive" arguments used in the case of Iraq.  Terrorism, WOMD, and the Islamic nature of Iran's society and government could be used as a pretext for seizing Iranian oil.
           It is entirely feasible that, if the U.S. does move into Iran next, ultimately the U.S. will be in effective control of over half the oil in the world, as soon as the end of this year or by the summer of 2004 (perhaps a more ideal time for a war with Iran, since it would come just before the next Presidential election).  In addition, the U.S. would have a huge military presence across the region for the first time in history, with forces in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and a few other periphery states (notably, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa).  This is not to mention the Israel and Turkish support for the U.S. in the region.
          Dominance of the Middle East (beyond simply the question of controlling oil, as we shall see) is of major strategic importance for U.S. hegemony in the world, and the U.S. military now stretches from the Horn of Africa up to the Persian Gulf, across the Middle East, and into central Asia and the Indian Ocean.  Control of the Central Eurasian continent has been a U.S. objective for some time, with the likely effects that would entail, effects we will turn to momentarily.
           Afghanistan is important for U.S. policy for several reasons, having nothing to do with the "war on terror".  Afghanistan is positioned to funnel oil from the region, and Russia planned to build a pipeline through Afghanistan to the Black Sea region.  Obviously, it is to Russia's advantage to pipe as much oil to the Black Sea as possible, as it puts Russia in a position of power regarding oil exporting and shipping.  U.S. control of Afghanistan means pipelines will direct oil away from the Black Sea region, towards the Mediterranean Sea instead.  The point of this is not only to enhance U.S. dominance, but also to weaken Russia's ability to exert influence in Central Eurasia or over Middle East oil.
           Regarding the Mediterranean Sea, U.S. control of this shipping area (especially as a route for Middle Eastern oil, diverted away from the Black Sea) is certainly of vital importance.  The key to such domination of the Mediterranean is, of course, the Suez Canal.  What this means for the future of Egypt might be imagined, and a move by either the U.S. directly or its clients in Israel (or both) to grab portions of Egypt should be expected in the future.  Syria, too, will probably fall prey to this policy, especially since a large pipeline from Iraq extends directly into Syria and could be used to further U.S. shipping in the Mediterranean Sea.

           What lies behind the U.S. drive for control of the world's energy?  Obviously, a profit of nearly $300 billion for U.S. oil industries does not need explanation of its importance.  However, beyond this clear motive lies a more subtle concern.  Put simply, the U.S. has no choice but to attempt a monopoly of energy supplies ("no choice" in terms of this analysis, not to be confused as a moral justification on the part of the author).
           The U.S. economy is not a truly "free market"; it is a federally subsidized market, and it is simply incapable of competing internationally without this subsidy.  It is also incapable of competing with any significant competition, and that is exactly the situation on the horizon (indeed, it is beginning now, to some degree).  The U.S. stands to lose its dominance of world financial markets, in the face of the eventual power of a single EU market, and the developing power of China's market.  While perhaps the U.S. could still compete against one or the other of these threats, it cannot hope to survive against both.
           There is the added side-issue of Russia's choice of either (a) integration into the EU market in the future, or (b) the possible emergence of a Russian-Chinese joint trade agreement, in which Russia becomes the middle-man between EU and a large Pan Asian market.  Russia seems to be moving towards the former option, which is the better (for Russia) of the two in the long term.  The position of the Black Sea as the route for oil out of the Middle East adds to Russia's importance in the U.S. strategy for control of the oil market, as does Russia's proximity to the Central Eurasian states the U.S. wishes to place under its own influence.
           In addition, France and Germany, along with Russia, have been increasing their investments in the Middle East, as have other nations.  These investments have matched or exceeded U.S. investments in recent decades (for one example: by the late 1980s, the U.S. was only the fourth-largest supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia, behind Britain, France, and China), and pose a significant threat to U.S. dominance in the region.  Consider:  currently, Western nations purchase two-thirds of Gulf oil, but by 2015 three-quarters of Gulf oil will go to China, according to a study by the CIA's National Intelligence Council.  Were the U.S. to lose its chance to control energy supplies in the region, it would have no chance of retaining a position of power in the world economy in the future.
           Outlining this policy more clearly than ever before, President Bush issued the National Security Strategy on September 21, 2002.  It states: "We will not hesitate to act alone…to exercise our right self-defense by acting preemptively," and, "the president has no intention of allowing any nation to catch up with the huge lead the United States has opened…[we] will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States."  This policy declaration echoes the words of Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon, who in 1992 wrote a memo stating the U.S. should build a massive military presence on six continents, to prevent "potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."
           Profits and oil control are largely related to another development in the Middle East.  On November 6, 2000, Charles Recknagel of Radio Free Europe reported on an otherwise hidden secret of the U.S.-Iraqi conflict.  In November of that year, Iraq switched from the "petro dollar" standard to the euro for oil transactions.  At the time, Iraq had roughly $10 billion in its "oil for food" fund at the U.N.  The euro was at only 80 cents to the dollar in 2000, but by 2002 it had risen between 15 and 20-percent, an increase which led to substantial gains in Iraq's oil fund.
           There is evidence Iran might be contemplating a move to the euro, as well.  In 2002, Iran converted over half its reserve funds to the euro.  Comments by members of Iran's Parliament and other facts indicate Iran is moving closer to conversion to the euro for oil transactions.  The reaction of the U.S. to such a move can be imagined.

           It is possible that the U.S. does not see a potential for long-term U.S. domination of the Middle East.  The historic instability (due largely to foreign interference and the Israeli issue) and growing influence of Islamic and nationalistic forces in the region could be viewed as detrimental to permanent U.S. control.  If this were true, then the U.S. would face eventual expulsion from the region and ultimately reemergence of a challenge to U.S. global economic power (either from the Middle East itself, regarding energy markets, or European and/or Russian influence in the Middle East and on global markets).
           The U.S. is also likely aware that while occupation of the Middle East will be possible temporarily, eventually international opposition to U.S. unilateralism and hegemony will reach a level hard for the U.S. to merely ignore.  It will also become harder as time goes by for the U.S. to justify domination of the region, since to this point the U.S. has relied mainly on "humane" reasoning, such as "liberation", and national security concerns, such as Iraqi WOMD, to deflect criticism.  Those arguments will lose weight the longer U.S. soldiers are in place, and the longer the U.S. exploits the region for its oil.
           With this in mind, the U.S. may be planning only a short-term occupation and domination of the region.  The fact that the U.S. is engaging in large-scale warfare against Iraq, could be planning a similar campaign against Iran, and has already committed massive bombings in Afghanistan and in the Gulf War against Iraq, all might point to the "short-term" option as the more likely policy.
           Here is the reason:  the wars previously waged and about to be waged in the Middle East involve destruction of infrastructures, wide-spread death and disease among the civilian populations, and the use of DU weapons which have poisoned the region substantially.  A continuation of these methods will eventually leave the major oil-producing nations and their neighbors wrecked, irradiated, and largely unsuitable for long-term investment.  Why would the U.S. engage in such a destructive policy?
           To destroy the Middle East as an energy-producing rival.  The theory is, if the U.S. does not feel it can maintain domination of the oil supply in the Middle East, then it will deny that supply to anyone else.  With enough warfare, epidemics, and irradiation, it will be impossible for the nations in question, or any other nations, to continue accessing the oil reserves in the region.
           The results of such a policy would be two-fold.  First, the U.S. would establish the aforementioned military bases needed for exploiting the regional oil, while allowing for U.S. exertion of influence into Central Eurasia.  Second, the region would eventually collapse from the damage and exploitation, leaving it nonviable as an energy source, which allows the Western Hemisphere (the U.S. and South America) to emerge as the largest suppliers of world energy, through U.S. oil companies.  This strategy gives the U.S. continuing control of the oil supplies, and once the Middle Eastern oil is no longer available, the sudden spike in oil prices for Western oil will balance the loss of supply to the U.S. corporations.
           The time before collapse in the Middle East would be sufficient to allow the U.S. to exploit its position to establish hegemony over the Central Eurasian population, so that withdrawal from the Middle East will coincide with U.S. establishment of bases within the desired Central Eurasian states (indeed, such bases are beginning to pop up already).  This also allows Israeli domination over the Middle Eastern nations which might largely escape direct application of the destructive U.S. policy (perhaps Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, the later already becoming a low-level "partner" to Israel much as Britain acts for the U.S., although the new Turkish government's religious sympathies will need to be kept in check by the Turkish armed forces, a role those forces have readily played in the past).

           Nothing in the theories outlined above relies on great leaps of logic or imagination; it merely considers U.S. policy as it is known generally with regard to strategic interests (oil, Central Eurasia, and U.S. hegemony being constants in this regard), and takes such policies to an extreme but natural conclusion (which happens to be a rather logical and desirable conclusion, from the standpoint of the government and corporate interests).
           Again, these are just theories, interpretations of policy, facts, and events.  However, the growing tensions in the Middle East, and the U.S. willingness to rush into war despite serious risks of the use of WOMD (including nuclear WOMD by the U.S. and Israel) signals that the U.S. is relatively unconcerned about the dangers posed to the region.  The fact that the outlined "worst-case" scenario for U.S. policy is at least possible should be reason enough to motivate everyone to resist U.S. attempts at domination of the region, even if the more "benign" policy of domination without total destruction is not enough to stir opposition to U.S. corporate and military imperialism.
           The outline of events during the Gulf War should serve as a warning of what is to come, on an even larger scale, if the U.S. continues its march to war.  The Gulf War acted as a testing ground for new technologies, and for the military strategy of destroying a fairly advanced country with conventional arms (if we are to consider DU weapons conventional) and not having to set foot on its soil, except to occupy it.  This lesson will be improved upon again and again, in all likelihood, until the entire region is under U.S. control.
           At the beginning of this analysis, the arguments against war were spelled out.  These were largely argued from a "self-interest" standpoint, focusing less on the humanitarian issues until the end.  The reason, as said earlier, is that these arguments seem to have a broader mass appeal, and mass appeal is what will be necessary to stop U.S. warfare and imperialism.  Mass appeal in this country, not just abroad, for it is only the citizens within the U.S. who can take control of the government and reign in the massive U.S. military and dominant transnational corporations, which are threatening the entire world.  The average citizens within the U.S. must be made aware of how U.S. warfare and imperialism directly endangers them, how it puts their families at risk, and how it makes the world a much more dangerous place for everyone.
           The price paid for inaction is U.S. occupation of an entire region; U.S. exploitation of that region's resource; U.S. domination of world energy; the killing, poisoning, and subjugation of the people of that region; and perhaps ultimately, the complete destruction of that region.  In addition, there is a price paid for American citizens as well:  the price of instability; of living in a world less safe, for Americans in particular; of the death or poisoning of their families by their very own government; the price of further economic stratification in the U.S.; and the price of surrendering every ideal of liberty and good-will so many Americans actually believe in.
           Imperialism and holocaust are too high a price for a humane people to tolerate, and must be opposed at every opportunity.  It is particularly the duty of U.S. citizens, for the policies of the U.S. government are carried out in the name of the American people, funded by their dollars, fought by their fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters.  When Americans known the facts and do nothing, the blood is on their hands as well.
           However, time is running out.  The next stage of U.S. policy is about to begin in Iraq, and soon it will be too late, and all opportunity to resist will vanish.  Not tomorrow, maybe not next year, but soon.  Resistance must begin now, before the U.S. policies of destruction bring destruction upon us all.