The Many

The most common criticism directed toward the wager is that Pascal has set his betting partition too narrowly, that there are possibilities that Pascal ignored and that drastically affect the wager. This is the many-gods objections.The objection concedes that it makes sense to think of the problem as a problem about practical rationality, and it does not quarrel with Pascal's assumption that the Christian God rewards belief and punishes disbelief as we have suggested. The objection is rather that Pascal has failed to take account of certain possibilities.

The religious environment that Pascal lived in was simple. Belief and disbelief only boiled down to two choices: Roman Catholicism and atheism. With a finite choice, his argument would be sound. But on Pascal's own premise that God is infinitely incomprehensible, then in theory, there would be an infinite amount of possible theologies about God, all of which are equally probable. For we cannot measure the probability of the correctness of each theology when the subject they teach is supposed to be infinitely incomprehensible. As the philosopher Antony Flew (b.1923) concluded:

The main but not the only fault of the argument is that Pascal assumes that there are only two alternative bets; become a Roman Catholic or not. But on his own basic premise of total ignorance, the set of conceivable alternative cosmic systems, all of the hypothesis is equally probable, must be infinite, as must be the subset of those promising eternal bliss, and threatening eternal torment, respectively, to reward, and to punish an infinite range of different favoured and disfavored way of life. This refutation is, on Pascal's own assumptions, decisive.

Pascal's Wager is an attempt to demonstrate that it is prudent to bet that God exists. He claims that when one weighs the potential costs and benefits of believing versus not believing in the Christian God, it is clear that it would be in one's best interest to believe. One of the major flaws in Pascal's approach is that it assumes a roughly 50/50 probability that the Christian God exists; it presupposes that the only relevant possibilities are Christianity and atheism/ agnosticism. But Pascal's wager does not take into account the other countless possible competing and necessarily incompatible gods that could exist, and therefore fails to be viable.

Through an early form of decision theory (i.e. the theory of decision-making in situations of uncertainty about outcomes), Pascal argued that God is a safe bet. By viewing theism through a utilitarian lens, he applied a concept of expected value to make his decision.He thought the chance that "God is" equals the flip of a coin. He assumed the probability that the Christian God exists to be roughly 50/50 and the probability that He does not exist to be 50/50.

One possibility is that the Christian God exists, a God who rewards those who believe in him and punishes those who do not believe. Another possibility is that there is no God at all. Pascal explicitly asserts that these are the only two possibilities. But that is not true.

Notice premise: If God exists and you believe in that God, then you will have infinite bliss.

Read as:
If the Christian God exists and you believe in the Christian God, then you will have infinite bliss.

But it is also true that:
If the anti-Christian God exists, and you believe in the Christian God, then you will have infinite suffering.

　

Christian God exists

Anti-Christian God exists

Neither God exists

Believe in the Christian God

Infinite payoff
(heaven)

Negative infinite payoff

finite loss at most
(Pascal: finite gain)

Don't believe

Negative infinite?

Infinite payoff?

finite gain at most

The most frequently claimed flaw of them all is that the Wager totally ignores other religions - if God doesn't exist, but some other gods or goddesses do, you could end up avoiding the wrong Hell. Effectively, this argument is subdividing the 'God does not exist' column into many columns, each containing the possibility that some other religion is true.

Pascal's wager for the Christian God fails when one considers the countless possible gods that could exist in addition to his god. Even when one accepts that it is appropriate, or even possible, to assign probabilities to the chance that a god exists, which god should one choose? Pascal gives no basis for choosing the Christian God over Zeus, Allah, Baal, or even a variation of his Christian God. Since "Reason can decide nothing here," we must give each of the possibilities a similar probability of existence. Each God would have to be equiprobable under uncertainty. When all of the possible alternate gods are placed in Pascal's equation, each with their respective probabilities, the chance that Pascal's Christian God exists shrinks from the original 50/50 down to an infinitesimal number. Suppose there are many Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: 新細明體; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-TW; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA" lang="EN-US">

If one adheres to the principal of Pascal's wager, keeping one's eternal options open, one might be obligated to bet on all of the possible gods that will award eternal life. This approach would, at a first glance, increase the chance that one would wager correctly. The wager would be reiterated for every other god or gods that offer infinity, combining their probabilities and increasing the likelihood of success. One would still wager for the Christian God but one must also wager for the indefinitely many other deities, in which case the wager would fail in a different way. Suppose you're believing in the wrong God -- the true God might punish you for your foolishness. This method would lead to contradiction due to jealous gods, such as the Christian God, that forbid worship of any other so as to avoid the belief in false gods.

Moreover, the wager that an ayatollah or "imam could just as well reason the same way." The decision theory cannot decide among the various religions practiced in the world; it gives no warrant for believing in Pascal's Catholicism, or even in a generic Judeo-Christianity. The matrix must consider at least the following possibilities.

Table	Yahweh exists	Allah exists
You worship Yahweh	infinite reward	infinite punishment
You worship Allah	infinite punishment	infinite reward

One might object to this argument, in support of Pascal's wager, offer a number of defenses.

1.Genuine Options

Some insist that only certain theological possibilities count as "genuine options" (James 1897, Jordan 1994b), although this notion is never clearly defined. Perhaps a proposition P is a genuine option for some subject S only if S is likely to succeed in believing P, should S choose to. However, the relevance of volition is questionable, as discussed in the previous section. Alternatively, perhaps P is a genuine option for S unless P strikes S as "bizarre" or untraditional (Jordan 1994b). The difficulty here lies in distinguishing this position from emotional prejudice (Saka 2001). Finally, it may be that a genuine option is one that possesses sufficient evidential support, in which case it can then participate in a run-off decision procedure.

2. Run-off decision theory

Some Pascalians propose combining pragmatic and epistemic factors in a two-stage process. First, one uses epistemic considerations in selecting a limited set of belief options, then one uses prudential considerations in choosing among them (Jordan 1994b). Alternatively, one first uses prudential considerations to choose religion over non-religion, and then uses epistemic considerations to choose a particular religion (Schlesinger 1994, Jordan 1993).

In order to be at all plausible, this approach must answer two questions. First, what is the justification for deliberately excluding some possibilities, no matter how improbable, from prudential reasoning? It seems irrational to dismiss some options that are acknowledged to be possible, even be they unlikely, so long as the stakes are sufficiently high (Sorensen 1994). Second, can epistemic considerations work without begging the question? Schlesinger argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason gives some support for believing in God, but in a Pascalian context this is questionable. If you subscribe to a suitable form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (one that leads to a given kind of theism), you are likely to be a theist already and hence Pascal's wager does not apply to you; on the other hand, if you do not believe in the right kind of Principle of Sufficient Reason then you will not think that it makes theism more probable than atheistic Buddhism, or anthropomorphic theism more probable than deism. Other epistemic considerations, such as Schlesinger's appeal to testimony, simplicity, and sublimity, meet with analogous challenges (Amico 1994, Saka 2001).

3. Relativism

Some Pascalians, while acknowledging that the Wager might be unsound for today is multi-culturally sophisticated, maintain that the Wager is sound relative to Pascal and his peers in the 1600s, when Catholicism and agnosticism were the only possibilities (Rescher 1985, Franklin 1998). But the Crusades in the 1100s taught the French of Islam, the Renaissance in the 1400s taught the French of Greco-Roman paganism, the discoveries of the 1500s taught the French of new-world paganism, and several wars of religion taught the French of Protestantism. To claim that the educated French of the 1600s rightfully rejected alien beliefs without consideration appears to endorse rank prejudice.

4. Generic Theism

Some acknowledge that Pascal's wager cannot decide among religions, yet maintain that "it at least gets us to theism" (Jordan 1994b, Armour-Garb 1999). The idea is that Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Moslems, and devil-worshippers can all legitimately use decision theory to conclude that it's best to believe in some supreme being. Against this there are two objections. First, it disregards theological possibilities such as the Professor's God. The Professor's God rewards those who humbly remain skeptical in the absence of evidence, and punishes those who adopt theism on the basis of self-interest (Martin 1975, 1990; Mackie 1982). Second, the claim that Pascal's wager yields generic theism assumes that all religions are theistic. But consider the following sort of atheistic Buddhism: if you clear your mind then you will attain nirvana and otherwise you won't -- i.e. if you fill your mind with thoughts and desires, e.g. if you believe that God exists or if you love God, then you will not attain salvation (Saka 2001).

5. Maximum Expectation

One may claim in the scenario where many gods could exist, one should not choose all gods that give eternal life but simply the one that would have the highest chance of providing the most eternal utility. It is sensible to make the wager for some god anyway. Even a minute chance at infinite success is still better than no chance of success whatsoever. One must make this wager based on three main factors (in descending order of importance): (i) respective payoffs, (ii) probability by empirical evidence, and (iii) lowest amount of effort required . To decide on one's best bet, (i), (ii), and (iii) must be satisfied to the highest combined value possible. It could be argued that by using this reasonable formula, one will still find that the Christian God is the best bet.
The Christian God clearly satisfies all three factors to the highest degree and, therefore, it is in one's best interest to believe it Him. Like very few of the other major religions, the Christian God has the most attractive possible afterlife and the nastiest form of damnation. He offers the highest possible values for (i), namely infinite bliss for believers and infinite pain for unbelievers. Given that some of the current major gods and countless made up gods could have the same infinite values for (i), we move on to (ii).

One should find that history provides better evidence for one god over another. Clearly the ability of the Christian religion to attract and sustain millions of believers over a period of two thousand years and the partially checkable scriptures that speak of Him prove that He is much more likely to exist than the other gods. The Christian God clearly satisfies (ii) with the highest probability. It should be obvious that a god with this empirical and historical backing is much more probable to exist than, for instance, the God of Good Hygiene or the God of Saltwater Taffy. It would be unreasonable not to choose a more probable god, given equal utility.
It would seem that (i) and (ii) are conclusively satisfied to a high degree by the Christian God. It should be of note that (iii) is satisfied as well, given that the Christian religion generally requires relatively little from the followers. In conclusion, when making the wager one would be foolish not to prefer an objectively more probable god when the utilities are equal; it would be unwise not to bet on the Christian God.

6.Logic error

        The problem with this objection is that it is based, in part, off a logical error. One commits a logical fallacy by making claim probability by empirical evidence and, therefore, the conclusion does not follow. Specifically, one commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent. This fallacy comes from forming a conditional argument, providing truth for the consequent, and then concluding that the antecedent must also be true. One cannot know the truth of the antecedent simply by knowing the truth of the consequent. For example, if I receive high marks in all of my classes, then I will treat myself to ice cream. The consequent is true, because I just had some ice cream. However, it does not follow that I received high marks in all of my classes. I could have still had ice cream, regardless of whether I had high marks or not. For a separate and equally notable accomplishment, such as writing a particularly fine essay, could have warranted this treat. One cannot know the truth or falsity of the antecedent simply by knowing the consequent is true.
        In probability by empirical evidence, one would claim that the chance that a god X exists is in some way knowable by the fact that many people believe in X and there are books about X. This "evidence" that one would cite will not suffice. This argument could be presented as a conditional sentence. X probably (or more probably) exists, therefore there will be more evidence that X exists. "X probably exists" would be the antecedent (because a god would necessarily have to come before there was evidence of that god) and "there is evidence that X exists" would be the consequent. There is evidence that X exists, namely the large number of people who believe in X. Therefore, one might conclude that X probably exists. However, this is simply affirming the consequent and it does not follow that the probability that X exists is increased in any way.
        Unlike scientific probability arguments, a theology argument such as this cannot have applicable empirical evidence. When scientists argue that black holes probably exist, they use empirical evidence such as the bending of light around gravitational forces and observed star data. These scientists do not claim that black holes probably exist because many scientists believe they exist. That argument would in no way discern any truth in the matter. All that claim would show is that many scientists believe the same thing. The same is true with the above objection to my many-gods argument. The "evidence" that is cited is not directly observed proof of a god but simply testimony that people tend to believe in and tell stories about the same thing.
        It should also be noted that for probability by empirical evidence to work at all, one must assume that people choose religious belief based on a reasoned reflection of all the relevant evidence for all the possible gods. This is clearly false for the general population. If it were true, then one would expect the major faiths to be distributed evenly or randomly over the globe. However, they in fact show a tendency to cluster in geographic "pockets". This illustrates that it is actually social and cultural forces which are the primary determinants for religious belief in general.

Go to Intellectualist Objection

Reference:

1.http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pasc-wag.htm#The%20Many-Gods%20Objection:%20Do%20Rival%20Religious%20Options%20Undermine%20Each%20Other?

2.http://students.washington.edu/asylum/Academics/Philosophy/Pensees.html

3..http://www.uark.edu/campus-resources/rlee/intrau018/oh/

4. http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/pucourse/phi203/Pascal.html

5.Jordan,Jeff,"The Many-Gods Objection"Jordan, Jeff(Ed),Gambling on God: essays on Pascal's Wager, (London, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,Inc.,1994)p.101-114

Hosted by www.Geocities.ws