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MONGOLIA AND JAPAN IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE XX CENTURY English Summary 1. The period of 1900-1945 is very important for Mongolia in terms of its involvement in the trilateral relations with Russia and China, its immediate two neighbors, and in broader international relations in the Far East which eventually contributed to the strengthening of its independent status and brought its international recognition. On the other hand, the role of a third power, particularly Japan, increased dramatically with the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, which became the direct neighbor to the Mongolian People's Republic. Since there were no diplomatic relations between Mongolia and Japan for that period, Japan had to deal with Mongolia mostly through Russia, especially the Soviet Union during 1925-1945. Therefore, Japanese policy toward Mongolia depended largely on the state of Japanese-Soviet relations for any given period. |
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2. Japan defeated Russia in 1904-1905 war and successfully negotiated with tsarist Russia three times in 1907-1912 the accords to define their respective spheres of influence in the Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. By the treaty of 1907, Russia acknowledged Japanese special interests in the Korean Peninsula, Japan in its turn recognized Russian special interests over Outer Mongolia. 1907-1912 treaty system between Russia and Japan had fixed the status quo in their power politics regarding the Northeast Asia. That status quo was destroyed by the October revolution of 1917 in Russia and subsequent Japanese policy to change the status quo in its favor aggressively pursued in the 1920s and l930s met stubborn Soviet resistance. The temporary compromise was reached between two nations in 1941 when they concluded the Neutrality treaty. 3. The state of Mongolia newly founded in 1911 made several important steps immediately thereafter to seek recognition by some major powers, including Japan. These steps included the sending of an official note to the Embassies of nine powers and the dispatch of the Khanddorj chin van delegation to Saint Petersburg to visit foreign embassies. The major initiative was done in early 1913 when Da lama Tserenchimed, interior Minister of the Hutuktu government, went to Hailar with the purpose to visit further Japan. These initiatives clearly suggest that the government of Mongolia was interested in establishing political relations with a third power like Japan in order to expand its freedom of political maneuvering between Russia and China. 4. The leaders of the government of the new Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) which was proclaimed in 1924 with Soviet support were in favor of strengthening its independent position both in domestic and foreign affairs. People like B.Tserendorj, A.Amar, Ts.Dambadorj and N. Jadamba strongly argued against Soveit dictates and tried to diversify its foreign economic contacts with as many partners as possible. Mongolian diplomats had regular contacts with the Japanese embassy in Moscow and requested the Japanese government to recognize the MPR in due time. Japanese diplomats requested Ulaanbaatar to give permission for them to visit Mongolia two times in 1926 and 1928 and was given a positive answer. However, the last minute intervention of the Soviet authorities prevented the Japanese representatives from coming to Mongolia and made any official contacts impossible after the end of 1920s. 5. The Kwantung army instigated the so-called Mukden incident in September 1931 and established the puppet regime of Manchukuo in March 1932 with Henry Pu Yi, the last of the Manchu emperors, as its head. The Japanese designation of Manchukuo as a state of five nationalities (Manchu, Chinese, Mongol, Japanese, and Korean) and the creation of special Hingan province populated by mongols were regarded as a politically motivated attempt by the Japanese military establishment to attract as many mongols as possible toward Manchukuo. 6. The seizure of Halhin-sum situated un the northeastern part of Mongolia by Japanese-Manchukuoan forces in January 1935 was considered as the first evidence of active Japanese military actions toward the MPR. The Kuantung army stationed in Manchukuo had the intention to open up Outer Mongolia (the MPR) to Manchukuoan government representatives and was determined to use both negotiations and border raids to achieve this goal. The leadership of Mongolia was willing to talk with Manchukuo in order not to give the Japanese military a pretext to use force in the border region. This position was reflected in the activities of Premier Genden who advocated a peaceful solution of border disputes between the MPR and Manchukuo. 7. Direct talks between the MPR and Manchukuoan representatives started in June 1935 at the border railway station of Manchouli. Four rounds of talking were held between 1935 and 1937. Although Mongolians and Manchurians themselves conducted the talks, every major issue at the negotiating table was closely monitored and discussed by Moscow and Tokyo. The Japan-Manchukuoan side insisted in the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Manchukuo and the MPR in order to get free access to Mongolia for their government and military agents. In contrast, the Soviet-Mongolian side wanted to gain time and took a very tough attitude toward Japanese demands to open up the MPR. In the international practice, two parties can recognize each other in an ad hoc fashion. It means two parties can enter into official contacts in order to solve any pending issues although they do not recognize each other. All evidence suggest that the MPR and Manchukuo entered into ad hoc relations in 1935-1937. 8. The Soviet-Mongolian protocol of mutual assistance concluded in March 1936 was linked to the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations. It upgraded the previous Gentlement's agreement of 1934 and served as the legal foundation for Soviet army entrance into Mongolian territory. The Soviet leadership accused Mongolian Premier Genden for his alleged efforts to compromise with Japan and to block the Soviet troop's entrance into Mongolia. Stalin's geostrategic calculations to bring the Soviet army into Mongolia were taken as a preventive measure to preclude any Japanese attempt to invade the MPR. 9. What was the attitude of P.Genden, who was the Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1932-1936, toward the Japanese threat and ongoing negotiations between the MPR and the Manchukuo? At the second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), held on 11-22 March 1936, Premier Genden was accused of treacherous behavior before the Japanese threat, for taking a soft attitude toward Manchukuoan demands at Manchouli conference, and for a hesitant position on enhancing defence measures against Japanese military raids. The account of Genden's activities in 1932-1936 suggests that Premier Genden had his own vision of how to ensure Mongolia's independence during that turbulent time. He thought that because of the scarce population and huge territory Mongolia had to rely on the USSR for its defence. However, it should be very careful with Japan, carrying out peaceful negotiations in order not to give Japan a pretext to make a provocative attack on the Mongolian border. 10. Soviet-Japanese relations sharply deteriorated after 1936. This stemmed from the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern pact between Japan and Germany in November 1935, which was designed as a defence against international communism. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, which could considerably strengthen its defence establishment in its Far Eastern region, decided not to take concessions any longer but to take a tough stand on all major issues regarding its relations with Japan. In this circumstance, Moscow took very seriously the eruption of full-scale war between Japan and China in July 1937. The Soviet leadership was greatly concerned with the security of Mongolia and brought 30 thousand Red army troops to Mongolia and stationed them along the southern and south-eastern border of Mongolia on the pretext of having found the Japanese plan of military occupation of Mongolia". At the same time, the Soviet leadership gave instructions to carry out mass arrests and the execution of several ten thousands of Mongolian government, party and army cadres on the pretext of "rooting out the spy organization headed by Genden and Demid". 11. The Halhin-Gol battle which lasted for four months between May and September of 1939 on the eastern border of Mongolia was a major event of international significance in the Far East. If assessed by the manpower and armaments involved, that military operation could be classified as a local war exceeding a mere frontier clash. What were the main tasks put forward before the two warring parties, the Soviet Union and Japan? Until recently, Mongolia claimed one-sidedly that the Soviet Union achieved a great victory over Japanese imperialism, which sought to invade and colonize the MPR. From today's point of view, se Japan was confronted with two options for its further military advance. The first option was to attack the USSR, which was considered in Japan as the he largest aid-giving country to China and the largest obstacle for Japan's final id defeat over China. The second option was to advance and colonize quickly the former colonies of Britain, France and the Netherlands in South and Southeast Asia which would be easily vulnerable when European powers became drawn into the European theatre of war. For the Soviet leadership, Japan had exerted a constant military threat to its Far Eastern and Siberian borders ever since the early 1930's. Stalin considered the MPR as a vital buffer and a direct extension of its Far Eastern and Siberian defence communications against Japan. He and other Soviet leaders were determined to give a lesson to Japanese military if they made a provocative attack toward the MPR. In their opinion, only such a response could ensure the security of the Soviet Far East and Siberia, which would enable the USSR to concentrate its war efforts on the European front. Along with its preparations for the final attack on Japanese forces in the Halhin-Gol, the Soviet leadership undertook serious negotiations with nazi Germany in order to gain time to postpone the coming war in Europe. Soviet commander Jukov started his final offensive in Halhin-Gol on 20 August 1939. Four days later, the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact was concludedon 24 August, 1939, which partitioned Europe into their respective sphere of influence. Based on swift changes in Europe, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly instructed its ambassador Togo in Moscow to start negotiations immediately with the USSR to resolve the Halhin-Gol conflict. A few days later, the General Staff of Japan ordered the Kwantung army to suspend its military preparations for the counter offensive in the Halhin-Gol anticipated in early September. Because of the mutual interest in a quick resolution of the military conflict in Halhin-Gol, both Moscow and Tokyo energetically negotiated a cease-fire between 9-16 September, 1939 and soon reached an agreement. When four parties (the USSR, Japan, the MPR, and the Manchukuo) negotiated the border line between Mongolia and Manchukuo the demarcation line was done along the frontier to the east of Halhin-Gol river as it was claimed by the MPR ever since 1935. The author concludes that the national interest of the MPR to defend its territory and national sovereignty coincided with the geostrategic interest of the USSR to secure its Far East and Siberian frontiers in the Halhin-Gol conflict at a time when the boundary of the MPR was challenged by Japanese military. 12. The Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty concluded in April 1941 became an important milestone event which brought the tense relations to an end. The treaty became possible due to basic new changes in international relations in Europe. One cannot exclude either the real impact of Japan's devastating defeat by the Soviet army in Halhin-Gol. Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka was eager to reach an agreement on division of respective spheres of influence in Northeast Asia together with the conclusion of Neutrality treaty. Matsuoka proposed that in return for the Soviet Union's acknowledgement of Inner Mongolia and three northeastern provinces of China as the Japanese sphere of influence, Japan would recognize Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang as the Soviet sphere of influence. However, the Soviet leadership refused that grand design of Matsuoka. Japan also repeatedly asked the USSR to officially recognize Manchukuo as a sovereign state. Molotov counter proposed to bring the MPR and Manchukuo as subjects covered by the first article of the Neutrality treaty. Stalin personally insisted on that matter - Matsuoka agreed to that proposal. However, he suggested to sign it as a joint declaration separate of the Neutrality treaty. Japan tried to avoid the statement that it recognized the MPR as a sovereign state. Instead, Japanese legal experts interpreted that declaration as meaning that Japan recognized "the existence of the MPR" and the USSR did the same thing toward the Manchukuo. However, the Neutrality treaty and the joint declaration can be regarded as important international documents, which confirmed the MPR as a legal subject in the framework of the Soviet-Japanese bilateral relations. 13. There's no doubt that the, authority of the USSR and its undisputed leader, Stalin was greatly enhanced during WW2. For Stalin, the vital question was how to ensure the security of the USSR in the postwar world. As one of the preconditions of USSR's entering into war against Japan, Stalin put forward "the preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia". Stalin's decision to make the MPR as a separate entity from China, to transform it into an international legal subject and to conclude a long-term defence alliance with Mongolia could be regarded as his answer to the long standing question, "How to ensure the safety and security of the Asian part of the USSR" at least for the next two-three decades. In other words, the key reason was the geographical location of the Mongolian People's Republic. On the other hand, the Yalta agreement did refer only to the MPR, thereby leaving the question of Inner Mongolia outside international concern. The leadership of the MPR tried to seize the opportunity and of declared its intention to unite both Outer and Inner Mongolia as the key purpose of its participation in the war against Japan. However, Stalin never took seriously the issue of unification of two parts of Mongolia and used that issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Guomingdang China. The USSR and Guomingdang China agreed mutually to recognize the MPR as a sovereign state on 24th August, 1945. 14. The solid foundation of mutual contacts and exchanges between Mongolia and Japan was laid during the first half of the 20th century which helped to create favorable conditions when the two countries finally established diplomatic relations in 1972. During the l910s, and especially in the second half of 1920s, two parties were actively engaged in political dialogue and in some commercial contacts. The political leaders of Mongolian had eagerly sought to establish some kind of relations with Japan as a third power" which could check overly aggressive intentions of both Russia and China. That current of thought began from the 1910s and continued well to the mid of 1930s. The careful and objective analysis of both negative and positive moments in bilateral contacts between Mongolia and Japan and learning from that history could help to reestablish the historical truth and to determine the future of bilateral relations for the next 21st century. CONTENTS Editor's word Preface Introductory Chapter. Asian Continental policy of Meiji Japan Chapter One. (1900-1919) 1. Division of spheres of influence by Japan and Russia in the Northeast Asia (1907-1916) 2. Independence of Mongolia in 1911 and Japan 3. A Japanese called Kodama and Hutuktu's letter to the Japanese Emperor 4. Urga and Japanese 5. The Dauria government and its connections with Japan Chapter Two. (1920-1931) 1. Siberian intervention and Japanese purpose 2. Zhang Zuolin and his contacts with Japanese military 3. Mantetsu and ManMo 4. Tanaka Giichi and his memorandum 5. Japanese interests toward the Mongolian People's Republic Chapter Three. (1932-1936) 1. Mukden incident and the creation of Manchukuo 2. Kwantung army and prince Demchigdonrov 3. Halhin-sum incident and the start of Manchuria conference 4. The second round of Manchuria conference 5. Moscow negotiations between Stalin and Mongolian Premier Genden 6. Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance of 1936 and Japan Chapter Four. (1937-1939) 1. Sino-Japanese war and the increase of Mongolia's geostrategic importance 2. Mongolia and Japan before the start of Halhin-Gol battle 3. Confrontation between Moscow and Tokyo concerning the Mongolian People's Republic 4. Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Agression and its impact on the Halhin-Gol battle 5. Molotov-Togo negotiations on the ceasefire in the Halhin-Gol 6. Four party talks on the demarkation of the border Chapter Five. (1941-1945) 1. Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty of 1941 and the question of the MPR's status 2. Status-quo of Outer Mongolia and Stalin-Sun negotiations 3. Mongolia's declaration of war on Japan 4. The recognition of the MPR by Guomindang China Conclusions Bibliography Index English Summary
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