by Tsedendambyn Batbayar

     Conclusion

     The Soviet-Japanese relations, officially established in 1925, were characterized by a tense rivalry and deep suspicion almost throughout the entire 1930s. The conquest of Northern Manchuria in 1932, which was traditionally regarded as a territory within the Russian afterwards Soviet sphere of influence, brought the USSR and Japan into direct neighborhood. The Japanese inspired Manchukuo puppet regime had about 4,000 km long border with Soviet Union in the east and north, and about 740 km long border with the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in the west.

     The Soviet Union's position of "strict neutrality" taken during the 18-months while the Kwantung army's influence was extended to northern, western Manchuria and the Jehol province (March 1933) was dictated not by any Soviet agreement with Japanese actions, but rather by the Soviet Union's external isolation and internal situation, manifested in its relative military weakness in the Far East. While strengthening the economic and military build-up in the Far East under the second five-year plan started in 1932, the Soviet Union thought to appease Japan by offering a non-aggression pact (December 1931). When this proposal met with rejection from the Japanese side, the Soviet side embarked upon the course of selling their last asset in Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway. The negotiations between the Soviet and Manchukuo representatives were frequently interrupted and not until March 1935 was the purchase agreement signed.

     Just before the signature of this agreement, the focal point of Soviet-Japanese tension had moved to the Manchukuo-MPR and Manchukuo-Soviet border. Beginning from the Khalkhin-sume (January 1935) incident border clashes became frequent along the Manchukuo-MPR frontier. The three rounds of Manchouli conferences, called to examine Manchukuo-Mongolia border issues including the Khalkhin-sume, were confronted by the completion of the Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance protocol as well as by the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and nazi Germany, and the Manchouli talks were broken off. The next major incidents of 1937 at Amur (Kanch'atzu) and Changkufeng in July 1938 produced a brink-of-war situation which was somehow settled by the diplomatic channel between Moscow and Tokyo before escalating into a full-scale war.

     Then the Khalkhin-Gol or Nomonhan incident came in May 1939. It was much major scale repetition what happened previously in Amur and Changkufeng. In military terms, it was a full-fledged war in all but name by August the same year. Both Soviet and Japanese side confronted each other's strategic units in operation and modern warfare including airforce and tanks was used extensively. In diplomatic terms, it became a part of power play between three parties, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Japan. By the end of August the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Japan was not only defeated militarily by its arch enemy the Soviet Union, it was humiliated diplomatically by its most trustful ally Germany.

     Soviet-Japanese confrontation in the 1930s very significantly influenced Soviet policy toward the Mongolian People's Republic. Since mid 1932 the Politburo of the CPSU replaced the Comintern Secretariat as "sole instructor" for the Mongolian leadership, and Stalin became personally involved in Mongolian affairs. Two important events dictated that sudden change in Soviet policy toward the MPR. One is Japanese army invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the other is the armed uprising of 1932 in Mongolia threatening the Soviet regime in the MPR.

     For Stalin, who was concerned about the vulnerability of its Far Eastern and Baikal region to Japanese attack, Mongolia became a very important geostrategic buffer. Stalin attached great importance to domestic stability and defence preparedness of the MPR throughout the entire 1930s. He was the initiator of the Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance protocol concluded in March 1936 and he sent the Red Army troops to Mongolia in June 1936 for the first time.

     The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 gave Stalin an excellent opportunity to send a large contingent of Soviet troops to Mongolia for the second time and to carry a mass terror in Mongolia against those who were allegedly labeled as members of "the Japanese spy network". It was Stalin who set up a repressive regime of Choibalsan who mercilessly executed thousands of civilians and army men, and destroyed the Lamaist church.

     Available documents suggest that Stalin suspected the worst thing from Japanese military, especially from the Kwantung army stationed in Manchuria, and calculated that if Japanese border raids to the MPR frontier areas not thwarted these could lead to a major attack through the MPR territory to cut the Soviet Siberian railway. Stalin, who was aware of geostrategic importance of the MPR as extension of its own Far East defence, decided to encircle Japanese army in the Khalkhin-Gol region and to destroy them within the boundary claimed by the MPR, thus accomplishing two tasks to avoid a possible Soviet war on two fronts and to bring the MPR under firm Soviet control.